Judgment : (V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.) This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“C.P.C.” for short) is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree, dated 06.07.2021 in A.S.No.26 of 2017, on the file of the X Additional District & Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam at Anakapalle, confirming the Judgment and decree, dated 07.09.2017 in O.S.No.273 of 1997, on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Anakapalle. 2. The appellant herein is the plaintiff and the respondent Nos.1 to 8 herein are defendant Nos.1 to 8 in O.S.No.273 of 1997, on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Anakapalle. During the pendency of the appeal, the 2 nd defendant died and his legal representatives were brought on record as respondent Nos.9 to 14. 3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.273 of 1997, on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Anakapalle, with a prayer for specific performance directing the defendants to execute lease deed for a period of 30 years commencing from 01.04.1994 at quarterly rent of Rs.300/- and alternatively, for declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to occupy the suit schedule premises for a period of 30 years commencing from 01.04.1994 on payment of quarterly rent of Rs.300/- to the defendants and permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants and representatives from disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. 4. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Anakapalle, dismissed the suit. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff in the above said suit filed A.S.No.26 of 2017, on the file of the X Additional District & Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam at Anakapalle. The learned X Additional District & Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam at Anakapalle, dismissed the appeal by confirming the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.273 of 1997, is as follows: The plaintiff is Burma Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited and it is carrying business of petroleum products and for such purpose, the plaintiff took plat schedule property measuring 48,000 sq. 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.273 of 1997, is as follows: The plaintiff is Burma Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited and it is carrying business of petroleum products and for such purpose, the plaintiff took plat schedule property measuring 48,000 sq. feet from Vedula China Kasipathi Chenulu, Yegneswara Chenulu and Eswarudu (1 st defendant), for a period of 30 years commencing from 01.04.1964 at quarterly rent of Rs.300/-. Later, the plaintiff constructed various structures in the plaint schedule carrying on business of petroleum products from the said property. Subsequently, as per the provisions, the right, title and interest of Burma Shell Company in respect of its undertaking in India was taken over and vested upon the Central Government. Covenant No.3(iii) of lease deed deals with renewal of lease on written request of the lessee made one month before the expiration of the lease period, lessors shall renew the lease for further 30 years on same terms. The plaintiff exercised its right of option for renewal of lease for further period of 30 years commencing from 01.04.1994, by sending letter, dated 17.09.1993. The plaintiff is regularly sending quarterly rent of Rs.300/- and the same were being received by the lessors and their legal heirs up to 31.03.1994. The plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform the terms and conditions of lease deed and also willing to pay all the accumulated rents as stated therein. The lessors –China Kasipati Chenulu and Yegneswara Chenulu died intestate leaving behind defendants except 1 st defendant. The plaintiff is entitled to renue the lease besides by virtue of Section 5(2) and Section 87(3) r/w Section 11 of the Act, 1976 for a period of 30 years commencing from 01.04.1994 and that the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit. 7. During the pendency of the suit, 1 st defendant died and 3 rd defendant is remained exparte. The 2 nd defendant filed written statement before the trial Court and the same was adopted by the defendant Nos.4 to 8. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows: The plaintiff company cannot sought to enforce the alleged legal right of renewal covered by clause 3 (iii) of the lease agreement. The plaintiff company never intimated the changes of constitution of its company. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows: The plaintiff company cannot sought to enforce the alleged legal right of renewal covered by clause 3 (iii) of the lease agreement. The plaintiff company never intimated the changes of constitution of its company. The option exercised by plaintiff company in pursuance of a covenant of a determined lease, dated 07.09.1964 for renewal of further period of 30 years from 01.04.1994 on the same terms and conditions, is not binding on the part of the lessors or their legal heirs as the said clause is only optional, but not obligatory. The plaintiff company ought to have delivered the possession of the plaint schedule property to the lessors on determination of lease and as per provisions contemplated in the Transfer of Property Act. In terms of lease agreement, the lessee is bound to put the lessors into peaceful possession of plaint schedule property. Even after efflux of lease period, the plaintiff company is continuing in suit schedule against the will of the lessors and without paying rents or depositing the same in the Court since 01.04.1994. The Central Government never expressed its desire in this case for the renewal of lease. The provisions of the Act for renewal of lease do not contemplate any unfettered right and automatic renewal of leases as stated by the plaintiff company. The plaintiff company cannot seek any protection by virtue of the provisions of the Act 2 of 1976. 8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned trial Judge, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of direction to the defendants to execute the renewal of lease for further period 30 years as sought for? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the alternative relief of declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to occupy the suit premises for a period of 30 years as claimed in the suit? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction as prayed for? (4) Whether the suit is not maintainable as barred by limitation? (5) Whether the plaintiff can invoke the covenants of the lease deed for renewal of lease even in case of determination of lease by efflux of time on 31.03.1994? (6) To what relief? 9. (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction as prayed for? (4) Whether the suit is not maintainable as barred by limitation? (5) Whether the plaintiff can invoke the covenants of the lease deed for renewal of lease even in case of determination of lease by efflux of time on 31.03.1994? (6) To what relief? 9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.11 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and no documents were marked. 10. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Anakapalle, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, dismissed the suit. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiff filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.26 of 2017, on the file of the X Additional District & Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam at Anakapalle, wherein, the following points came up for consideration: 1) Whether the plaintiff committed default in payment of rents as contended by the 2 nd defendant? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for renewal of lease for another period of 30 years as contended by it? 3) Whether there are any grounds to interfere with the judgment and decree of the trial Court and if so, to what extent? 11. The learned X Additional District & Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam at Anakapalle i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, as above, against the plaintiff and dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff. Felt aggrieved of the same, the plaintiff in O.S.No.273 of 1997 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 12. On hearing both side counsels at the time of admission of the appeal, on 30.09.2021, this Court, framed the following substantial questions of law: 1) Whether the Courts below acted legally in not considering the effect of clause 3(iii) of the lease agreement which obligates the owner to renew the lease for a further period of 30 years? 2) Whether the interpretation placed by the Courts below with regard to the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976 is legally sustainable? 2) Whether the interpretation placed by the Courts below with regard to the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976 is legally sustainable? 3) Whether the Courts below acted legally in relying on the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act ignoring that the provisions of the Special Act i.e., Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976 are applicable? 13. Heard Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned senior counsel on behalf of Sri V.V. Satish, learned counsel for the appellant and heard Sri K. Chidambaram, learned senior counsel on behalf of Sri Rajesh Matcha, learned counsel for the respondents. 14. Law is well settled that under Section 100 of CPC the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence. In a case of Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh , [ AIR 1993 SC 398 ] , the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court which was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature.” In a case of Kondira Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar , [AIR 1999 SC 471] , the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 15. The undisputed facts are one Vedula China Kasipathi Chainulu, Vedula Yagneswara Chainulu and Vedula Eswarudu, entered into a registered lease deed with the plaintiff on 01.04.1964 for a period of 30 years by ending 31.03.1994 and the lease will expire by 31.03.1994. The undisputed facts are one Vedula China Kasipathi Chainulu, Vedula Yagneswara Chainulu and Vedula Eswarudu, entered into a registered lease deed with the plaintiff on 01.04.1964 for a period of 30 years by ending 31.03.1994 and the lease will expire by 31.03.1994. The plaintiff sent a letter of option under Ex.A.5 on 21.09.1993 for extending the lease period for further 30 years and the same was addressed to one Vedula Eswarudu, Satyanarayana Murthy, Vedula Lakshmi Sodemma and Amaha Ratnalu and they received letter under Ex.A.5. The recitals in Ex.A.5 are the lease will expire by 31.03.1994 and under clause 3 (iii) thereafter, they intend to renew the lease for further period of 30 years from 01.04.1994 on the same terms and conditions. 16. The plaintiff in the suit is claiming relief of specific performance of renewal clause in Ex.A.1 lease deed. The Court fee is paid on only rental value of Rs.1,200/- and also Court fee also paid a relief of permanent injunction on a notional value of Rs.3,000/-, therefore, it is clear that the plaintiff sought the relief of specific performance for renewal clause in Ex.A.1 lease deed and directed the defendants to renew the lease for a further period of 30 years commencing from 01.04.1994. The recitals in clause 3 (iii) of Ex.A.1 registered lease deed is as follows: “That the lessor will on the written request of the lessee made one month before the expiration of the term hereby created grant to it a lease of the demised premises on the same rental for the further term of 30 years from the expiration of the said term and containing the like covenants and provisions as are herein contained with the exception of the present covenant for renewal.” 17. Ex.A.5 letter of option is sent to one Vedula Eswarudu, Satyanarayana Murthy, Vedula Lakshmi Sodemma and Amaha Ratnalu on 17.08.1993 by the plaintiff and later the plaintiff kept quiet and did not pursue the matter till the date of filing of the suit on 27.03.1997. The material on record reveals that the lease period is expired by 31.03.1994. Admittedly, no notice has been issued to all the defendants, one month prior to expiry of lease by the plaintiff except sending Ex.A.5 letter of option long back on 17.08.1993 to 1 st defendant, 2 nd defendant and others. The material on record reveals that the lease period is expired by 31.03.1994. Admittedly, no notice has been issued to all the defendants, one month prior to expiry of lease by the plaintiff except sending Ex.A.5 letter of option long back on 17.08.1993 to 1 st defendant, 2 nd defendant and others. Admittedly, Ex.A.5 letter of option is not addressed to the defendant Nos.3 to 7. As stated supra, from 17.08.1993 onwards the plaintiff remained silent till the date of filing of the suit on 27.03.1997. Subsequent to 30 months from the date of Ex.A.5 letter, the plaintiff instituted a suit on 2.03.1997. The suit has been filed originally against defendant Nos.1 to 7 in the year 1997. As noticed supra, no notice has been issued to defendant Nos.1 to 7 prior to institution of the suit for claiming relief of specific performance of renewal clause in Ex.A.1 registered lease deed and directing the defendants to execute a registered lease deed for a further period of 30 years. It is not the case of plaintiff that the plaintiff made oral request to the defendants to renew the lease for a further period of 30 years from 01.04.1994 to 31.03.2024. There is no whisper in the plaint itself that the plaintiff made oral demands to the defendants to renew a lease for a further period of 30 years from 01.04.1994 to 31.03.2024. 18. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars the relief of specific performance in favour of a person who fails to ever and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. In a case of K.S. Vidyanandam v. Vairavan , [ (1997) 3 SCC 1 ] , the Apex Court held that the relief of grant of specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant it. Ex.A.5 letter is sent to the defendant Nos.1 and 2 and others on 17.08.1993. The suit for specific performance is filed on 22.03.1997. No notice has been issued by the plaintiff to all the defendants prior to filing of the suit with a demand to execute a registered lease deed for a further period of 30 years in view of clause 3 (iii) of Ex.A.1 lease deed. The suit for specific performance is filed on 22.03.1997. No notice has been issued by the plaintiff to all the defendants prior to filing of the suit with a demand to execute a registered lease deed for a further period of 30 years in view of clause 3 (iii) of Ex.A.1 lease deed. It is not at all the case of the plaintiff that they made oral request to the defendants to renew the lease for a further period of 30 years and they intend to avail renewal clause which is incorporated in registered lease deed from 01.04.1994 to 31.03.2024 for a further period of 30 years. 19. Law is well settled that every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within a period of limitation and the Courts will also frown upon suits which are not filed immediately after breach/ refusal. The fact that the limitation is three years does not mean that the plaintiff has to wait till the last date of limitation. In the case on hand, no notice has been issued to the defendants prior to filing of the suit though Ex.A.5 letter of option has been addressed to defendant Nos.1 and 2 and others, 3 years 9 months much prior to the institution of the suit. The said Ex.A.5 letter has not been addressed to the defendant Nos.3 to 7. The plaintiff remained silent from 17.08.1993 to 27.03.1997 i.e., approximately for a period of 4 years. The plaintiff in the suit is seeking relief of specific performance of renewal clause. The conduct of the plaintiff is very crucial in a suit for specific performance. 20. Learned counsel for appellant placed a reliance of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. P. Kesavan and another , [(2004) 9 Supreme Court Cases 772] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “The Parliament enacted the Act which came into force on or about 24.1.1976, in terms whereof the right, title and interest of Burmah Shell in relation to its undertakings in India stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government. The effect of such vesting is stated in Section 4 of the Act whereby and whereunder, inter alia, all assets, rights, powers, authorities and privileges and all property, movable and immovable vested in the Central Government. The effect of such vesting is stated in Section 4 of the Act whereby and whereunder, inter alia, all assets, rights, powers, authorities and privileges and all property, movable and immovable vested in the Central Government. By reason of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act where any property was held in India by Burmah Shell under any lease or under any right of tenancy, the Central Government became the lessee and tenant, as the case may be, in respect thereof as if the lease or tenancy in relation to such property had been granted to it and thereupon all the rights under such lease or tenancy was to be deemed to have been transferred to, and vested in the Central Government. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act provides that on the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in sub- section (1), such lease or tenancy was, if so desired by the Central Government, to be renewed on the same terms and condition on which the lease and tenancy was held by Burmah Shell immediately before the appointed day. 'Appointed day' has been defined to mean the date of commencement of the said Act which, as noticed hereinbefore, has been specified on 24.1.1976. Section 7 of the said Act provides for the Central Government to direct vesting of the undertakings of the Burmah Shell in a Government company. It is not in dispute that an appropriate notification in terms of sub- section (1) of Section 7 has been issued in favour of the appellant herein. Sub-section (3) of Section 7 provides that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 5 shall apply to a lease or tenancy which vests in a Government company as tenancy in the Central Government and reference therein to the Central Government shall be construed as the reference to the Government company. Section 11 of the Act provides for a non-obstante clause stating that the provisions thereof shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the said Act.” 21. Section 11 of the Act provides for a non-obstante clause stating that the provisions thereof shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the said Act.” 21. Learned counsel for the appellant place a reliance of Subhash Chander and others vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) and another , [(2022) 11 Supreme Court Casers 561] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “A perusal of the scheme of the Act 1976 would show that from the appointed day, right, title and interest of Burmah Shell with effect to Section 5(1) stood transferred and vested with the Central Government and by virtue of Section 7(2), the vesting of tenancy rights with the Central Government stood further transposed and vested in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and that became a statutory tenant by virtue of Section 7(3) of the Act. To that extent, Section 11 of the Act has an overriding effect to the provisions of other laws. That being so, the jurisdiction indeed of a civil Court is impliedly barred from the field covered specifically by the provisions of the Act 1973 and that being the complete code determining the rights of a tenant/landlord to the exclusion of the other laws, we find no error in the view expressed by the High Court in the impugned judgment holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is held to be barred and remedial mechanism for ejectment could be possible only under the provisions of the Act 1973.” In the case on hand, the plaintiff is a Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited. The plaintiff approached the Court for seeking relief of specific performance for invoking renewal clause for a further period of 30 years and the plaintiff also sought a direction from the Court to direct the defendants to execute another registered lease deed for a further period of 30 years. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit, against which the plaintiff filed first appeal and the same has been dismissed by the learned First Appellate Judge and the second appeal is filed against the concurrent findings arrived by both the courts below. As noticed supra, Ex.A.5 letter addressed to the defendant Nos.1 and 2 and others in the year 1993. As noticed supra, Ex.A.5 letter addressed to the defendant Nos.1 and 2 and others in the year 1993. The suit is filed against defendant Nos.1 to 7 in the year 1997. Admittedly, Ex.A.5 letter of option has not addressed to defendant Nos.3 to 7. No notice has been issued to all the defendants prior to filing of the suit by the plaintiff. It is not at all the case of the plaintiff that they made an oral demand to the defendants to execute a registered lease deed for a further period of 30 years. In the case on hand, it is an admitted fact by both the parties that the plaintiff being a tenant committed default of payment of rents for a period of 20 years from 01.04.1994 onwards. Later during the pendency of the suit proceedings, the plaintiff deposited the rents into the Court. It is not yet disputed by the plaintiff that the plaintiff has not paid rents for two decades to the land-lords. As per Ex.A.1 registered lease deed, the quarterly rent for schedule premises is Rs.300/- for every four months. The plaintiff has been continuing in the schedule premises for quarterly rent of Rs.300/- for every four months period since 61 years. 22. Except referring clause 3 (iii) of Ex.A.1 lease deed, need for requirement is not yet mentioned in Ex.A.5 letter. The rents are not paying by the tenant by 01.04.1994 onwards. The plaintiff squatted on the plaint schedule premises without paying meager rent for a period of 30 years. It is admitted fact by both the parties that the rents are not paid to the owners of the plaint schedule property by the appellant and rents are also not deposited during the pendency of the suit for a period of 20 years from the date of default. The contention of the plaintiff is that after 20 years from 01.04.1994 during the pendency of the suit proceedings they used to deposit the rents in the Court. It is clear that the plaintiff enjoyed the property without paying single paise to the land-lords for a period of 30 years. The plaintiff also failed to prove that there is a bonafide request, apart from their legal right to have automatic renewal under Section 5(2) and Section 7 (3) of the Act. It is clear that the plaintiff enjoyed the property without paying single paise to the land-lords for a period of 30 years. The plaintiff also failed to prove that there is a bonafide request, apart from their legal right to have automatic renewal under Section 5(2) and Section 7 (3) of the Act. In fact, the appellant did not deposit a meager quarterly rent of Rs.300/- for every four months for 20 long years. The desire is also not specifically mentioned in Ex.A.5 letter which was addressed to the defendant Nos.1 and 2 and others. Admittedly, Ex.A.5 letter has not been addressed to the defendant Nos.3 to 7. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant acted fairly. The renewal was actuated by unfair and unreasonable motives. As such, it cannot be said that under guise of Section 5(2) of the Act, the appellant is entitled for automatic renewal. Admittedly, no reasons are assigned in Ex.A.5 letter for renewal is necessary except mere expressing desire for renewal. 23. In a case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Maddula Ratnavalli and others , [(2007) 6 Supreme Court Cases 81] , the Apex Court held as follows: “An executive action must be informed by reason. An unfair executive action can only survive for a potent reason. An action which is simply unfair or unreasonable would not be sustained. Objective satisfaction must be the basis for an executive action. Even subjective satisfaction on the part of a State is liable to judicial review. The 'State' acting whether as a 'landlord' or a 'tenant' is required to act bona fide and not arbitrarily, when the same is likely to affect prejudicially the right of others.” Admittedly, in the case on hand, the appellant expressed mere desire only to renew the lease under Ex.A.5 letter in the year 1993. Later on, the appellant/tenant remained silent till the date of institution of the suit in the year 1997 and also did not take any legal steps for obtaining lease deed from the defendants. The appellant squatted on the property for a period of 61 years and admittedly the appellant did not pay any meager quarterly rent of Rs.300/- for every four months to the defendants for two decades. The contention of the plaintiff is that they offered rent to one of the lessors, Eswarudu, but he refused to receive the rents. The appellant squatted on the property for a period of 61 years and admittedly the appellant did not pay any meager quarterly rent of Rs.300/- for every four months to the defendants for two decades. The contention of the plaintiff is that they offered rent to one of the lessors, Eswarudu, but he refused to receive the rents. It is not yet the case of the appellant that they offered rent to other defendants or other lessors. It is also not the case of the plaintiff that after rejecting the rent, they have sent a notice to Eswarudu to inform his bank account number to deposit the rents. When the plaintiff has acted unfair advantage for not paying rents to the land-lords for a period of 20 years, certainly in a case the Court cannot interfere, if the desire expressed by the plaintiff in Ex.A.5 letter only when it is actuated by any malice or ill-will. In Maddula Ratnavalli’s case (6 supra), the Apex Court held as follows: We may also notice that recently in M/s. Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai [ 2006 (9) SCALE 652 ], one of us (Katju, J.) stated (SCC p.597, para 27) : "27. In this connection, it may be mentioned that according to the theory of the eminent positivist jurist Kelsen (The Pure Theory of Law) in every legal system there is a hierarchy of laws, and whenever there is conflict between a norm in a higher layer in this hierarchy and a norm in a lower layer the norm in the higher layer will prevail (see Kelsen's 'The General Theory of Law and State')." With that we may add that a statutory order or discretion exercised by a statutory authority must also be tested on the anvil of the constitutional scheme. The Apex Court further held as follows: In M.L. Kamra v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. [ (1992) 2 SCC 36 ], this Court held: (SCC p.41, para 4) "The Court ought not to interpret the statutory provisions, unless compelled by their language, in such a manner as would involve its unconstitutionality, since the legislature or the rule making authority is presumed to enact a law which does not contravene or violate the constitutional provisions. [ (1992) 2 SCC 36 ], this Court held: (SCC p.41, para 4) "The Court ought not to interpret the statutory provisions, unless compelled by their language, in such a manner as would involve its unconstitutionality, since the legislature or the rule making authority is presumed to enact a law which does not contravene or violate the constitutional provisions. Therefore, there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality of a legislation or statutory rule unless ex facie it violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. If the provisions of a law or the rule is construed in such a way as would make it consistent with the Constitution and another interpretation would render the provision or the rule unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. Right of property although is not a fundamental right, nonetheless remains a constitutional right and any expropriatory legislation must be construed strictly. [See Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shahpur Chennai & Ors. [ (2005) 7 SCC 627 ]]. In Subhash Chander’s case (5 supra) it is held as follows: “A perusal of the scheme of the Act 1976 would show that from the appointed day, right, title and interest of Burmah Shell with effect to Section 5(1) stood transferred and vested with the Central Government and by virtue of Section 7(2), the vesting of tenancy rights with the Central Government stood further transposed and vested in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and that became a statutory tenant by virtue of Section 7(3) of the Act. To that extent, Section 11 of the Act has an overriding effect to the provisions of other laws. That being so, the jurisdiction indeed of a civil Court is impliedly barred from the field covered specifically by the provisions of the Act 1973 and that being the complete code determining the rights of a tenant/landlord to the exclusion of the other laws, we find no error in the view expressed by the High Court in the impugned judgment holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is held to be barred and remedial mechanism for ejectment could be possible only under the provisions of the Act 1973.” In the case on hand, the plaintiff Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited approached the civil court for claiming the relief of specific performance for exercising automatic renewal of 30 years. The defendants have not approached the civil Court for claiming relief of specific performance. In the case on hand, the appellant company is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, enjoined with a date to act fairly and reasonably just because it has been conferred with a statutory power, the same by itself would not mean that exercise thereof in any manner whatsoever will meet the requirements of law. The statue uses the words “if so desired by the Central Government”. Such a desire cannot be based upon a subjective satisfaction. The action of State, however, must be judged on the touch stone of reasonableness. 24. In the case on hand, without issuing any legal notice to the defendants, the plaintiff company filed a suit for specific performance in the year 1997. Admittedly, Ex.A.5 letter was addressed to the defendant Nos.1 and 2 and others in the year 1993 by expressing mere desire of renewal. Need for renewal was also not at all mentioned in Ex.A.5. Ex.A.5 has not been addressed to the defendant Nos.3 to 7. As stated supra, Ex.A.5 letter was addressed in the year 1993 to defendant Nos.1 and 2 and others. Thereafter, the plaintiff remained silent for a period of four years and approached the civil Court and filed a suit for specific performance for invoking the automatic renewal clause of 30 years and with a specific prayer to direct the defendants to execute a registered lease deed for a further period of 30 years. In the case on hand, nothing was done by the plaintiff during the aforesaid four years and no further lease is obtained from 01.04.1994 onwards from the defendants. The plaintiff i.e., tenant squatted on the property for two decades even without paying meager quarterly rent of Rs.300/- for every four months. The plaintiff is continuing as a tenant in the schedule premises since 61 years with a meager quarterly rent of Rs.300/- for every four months. Therefore, the desire of the appellant was not at all bonafide. Original lease deed under Ex.A.1 is from the year 1964 to 31.03.1994 and there is no another lease deed from 01.04.1994 to 31.03.2024 for 30 years. Therefore, the desire of the appellant was not at all bonafide. Original lease deed under Ex.A.1 is from the year 1964 to 31.03.1994 and there is no another lease deed from 01.04.1994 to 31.03.2024 for 30 years. As on today also the appellant is continuing as tenant i.e., since 61 years, the plaintiff is continuing as tenant in the schedule premises with a meager quarterly rent of Rs.300/- for every four months. In Subhash Chander’s case (5 supra), the Apex Court held as follows: “The question under consideration was as to whether if one term of lease has been extended under the lease deed, whether automatic renewal of lease is permissible by virtue of Section 5(2) of the Act 1976 and it has been held by this Court that only one extension was permissible in terms of the conditions of lease deed and Section 5(2) of the Act 1976 will not be available for a further renewal.” In the case on hand, the plaintiff company never expressed its intention to have a registered lease deed by its letter in Ex.A.5. The desire expressed by the appellant is not at all bonafide desire, the plaintiff actuated in a malafide manner and the plaintiff being the Central Government undertaking squatted on the property for a period of 20 years even not paying the meager quarterly rent of Rs.300/- to the land-lords/defendants. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the desire expressed by the plaintiff was not at all boanfide one. As stated supra, the desire expressed by the plaintiff in Ex.A.5 letter is with a malafide intention and the plaintiff continued as a tenant on a meager rent, since 61 years. 25. Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit and the First Appellate Court also after re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record rightly dismissed the first appeal, therefore, I do not find any illegality in the concurrent findings arrived by both the Courts below and it requires no interference. Therefore, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 26. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed confirming the Judgments of both the Courts below. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal. Therefore, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 26. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed confirming the Judgments of both the Courts below. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.