JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna, J. These writ appeals are filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court, 1958, by the respective petitioners in W.P.(C) Nos.2372, 4495 and 4550 of 2025. They filed those writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging their respective transfer orders. The appellant in W.A. No.192 of 2025 is working as Assistant Manager at the Regional Office of the respondent Bank in Ernakulam. As per the transfer order dated 10.01.2025, he was transferred to the Regional Office, Ahmedabad. The appellant in W.A. No.358 of 2025, who is working as Manager I-Line in the Kollengode Branch of the respondent Bank, was transferred to Ludhiana Region in Punjab as per the order dated 10.01.2025. The appellant in W.A. No.361 of 2025, who is working as Assistant Manager in Kozhikode main branch was transferred to the Regional Office , Lucknow, as per the order issued on the very same day. As per the impugned judgments dated 21.01.2025 in W.P.(C)No.2372 of 2025 and 07.02.2025 in the remaining two writ petitions, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions holding that transfer and posting are the subject matter better left to the discretion of the competent authority, and the Court should loath to interfere in the transfer and posting of the employees. As far as the order of punishment imposed on the appellants in the disciplinary proceedings is concerned, the learned Single Judge directed the 4 th respondent therein to decide the appeal filed by the appellant in W.A.No.192 of 2025 expeditiously, preferably within one month from the date of that judgment. The appellants in W.A. Nos.358 and 361 of 2025 are granted liberty to file statutory appeal before the 2 nd respondent therein within 10 days and the 2 nd respondent was directed to decide the appeal expeditiously, preferably within one month from the date of filing of the appeal. 2. Heard the learned counsels appearing for the appellants and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 3. The learned counsels appearing for the appellants argued that against the disciplinary proceedings initiated against them, the appellants filed statutory appeals. The appeal filed by the appellant in W.A. No.192 of 2025 was already rejected by the Appellate Authority. However, the statutory appeals filed by the remaining two appellants are under consideration. 3. The learned counsels appearing for the appellants argued that against the disciplinary proceedings initiated against them, the appellants filed statutory appeals. The appeal filed by the appellant in W.A. No.192 of 2025 was already rejected by the Appellate Authority. However, the statutory appeals filed by the remaining two appellants are under consideration. It is in the course of disciplinary proceedings the appellants were transferred to distant places as a punishment. In fact, in pursuance of the disciplinary proceedings, punishment of reduction in the scale of pay was imposed on them. Hence, their transfer to distant places is a dual punishment for the same disciplinary action. 4. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents argued that the disciplinary proceedings culminated in the reduction in the salary of the appellants and the transfer was effected due to administrative reasons and it has nothing to do with disciplinary proceedings. 5. The materials on record would show that the appellants were punished in the disciplinary proceedings by a reduction in the scale of pay. The allegation against the appellant in W.A. No.192 of 2025 is that he accessed confidential files of the Bank without necessary authorisation and shared it in various WhatsApp groups, including the individuals outside the bank’s authorized personnel. The allegation against the appellant in W.A. No.358 of 2025 is that he has posted unwanted and defaming messages in the WhatsApp groups for the officials of the Bank against the Regional Administrative Institution with the intention to provoke and mislead the other officials of the Region. The allegation against the appellant in W.A. No.361 of 2025 is that he has not fulfilled the official duties entrusted to him and during the Review meeting, he argued with the Chief Regional Manager in the presence of Regional Office Officials and Second Line Manager and behaved in an undisciplined manner. 6. Based on these allegations, enquiry proceedings were initiated and punishment was imposed on the appellants. 7. It is true that the appellants are transferred to different places by the respective orders of transfer. But there is nothing on record to say that these orders of transfer were issued as a punitive measure. 8. It is trite that whether an employee is to be transferred to a different division, etc, are matter for the employer to consider, depending upon the administrative necessities. But there is nothing on record to say that these orders of transfer were issued as a punitive measure. 8. It is trite that whether an employee is to be transferred to a different division, etc, are matter for the employer to consider, depending upon the administrative necessities. The power to transfer an employee in a transferable service is within the prerogative of the employer. It is the employer who knows best where an employee should be deployed for an effective discharge of his or her duties for the establishment. The inconveniences caused to the employee and his family consequent to the transfer are not sufficient to interfere with the orders of transfer. Generally, the Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere in the orders of transfer of an employee issued by the employer, for administrative reasons, as it will adversely affect the smooth functioning of that institution. The circumstance under which the Court can interfere with the orders of transfer is laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in several judgments. 9. In Union of India v. S.L Abbas [ (1993) 4 SCC 357 ] the Apex Court held thus: “Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration.” (emphasis supplied) 10. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd v. Shri Bhagwan [ (2001) 8 SCC 574 ] the Apex Court held thus: “It is by now well-settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of public Undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the Management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.” (emphasis supplied) 11. In Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and others [2024 SCC Online SC 279] the Apex Court held thus: “15. In view of the foregoing enunciation of law by judicial decisions of this Court, it is clear that in absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegations are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. In the sequel of the said settled norms, the scope of judicial review is not permissible by the Courts in exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” (emphasis supplied) 12. This Court in Mayadevi M.P and another v. Canara Bank and others [ 2015 (4) KHC 874 ] held that an order of transfer cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the absence of any specific allegation of mala fides or at least a prima facie proof of vitiating circumstances influencing that order of transfer. It is far too late in the day to assert that, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with an order of transfer of an employee as if it is sitting in appeal over such an order issued by the employer. The scope of judicial review in this area is very limited. Unless mala fides or oblique motives are specifically pleaded or can necessarily be inferred from the proof of facts, this Court cannot interfere with an order of transfer of an employee. Therefore, a mere assertion in the writ petition that, the orders of transfer are 'vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides', cannot therefore sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives. Therefore, a mere assertion in the writ petition that, the orders of transfer are 'vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides', cannot therefore sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives. The concept being basically different, this Court cannot even draw an inference that the order of transfer issued by the employer is vitiated by mala fides or on extraneous considerations or with oblique motives, unless it is specifically pleaded in the writ petition with reliable materials, which are sufficient to draw an inference of any vitiating circumstances influencing such an order of transfer. 13. Again, in Nixy James v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [ 2023 (3) KLT 893 ] , this Court held that law is too well settled that transfer is an incidence of service and the employee has no legal right in this behalf. It is also well settled that, unless the orders of transfer are vitiated by statutory violations or mala fides, Courts should be loathed in interfering with the same. 14. In the instant writ petitions, it is not specifically pleaded that the transfer orders of the appellants are vitiated by mala fides. As said above, it is the employer who is the best person to decide where the service of the employee would be necessary for better administration of the institutions concerned. No specific statutory violation could be pointed out by the appellants in their orders of transfer. So also, they could not plead and prove that their transfer orders are vitiated by malafides. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned judgments of the learned Single Judge. In the result, the writ appeals stand dismissed.