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2025 DIGILAW 483 (GUJ)

Mukeshbhai Virsangbhai Rathod v. State Of Gujarat

2025-06-17

CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY, D.M.VYAS

body2025
ORDER : CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY, J. 1. Aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 (herein after referred to as “the IPC”) in Sessions Case No. 32 of 2020 on the file of learned 2 nd Additional Sessions Judge, Anand at Khambhat dated 04.12.2024, the present appeal is preferred by the de facto complainant and the injured assailing the legality and validity of the judgment of acquittal for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. 2. As per the prosecution version, there was a land dispute between the family of de facto complainant and the accused Nos. 1 to 4 and therefore, the accused bore grudge against the family of the complainant, who is examined as PW-7. So, on 02.05.2018 at about 2:00 p.m., accused Nos. 1 to 4, armed with Dhariya (Scythe) came to the house of PW-7 and attacked him, his brother PW-8, his mother PW-9 and his father PW-10 and caused injuries to them with the said Dhariya. All the four injured sustained simple injuries on their head. It is stated that the accused attacked the injured and caused the said injuries with intention to commit murder of the said injured persons and with knowledge that the said injuries would result into their death. 3. On the report lodged by PW-7, a crime was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 307 , 324, 323, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC. The case was investigated and after completion of investigation, Charge-sheet was filed by the police against the accused for the aforesaid offences. 4. As the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the committal Court committed the said case to the Court of Sessions Division. Thereafter, it was made over to learned 2 nd Additional Sessions Judge, Anand at Khambhat for trial. The trial Court has framed the Charge for the offences punishable under Sections 307 , 324, 323, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC against the accused. The accused denied the said Charge and claimed to be tried. At the culmination of trial, the trial Court did not find the accused guilty for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC and thereby, acquitted them for the said charge. The accused denied the said Charge and claimed to be tried. At the culmination of trial, the trial Court did not find the accused guilty for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC and thereby, acquitted them for the said charge. The trial Court found the accused guilty for offences punishable under Sections 323 , 324, 325, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC and accordingly, convicted and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, the de facto complainant has preferred the instant appeal questioning the legality and validity of the said acquittal for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. 6. After considering the evidence on record and appreciation of the said evidence, the trial Court found that the accused attacked all the four injured with Dhariya and caused injuries to them on their head. So, the trial Court convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 323 , 324, 325, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC. But, the trial Court did not find that there was any intention on the part of the accused to commit murder of the injured or that they caused the said injuries with knowledge that it will result into the death of the injured. So, the trial Court has acquitted the accused of the charge for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. 7. We have carefully considered the evidence on record and scrutinized the same. We also do not find any evidence on record to prove and establish that the accused had any intention to commit murder of the injured in this case and that, with the said intention, they attacked the injured and caused injuries to them. We do not find any evidence on record also to prove that they attacked the injured with knowledge that the said injuries would result into death of the injured. 8. It is settled law that intention to cause death and to cause injury with the said intention or that the injury should be caused with requisite knowledge that it will result into death of the injured are the necessary ingredients as contemplated under Section 307 of the IPC to prove the charge for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. Direct evidence will seldom be available to prove the intention of a guilty a person as it is pertaining to the state of mind of the concerned person in doing the said act. Therefore, the intention, that is attributed, has to be ascertained, gathered, or inferred from the surrounding facts of the case or from the circumstances of the case. There is nothing to indicate on record from the evidence adduced in this case and from the facts of the case that the accused had any intention to cause murder of the injured in this case and with that intention, they have caused injuries to the injured. It is significant to note here that as per the medical evidence on record, though the weapon that was used in causing the said injuries is Dhariya (Scythe), that the said injuries caused to all the four injured persons in this case are simple in nature. They are not even grievous in nature. So, they are not fatal injuries that are caused to the injured in this case. Therefore, it is a circumstance that clearly rules out the allegation that the accused caused the said injuries to the injured with an intention to commit murder of them or that, they had any knowledge that the said injuries would result into the death of the injured. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that when the weapon like Dhariya (Scythe) is used which is a lethal weapon, the fact that the accused attacked the injured with intention to cause murder can be inferred from it and when the said injuries are caused on the vital part of the body i.e. head, that it can also be inferred that they had intention to commit murder of the injured. But, we are unable to countenance the said contention. The weapon that is used even if it is a dangerous weapon, that by itself is not a determining factor to prove or establish that the accused caused injuries to the injured with intention to commit murder of them. Therefore, the said contention holds no water. 10. The trial Court, after considering the facts of the case and the law on the subject with regard to the applicability of Section 307 of the IPC, clearly held at paragraph 19 as follows: “19. Therefore, the said contention holds no water. 10. The trial Court, after considering the facts of the case and the law on the subject with regard to the applicability of Section 307 of the IPC, clearly held at paragraph 19 as follows: “19. Now, the question arises as to whether offence under Section 307 IPC is made out against the accused or not. Section 307 IPC states that, "Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death". Hence to prove the offence under Section 307 IPC prosecution has to prove that, (1)- The accused did an act. (2) The act was done-a) with the intention of causing death, or (b) with the intention of,-(1) causing such bodily injury as the accused knew to be likely to Cause the death of the person to whom the harm was attempted to be caused, or (ii) causing bodily injured to a person and the bodily injury intended would have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or (ii) the act, if committed, would have been so imminently dangerous that would have in all probability caused death and the act was attempted without any justification for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.” 11. Then, the trial Court has also considered the relevant case law on the subject and held as follows at paragraph 20: “20. It is added here that in the case law titled as Pritam Singh Versus State Of Punjab 2010 (0) AIJEL-PH 1629171, it has been observed in the para numbers 30,33 34, 35 and 36 as:- 30. The complete reading of this provision would suggest that in order to convict a person under Section 307 IPC, the intention or the requisite knowledge to cause death are the essential ingredients. The complete reading of this provision would suggest that in order to convict a person under Section 307 IPC, the intention or the requisite knowledge to cause death are the essential ingredients. An attempt for purpose of Section 307 IPC should stem from a specific intention to commit murder. That means, an act though sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, would not constitute an offence under this Section, if the necessary intention or knowledge on the part of the accused is lacking. Thus, for the purpose of this offence, what is material, is the intention or knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out that intention. Intention and knowledge being a man's state of mind, cannot be proved by direct evidence thereof except through his own confession. In the absence of such a confession, intention and knowledge can only be proved by circumstantial evidence. These are the matters of inferences from all the facts and circumstances available on record. 33. There is another aspect of the matter which can be viewed from a different angle. As per medical evidence of PW5, there was a stab wound 2.5 x 1 cm on the left side of back of abdomen, 13cm above the hip bone. In addition to it, PW5 declared injury as could be dangerous to life as per operation notes. He did not operate PW1. It was PW6, who conducted the operation but he has not given his opinion with regard to the nature of injury that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature/life to cause death. The police did not obtain this indicated opinion from PW6, who actually conducted the operation for the reasons best known to it. On dissection, PW6 found a 5 cm long cut present on the cortex of left kidney on its outer surface which was stitched with chromic catgut. PW1 has explained in his cross-examination that he remained in the hospital for about 25 days. Therefore, the opinion in this regard by PW5 on the basis of operation notes and not by PW6, who actually conducted the operation, pales into insignificance. 34. Be that as it may, even PW5 has simply declared the injury; as could be dangerous to life. Therefore, the opinion in this regard by PW5 on the basis of operation notes and not by PW6, who actually conducted the operation, pales into insignificance. 34. Be that as it may, even PW5 has simply declared the injury; as could be dangerous to life. Meaning thereby, the words "dangerous to life" are equivalent to "endangering life" and such acts squarely covered within the ambit of clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC, which is punishable under Section 326 IPC. The distinction between the words "danger- ous to life" and "endangering life" came to be determined by a Division Bench of this Court in Atma Singh V/s. The State of Punjab, 1982(2) CLR 496 and it was held as under :- "Held, that the expression 'dangerous' is an adjective and the expression 'endanger' is verb. An injury which can put life in immediate danger of death would be an injury which can be termed as 'dangerous to life' and, therefore, when a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life', he means an injury which endangers life in term of clause 8 of Section 320, INDIAN PENAL CODE , for, it describes the injury 'dangerous to life' only for the purpose of the said clause. He instead of using the expression that this was an injury which 'endangered life' described it as 'dangerous to life', meaning both the time the same thing". 35. The same view was expressed by this Court in cases Tej Ram V/s. The State of Punjab, 1987(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 611:1978 (6) CLR, 76 and State of Punjab V/ s. Tara Singh, 1987(1) Recent Criminal Reports (Criminal) 184, that injury described by the doctor as 'dangerous to life' and if not treated i.e. to say that but for timely and medical aid the injured was likely to die. Such type ,of injury/opinion is not the type of the injury as would attract the provisions of Section 307 IPC, which envisages an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, such injury would fall within the ambit of clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC, would be punishable under Section 326 IPC and in view of such opinion, charge under Section 307 IPC cannot be sustained. The law laid down in the aforesaid judgments mutatis-mutandis, is applicable to the facts of this case. 36. The law laid down in the aforesaid judgments mutatis-mutandis, is applicable to the facts of this case. 36. Therefore, it is held that appellant-Pritam Singh did not intend to attempt to commit murder of PW1, but he only intended to and caused the grievous injury. He cannot possibly be held guilty of an attempt to murder with the offence prescribed under Section 307 IPC. This act of appellant- Pritam Singh squarely falls within the ambit of clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC, which is punishable under Section 326 IPC. To this extent, the trial court appears to have gone legally wrong in this relevant connection.” 12. In the first judgment that is referred and cited by the trial Court in Pritam Singh’s case , it was a case where a lethal weapon is used and stab wounds are caused on the left side of back of abdomen. The medical evidence also shows that the said injuries are dangerous to life. Yet, it was held in the said judgment that the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC was not made out as the intention to commit murder or knowledge that the said injuries would result into death, is not established. The present case stands on a better footing. In the case on hand, injury is caused on the head of the injured and that too, a simple injury. 13. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that no offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC is made out against the accused, is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record and also the law on the subject. It does not suffer from any legal infirmity which warrants interference in this appeal. No case is made out, much less, any prima facie case, even to admit the case. 14. Therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed, at the admission stage.