Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax 1 v. Rajesh Suresh Chopra
2025-06-17
BHARGAV D.KARIA, PRANAV TRIVEDI
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : PRANAV TRIVEDI, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Karan Sanghani for the appellant. 2. The present Tax Appeal is filed under Section 260A of the INCOME TAX ACT , 1961 (for short ‘the Act’) raising following substantial questions of law arising out of the Judgment and Order dated 28.03.2024 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Surat (for short ‘the Tribunal’) in ITA No.373/SRT/2023 in respect of the Assessment Year 2012-2013:- a) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon'ble ITAT has justified in dismissing the appeal of the Revenue against the decision of the Tribunal in deleting the addition made by the AO at the rate of 100% of bogus purchases amounting to Rs. 116,49,88,059/- ignoring the fact that these purchases are sham transactions fabricated through bogus paper concerns of Bhanwarlal Jain Group companies which were engaged in providing accommodation entries? b) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon'ble ITAT has justified in dismissing the appeal of the Revenue, holding that there is no substantial question of law? c) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon'ble ITAT is correct in not considering that the amount claimed as payment to hawala dealers was in effect suppression of profits by obtaining bogus purchase bills which was liable to be added to the income of the Assessee? d) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon'ble ITAT has erred in not considering ? the judgment of Gujarat High Court in the case of N.K. Industries Ltd… restricted addition to 25%, holding that such restriction goes against the principles of Sections 68 and 69C of INCOME TAX ACT ? ? the judgment of Calcutta High Court of in the case of PCIT vs. Premlata Tekriwal (143 taxmann.com 173) involving similar issue of purchase of bogus concern to suppress profits wherein the court held that "since it was established that unexplained/bogus, expenditure was entire amount of bogus expenditure was to be added to income of Assessee"? ? the ratio of judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue of unexplained expenditure (bogus purchase) in the case of N.K. Proteins v. Dy.
? the ratio of judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue of unexplained expenditure (bogus purchase) in the case of N.K. Proteins v. Dy. CIT [2017] 84 taxmann.com 195/250 Taxman 22 (SC) wherein, the SLP filed by the assessee has been dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court? e) Whether on the facts and circumstance of the case and in law, the Hon'ble ITAT is justified in dismissing the appeal of the revenue wherein the AO has made 100% addition of bogus transaction amounting to Rs. 116,49,88,059/- made by the Assessee with the entry provider not appreciating that non-genuineness of the expenditure booked was established by the information received from DIT(Inv)-II, Mumbai and the Assessee was not able to discharge its onus to establish the genuineness of transaction before the AO as well as before the Ld CIT(A)?” 3. Brief facts of the case are that: 3.1 The respondent-assessee filed his return of income for Assessment Year 2012-13 on 26.7.2012 declaring total income of Rs. 1,76,510/-. The return of income was processed under Section 143(1) of the Act on 6.3.2013. The Assessment order under Section 143(3) read with Section 147 of the Act was passed on 13.11.2019, assessing total income at Rs.118,84,64,330/- after making addition of Rs.116,49,88,059/- on account of accommodation entry of purchases and Rs.2,32,99,761/- on account of unaccounted cash paid as commission of such accommodation entry at the rate of 2% of the amount of accommodation. 3.2. Being aggrieved by the Assessment order, respondent preferred an appeal before CIT (Appeals), who, vide order dated 29.3.2023 dismissed the appeal of respondent. 3.3. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate authority, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’ for short). The Tribunal, by the impugned order dated 28.03.2024, partly allowed the appeal of the assessee and restricted the addition made by the Assessment Officer of 100% to 6% of the bogus purchases. 4. At the outset, learned advocate Mr. Karan Sanghani for the Appellant-Revenue has conceded to the fact that the issue is no more res-integra pursuant to the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court.
4. At the outset, learned advocate Mr. Karan Sanghani for the Appellant-Revenue has conceded to the fact that the issue is no more res-integra pursuant to the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court. The Co- ordinate Bench of this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr.Justice N.V.Anjaria and Hon’ble Mr.Justice Niral R. Mehta) in case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Versus Pankaj K. Choudhary dated 07.03.2023 rendered in Tax Appeal No.617 of 2022 partly allowed the appeal of the Revenue wherein it was held that in respect of bogus purchases, the addition at the rate of 6% of bogus purchases is fair and reasonable. 5. Considering the above submissions, the relevant extract of order of Coordinate Bench in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Versus Pankaj K. Choudhary (Supra) is reproduced herein below: “5. The Assessing Officer noticed the contentions of the assessee that confirmation, purchase bills, bank statement, stock register, copy of ITR were already filed. The Assessing Officer was, however, of the view that transactions were bogus and merely that it routed through the banking channel, was not sufficient to conclude that they were the genuine transactions. The contention of the assessee that he had not dealt with the Bhanvarlal Jain group was also negatived. The appellate Commissioner took the view that disallowance was required to be sustained at 12.5% of the purchase. The Assessing Officer was directed accordingly to workout disallowance. In para 10.6, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), recorded thus, “As held above, it is clear that the appellants have made purchases from elsewhere, but have obtained bills from the impugned suppliers. From the Trading & P & L account and Audit report it can be seen that the GP rate shown by appellant is 1.85% oil sales. In such circumstances the disallowance of 100% of purchases cannot be justified. Also as held above, the appellant would nave indulged in above practice in order to get some benefit. And it is this benefit derived by the appellant that need to be taxed. What would be the magnitude of benefit derived by the appellant is the mute question. In the appellant’s case, it is seen that GP rate shown is 0.78%”. 5.1 The final view was expressed in para 10.10, “Following the above judicial pronouncements and views taken by Ld. CIT(A) & AOS in a few identical cases.
What would be the magnitude of benefit derived by the appellant is the mute question. In the appellant’s case, it is seen that GP rate shown is 0.78%”. 5.1 The final view was expressed in para 10.10, “Following the above judicial pronouncements and views taken by Ld. CIT(A) & AOS in a few identical cases. In a couple of identical cases, where the GP shown by the appellants is more than 5%, I have confirmed the disallowance of the impugned purchases to the extent of 5% of the impugned purchases. However in the instant case the appellant is showing measly G.P. of only 0.78% on turnover. In view of this I am of the considered opinion that disallowance of 12.5% of the impugned purchases would be reasonable and would meet the ends of justice. Hence, the disallowance is restricted to 12.5% of the impugned purchases for the assessment year in appeal.” 5.2 The disallowance at 100% was made in the assessment order for the year under consideration to the tune of Rs. 4,34,00,343/-, which was reduced to 12.5% at Rs. 54,25,040/-. Thereafter, the issue was delat with by the appellate Tribunal. The appellate Tribunal endorsed to the view taken by the appellate Commissioner. It was observed that Assessing Officer failed to consider the evidence furnished by the assessee. 5.3 Considering the facts and relevant aspect, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal partially allowed the appeal of the assessee to further reduce the disallowance at 6%. In so concluding, the Tribunal observed in paragraph No.21 as under, “.......during the financial year under consideration the assessee has shown total turnover of Rs. 66,09,62,458/-. The assessee has shown Gross Profit @ 78% and net Profit @ 0.02% (page 11 of paper Book). The assessee while filing the return of income has declared taxable income of Rs. 1,81,840/- only. We are conscious of the facts that dispute before us is only with regard of the disputed purchases of Rs. 4.34 Crore, which was shown to have purchased from the entity managed by Bhanwarlal Jain Group. During the search action on Bhanwarlal Jain no stock of goods/material was found to the investigation party. Bhanwarlal Jain while filing return of income has offered commission income (entry provider). Before us, the Ld.
4.34 Crore, which was shown to have purchased from the entity managed by Bhanwarlal Jain Group. During the search action on Bhanwarlal Jain no stock of goods/material was found to the investigation party. Bhanwarlal Jain while filing return of income has offered commission income (entry provider). Before us, the Ld. CIT-DR for the revenue vehemently submitted that the ratio of decision of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Mayank Diamond Private Limited (supra) is directly applicable on the facts of the present case. We find that in Mayank Diamonds the Hon'ble High Court restricted the additions to 5% of GP. We have seen that in Mayank Diamonds P Ltd (supra), the assessee had declared GP @ 1.03% on turnover of Rs 1.86 Crore. The disputed transaction in the said case was Rs. 1.68 Crore. However, in the present case the assessee has declared the GP @ 0.78%. It is settled law that under Income-tax, the tax authorities are not entitled to tax the entire transaction, but only the income component of the disputed transaction, to prevent the possibility of revenue leakage. Therefore, considering overall facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that disallowances @ 6% of impugned purchases / disputed purchases would be sufficient to meet the possibility of revenue leakage. In the result the ground No. 2 of appeal raised by the assessee is partly allowed and the grounds of appeal raised by revenue are dismissed.” 6. The view taken and the conclusion arrived at by the appellant Tribunal are based on material before it and after analysing the facts and figure available before it. When the Tribunal has thought it fit to reduce the disallowance at 6% from 12.5%, the Tribunal had before it the facts which were duly analysed by it. No interference is called for in the said conclusion and findings of the Tribunal in the present appeal by this court. 6.1 The another weighing aspect is that the Tax Appeal No. 674 of 2022 in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax 1, Surat vs. M/s. Surya Impex which came to be decided by the co- ordinate Bench on 16.1.2023 dealt with the very issue of accommodation entries provided by Bhanwarlal Jain Group. The group involved in the said case is the same group who is saddled with allegations of providing accommodation entry to the assessee.
The group involved in the said case is the same group who is saddled with allegations of providing accommodation entry to the assessee. In M/s. Surya Impex (supra) the court held in favour of the assessee. The questions of law involved in the said case were of the same nature and were in the context of similar facts involving the same group. 7. For all the above reasons, substantial questions of law proposed by the appellant in this appeal stands already answered. No question of law much less any substantial questions of law arise in the facts of the present case. No other substantial question of law arises. The appeal is meritless. It is summarily dismissed.” 6. In view of the above, the substantial questions of law proposed by the appellant in this appeal stands already answered and therefore, no question of law much less any substantial question of law can be said to have arisen in the facts of the present case. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No orders as to cost.