JUDGMENT : Ajit Kumar, J. 1. Heard Shri Saurabh Srivastava, learned Advocate appearing for petitioner in Writ Petition No. 53050 of 2016 and Shri T.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Siddharth Nandan, learned counsel appearing for petitioner in Writ Petition No. 53049 of 2016 and Shri Atul Dayal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Udai Chandani, learned counsel appearing for respondent. 2. These two petitions, one filed by landlord being Writ Petition No. 53050 of 2016 and the other filed by tenant being Writ Petition No. 53049 of 2016 are connected to each other and are directed against the order of vacancy and consequential order of allotment passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the Designated Authority under the U.P. Urban Buildings (regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short Act No. 13 of 1972). The orders passed upon review application filed under Section 16 of Act No. 13 of 1972 and the order passed by authority in revision arising out of review- application are also under challenge. Hence both the petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. Briefly stated facts are that the proceedings under Section 12 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 came to be drawn for declaring a vacancy under Section 12 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 of which notice came to be issued to the landlord respondent on 13.05.2013 which came to be served upon landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava on 22.05.2013. The Revenue Inspector under the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer conducted spot inspection and submitted a report. The landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava is claimed to have filed his affidavit in the proceedings whereas the alleged sitting tenant Rajesh Kumar Gupta filed his objections. While Puttan Lal Srivastava in his affidavit supported the vacancy, the other petitioner Rajesh Kumar Gupta opposed the application for vacancy. The designated authority under Section 12 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 declared the vacancy qua the premises in question under its order dated 05.04.2014. After the declaration of vacancy it is claimed that since the landlord was participating in the proceedings he moved an application for nominating the contesting respondent to be an allottee. The designated authority under Section 12 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 declared the vacancy qua the premises in question under its order dated 05.04.2014. After the declaration of vacancy it is claimed that since the landlord was participating in the proceedings he moved an application for nominating the contesting respondent to be an allottee. In the meanwhile Rajesh Kumar Gupta claiming to be tenant challenged the vacancy order before this Court by means of writ petition being Writ A No. 28311 of 2014 which came to be dismissed on 21.05.2014. After the dismissal of writ petition, Rajesh Kumar Gupta came to file a review petition under Section 16 (5) of Act No. 13 of 1972 which came to be dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer while passing the order of allotment in favour of the contesting respondent on 04.07.2014. After this review petition came to be dismissed Rajesh Kumar Gupta filed another review petition on 04.08.2014 which too came to be dismissed on 20.08.2014. On the very next day i.e., on 21.08.2014 petitioner Rajesh Kumar Gupta filed a review petition before this High Court in respect of the judgment and order dated 21.05.2014 passed in Writ A No. 28311 of 2014 which came to be rejected vide order dated 17.09.2014 holding that no good reason or justification was there to review the order. In the meanwhile, an affidavit came to be filed before the Executing court by landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava on 21.07.2014 taking a plea that Rajesh Kumar Gupta was there already sitting tenant in the premises in question since 2004 and, hence, there was no vacancy and that the allottee Pankaj Kumar Gupta had got the allotment order in his favour by preparing a forged document and filing the same before the Judge Small Causes (II) who was the designated authority, as Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Subsequently he moved another application of review under Section 16 (5) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on 11.09.2014 in respect of vacancy order as well as allotment order. The plea taken in the review application was that it was a public trust, created by means of a trust deed by his father late Shyam Sunder Lal Srivastava and that he was a Sarwarakar and trust being a public trust Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable. 4. The plea taken in the review application was that it was a public trust, created by means of a trust deed by his father late Shyam Sunder Lal Srivastava and that he was a Sarwarakar and trust being a public trust Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable. 4. It was also pleaded that he had not signed any affidavit that had been filed before the authority and since it was a case of fraud and forgery committed by the allottee, the order of vacancy as well as consequential allotment order deserved to be recalled. On the other hand against the order rejecting the review Rajesh Kumar Gupta filed a revision petition which came to be dismissed and resultantly he approached this Court by means of writ petition being Writ A No. 53049 of 2016. The landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava has also been unsuccessful in getting the vacancy order and allotment order reviewed as the same came to be dismissed on 15.10.2015 against which he filed revision which too came to be dismissed vide order dated 31.12.2015. The landlord has filed petition before this Court being Writ A No. 53050 of 2016 challenging both the orders as well as order declaring vacancy. 5. Arguing on behalf of the landlord Shri Saurabh Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for petitioner has raised the following arguments for assailing the order rejecting his review petition as well as revision and also the order declaring vacancy: (I) The property being a public charitable trust and sufficient evidence there being led in that regard including the report of the RI and an agreement of lease by virtue of which the landlord had inducted Rajesh Kumar Gupta as tenant in the year 2004, all these important documents needed a proper interpretation by the court before drawing a conclusion that it was a private trust, more especially, as he argues, in the circumstances when the landlord had himself disputed his earlier affidavit in which an avernment had been made that trust was a private trust. It is argued that had the order been reviewed, there would have been a proper opportunity available to the landlord to lead evidence in support of the stand that it was a public charitable trust and not a private trust. According to him the order is quite cryptic and sans cogent and convincing reasons. 6. It is argued that had the order been reviewed, there would have been a proper opportunity available to the landlord to lead evidence in support of the stand that it was a public charitable trust and not a private trust. According to him the order is quite cryptic and sans cogent and convincing reasons. 6. In support of the above argument Shri Saurabh Srivastava, learned Advocate appearing for landlord petitioner has placed before the Court firstly, the agreement dated 10.12.2004 in which it had come to be recorded very clearly that the trust was created to maintain the temple of Virajman Mahadev Ji and that tenant had paid Rs. 3,00,000/- in advance for the repair work and renovation work to be carried out in the temple as well as for construction of dharmshala on the first floor and that Rs. 3,00,000/- which were given in advance would never be returned. Thus, according to him agreement itself carried a condition that the temple and the dharmshala will be for .public use and this itself was indicative of the fact that trust was for public cause/ public purpose as both the temple and dharmshala were permitted to be used by public at large. Shri Srivastava has also taken the Court to the trust deed created by late Shyam Sunder Srivastava, resident of old house No. 75 Kajikheda Kanpur. From the recitals, he submitted, it was clear that temple of Vinkatan Mahadev Ji was constructed and two idols of Bajrangbali and Thakur Radhakrishna Ji were installed in the temple for the Worship, Keertan and Arti to be held on a regular basis and his son Puttan Lal was made Sarwarkar. The Worship, Arti, and Utsav were all mentioned in the trust deed and it also provided for organizing of Nagpanchmi fair and Janamastami event as mentioned in the trust deed and this all indicated that the trust shall be a public charitable trust. According to Mr. Srivastava, all these documents have not been properly appreciated and discussed either in the review filed by the landlord which was an obligation very much cast upon the authority as according to him the landlord had never any opportunity to contest the matter. According to Mr. Srivastava, all these documents have not been properly appreciated and discussed either in the review filed by the landlord which was an obligation very much cast upon the authority as according to him the landlord had never any opportunity to contest the matter. (II) An act of fraud can never give any legal colour or validity to a proceeding which may result in creating certain rights in respect of a party on the principle that fraud vitiates entire proceedings and renders the order as void ab initio. According to him a valid plea was taken before the authority that the real landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava had no notice either under Section 8(2) or Section 9(3) of Act No. 13 of 1972 and, hence, he could not contest the case, in as much as the affidavits that were filed in respect of the vacancy proceedings and subsequent application for nomination were all fraudulently prepared forging signatures of Puttan Lal Srivastava. Thus, as per the argument advanced, the authority has erred in law in not getting the disputed signatures verified. It is further submitted that even in the absence of handwriting expert opinion, the court could have itself examined the signatures and looking to the difference in signatures upon disputed and admitted documents, the order of vacancy deserved to be reviewed. 7. In support of his above argument, learned counsel appearing for petitioner has taken the Court to the notice dated 08.04.2013 issued under Section 8(2) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 in which the address of the landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava is given as House No. 36 Harjendra Nagar for the municipal shop No. 2 Khajikheda Lal Bagh. Learned Advocate has laso drawn the attention of the Court ot the service by refusal dated 24.04.2013. Shri Srivastava has argued that this House No. 36 Harjendra nagar is a wrong house number because house Number of Puttan Lal Srivastava is 332 Khajikheda which is given as house No. 75 Khajikheda in the review application filed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as the affidavit filed in support thereof. Thus, according to learned counsel appearing for petitioner landlord, there was no service of notice ever effected upon the landlord qua the proceedings drawn under Section 12 of the Act No. 13 of 1972. Thus, according to learned counsel appearing for petitioner landlord, there was no service of notice ever effected upon the landlord qua the proceedings drawn under Section 12 of the Act No. 13 of 1972. Learned counsel for petitioner has also drawn the attention of the Court towards the signatures upon the affidavit filed by the landlord on 19.06.2013 in the proceedings as well as the signatures upon the review application which according to him are absolutely different, both in form and style and that it was apparent being writ large on the face of record more so when earlier affidavit which has been absolutely disowned by the landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava, were definitely forged signatures prepared to get the order of vacancy. Shri Srivastava has submitted that the landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava absolutely denied the avernments made in the alleged affidavit filed in his name describing the trust as a private trust and also denied the fact that Rajesh Kumar Gupta was unauthorized occupant. Shri Srivastava thus, submitted that even if the handwriting expert opinion was not requested for, the court should have on its own compared the signatures available upon the disputed documents with those available on the admitted documents and had the court compared, it would have definitely arrived at a conclusion that throughout in all documents landlord used to write Puttan Lal Srivastava and not Puttan Lal. Thus, according to him since earlier affidavit only bore the signature as Puttan Lal that itself showed that signatures were forged. 8. In support of his above submissions, learned counsel appearing for petitioner has relied upon the authorities of this Court in the cases of Raj Kishore Tandon and others v District Judge Etawah and others 2006 (1) ARC 880 , 2009 (1) ARC 839, Om Shankar Sharma v. IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar and authority of Supreme Court in the case of Lalit Poply v. Canara Bank and others (2000) 3 SCC 583. 9. In support of his argument that constructions were made in the year 2004 onwards, Shri Srivastava submitted that firstly the agreement itself referred to the proposed construction of dharmshala for which money was advanced which has come to be stated in the agreement. According to him even in the RI inspection report it has come to be referred very clearly that on the first floor Dharmshala was constructed. According to him even in the RI inspection report it has come to be referred very clearly that on the first floor Dharmshala was constructed. In this regard he has also drawn the attention of the Court to the statement of Ram Prakash Kushwaha, a Revenue Inspector, Nagar Nigam Zone II Kanpur Nagar dated 18.01.2014 wherein he has clearly stated that constructions were of the year 2004. He has drawn the attention to the report of the Zonal Officer, Zone II dated 03.01.2014 in which it has come to be stated that the building in question was got inspected by the Regional Revenue/ Tax Inspector according to which constructions of the shop No. 2 was made in the year 2004. Shri Srivastava further submitted that in the report of the Zonal Officer, Zone No. II it has clearly come to be stated that old constructions were demolished and new constructions were raised eitght to nine years before. Thus, according to him the report submitted on 23.01.2014 clearly established that the constructions were raised sometimes in the year 2004 and onwards. 10. Shri T.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing for tenant Rajesh Kumar Gupta has raised following arguments before the court: (I) That sufficient evidence was there in support of the plea that the trust in question was a public charitable trust and the RI report very much referred to it, which was not properly appreciated. In support of his arguments learned Senior Counsel has referred to the statement of the tenant which was referred to in the RI report. He has also taken the Court to the trust deed. According to Mr. Singh once Pooja Archana and Jalsa were meant to be organized in the temple on land of trust, then it is referable to be public functions and since everybody was to permitted to offer Pooja and Archana in the temple, its character was bound to be of a charitable trust for public cause and public charity. 11. In support of his above submissions, besides the document of agreement of trust deed as well as revenue inspector report wherein it came to be stated that for certain Worship, Arti, Jalsa and other ceremonies etc. 11. In support of his above submissions, besides the document of agreement of trust deed as well as revenue inspector report wherein it came to be stated that for certain Worship, Arti, Jalsa and other ceremonies etc. were indicative of the character of the trust being a public trust, Shri T.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate has drawn the attention of the Court to the statement of Rajesh Kumar Gupta given to the revenue inspector in which he stated that his tenancy had started in the year 2004 at an agreed rent of Rs. 400 per month and that the demised property was for public use and was an absolutely new construction. The dharmshala which was there on the first floor was for the use of public and, therefore the Act No. 13 of 1972 could not have been applied. In the statement, Mr. Singh submitted, reference as to rent agreement had also been made and the receipts issued against the deposits were also referred to. According to Mr. Singh all these documents were available on record but the authority miserably failed to appreciate the same. (2) The mandatory provisions of service upon the landlord under Rule 8(2) and Rule 9(3) was not followed and in absence of notice, the landlord could not present himself and taking advantage of the ineffective service, the allottee got forged and fabricated affidavit prepared in the name of landlord and also the nomination application in his favour by making forged signatures. It is argued that even if the tenant did not intimate the landlord, it was only for compelling circumstances that he was rushing to court to participate in proceedings and file objections and affidavit and hence could not get appropriate opportunity to inform the landlord, but it was only due to inadvertence and not a deliberate act. 12. Shri Singh agreed that opening a dharamshala and running it is a public charity and once it has come to be stated that there was a dharamshala which was constructed after getting donations from the tenant Rajesh Kumar Gupta, it sufficiently proved the point that the trust was a public charitable trust. 13. In support of his above argument, Shri Singh, has reiterated the arguments advanced by Mr. Srivastava. 13. In support of his above argument, Shri Singh, has reiterated the arguments advanced by Mr. Srivastava. He has further drawn the attention of the Court especially to Rule 9(3) according to which the notice was meant for public at large so that anybody who was interested in the allotment might apply once the vacancy got declared in respect of the building, but no such notice was pasted anywhere for public purpose, nor any notice was served upon the landlord. He also submitted that once the signatures on certain documents previously filed were disputed by the landlord himself by filing affidavit in support of the review application, it was the duty of the court to have compared the signature on the two documents as they were apparently different both in the matter of manner and style of writing. Thus, according to Mr. Singh the authority ought to have reviewed its order to offer proper opportunity to the parties to contest the matter. 14. Shri Singh has relied upon the authorities in the cases of Yogendra Tiwari v. District Judge Gorakhpur AIR 1984 SC 1149 ; The Roman Catholic Diocese Agra Ltd v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer Agra and others 1991 (18) ALR 591; Rama Shankar and another v. Additional District Judge II Lucknow and others 2009 (76) ALR 681; Chandrama Singh v. Mirza Anis Ahmad [2011 (2) ARC 31]; Union of India v. District Judge Varanasi 2006 (2) ARC 563 and Union of India v. M/s Ganesh Das Bhojraj 2000 AIR SC 1102 15. Countering the above submissions advanced on behalf of both the petitioners, Shri Atul Dayal, learned Senior Advocate has raised following submissions: (1) Landlord and tenant were absolutely in collusion with each other and while vacancy proceedings had started in May, 2013 and the RI visited Rajesh Kumar Gupta who gone his statement made in writing and then contested the matter throughout and so had an absolute knowledge that the landlord had already put in appearance but did not raise any objection to question the affidavit already filed by Puttan Lal Srivastava. Still further, even after the vacancy order was passed when Rajesh Kumar Gupta filed his review petition, he did not raise any objection as to this affidavit of landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava. Still further, even after the vacancy order was passed when Rajesh Kumar Gupta filed his review petition, he did not raise any objection as to this affidavit of landlord Puttan Lal Srivastava. According to Shri Dayal when the petitioner Rajesh Kumar Gupta failed in his second round of review that he forced the landlord to file review which also came to be dismissed. 16. In support of his above first submission Shri Dayal learned Senior Advocate has taken the Court through the affidavit of Rajesh Kumar Gupta dated 06.07.2013 in which the tenant had referred to agreemnt dated 10.12.2004 which was an unregistered agreement. According to him since the agreement did not refer to any time bound tenancy, therefore, it amounted to an agreement for tenancy in perpetuity. According to Mr. Dayal such an agreement is void being an unregistered agreement, in as much as the agreement did not bear signatures of the landlord. He has further drawn the attention of the Court to the review petition filed by the tenant dated 06.07.2013 in response to the notice in which none of the paragraphs of the affidavit claimed that the affidavit filed by landlord in the case was forged one. Thus, according to him once the tenant himself had appeared in the case under Section 12 instituted for declaring vacancy in the year 2013 and contested that, and in which final order came to be passed only in July, 2014, there was a pretty long one year time for the tenant to have consulted the landlord or to persuade him to lodge his protest against the vacancy case. He has argued that had it been a case that landlord had no notice, the tenant petitioner would have been certainly brought it to the notice of the landlord to contest the matter. Thus, according to him the manner in which the case was contested by the tenant without disputing the affidavit of Puttan Lal Srivastava, already on record, this by itself established that both the landlord and tenant had the notice and yet the landlord favoured the vacancy matters. Shri Dayal, submitted that had the signatures been forged on the affidavit filed in the year 2013 by Puttan Lal and the nomination document filed in the year 2014 with the declaration of vacancy, the tenant would have got the landlord appeared in the vacancy case itself to dispute the affidavit. Shri Dayal, submitted that had the signatures been forged on the affidavit filed in the year 2013 by Puttan Lal and the nomination document filed in the year 2014 with the declaration of vacancy, the tenant would have got the landlord appeared in the vacancy case itself to dispute the affidavit. Thus, according to him both the tenant and the landlord were in hands in glove with each other and were playing hide and seek with the authority so that once the vacancy was declared they might have had an opportunity to contest the case separately and drag on the proceedings further to the disadvantage of the allottee. (ii) There was sufficient service of notice as was sent on the address of the noticee landlord on whose behalf notice was received and so there would be a valid presumption that there was effective service of notice, in as much late Puttan Lal Srivastava himself participated in the proceedings by filing affidavit and until September, 2014 when the second review of Rajesh Kumar Gupta got filed, he had not filed any review or recall application. With the filing of the nomination in favour of the allottee Pankaj Kumar Gupta the mandatory requirement of service of notice under Section 9(3) became irrelevant. 17. In support of his above submission, Shri Dayal has taken the Court to the notice dated 13.05.2013 sent to Puttan Lal at 36 Harjendra Nagar which got duly served upon him on 22.05.2013. Shri Dayal further submitted that the old number of the property was 116 that got new number 36-36-A and this property was adjacent to the property which was house no. 75 with new No. 332. In support of his submission Mr. Dayal had drawn the attention of the Court to instrument of sale dated 11.09.1981 brought on record as annexure No. 1 to the supplementary counter affidavit which showed that the property of House No. 116 with the new number 36 was subjected to sale in favour of Puttan Lal Srivastava who was residing in the adjusent house No. 332 owned earlier by his father late Shyam Sunder Lal Srivastava. Shri Dayal submitted that this 322 is new number of old number 75. Shri Dayal submitted that this 322 is new number of old number 75. Shri Dayal has taken the Court to the recital part of the sale deed in which it was stated that Puttal Lal son of Shyam Sunder Lal Srivastava resident of 322 Harjendra Nagar and on the top of the instrument four boundaries of the sale property were given in which northern side property was of Shyam Shunder Lal. Thus, according to him both the houses were adjacent to each other and, therefore, it could not be said that since the house number of Puttan Lal was 75, so the notice was sent at a wrong address. Shri Dayal has also drawn the attention of the Court to the Aadhar Card of Puttan Lal which showed that house No. 75 whereas in the sale deed it was shown as residing at House No. 332. Thus, according to him the house No. 116 with new Number 36/ 36-A was a house property adjacent to the house No. 332 Harjendra Nagar and so both the properties that belonged to Puttan Lal were adjacent to each other. Shri Dayal further submitted that once Puttan Lal appeared in the vacancy case and filed his affidavit and hence, the issue of service of notice became irrelevant. He further submitted that after the declaration of vacancy since Puttan Lal himself filed an affidavit alongwith nomination application for nominating Pankaj Gupta before the court, the answering respondent as allottee, the question of ignorance of the case also did not arise. Besides this, Mr. Dayal argued that one Dhirendra Tripathi was also a prospective allottee who had challenged the order of allotment in review petition No. 42 of 2014 which was dismissed on 20.04.2015 and, therefore, it could not be said that there was no proper public notice. Shri Dayal has further taken the Court to the affidavit filed by Puttan Lal Srivastava in the execution case in which he had himself stated to be resident of 322 Khaji Kheda. This affidavit was already filed by the petitioner as annexure No. 17 to the petition. Shri Dayal has further taken the Court to the affidavit filed by Puttan Lal Srivastava in the execution case in which he had himself stated to be resident of 322 Khaji Kheda. This affidavit was already filed by the petitioner as annexure No. 17 to the petition. (iii) The Finding to the effect that petitioner failed to make out a case that affidavit of Puttan Lal Srivastava was a result of fraud, itself was indicative of a finding to the effect that there was no forgery in the signatures on affidavit and the authority was convinced that the order of vacancy and the allotment were rightly passed. For a trust to be a public charitable trust it was required to get donation from public, running of orphanage or giving scholarship to the poor but the trust deed was absolutely silent and merely organizing pooja-archana by a poojari nominated by Sarwarakar and organizing jalsa in the temple, by itself cannot make a trust a public charitable trust. No evidence was led to establish that constructions were raised for the first time in the year 2004 or onwards and the evidence that was led in the form of statement of the municipal officials that was all based on hearsay. 18. Meeting the argument regarding fraud which became basis for review petition filed both by tenant and landlord, Mr. Dayal argued that the first available opportunity for the tenant was to raise this plea when he had appeared in the vacancy case after the RI had submitted the report but he failed to file any application requiring the landlord to appear and state whether he had filed any affidavit or not in support of the vacancy. Shri Dayal submitted that instead of raising any voice as to the authenticity of the affidavit filed by the landlord, tenant choose to contest the matter on merits, which itself showed that he had full knowledge of the notice case to the landlord and he knew that the landlord was supporting the vacancy case. He further submitted that even while he had filed the first review, he did not take any such plea of forged signatures on the affidavit field by the landord or even on the nomination application supported by affidavit. He has taken the Court to the first review petition filed by the tenant. 19. He further submitted that even while he had filed the first review, he did not take any such plea of forged signatures on the affidavit field by the landord or even on the nomination application supported by affidavit. He has taken the Court to the first review petition filed by the tenant. 19. Lastly Shri Dayal submitted that as far as the petition filed by Rajesh Gupta was concerned, that deserved to be dismissed summarily because challenge to the vacancy allotment order had attained finality with the dismissal of the writ petition by this Court and after dismissal of review petition by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the second review application was certainly not maintainable. He submitted that Court in revision rightly held that second review petition was not maintainable and tenant Rajesh Kumar Gupta had no case. 20 Learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the authorities in the case of Kripa Shankar Gupta v. Adarsh Kumar Agarwal and another 2016 (3) ARC 154 , 2003 (11) SCC 772 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others , 2019 (142) RD 166 Matsay Jeevi Sahkari Samiti Ltd v. State of U.P. and others and Ram Swaroop Rai v. Smt Lalawati 1980 ARC 466. 21. Having heard learned counsel appearing for respective parties, their arguments raised across the Bar, the authorities cited in support thereof and the pleadings raised as well as the order impugned, I find the point to be arising in the case for consideration is as to whether the landlord of the demised premises, namely, Shri Puttan Lal Srivastava had the notice of the vacancy case and further whether the findings returned on the validity/ authenticity of the affidavit filed by Puttan Lal Srivastava in the vacancy case and the nomination filed for the proposed tenant, by the Rent Control and Eviction Authority, is sustainable in law. 22. In order to appreciate the arguments as advanced by learned counsel for petitioner landlord, I proceed to examine the document of notice which is claimed by both the parties to have been issued by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and while the petitioner denied the service, the respondent took the stand that there was effective service and so the question would also be whether the notice would be deemed to be sufficient within the meaning of Rule 8(2) of the Rent Control and Eviction Rules. 23. 23. From perusal of the notice issued on 08.04.2013, purported to be issued under Section 8(2) of the Act No. 13 of 1972, I find it to be issued at the address bearing House No. 36 Harjendra Nagar, Municipal Shop No. 2 Khaji Kheda, Lal Bagh. The service was effected by refusal as per the endorsement made to that effect on 24.04.2013. However, the notice issued on 13.05.2013 to the same addressee is shown to be duly served on 25.05.2013 and this document is also avaliable on record and has been referred to hereinabove in the foregoing paragraphs. The name Puttan Lal or Puttan Lal Srivastava is one and the same person but the question sought to be raised as to the identity and further address given in the notice. It has been sufficiently demonstrated from the saledeed which is part of the record, by Shri Dayal that a portion of House No. 36 was sold to Shri Puttan Lal Srivastava, a document that has not been disputed, resident of adjacent house that was in the name of his father Shyam Sundar Lal. The adjacent property is the house No. 75 with the new number 332. Thus, it is clear that the address given in respect of house of Puttan Lal is same. Interestingly, the tenant when he filed his objection in the vacancy case, he did not take the plea of non-service of notice upon the landlord, nor to himself, nor even contested the affidavit of the landlord filed in the vacancy case either on the ground of it bearing forged signature of Puttan Lal Srivastava or that Puttan Lal Srivastava had no notice of the case at all. Thus, in the first available opportunity to the tenant, he did not object to the case either on the ground that there was no service of notice upon the landlord or on the ground that affidavit filed by landlord was a result of fraud. Instead, what I find is that the tenant contested the matter on merits. In these circumstances, the argument advanced on behalf of petitioner that he had no notice of the vacancy case meant to be issued under Section 8(2) is not tenable. 24. Instead, what I find is that the tenant contested the matter on merits. In these circumstances, the argument advanced on behalf of petitioner that he had no notice of the vacancy case meant to be issued under Section 8(2) is not tenable. 24. Still further, as far as notice as contemplated under Rule 9(3) is concerned, the argument advanced was that notice contemplated under Rule 9(3) was not only for the purposes of information to the landlord but also for the purposes of information to other prospective allottes who could be a stranger as anybody could apply in the event vacancy had been declared qua the premises in question. From the document that has been brought on record which is claimed to be application for nomination in favour of contesting respondent, I find Puttan Lal Srivastava has signed it as Puttan Lal Srivastava and since he himself had filed nomination application in favour of contesting respondent, there arose no question of issuing any notice under Rule 9(3) to Puttan Lal Srivastava, the landlord. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Vishwanath (supra) has held that where the opposite party had appeared and contested the matter then the plea of no notice as required mandatorily under Rule 9 looses its relevance and is rendered immaterial. Vide paragraph-4 the Court observed thus: “4. The other and more controversial question is if the finding of revising authority that the order of allotment was vitiated because provisions of Rule 9 were not complied with can be sustained. The revising authority has based his finding on it mainly because he found that no vacancy existed but it has already been seen that one of the reasons for it was erroneous. The other reason what that the order was non speaking order. In recording this findings also be committed error of law because that is not factually correct. And if these two findings cannot be maintained then the findings that the order was in violation of Rue 9 automatically falls. But the learned counsel for opposite party vehementaly defended the order and urged that from fact is was apparent that the landlord was not intimated of the date fixed after vacancy was notified. Number of decisions were placed in support of the submission that observance of Rule 9 was mandatory. But the learned counsel for opposite party vehementaly defended the order and urged that from fact is was apparent that the landlord was not intimated of the date fixed after vacancy was notified. Number of decisions were placed in support of the submission that observance of Rule 9 was mandatory. May be so but the landlady was permitted to contest the allotment proceedings by the revising authority. Argument of notice etc. thereafter became immaterial. ”. (emphasis added) 25. As far as the argument regarding public notice is concerned, from the records I find that one Dhirendra Tripathi had also applied for allotment but his application was rejected against which he has filed revision which was also dismissed. Petitioner has not disputed this fact that Dhirendra Tripathi had applied for the allotment and had been unsuccessful. It cannot, therefore be presumed that there was no public notice at all. It was a third party which had come up to make an application for allotment besides the nomination in favour of Rakesh Gupta by the landlord himself. On the contrary the circumstances and the factum of application moved by Dhirendra Tripathi itself is sufficient to believe that there was a public notice. The question whether notice was posted on a conspicuous place as prescribed for under Rule 9(3), that point cannot be gone into as there is no pleading raised that there was no such notice pasted at all. The entire pleadings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as in revision was silent to that count. Thus, in my considered view there was a sufficient notice, both to landlord as well as notice contemplated under Section 9(3). 26. In so far as the argument qua the authenticity of the affidavit filed by Puttan Lal Srivastava is concerned, I have found two circumstances to exist together to demonstrate that Puttan Lal Srivastava had notice and so he filed an affidavit: firstly, in support of the vacancy; and secondly by moving an application for nomination. Further the tenant had the notice as the Revenue Inspector visited the place for inspection and to whom the tenant also gave an affidavit as to the structure of the building. Further the tenant had the notice as the Revenue Inspector visited the place for inspection and to whom the tenant also gave an affidavit as to the structure of the building. It cannot be believed that tenant did not contact the landlord for the said purpose and again for this very reason that he had already contested the case before the court below and further the tenant in his first objection he did not raise any objection as to the authenticity and genuineness of the document and affidavit and the signatures placed upon the same in the name of Puttan Lal/ Puttal Lal Srivastava. Further I find, although the affidavit filed at the time of contest of the vacancy case it bore signature of landlord as Puttan Lal where as in the nomination application it bore signature as Puttan Lal Srivastava. This signature upon the nomination as Puttan Lal Srivastava fully matches with the admitted signatures of Puttan Lal Srivastava made subsequently upon review application. Under these circumstances therefore, there was no occasion for the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to disbelieve the affidavit and, therefore, the findings return upon the review/ recall application are absolutely sustainable. 27. In so far as the second review application filed by tenant and the resultant petition arising out of that before this Court are concerned, in my considered view once application qua earlier review was already decided on merits by means of a rejection order by Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 04. 07.2014, the second review application on the same ground filed on 04.08.2014 was not at all maintainable and was so rightly dismissed on 20.08.2014. The revision filed against the same was also rightly dismissed by authority sitting in revision, hence, I do not find any merit, in so far as the petition filed by Rejesh Kumar Gupta and the same is rendered devoid of merits. 28. The revision filed against the same was also rightly dismissed by authority sitting in revision, hence, I do not find any merit, in so far as the petition filed by Rejesh Kumar Gupta and the same is rendered devoid of merits. 28. It is true that the fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings and order based upon such proceedings are liable to be held void ab initio but since I do not find there to be fraud committed in the matter of proceedings drawn under Section 12 of Act No. 13 of 1972 which resulted in the order of vacancy and also the allotment order, judgments cited before this Court by the learned counsel appearing for petitioner laying down the above principle, are not attracted to the present case. 29. There was yet another argument advanced on behalf of petitioner as well as learned Senior Advocate appearing for petitioner Rajesh Kumar Gupta that the premises in question belonged to the Public charitable trust and, therefore, Act No. 13 of 1972 was not attracted. The basis of the argument was agreement reached between Rajesh Kumar Gupta and the landlord dated 10.12.2004, in which money was advanced for construction of dharmshala and the RI report in which construction of dharmshala has been shown. It is a settled principle of law that when the right accruing from an agreement in respect of immovable property is pressed into, then such an agreement must be valid in law. Any lease agreement which does not make it terminable within a period of one year, is required compulsorily to be registered under the Transfer of Property Act. In the absence of registered agreement of lease no lease rights can flow because such an agreement would be void. In the present case the agreement dated 10.12.2004 claimed by the petitioner in both the petitions is an unregistered agreement and does not refer to any term of lease which means a lease in perpetuity. Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act runs as under: “107. Leases how made. - A lease of immovable property for any term exceeding one year, and reserving a yearly rent, exceeding rupees fifty can be made only by a registered instrument. Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act runs as under: “107. Leases how made. - A lease of immovable property for any term exceeding one year, and reserving a yearly rent, exceeding rupees fifty can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession : Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification direct that leases of immoveable property, other than leases for any term exceeding one year, and reserving a yearly rent, exceeding rupees fifty or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.”. 30. From a bare reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that an agreement of lease for a term beyond a period of 12 months is required compulsorily to be a registered one. 31. This Court in the case of Puneet Kumar Singh v. Bharat Petroleum Ltd. and others (Writ C No. 36576 of 2019 decided on 10.12.2024) has already held that such lease agreements that are required to be compulsorily registered, and if not registered are void. No rights can flow from a document which is void. Under the circumstances it cannot be held that there was a dharmshala constructed as per the lease agreement and that it had a character of charitable trust. 32. In so far as the reliance placed upon RI report is concerned, I find part of the RI report that refers to the structure of dharmshala is nothing but a reproduction of statement made in writing by Rajesh Kumar Gupta who was at that time found to be in possession of the property. Reference to a written document/ affidavit cannot be said to be an independent opinion based upon any observation during spot inspection by the RI and, hence, such document cannot be relied upon to prove a fact that there existed a dharmshala as per inspection report and that the property was a charitable trust. Still further, law is settled that in order to establish a case that trust is a charitable trust, it is necessarily required to be having an objective of public charity, receiving donation from public, running an orphanage and distributing scholarships, etc. Still further, law is settled that in order to establish a case that trust is a charitable trust, it is necessarily required to be having an objective of public charity, receiving donation from public, running an orphanage and distributing scholarships, etc. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Shewak v. Laxmi Narayan 2019 (142) RD 617 has extensively dealt with the issue as to what characteristic of a charitable trust would be by referring to various authorities of Supreme Court. Vide paragraphs 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 the Court has held thus: “16. Again, in Radhakanta Deb and another vs. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, 1981 AIR 798, Court observed that whenever a dedication is made for religious purposes and deity installed in a temple, the worship of the deity is a necessary concomitant of the installation of the deity, and therefore, the mere factum of worship would not determine the nature of the endowment. Court further held : "Indeed if it is proved that the worship by the members of the public is as of right that may be a circumstance which may in some cases conclusively establish that the endowment was of a public nature. 18. In Kuldip Chand and others Vs. Advocate General to Government of Himachal Pradesh and others (2003) 5 SCC 46 , the question up for consideration was "Whether the mere use of a premises as a 'Dharamsala' for about 125 years would lead to an inference that the same belongs to a public trust" . One Raj Kumar Bir Singh, owner of Nahan Estate, constructed a Dharamsala on a land measuring 1702 sq. yards. In the town of Nahan, public in general, travellers and in particular those taking part in an yearly fair known as Renuka Fair could be stayed in the said Dharmsala for a period of three days without permission of owner and thereafter, permission was necessary. Claiming it to be a Trust property, a suit was filed by Advocate General of the Government of Himachal Pradesh under Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure alleging that Dharmsala was dedicated to public. Learned Single Judge held that there was no public trust created. Division Bench reversed the judgment and matter came to Supreme Court. Claiming it to be a Trust property, a suit was filed by Advocate General of the Government of Himachal Pradesh under Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure alleging that Dharmsala was dedicated to public. Learned Single Judge held that there was no public trust created. Division Bench reversed the judgment and matter came to Supreme Court. Court held that a Hindu is entitled to dedicate his property for religious and charitable purposes but intention and purpose must be cleared. It is said that :- "For the purpose of creating an endowment, what is necessary is a clear and unequivocal manifestation of intention to create a trust and vesting thereof in the donor and another as trustees. Subject of endowment, however, must be certain. Dedication of property either may be complete or partial. When such dedication is complete, a public trust is created in contra-distinction to a partial dedication which would only create a charity. Although the dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grant. there must exist cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and user of the property, which show the extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity." 19. Court further said that a dedication for public purposes and for the benefit of general public would involve complete cessation of ownership on the part of the founder and vesting of the property for the religious object. Dedication may either be complete or partial. A right of easement in favour of a community or a part of the community would not constitute such dedication where the owner retained the property for himself. It may be that right of the owner of the property is qualified by public right of user but such right is not wholly unrestricted. Apart from the fact that the public in general and or any particular community did not have any right of participation in the management of the property nor the maintenance thereof any contribution was made is a matter of much significance. A dedication, it may bear repetition to state, would mean complete relinquishment of his right of ownership and proprietary. When complete control is retained by the owner - be it be appointment of a Chowkidar: appropriation of rents, maintenance thereof from his personal funds -- dedication cannot be said to be complete. 20. A dedication, it may bear repetition to state, would mean complete relinquishment of his right of ownership and proprietary. When complete control is retained by the owner - be it be appointment of a Chowkidar: appropriation of rents, maintenance thereof from his personal funds -- dedication cannot be said to be complete. 20. In Sri Gedela Satchidananda Murthy Vs. Deputy Commissioner, Endowments Department, A.P. & Others, (2007) 5 SCC 67, Court following its earlier judgment in Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan (supra) reiterated "We are not, however, oblivious of the fact that only because members of the public are freely admitted to the temple, that by itself would not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that the temple was a public institution." 21. In State of West Bengal Vs. Sri Sri Lakshmi Janardan Thakur , (2006) 7 SCC 490 , Court laid down relevant factors in determining whether a trust is public or not and said as under : "In order to ascertain whether a trust is private, the following factors are relevant: (1) If the beneficiaries are ascertained individuals. (2) If the grant has been made in favour of an individual and not in favour of a deity. (3) The temple is situated within the campus of the residence of the donor. (4) If the revenue records or entries suggest the land being in possession of an individual and not in the deity." 22. Court further said that in order to determine whether a temple along with properties attached to it, is a public trust, an inference can be drawn from following relevant factors in its favour: "(1) If public visit the temple as of right. (2) If endowment is in the name of the deity. (3) beneficiaries are the public. (4) If the management is made through the agency of the public or the accounts of the temple are being scrutinized by the public." (Emphasis added) 33. I have gone through the entire trust deed and I find that, except for construction of a temple and installation of deities inside and the performance of religious rituals like Pooja, etc and organizing Jalsa (a cultural event), there is no reference to any public charity or public donation or distribution of scholarship or running of orphanage etc. I have gone through the entire trust deed and I find that, except for construction of a temple and installation of deities inside and the performance of religious rituals like Pooja, etc and organizing Jalsa (a cultural event), there is no reference to any public charity or public donation or distribution of scholarship or running of orphanage etc. Learned Advocate appearing for landlord petitioner also could not demonstrate from any document that objects of the trust were further modified qua the trustdeed or that there was a number of trustees who were assigned the duties to manage the affairs of trust for public cause. The trust deed only prescribed for a trusteeship as hereditary and that sole trustee was Puttan Lal Srivastava and after his death his son, namely the present landlord. In such view of the matter it cannot be held that the trust claimed by petitioner was a charitable trust to get the building in question out of the purview of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 34. Supreme Court in the case of Radha Kant Dev (supra) has drawn points of distinction between a private and public charitable trust vide paragraphs 8 and 14 of judgment which runs as under: “8. The mere fact that members of the public are allowed to worship by itself would not make an endowment public unless it is proved that the members of the public had a right to worship in the temple. In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar this Court observed as follows:- "The distinction between a private and a public trust is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific individuals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. While in the former the beneficiaries are persons who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment. .. .. .. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof. .. .. .. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof. In accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. 14. Thus, on a conspectus of the authorities mentioned above, the following tests may be laid down as providing sufficient guidelines to determine on the facts of each case whether an endowment is of a private or of a public nature: (1) Where the origin of the endowment cannot be ascertained, the question whether the user of the temple by members of the public is as of right; (2) The fact that the control and management vests either in a large body of persons or in the members of the public and the founder does not retain any control over the management. Allied to this may be a circumstance where the evidence shows that there is provision for a scheme to be framed by associating the members of the public at large; (3) Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature. (4) Where the evidence shows that the founder of the endowment did not make any stipulation for offerings or contributions to be made by members of the public to the temple, this would be an important intrinsic circumstance to indicate the private nature of the endowment. " . 35. (4) Where the evidence shows that the founder of the endowment did not make any stipulation for offerings or contributions to be made by members of the public to the temple, this would be an important intrinsic circumstance to indicate the private nature of the endowment. " . 35. In so far as the issue qua construction to be new one as was claimed to have been raised after 2004, is concerned, I do not find there to be any record available qua assessment by the municipality concerned, nor was there any sanctioned map brought on record to demonstrate that construction of building in question was sanctioned by a municipal authority or the development authority, as the case could have been, in support of the plea so taken. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Shri Dayal has placed reliance upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Ram Swaroop Rai (supra) wherein Supreme Court has observed that when statutes itself provides municipal assessment records as an evidence of time of construction, reliance should be placed upon the same, rather than lips of witness. Vide paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, the Court has held thus: “8. Unfortunately, it is not possible for the purchaser-respondent or the tenant-appellant to give direct testimony about the time of the construction or the nature of the construction vis-a- vis Explanation (b) Order (c). The best testimony is the municipal records about the completion of the building and the verification by the municipal authorities as to whether a new construction has come into being or an old construction has been remodeled and, if so, when exactly the completion took effect. The municipal assessment record produced in the court merely state "increased assessment". It may suggest the existence of an assessment which has been increased or it may perhaps be argued that when the building was reconstructed a new assessment was made which was more than the previous assessment and, therefore, was described as increased assessment. The oral evidence in the case, apart from what we have set out, is inconsequential, being second hand testimony. Even the recital in the rent deed that there was a new construction is 1965-66 is by the appellant and the respondent, neither of whom has any direct knowledge about the construction. The oral evidence in the case, apart from what we have set out, is inconsequential, being second hand testimony. Even the recital in the rent deed that there was a new construction is 1965-66 is by the appellant and the respondent, neither of whom has any direct knowledge about the construction. Of course, an admission by the appellant is evidence against him but an admission is not always conclusive especially in the light of the municipal records such as are available and the burden such as has been laid by the statute. 9. Viewed in this perspective, the failure of the trial court specifically to record when the building was completed and what was the extent of re-building, whether it was a case of total demolition and reconstruction or such extensive additions as to push the existing building into a minor part, becomes fatal. These basic issues have failed to receive any attention from the courts below. A finding recorded on speculative basis is no finding and that is the fate of the holding in the present case. 10. We do not want to dwell or the evidence in greater detail because we propose to remit the case to the trial court (Court of the First Additional District Judge, Jhansi). It is quite conceivable that the municipal records bearing on the completion of the construction may throw conclusive light, whatever might have been the original proposal in the plan submitted. It is perfectly possible that on a view of the earlier construction, vis-a-vis the completed new building, the former may form but a small part. It may also be that the implication of the expression "increased assessment" may be explained with reference to earlier assessment records in the municipality. Moreover, whenever a new building is completed, a report has statutorily to be made and only on a completion survey and certificate, occupation is ordinarily permitted. These records must also be available in the office of the local authority. The statute makes it clear that reliance upon the municipal records, rather than on the lips of witnesses, is indicated to determine the date of completion and the nature of the construction. This statutory guideline has been wholly overlooked and the burden lying on the landlord has not been appreciated. The result is that the eviction order has to be demolished . ”. (Emphasis added) 36. This statutory guideline has been wholly overlooked and the burden lying on the landlord has not been appreciated. The result is that the eviction order has to be demolished . ”. (Emphasis added) 36. In view of the above, therefore, in the absence of any material qua assessment by concerned municipality, a mere statement made by petitioner that constructions were new one raised after 2004 cannot be relied upon to hold that the building was outside the purview of Act No. 13 of 1972. 37. One more argument that needed to be referred to is relating to the status of RI who conducted the inspection. Mr. T.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate has raised this argument that R.I. should necessarily be a Gazetted Officer. This contention has been disputed by Shri Dayal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent by submitting that requirement of inspecting officer to be a gazetted officer is not mandatory, inasmuch as this objection if not taken initially at the time of filing of objection by petitioner, now they cannot be permitted to raise objection that the inspection report was not given by a Gazetted Officer. For the above submission so advanced by Shri Dayal, I find support in the judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Gorakh Nath Yadav (supra) in which vide paragraph 35 the Court has observed thus. “Admittedly in this case inspection was carried out by the R.C.I. on two occasions when at the time of inspection the tenant was not only present but had also participated in the proceedings before the RC & EO. He had filed objections to the second inspection which have been considered by the RC & EO. Thus, even if the inspection had not been carried out by a Gazetted Officer but an Inspector appointed under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 it would not prejudice the case of the tenant as there is no bar for any of the parties to plead and prove the prejudice before the RC & EO. In the instant case the tenant has not taken any ground in his objection that his case is prejudiced as the shop was not inspected by a 'Gazetted Officer' as contemplated in Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act. In the instant case the tenant has not taken any ground in his objection that his case is prejudiced as the shop was not inspected by a 'Gazetted Officer' as contemplated in Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act. Hence in my view merely because the inspection was not made by the Gazetted Officer but an officer under the aforesaid Act, 1972 would not effect the conclusion of this case as not only the tenant was present during the inspection and principle of natural justice followed but also because of the fact that he had not pleaded any prejudice before the RC & EO. It may also be noted that the plea that the premises was not inspected by a Gazetted Officer has been taken for the first time in the writ petition can not also for this reason be taken into consideration as the tenant-petitioner had not taken this plea in the court below. ” 38. Thus, for the discussions held above and authorities referred to, I do not find any error much less an error of law in the judgments of Rent Control and Eviction Officer in declaring the vacancy and consequential allotment thereof in favour of the contesting respondent that may warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Both the impugned orders are held sustainable. Both the petitions are held to be devoid of merits and are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.