ORDER : 1. By filing this criminal misc. petition, the petitioner/complainant has made a challenge to the order dated 04.01.2025 passed by the Court of learned Addl. District Judge No.3, Alwar (for short 'the learned revisional court') in Criminal Revision Petition No.76/2024, whereby the learned revisional Court allowed the revision petition filed by the non-petitioners/accused and set aside the order dated 01.10.2024 passed by the Court of learned Special Judicial Magistrate (N.I. Act) Cases No.2, Alwar (for short 'the learned trial court') in Case No. 23/1452/2021 and further ordered that for verification of the signatures alleged to be of the non-petitioners/accused on the disputed cheque, be got verified by the Forensic Science Laboratory, Jaipur by sending the cheque to the State FSL, Jaipur. 2. Vide order dated 01.10.2024, which was under challenge in the criminal revision petition, the learned trial court dismissed the application dated 08.08.2024 filed by the non-petitioners/ accused for sending the disputed cheque to the State FSL, Jaipur for verification of the signatures over it. 3. The brief facts of the case borne out from the pleadings are that the petitioner/ complainant filed a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act against the non-petitioners/ accused stating that the complainant/petitioner is a Member of the non- petitioner/accused No.3- Groupnet Education & Welfare Society (for short 'the Society') way back from 2008 which was providing higher and quality education to the students. It was further stated that the said Society borrowed an amount from the complainant /petitioner and the same was shown in the balance-sheet of the Society. When the complainant/ petitioner was in need of the money, she gave a demand notice by Registered Post to the Society to pay back the amount along-with the interest and thereafter, the Society issued a Cheque No.968592 of Rs.71,93,484.86/- on 11.08.2021 to the complainant / petitioner. However, when the said cheque was processed to the Bank, same was dishonoured on account of 'Insufficient Funds' in the Bank account and thereafter the complainant / petitioner sent a notice on 13.02.2021 to the Society as well as its Post bearers and then has filed the complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 4. However, when the said cheque was processed to the Bank, same was dishonoured on account of 'Insufficient Funds' in the Bank account and thereafter the complainant / petitioner sent a notice on 13.02.2021 to the Society as well as its Post bearers and then has filed the complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 4. During the pendency of the proceedings of complaint the non-petitioners/ accused on 8.8.2024 filed an application and prayed that the Cheque No. 968592 is a forged and fabricated document as signatures on it alleged to be of accused/ appellant are forged one. Therefore, the cheque in dispute be sent to the State FSL, Jaipur for examination. It was stated in the application that the non- petitioners/ accused have taken a defence since very beginning about the forgery of the cheque in dispute. It was further stated in the application that the non-petitioners/ accused got the signatures verified by a private handwriting expert wherein it was opined that the signatures on the cheque in dispute are forged, and therefore, in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to send the cheque in dispute to the State FSL, Jaipur, an independent agency for verification of signatures. 5. Reply to the application dated 08.08.2024 was filed by the complainant /petitioner denying the facts stated in the application and it was further stated that the cheque has not been dishonoured because of mismatching of the signatures but it was dishonoured on account of 'Insufficient Funds' in the account. It was also stated in the reply that the application has been filed so as to delay the proceedings of the case. It was also stated in the reply to the application that in view of the private handwriting expert report obtained by the non-petitioners/ accused, the complainant/ petitioner also got the signatures on the disputed cheque verified by the handwriting expert wherein it was opined that the signatures on the cheque in dispute are original and there is no forgery. 6. Taking into consideration the averments made in the application, reply to the application and the submissions made by the counsel for the parties, the learned trial court vide its order dated 01.10.2024 dismissed the application seeking verification of the signatures on the cheque in dispute by sending it to the State FSL, Jaipur. 7. 6. Taking into consideration the averments made in the application, reply to the application and the submissions made by the counsel for the parties, the learned trial court vide its order dated 01.10.2024 dismissed the application seeking verification of the signatures on the cheque in dispute by sending it to the State FSL, Jaipur. 7. Being aggrieved by the order dated 01.10.2024, the non-petitioners / accused preferred a criminal revision petition before the learned revisional court. Before the learned revisional court, the complainant /petitioner also raised an issue of maintainability of the revision petition contending that the order passed by the learned trial court is an interlocutory order and no revision petition can be entertained against the interlocutory order. 8. The learned revisional court taking into consideration the material available on the record and the submissions made by both the counsels appearing for the respective parties, allowed the criminal revision petition vide order dated 04.01.2025 and quashed and set aside the order dated 01.10.2024 passed by the learned trial court and further ordered to send the cheque in dispute to the State FSL, Jaipur for verification of signatures over it. 9. Mr. S.S. Hora, learned counsel appearing for the complainant/ petitioner first of all raised an issue as regards the maintainability of the revision petition against the order of the trial court and submitted that since the order dated 01.10.2024 passed by the trial court is an interlocutory order as it does not concludes the rights of the parties, and therefore, the revision petition filed by the non-petitioners/ accused is not maintainable and thus, the order passed by the learned revisional court deserves to be set aside. Counsel also submitted that the cheque has not been dishonoured on account of mismatching of the signatures of the person issuing the cheque but the said cheque has been dishonoured on account of 'Insufficient Funds' in the bank account. Counsel further submitted that since the cheque has not been dishonoured on account of mismatching of signatures, there is no requirement for sending the said cheque for verification of the signatures.Counsel for the complainant/ petitioner also submitted that both i.e. complainant/petitioner as well as the non-petitioners/ accused have got the separate opinion from the private handwriting experts as regards the genuineness of the signatures, and therefore, the persons giving the opinions may be produced and examined as witnesses before the trial court. Counsel has also submitted that in view of provisions of section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, sending the cheque in dispute to the State FSL, Jaipur for verification of the signatures, is not required as the trial court after perusing the signatures over the cheque and signatures of the person issuing the cheque available on record on the Vakalatnama and other pleadings has opined to be of the same person and genuine Counsel appearing for the complainant/ petitioner in support of his submissions has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- 1. Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam, (2009) 5 SCC 153 2. Surender Kumar Sharma v. Rajesh Dagar, delivered by Punjab & Haryana High Court, in Criminal Misc. No.M-29668 of 2012 (O&M) decided on 24.09.2012 3. Kanhiyalal Gujjar v. State & Anr., S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petition) No. 438/2018 decided on 07.03.2018 10. Mr. Harendra Singh Sinsinwar and Mr. Pankaj Gupta, counsels appearing for the non-petitioners/ accused submitted that the order passed by the trial court culminates the rights of the parties because the trial court has given its opinion that the signatures on the cheque in dispute are the original signatures of the person who has issued the cheque, and therefore, it cannot be said that it is an interlocutory order and the revision petition cannot be maintained. The revisional court has entertained the revision petiton of the non-petitioners/ accused and decided the issue on merits. If for the sake of arguments, the plea raised by the complainant/ petitioner is accepted then the revision petition should have been thrown at the initial stage and the non- petitioners / accused could have challenged the order of the trial court by availing the appropriate remedy including the remedy under the provisions of Section 528 of the BNSS. But since the revision petition has been entertained and decided on merits, the non-petitioners / accused cannot be thrown out for getting justice on this ground alone. So, the Court can also consider the case in the totality of the merits of the matter. In support of their submissions, counsels have relied upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Honnaiah T.H. v. State of Karnatak & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1147 of 2022 decided on 04.08.2022. So, the Court can also consider the case in the totality of the merits of the matter. In support of their submissions, counsels have relied upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Honnaiah T.H. v. State of Karnatak & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1147 of 2022 decided on 04.08.2022. It is also submitted by the counsels appearing for the non-petitioners/ accused that whenever a cheque is processed by the Bank, first of all, it is seen that whether there is 'insufficient funds' in the account of a person issuing the cheque or not. In the present case, since the cheque was dishonoured at the first instance on account of 'Insufficient Funds' in the account, and therefore, there was no occasion for the Bank to verify the signatures on the cheque whether they are genuine or forged. They further submitted that there are two different opinions of the private handwriting experts; first, giving an opinion that the signatures on the cheque in dispute are original and second, giving an opinion that the signatures are forged. In such circumstances, they submitted that it would be in the fitness of things and in the interest of justice and so also to decide the rights of the parties, to send the cheque in dispute to the State FSL, Jaipur for verification of the signatures so that the actual truth can come out.In support of their submissions, counsels appearing for the non-petitioners/ accused has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- 1. Kalyani Baskar vs. M.S. Sampoornam, (2007) 2 SCC 258 2. T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Muralidhar, (2008) 5 SCC 633 3. Ajay Kumar Parmar v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 12 SCC 406 11. In the case of Sethuraman (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in para 5 as under:- "5. Secondly, what was not realised was that the orders passed by the trial court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC, were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) CrPC. The trial court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent-accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The trial court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent-accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The trial court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders i.e. one on the application under Section 91 CrPC for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 CrPC for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed ." In the case of Surendra Kumar Sharma v. Rajesh Dagar (supra), the Punjab & Haryana High Court, has observed in para 8 as under:- " 8. The application with the prayer for appointment of an handwriting expert for examining the document and comparing the same with the writing of the accused was dismissed by learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Faridabad. Applying the above laid test, it is to be seen as to whether the proceedings would culminate if the plea of the accused was allowed. In my opinion, if the revision petition would have been allowed, the proceedings would not have concluded and, therefore, the order in question would be an interlocutory order against which revision did not lie." In the case of Kanhiyalal Gujjar (supra), the Coordinate Bench of this Court has observed as under:- "The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the petitioner has denied all handwriting on the cheque, except his signatures. Counsel further contends that the petitioner- accused filed an application praying that the cheque, in question be sent to the handwriting expert at State Forensic Science Laboratory Rajasthan, Jaipur for comparison of the handwriting. Offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is civil in nature. It is common knowledge that the State Forensic Science Laboratory Rajasthan, Jaipur is heavily over burdened with the reports to be submitted in the rape and murder cases. Offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is civil in nature. It is common knowledge that the State Forensic Science Laboratory Rajasthan, Jaipur is heavily over burdened with the reports to be submitted in the rape and murder cases. The reports in murder and rape cases are not being presented by the State Forensic Science Laboratory Rajasthan, Jaipur due to lack of infrastructure. In case, the cheque, in question in a cases arising out of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, are sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory Rajasthan, Jaipur its working shall be chocked forever." 12. In the case of Honnaiah T.H. (supra), referred by the counsels appearing for the non-petitioners/ accused, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:- "12. There would be a serious miscarriage of justice in the course of the criminal trial if the statement were not to be marked as an exhibit since that forms the basis of the registration of the FIR. The order of the trial judge cannot in these circumstances be treated as merely procedural or of an interlocutory in nature since it has the potential to affect the substantive course of the prosecution. The revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC can be exercised where the interest of public justice requires interference for correction of manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 ; Sheetala Prasad v. Sri Kant, (2010) 2 SC 190. A court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction against a final order of acquittal or conviction, or an intermediate order not being interlocutory in nature. In the decision in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 this Court explained the meaning of the term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) CrPC. This Court held that the expression “interlocutory order” denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch upon the important rights or liabilities of parties. Hence, any order which substantially affects the right of the parties cannot be said to be an “interlocutory order”. Speaking for a two-Judge Bench, Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali observed: “6. […] It seems to us that the term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. Speaking for a two-Judge Bench, Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali observed: “6. […] It seems to us that the term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.” Explaining the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2) CrPC, this Court observed is Amar Nath (supra) that the wide power of revision of the High Court is restricted as a matter of prudence and not as a matter of law, to an order that “suffered from any error of law or any legal infirmity causing injustice or prejudice to the accused or was manifestly foolish or perverse.” In K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2000) 6 SCC 195 where a criminal revision was filed against an order taking cognizance and issuing process, this Court followed the view as expressed in Amar Nath (supra), and observed: “11. [….] It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 , V.C. Shukla v. State, 1980 Supp SCC 92 and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam, (1999) 3 SCC 134 ). The feasible test is whether upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable.” 13. In the decision in VC Shukla (supra), this Court noted that under the CrPC, the question whether an order such as an order summoning an accused Amar nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 or an order framing a charge Madhu limaye v. State of maharastra, (1997) 4 SCC 551 is an “interlocutory order” must be analysed in the light of the peculiar facts of a particular case. In the present case, the objection taken by the defense counsel (which was upheld by the trial judge) that the statement of the informant is a statement under Section 161 CrPC travels to the root of the case of the prosecution and its acceptance would substantially prejudice the case of the prosecution. According to the charge sheet, the statement of the appellant/informant formed the basis of the FIR and set the criminal law in motion. Rejection of the prayer of the Public Prosecutor to mark the statement as an exhibit would possibly imperil the validity of the FIR. In this background, the order of the trial court declining to mark the statement of the informant as an exhibit is an intermediate order affecting important rights of the parties and cannot be said to be purely of an interlocutory nature. In the present case, if the statement of the appellant/informant is not permitted to be marked as an exhibit, it would amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. 14. In the present case, if the statement of the appellant/informant is not permitted to be marked as an exhibit, it would amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. 14. The challenge to the maintainability of the revision at the instance of the appellant impugning an order passed during the pendency of the trial must also be rejected. The revisional jurisdiction of a High Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the CrPC, is a discretionary jurisdiction that can be exercised by the revisional court suo motu so as to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of an order recorded or passed by the trial court or the inferior court. As the power of revision can be exercised by the High Court even suo moto, there can be no bar on a third party invoking the revisional jurisdiction and inviting the attention of the High Court that an occasion to exercise the power has arisen. Holding a revision petition instituted by a complainant maintainable, Justice Santosh Hegde writing for this Court in K. Pandurangan v. S.S.R. Velusamy, (2003) 8 SCC 625 observed: “ 6. So far as the first question as to the maintainability of the revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned, we think the said argument has only to be noted to be rejected. Under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the court has suo motu power of revision, if that be so, the question of the same being invoked at the instance of an outsider would not make any difference because ultimately it is the power of revision which is already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being exercised by the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is done by itself or at the instance of a third party will not affect such power of the High Court. In this regard, we may note the following judgment of this Court in the case of Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Admn).” 13. The judgment delivered in the case of Sethuraman (supra), cited by the counsel appearing for the complainant/ petitioner pertains to an order passed on the application under section 311 CrPC seeking directions to produce the bank pass books, income tax accounts and the LDS deposit receipts of the appellant therein as also for recalling him for cross-examination. The judgment delivered in the case of Sethuraman (supra), cited by the counsel appearing for the complainant/ petitioner pertains to an order passed on the application under section 311 CrPC seeking directions to produce the bank pass books, income tax accounts and the LDS deposit receipts of the appellant therein as also for recalling him for cross-examination. In the case of Surendra Kumar Sharma (supra) , the revision petition against the order passed by the trial court as regards the prayer for appointing the handwriting expert was held not maintainable at the initial stage. 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Honnaiah T.H. (supra), which has been relied upon by the counsels appearing for the non-petitioners/ accused, has opined that as regards the maintainability of the revision petition holding an order to be an interlocutory, is required to be considered on facts of each and every case on a distinct footing taking into consideration the result of acceptance or rejection of the prayer by the order under challenge in the revision petition. 15. In the present case, it is borne out that the non- petitioners/ accused have taken a plea from the very beginning that the cheque in dispute in regard to which the complaint has been filed by the complainant/ petitioner bears the forged signatures of the person alleged to have issued the cheque. There is a peculiar fact in this case that both the parties have got the opinions from the private handwriting experts, which are contrary to each other; one saying that the signatures are genuine and other opinion saying that the signatures on the cheque are forged. 16. The learned trial court has also given out its opinion on the basis of perusal of the signatures on the cheque in dispute and other documents available on the record including the Vakalatnama and pleadings. As regards the genuineness of signatures, handwriting etc., a Judicial Officer cannot be said to be an expert, though a prima facie opinion can be given by him but the same cannot be a conclusive opinion and that too in a peculiar circumstance when there are two divergent opinions given by the private handwriting experts. As regards the genuineness of signatures, handwriting etc., a Judicial Officer cannot be said to be an expert, though a prima facie opinion can be given by him but the same cannot be a conclusive opinion and that too in a peculiar circumstance when there are two divergent opinions given by the private handwriting experts. Since the learned Magistrate has given his opinion as regards the genuineness of the signatures in view of the provisions of section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, which in a particular manner culminates the rights of the parties as he has given a decision that the signatures on the cheque in dispute are genuine and original. Since the findings of the learned trial court decides the issue finally, then in such circumstances in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Honnaiah T.H. (supra) , the order passed by the trial court cannot be said to be an interlocutory order and therefore, the objection raised by the counsel for the complainant/ petitioner as regards the maintainability of the revision petition is not sustainable. 17. In the present case, the non-petitioners/ accused from the very beginning have disputed and asserted that the signatures over the cheque in dispute in regard to which the complaint has been filed by the complainant /petitioner, are forged. The non-petitioners/ accused got an opinion from the private handwriting expert as regards the signatures on the cheque in dispute, who opined that the signatures on the said cheque are forged. The complainant/ petitioner also got an opinion from the different private handwriting expert as regards the signatures over the cheque who has given an opinion that the signatures on the cheque are genuine and original. Meaning-thereby, there are two different opinions of private handwriting experts contrary to each other. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Kanhiyalal Gujjar (supra) has denied to send the signatures for verification to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur, in view of the fact that the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur, is heavily burdened with the reports to be submitted in the rape and murder cases and if the documents related to the proceedings under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are also sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur, its working shall be chocked forevver. 18. 18. The prime duty of the Court is to impart justice to the litigants and merely because any institution is burdened with the workload cannot be a ground for not getting an opinion so as to make effective adjudication of the issue pending before it to decide the rights of the parties. Courts are to make all efforts within law to arrive at a correct conclusion. 19. In the case of Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) [supra] the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:- "3. A complaint has been preferred by Mrs M.S. Sampoornam, the complainant respondent herein, against Mrs Kalyani Baskar, the appellant herein and her husband for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “the Act”) before the Judicial Magistrate, Tambaram, Chennai, alleging that the appellant along with her husband jointly signed and issued Cheque No. 037296 for discharging their liability. On presentation of the said cheque, it was dishonoured for “insufficient funds”. Though the notice was served upon both the accused persons yet no reply has been sent by them. Thereafter, observing all the formalities as contemplated under the Act, the complainant respondent had preferred CC No. 439 of 1998 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Tambaram, Chennai, against the appellant and her husband. The accused appeared before the Magistrate and filed an application under Section 245 CrPC raising inter alia preliminary objections that: (1) the accused has not signed the cheque nor issued it to the complainant respondent; (2) the cheque in question, was drawn from the individual account of the accused and therefore, as alleged by the complainant, the accused and her husband could not have jointly signed and issued the cheque; (3) the signature on the cheque may be sent for expert opinion to ascertain bona fides of the same and (4) neither the appellant nor her husband owe any debt to the respondent. 10. It is not in dispute that the appellant at the initial stage of her appearance before the Magistrate had filed an application under Section 245 CrPC in which she had categorically denied her signature on the cheque and its delivery to the respondent besides raising other preliminary objections in opposition to the complaint filed by the respondent under Section 138 of the Act. From the record, it appears that the said application was dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that the genuineness of the signature can be questioned only at the time of trial. The appellant accepted the correctness of the said order of the Magistrate. During the trial, the respondent was examined as PW 1 on 22-9-1999 and PW 3, the officer of the bank was examined on 22-11-2000. It is thereafter that the appellant had filed the application under Section 243 CrPC praying to send the cheque in question, for ascertaining the bona fide and genuineness of her signature appended thereon. The trial Magistrate as well as the High Court have observed that Section 243 CrPC deals with summoning of defence witnesses and cause any document or thing to be produced through him. But in the present case, the accused has filed a petition without naming any person as witness or anything to be summoned which is to be sent for handwriting expert for examination. 12. Section 243(2) is clear that a Magistrate holding an inquiry under CrPC in respect of an offence triable by him does not exceed his powers under Section 243(2) if, in the interest of justice, he directs to send the document for enabling the same to be compared by a handwriting expert because even in adopting this course, the purpose is to enable the Magistrate to compare the disputed signature or writing with the admitted writing or signature of the accused and to reach his own conclusion with the assistance of the expert. The appellant is entitled to rebut the case of the respondent and if the document viz. the cheque on which the respondent has relied upon for initiating criminal proceedings against the appellant would furnish good material for rebutting that case, the Magistrate having declined to send the document for the examination and opinion of the handwriting expert has deprived the appellant of an opportunity of rebutting it. The appellant cannot be convicted without an opportunity being given to her to present her evidence and if it is denied to her, there is no fair trial. “Fair trial” includes fair and proper opportunities allowed by law to prove her innocence. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of that right means denial of fair trial. “Fair trial” includes fair and proper opportunities allowed by law to prove her innocence. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of that right means denial of fair trial. It is essential that rules of procedure designed to ensure justice should be scrupulously followed, and the courts should be jealous in seeing that there is no breach of them. We have not been able to appreciate the view of the learned Judge of the High Court that the petitioner has filed application under Section 243 CrPC without naming any person as witness or anything to be summoned, which are to be sent for handwriting expert for examination. As noticed above, Section 243(2) CrPC refers to a stage when the prosecution closes its evidence after examining the witnesses and the accused has entered upon his defence. The appellant in this case requests for sending the cheque in question, for the opinion of the handwriting expert after the respondent has closed her evidence, the Magistrate should have granted such a request unless he thinks that the object of the appellant is vexation or delaying the criminal proceedings. In the circumstances, the order of the High Court impugned in this appeal upholding the order of the Magistrate is erroneous and not sustainable. 13. For all the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated 10-2-2004 passed in Criminal Revision Case No. 335 of 2002 by which the order dated 15-11-2001 of the Judicial Magistrate made in Crl. MP No. 341 of 2001 in CC No. 439 of 1998 dismissing the application of the appellant under Section 243 CrPC was affirmed. Accordingly, Crl. MP No. 341 of 2001 in CC No. 439 of 1998 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Tambaram, Chennai, shall stand allowed. The learned Magistrate shall take appropriate steps for obtaining the report of the handwriting expert on the point whether the signature on the cheque is that of the accused and shall proceed with the trial of the case in accordance with law. Since the case is very old, further proceedings shall be taken with utmost expedition." 20. In the case of T. Nagappa (supra) , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:- "7. Since the case is very old, further proceedings shall be taken with utmost expedition." 20. In the case of T. Nagappa (supra) , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:- "7. When a contention has been raised that the complainant has misused the cheque, even in a case where a presumption can be raised under Section 118(a) or 139 of the said Act, an opportunity must be granted to the accused for adducing evidence in rebuttal thereof. As the law places the burden on the accused, he must be given an opportunity to discharge it. 8. An accused has a right to fair trial. He has a right to defend himself as a part of his human as also fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The right to defend oneself and for that purpose to adduce evidence is recognised by Parliament in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as under: “243. Evidence for defence. (1)*** (2) If the accused, after he has entered upon his defence, applies to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross- examination, or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice and such ground shall be recorded by him in writing: Provided that, when the accused has cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross- examining any witness before entering on his defence, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled under this section, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary for the ends of justice.” 9. What should be the nature of evidence is not a matter which should be left only to the discretion of the court. It is the accused who knows how to prove his defence. It is true that the court being the master of the proceedings must determine as to whether the application filed by the accused in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 243 of the Code is bona fide or not or whether thereby he intends to bring on record a relevant material. It is true that the court being the master of the proceedings must determine as to whether the application filed by the accused in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 243 of the Code is bona fide or not or whether thereby he intends to bring on record a relevant material. But ordinarily an accused should be allowed to approach the court for obtaining its assistance with regard to summoning of witnesses, etc. If permitted to do so, steps therefor, however, must be taken within a limited time. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the accused should not be allowed to unnecessarily protract the trial or summon witnesses whose evidence would not be at all relevant. 10. The learned trial Judge as also the High Court rejected the contention of the appellant only having regard to the provisions of Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The very fact that by reason thereof, only a prima facie right had been conferred upon the holder of the negotiable instrument and the same being subject to the conditions as noticed hereinbefore, we are of the opinion that the application filed by the appellant was bona fide. 11. The issue now almost stands concluded by a decision of this Court in Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornam, (2007) 2 SCC 258 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 577 (in which one of us, L.S. Panta, J., was a member) wherein it was held : (SCC p. 262, para 12) “12. Section 243(2) is clear that a Magistrate holding an inquiry under CrPC in respect of an offence triable by him does not exceed his powers under Section 243(2) if, in the interest of justice, he directs to send the document for enabling the same to be compared by a handwriting expert because even in adopting this course, the purpose is to enable the Magistrate to compare the disputed signature or writing with the admitted writing or signature of the accused and to reach his own conclusion with the assistance of the expert. The appellant is entitled to rebut the case of the respondent and if the document viz. The appellant is entitled to rebut the case of the respondent and if the document viz. the cheque on which the respondent has relied upon for initiating criminal proceedings against the appellant would furnish good material for rebutting that case, the Magistrate having declined to send the document for the examination and opinion of the handwriting expert has deprived the appellant of an opportunity of rebutting it. The appellant cannot be convicted without an opportunity being given to her to present her evidence and if it is denied to her, there is no fair trial. ‘Fair trial’ includes fair and proper opportunities allowed by law to prove her innocence. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of that right means denial of fair trial. It is essential that rules of procedure designed to ensure justice should be scrupulously followed, and the courts should be jealous in seeing that there is no breach of them.” 13. Ms Suri, however, pointed out that the application of the appellant being one under Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was rightly rejected. It is now a well-settled principle of law that non- mentioning or wrong mentioning of provision of law would not be of any relevance, if the court had the requisite jurisdiction to pass an order." 21. In the case of Ajay Kumar Parmar (supra), has observed as under:- " 28. The opinion of a handwriting expert is fallible/liable to error like that of any other witness, and yet, it cannot be brushed aside as useless. There is no legal bar to prevent the court from comparing signatures or handwriting, by using its own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing and then from applying its own observation to prove the said handwritings to be the same or different, as the case may be, but in doing so, the court cannot itself become an expert in this regard and must refrain from playing the role of an expert, for the simple reason that the opinion of the court may also not be conclusive. Therefore, when the court takes such a task upon itself, and findings are recorded solely on the basis of comparison of signatures or handwritings, the court must keep in mind the risk involved, as the opinion formed by the court may not be conclusive and is susceptible to error, especially when the exercise is conducted by one, not conversant with the subject. The court, therefore, as a matter of prudence and caution should hesitate or be slow to base its findings solely upon the comparison made by it. However, where there is an opinion whether of an expert, or of any witness, the court may then apply its own observation by comparing the signatures, or handwritings for providing a decisive weight or influence to its decision." 22. The provision of section 528 of the BNSS, which empowers this Court with the inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Sanhita or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The provisions of section 528 of the BNSS reads as under:- "528 - Saving of inherent powers of High Court.- Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 23. Having regards to the facts that (1) from the very beginning the non-petitioners/ accused have taken a defence / plea that the cheque in dispute in regard to which the complainant has filed a complaint, bears the forged signatures of the person alleged to have issued the cheque; (2) there are two divergent opinions of two separate private handwriting experts obtained, one, by the non-petitioners / accused and other by the complainant/ petitioner; and (3) so as to arrive the effective conclusion as regards the dispute in between the parties and other facts, it is a fit case to exercise the inherent jurisdiction for securing the ends of justice and for effective adjudication of the dispute raised before the trial court. The opening language of the provisions of Section 528 of the BNSS clearly speaks that 'Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders'. Even if for a moment, the complainant /petitioner could not have filed the revision petition then also this Court was having inherent powers to exercise its jurisdiction and to decide the dispute between the parties in an effective manner. 24. The Court is also conscious of the fact that if the cheque in dispute is sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur, for verification of the signatures over it, no prejudice will be caused to any of the parties because any report of the State Forensic Science Laboratory would lead to effective adjudication of the dispute. 25. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court finds no ground to interfere with in the order dated 04.01.2025 passed by the Court of learned Addl. District Judge No.3, Alwar, passed in Criminal Revision Petition No.76/2024 and accordingly, the criminal misc. petition filed by the complainant / petitioner is dismissed and order as under:- A. In case the Court make scrutiny of the order of trial Court rejecting application, then also the Court is of the view that the cheque be sent to State FSL, Jaipur, for verification of signatures on it. The order for sending the cheque in dispute to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur, for verification of signatures is just and proper in the totality of the facts and circumstances of this particular case as same would be in the interest of justice of both the parties. B. The Court considering the apprehension of the complainant/ petitioner that complainant petitioner has moved the application for sending the cheque to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur, so as to delay the proceedings of the matter. To curb this apprehension, the Court orders that the cheque in dispute No 968592 be sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur, for verification of signatures over it without any further delay and the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur, is directed to submit the verification report to the trial court, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the cheque in the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan, Jaipur. 26. 26. In view of the order passed in the main petition, the stay application and pending application/s, if any, also stand disposed of.