JUDGMENT : (Bipin C. Negi, J.) The present petitioner has been filed seeking a following relief:- (i). The impugned/order dated 24.12.2019 in CMA No. 2-G/2019 (CNR HP KA010062042018) Annexure P-5 passed by the learned Additional District Judge- II, Kangra at Dharamshala Circuit Court at Jawali, may kindly be quashed and set aside by allowing the present petitioner. 2. Heard counsel for the parties. Perused the pleadings. 3. The present petitioners were the defendants before the trial Court. The suit filed for permanent prohibitory injunction by the present respondent/plaintiff before the trial Court on 07.07.2009 was decreed vide judgment dated 28.12.2017. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid, judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, an appropriate appeal was filed before the 1 st Appellate Court, however, in the filing of the appeal, there was a delay of more than one year. Hence, for condonation of delay on filing the appeal before the 1 st Appellate Court, an application under Section 5 was filed. 5. In the application filed for condonation of delay, it was pleaded by the present petitioner that most of the petitioners are serving outside in order to eke out a livelihood. It was further submitted that some of the applicants are ladies whose domain is their households. Other than the aforesaid, it was pleaded that the present respondent was assuring the petitioners for a compromise and as such, the appeal could not be filed within time. 6. It is further pleaded in the application that it is only when an execution was filed for implementing the judgment and decree dated 28.12.2017 passed by the trial Court and summons were received by the present petitioners, on receipt of the same, a certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree dated 28.12.2017 was applied for 1.1.2018. The same was received on 07.12.2018. Immediately thereafter, an appeal was got drafted and filed. 7. In response to the aforesaid averments, it is categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioners No. 2 to 3 and 9 as well as their counsel was appearing in the ld. Lower Court on each and every day for hearing. It is further categorically stated in the response to the application that on the date which the suit was decreed in favour of the present respondent, all the aforesaid were present in the Court. Lower Court on each and every day for hearing. It is further categorically stated in the response to the application that on the date which the suit was decreed in favour of the present respondent, all the aforesaid were present in the Court. Insofar as the aspect of compromise is concerned, it was categorically stated by the respondent in his response that since the present petitioners did not compromise with the respondent on that terms and conditions, therefore compromise could not fructified. 8. In the aforesaid backdrop, vide impugned judgment dated 24.12.2019, the 1 st Appellate Court had dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay. The sole contention raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners is that in the case at hand insofar as the impugned judgment and decree dated 28.12.2017 is concerned, the petitioners had applied for a copy of the same on 1.1.2018, however, certified copy of the same was provided to them on 7.12.2018. Immediately thereafter the present application alongwith the appeal was drafted on 7.12.2018. In the aforesaid backdrop, it is contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that applying for a copy on 1.1.2018, no time was fixed by the copying agency either as to the date when the copy would be ready and when the same would be delivered to the applicant. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the time required for obtaining the copy should be counted up to the date when the copy was actually delivered on 7.12.2018. To support his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment reported in ILR 1975 Himachal Series 237. Relevant extract whereof is reproduced hereinbelow:- “3. Now we have to see as to which is the time requisite for obtaining the copy whether it is only the time upto the preparation of the copy or the date on which the copy is actually delivered. I have seen the application. There is no order passed by the Copying Agency as to when the copy would be ready for delivery so as to fix the knowledge on the part of the petitioner to go and collect the copy on that particular date. I have seen the application. There is no order passed by the Copying Agency as to when the copy would be ready for delivery so as to fix the knowledge on the part of the petitioner to go and collect the copy on that particular date. No rules have been shown by the learned counsel for the respondent as to which is the requisite time for supplying of the copy, whether it is the date on which the copy is ready or it is the date on which the copy actually was delivered or collected by the applicant. In my opinion, if the petitioner was instructed to attend the Court on a particular date to ascertain whether the copy was ready and the petitioner did not attend to obtain the copy on that date then it must be held that the day beyond that cannot be deducted from the limitation period as time requisite for obtaining the copy. In the instant case no time was fixed by the Copying Agency either as to the date when the copy would be ready and when the same would be delivered to the applicant. Therefore, in my opinion, the time requisite for obtaining the copy would be counted upto the date when the copy was actually delivered. It is in fact the omission on the part of the Copying Agency to inform the applicant as to the date when he should have gone to take the delivery of the copy. Therefore, in these circumstances the entire period from the date of the application to the date of the delivery of the copy must be excluded as the time for obtaining the copy”. 9. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has submitted that the aforesaid judgment is clearly distinguishable as at time of the passing of the said judgment, there were no rules in vogue, however, presently insofar as the copying agency is concerned, their exits the Himachal Pradesh Civil and Criminal Courts (preparation and supply of copies of records) Rules, 2000 (hereinafter for purpose of remedy referred as rules). Attention is specifically invited to Rules 13, 14, 15, 16(c) 22, 23, 24 which reads as follows:- 13. Attention is specifically invited to Rules 13, 14, 15, 16(c) 22, 23, 24 which reads as follows:- 13. Scrutiny of application - on receipt of an application, the copying agent shall scrutinize it as to whether:- (a) The copy applied for can be supplied under these rules; (b) The application given the necessary particulars for tracing the record. 14. Rejection of application:- If an application is rejected or is not in order or if for any reason it is not possible to prepare the copy asked fro, the application be filed after being kept pending for fifteen days. 15. Examiner to be consulted in case of doubt. If it is clear that the copy can be supplied as a matter of routine and the application is in order, the Copying Agent shall give notice to the applicant calling upon him to furnish the approximate requisite court fee stamps as calculated by him within three days in the case of urgent application and w within seven days in the case of ordinary application. If the stamps are not furnished within the aforesaid time, the application shall be struck off. 16. Copy is ordered to be prepared by Copying Agency.- If a copy is ordered to be prepared, the Copying Agency shall.- (c) issue receipt of the application in the form Annexure- C, specifying the date when copy is likely to be ready for delivery: 22. Particulars to be endorsed on copy. After a copy has been prepared but before it is revised and attested the following particulars shall be endorsed thereon:- (a) the number of the application in the register in form Annexure-B; (b) the date of presentation of the application for a copy: (c) the name of the Copyist: (d) the date on which the copy was completed: (e) the date on which the copy was examined; (f) the date on which the copy was attested; (g) purpose for which the copy is applied for; (h) the number of words or pages: (1) 1. The cost of the copy as prescribed in the schedule annexed to these rules; 2. Urgent fee; 3. Search fee: 4. Date of delivery: 23. Delay in preparation of copy. A copy shall be ordinarily read by the 10th working day of the receipt of application. However an urgent copy shall be ready within the next three working days. 24. The cost of the copy as prescribed in the schedule annexed to these rules; 2. Urgent fee; 3. Search fee: 4. Date of delivery: 23. Delay in preparation of copy. A copy shall be ordinarily read by the 10th working day of the receipt of application. However an urgent copy shall be ready within the next three working days. 24. Application to be given next date if the copy is not ready on appointed day. The applicant shall be entitled to have his copy furnished to him, as far as possible, on the day appointed for delivery of the copy if, for any reason it is not ready for delivery by the appointed day the Copying Agent shall give another date for its delivery on the receipt (Annexure-C) presented by the applicant shall also make corresponding entry in the Register Annexure-B as well as the counterfoil of the receipt.” 10. From a perusal of the Rules to which a reference has been made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, it is evident that normally a copy is to be prepared by 10 th working day of the receipt of application (other than an urgent copy which is to be prepared within three working days). Since in the year 2000, their exist rules for supplying of copies by the copying agency, in view thereof, judgment whereupon reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners is clearly distinguishable. Even otherwise, the contention now has been sought to be raised by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners was not the explanation offered for condonation of delay in the application filed for condoning the delay. Want of diligence or inaction is a writ large in the case at hand. 11. In what cases can Want of ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ be attributed to an applicant it would be appropriate to refer to Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, (2009) 11 SCC 183 : “Want of ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent.” 12. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent.” 12. After filing an application for receipt of the certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the lis which was expected with the petitioners was to pursue their application so filed before the concerned copying agency. 13. The length of delay is immaterial. The condonation of delay is a discretionary power. Exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of cause shown and the degree of its acceptability thereof. The expression “sufficient cause” is to be duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on its part (Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 ). 14. The Court must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer a judgment reported as Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v. Union of India and Another, 2023 (10) SCC 531 . The relevant extract of the same are as under: “…...Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.” 15. For the reasons offered in the application in the case at hand cannot be termed to be “explanation” what is being stated in the application for condonation of delay in the case at hand can at best in terms of an “Excuse”. 16. Other than the aforesaid it would be appropriate to refer to case reported as Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 for the legal propositions laid therein qua law of limitation:- “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 14. 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.” 17. In view of the aforesaid, the petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.