JUDGMENT : MANISH CHOUDHURY, J. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred inter-alia to assail an Order dated 23.08.2022 passed in Misc. [J] Case no. 44/2022, arising out of Misc. [Election] Petition no. 5/2022, by the learned District Judge, Sonitpur at Tezpur. By the Order dated 23.08.2022, the learned District Judge dismissed the application, Misc. [J] Case no. 44/2022, which was preferred by the present writ petitioner as the applicant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of the period of delay which had occurred in filing an election petition, which was registered and numbered as Misc. [Election] Petition no.5/2022. 2. The preceding events which have led the writ petitioner to prefer the writ petition can be exposited, in brief, at first. 3. On 09.02.2022, the State Government issued a Notification for election of ward commissioners to the Municipal Boards in the entire State of Assam. Dhekiajuli Municipal Board was one of the Municipal Boards where elections for the ward commissioners were to be held. The petitioner being a Scheduled Castes [SC] category candidate, desired to contest the election for the ward commissioner from Ward no. 10, Dhekiajuli Municipal Board. The petitioner was a nominated candidate of the political party, Indian National Congress and submitted her nomination papers accordingly, on 15.02.2022. Similarly, the respondent no. 5 submitted her nomination papers for contesting the post of ward commissioner from Ward no. 10 as a nominated candidate of another political party, Bharatiya Janata Party. The respondent no. 5 had claimed to have belonged to Other Backward Classes [OBC]category. 4. The petitioner has stated that after filing of the nomination papers by the petitioner, the respondent no. 5 and other candidates on or before the last date of submission on 15.02.2022, the nomination papers were scrutinized. It is the case of the petitioner that as per Clause [10] of the nomination form, a candidate had to submit his/her HSLC/HS Pass Certificate along with the nomination papers. The stage of scrutiny of the nomination papers was over on 17.02.2022. The nomination papers of the respondent no. 5 were accepted as valid after scrutiny. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner submitted written complaints on 17.02.2022 and on 19.02.2022 before the Magistrate In-Charge/Returning Officer, Dhekiajuli Municipal Board election challenging the caste certificate and the documents pertaining to the academic qualification of the respondent no. 5. The nomination papers of the respondent no. 5 were accepted as valid after scrutiny. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner submitted written complaints on 17.02.2022 and on 19.02.2022 before the Magistrate In-Charge/Returning Officer, Dhekiajuli Municipal Board election challenging the caste certificate and the documents pertaining to the academic qualification of the respondent no. 5. The grounds, according to the petitioner, for submission of the written complaints were that the respondent no. 5 had submitted false and fabricated documents and the said fact came to the knowledge of the petitioner from a reliable source. But, the Magistrate In-Charge/Returning Officer did not act on those written complaints. The petitioner had alleged that the Magistrate In-Charge/Returning Officer improperly accepted the nomination papers of the respondent no. 5, which were filed with false and fabricated documents. 5. It is not in dispute that election for the Dhekiajuli Municipal Board was held on 06.03.2022 and the results of the election for various wards were declared on 09.03.2022. In respect of the election for Ward no. 10, the respondent no. 5 was declared as the returned candidate, meaning thereby, the petitioner was an unsuccessful candidate. 6. As the petitioner had the belief that the respondent no. 5 was not eligible to contest the election, the petitioner in order to obtain information with regard to such ineligibility of the respondent no. 5, submitted an application before the State Public Information Officer [SPIO] & Assistant Commissioner, Tezpur under the Right to Information Act, 2005 [‘the RTI Act’, for short] on 28.03.2022. The SPIO had, in turn, forwarded the said application of the petitioner to the Executive Officer, Dhekiajuli Municipal Board on 29.03.2022 under Section 6[3] of the RTI Act to provide the information sought for by the petitioner within the stipulated time period of thirty days. The petitioner has stated that the Executive Officer, Dhekiajuli Municipal Board had, however, failed to furnish the information/documents sought for by the petitioner within the stipulated period of thirty days. It was only on 17.06.2022, the petitioner could to obtain the information/ documents sought for by her under the provisions of the RTI Act. 7. It is the case of the petitioner that on getting the information/ documents, the petitioner got assured that the respondent no. 5 did not submit her academic qualification certificate along with her nomination papers and had only made a declaration that she [the respondent no. 7. It is the case of the petitioner that on getting the information/ documents, the petitioner got assured that the respondent no. 5 did not submit her academic qualification certificate along with her nomination papers and had only made a declaration that she [the respondent no. 5] had passed the HSLC Examination from Udalguri Girls’ Higher Secondary School in the year 1997. The petitioner also got assured of the fact that the OBC caste certificate submitted by the petitioner was illegally obtained on 27.12.2019. It is the further case of the petitioner that since the respondent no. 5 belongs to Brahmin family, from the side of her parents as well as in-laws, the respondent no. 5 could not have procured a caste certificate as an OBC candidate. The petitioner also got the information from Udalguri Girls’ Higher Secondary School that no candidate with the name of the respondent no. 5 had passed the HSLC Examination from the School in the year 1997. 8. The petitioner had, thereafter, filed an election petition before the District Judge, Sonitpur at Tezpur on 07.07.2022. The election petition so filed, was registered and numbered as Misc. [Election] Petition no. 5/2022. Along with the election petition, the petitioner had also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of the period of delay, which had occurred in filing the election petition on 07.07.2022. The application for condonation of delay was registered and numbered as Misc. [J] Case no. 44/2022. 9. The learned District Judge had considered the application, Misc. [J] Case no. 44/2022. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and upon consideration of the materials on record, the learned District Judge by the impugned Order dated 23.08.2022 dismissed the application for condonation of delay primarily on the ground that any period of delay beyond twenty-one days could not be condoned in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Holding so, the application had been dismissed by the Order dated 23.08.2022. Assailing the same, the instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner. 10. I have heard Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. B.J. Talukdar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. P.K. Medhi, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 3; Mr. R. Dubey, learned Standing Counsel, Assam State Election Commission [ASEC] for the respondent no. 2; Mr. 10. I have heard Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. B.J. Talukdar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. P.K. Medhi, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 3; Mr. R. Dubey, learned Standing Counsel, Assam State Election Commission [ASEC] for the respondent no. 2; Mr. B. Buragohain, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4; and Mr. P. Bora, learned counsel for the respondent no. 5. 11. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as per Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956, an election petition should ordinarily, be filed by an unsuccessful candidate within a period of twenty-one days after the date of declaration of results of the election. It is his contention that as per the second proviso to Rule 104A of the corresponding Rules to the Assam Municipal Act, 1956, Section 4, Section 9 & Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply mutatis mutandis. The petitioner was prevented by the act of non-furnishing the information/documents sought for by the application under the RTI Act by the SPIO in time and it was only on 17.06.2022, the information/documents sought for by the petitioner were provided to her. After receipt of the information/documents regarding ineligibility of the respondent no. 5 on 17.06.2022, the petitioner had filed the election petition on 07.07.2022, which was within a period of twenty-one days from 17.06.2022. It is submitted by him that the object behind the election petition is to advance the cause of justice and no party should ordinarily, be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. It is ex-facie evident from the facts presented in the election petition that the respondent no. 5 was ineligible to contest the election for ward commissioner due to lack of academic qualification to contest the election and for submission of a fake and fabricated caste certificate. He has submitted that the learned District Judge had erred in holding that an application for condonation of delay of any period beyond twenty-one days is not maintainable. It is his submission that when cause of substantive right is involved, an application for condonation of delay ought not to be dismissed on the technical ground of limitation, so as to advance the cause of justice and it is the substantive justice which prevails. 11.1. To buttress his submissions, Mr. It is his submission that when cause of substantive right is involved, an application for condonation of delay ought not to be dismissed on the technical ground of limitation, so as to advance the cause of justice and it is the substantive justice which prevails. 11.1. To buttress his submissions, Mr. Das has referred to the decisions in Kailash vs. Nanhku, [2005] 5 SCC 480; Uday Shankar Triyar vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, [2006] 1 SCC 75; Lakshmi & another vs. Chinnammal @ Rayyammal & others, [2009]13 SCC 25; and Abdul Aziz & others vs. Salema Bewa, 2016 [1] GLT 465. 12. Mr. Bora, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 5 has supported the reasonings recorded by the learned District Judge in the Order dated 23.08.2022. He has submitted that no election petition beyond the period of twenty-one days from the date of declaration the results could have been entertained under Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 by condoning any period of delay beyond such twenty-one days. In such view of the matter, the learned District Judge was right in holding that the application, Misc. [J] Case no. 44/2022 was not maintainable. It is his contention that by the second proviso to Rule 104-A of the Rules, only the provisions of Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 of the Limitation Act have been made applicable. As only the said three provisions have been made applicable, it is a clear indication that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an election petition filed under Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act to condone any period of delay. 12.1. In support of his submissions, Mr. Bora has referred to the decisions of this Court in Aslima Khatun vs. State of Assam and others, [2014] 5 GLR 442; and Arpana Das vs. Derhasat Basumatary, 2018 [2] GLT 1040. 13. Mr. Talukdar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State respondents has submitted that no interference is called for in this writ petition. It is his submission that by the provisions of the Assam Municipal Act and the rules framed thereunder, only a few provisions, other than Section 5 of the Limitation Act have been made applicable. It cannot, therefore, be construed that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be made applicable. The Assam Municipal Act being a special Act, is self-contained code. It cannot, therefore, be construed that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be made applicable. The Assam Municipal Act being a special Act, is self-contained code. It is his submission that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner pertain to the general law and none of the decisions is on the point of special law vis-à-vis general law. 14. I have duly considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. I have gone through the materials brought on record by the parties through their pleadings. I have considered the decisions cited at the bar. 15. The contentions of the parties are based on the provisions of Section 16 and Section 18 of the Assam Municipal Act and Rule 101 to Rule 104-A of the Rules for the Election of Commissioners of Municipal Boards, framed under the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 [‘the Rules’, for short]. 16. Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act has provided that if the validity of an election of a commissioner is brought in question by an unsuccessful candidate or person qualified to vote at the election to which such question refers, such person may, at any time within twenty-one days after the date of the declaration of the result of the election, file a petition in the prescribed manner before the District Judge of the district within which the election has been or should have been held. 17. The first proviso to Section 16 has provided that the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer, as the case may be, may be authorised by the State Government to receive election petitions on behalf of the District Judge for transmission to him. The second proviso to Section 16 has mentioned grounds on which an election cannot be questioned. As per the second proviso to Section 16, the validity of such election petition shall not be questioned in any such petition, [a] on the ground that the name of any person qualified to vote has been omitted from the electoral roll; or [b] on the ground that the name of any person not qualified to vote has been inserted in the electoral roll; or [c] on the ground of acceptance or refusal of nomination of candidates. The third proviso to Section 16 has provided further that an appeal in the manner prescribed shall lie to the District Judge against such acceptance or refusal of nomination. 18. Section 17 of the Assam Municipal Act has provided for the procedure and powers of the District Judge for holding enquiry in the event of filing of a petition under Section 16. Section 18 of the Assam Municipal Act has provided the power to the District Judge to declare election of a candidate as void, which declaration is to be made after holding an enquiry in the manner mentioned therein. 19. The State Government has also framed a set of rules, ‘Rules for the Election of Commissioners of Municipal Boards under the Assam Municipal Act, 1956’ [‘the Rules’, for short], framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 301 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956. 20. Rule 101 of the Rules has provided for election petitions. As per Rule 101, no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provision of Section. Rule 104-A of the Rules has been referred to by the learned counsel for the parties. Rule 104-A is quoted hereinbelow, for ready reference :- 104-A. Every appeal under [c] of the second proviso to Section 16 of the Act, shall be, - [i] in the form of memorandum signed by the appellant and verified in the manner prescribed for verification of pleading in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and presented by the appellant or his leader or by his duly authorised agent; [ii] accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed from; and [iii] presented to the District Judge within a period of seven days from the date of acceptance or refusal of nomination; Provided that such memorandum of appeal may also be presented to the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer as the case may be within the periods of limitation for transmission to the District Judge : Provided further that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation the provisions of Sections 4, 9 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 [Act X of1908] shall apply mutatis mutandis. 21. From a close reading of Rule 104-A, it can be noticed that it specifically mentions of an appeal under Clause [c] of the second proviso to Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act. 21. From a close reading of Rule 104-A, it can be noticed that it specifically mentions of an appeal under Clause [c] of the second proviso to Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act. When Rule 104-A of the Rules is read together with Clause [c] of the second proviso to Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act, it is clear that an appeal also lies on the ground of either acceptance or refusal of nomination of candidates. Such an appeal shall be in the form of memorandum signed as per Clause [i] of Rule 104-A and it should be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appeal from, as provided in Clause [ii] of Rule 104-A. Clause [ii] of Rule 104-A has provided a period of limitation by stating that a memorandum of appeal questioning either acceptance or refusal of nomination is to be presented to the District Judge within a period of seven days from the date of acceptance or refusal of nomination. The first proviso to Rule 104-A has provided that the memorandum of appeal may also be presented to the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer, as the case may be, within the period of limitation for transmission to the District Judge. The second proviso to Rule 104-A has provided that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the provisions of Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 [Act IX of 1908] shall apply mutatis mutandis. 22. Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provided that where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expired on a day when the court was closed, the suit, appeal or application could be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopened. Section 9 provided that where once time had begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue would stop it. Section 12 prescribed for exclusion of time in legal proceedings. Section 12[1] stipulated that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period was to be reckoned shall be excluded. Similar exclusion was provided in the subsequent sub-sections of Section 12. The corresponding sections of the Limitation Act, 1963, that is, Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 are pari material to Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Similar exclusion was provided in the subsequent sub-sections of Section 12. The corresponding sections of the Limitation Act, 1963, that is, Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 are pari material to Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 23. It may be relevant to note that the Limitation Act, 1908 has been replaced by the Limitation Act, 1963 [Act 36 of 1963]. Reference has been made in Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 in Rule 104-A of the Rules. Thus, the provisions of Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 are made applicable or assuming that the provisions of Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are made applicable to an appeal lying under Clause [c] of the second proviso to Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act, it cannot be assumed, in absence of specific provision in the Assam Municipal Act, that the said provisions have been made applicable also to an application under the main enacting clause of Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act. Even to an appeal under Clause [c] of the second proviso to Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act, Rule 104-A has not provided that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 or for that matter, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been made applicable to an appeal under Clause [c] of the second proviso to Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act. Thus, it is clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 or Section of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not specifically made applicable to an appeal under the main enacting clause of Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act. 24. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908/1963 as prescribed had/has provided for extension of prescribed period in certain cases. As per Section 5, any appeal or any application, as mentioned therein, may be admitted after the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant/applicant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal/application within the prescribed period of limitation. 25. As per Section 5, any appeal or any application, as mentioned therein, may be admitted after the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant/applicant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal/application within the prescribed period of limitation. 25. The sole issue which has arisen for consideration in the case in hand is whether a application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of any period of delay beyond twenty-one days from the date of declaration of the results of election for ward commissioner is maintainable under the provisions of the Assam Municipal Act and the Rules framed thereunder. From Section 5, it is discernible that if the court is satisfied that the appellant/applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or not making the application within the period of limitation, the court may admit the same after the prescribed period of limitation. 26. Admittedly, the results of the election for the ward commissioners of Dhekiajuli Municipal Board including Ward no. 10 were declared on 09.03.2022 and as per the results, the respondent no. 5 was declared elected from Ward no. 10. The petitioner was found to have spent the time period from 09.03.2022 to 17.06.2022 to collect the information/documents with regard to the alleged ineligibility of the respondent no. 5 to contest the election for ward commissioner on the points of not possessing requisite qualification and of obtaining a fake and fabricated Caste Certificate. The petitioner has pleaded that the nomination papers were submitted on 15.02.2022 and the nomination papers were scrutinised on 17.02.2022. At the time, the petitioner had the notion that the nomination papers of the respondent no. 5 was to be rejected on the ground of her ineligibility to contest the election. The petitioner has stated that she submitted written complaints before the authorities on 17.02.2022 and 19.02.2022 respectively. But, the authorities, more particularly, the Magistrate In-Charge/Returning Officer, Dhekiajuli Municipal Board election did not take cognizance on those complaints. 27. Since the nomination of the respondent no. 5 was accepted by the Magistrate In-Charge/Returning Officer, Dhekiajuli Municipal Board election on 17.02.2022, the petitioner had option to prefer an appeal under Clause [c] of the second proviso to Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act within a period of seven days from 17.02.2022. But, the petitioner did not opt for preferring such an appeal at that point of time. But, the petitioner did not opt for preferring such an appeal at that point of time. Had such an appeal been preferred within the period of seven days by the petitioner before the District Judge, the decision of acceptance or rejection of the nomination of the respondent no. 5 could have been decided by the District Judge at that point of time. 28. At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under :- 29. Savings.— [1] Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 [9 of 1872]. [2] Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 [inclusive] shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. [3] Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law. [4] Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of ‘easement’ in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 [5 of 1882], may for the time being extend. 29. Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908 used to provide as under :- 29. Savings.— [1] Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872 [IX of 1872]. [2] Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that schedule, and for the purpose of determinating any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law. [a] the provisions contained in Section 4, Section 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and [b] the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. [3] Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Divorce Act [IV of 1869]. [4] Sections 26 and 27 and the definition of ‘easement’ in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Easements Act, 1882 [V of 1882], may for the time being extend. 30. Since the Limitation Act, 1908 is no longer in force, it is the Limitation Act, 1963, which can only be made applicable to the proceedings in question. The provisions contained in Section 29 of the Limitation Act deals with savings. Where any special law or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period when a period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special law or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to Section 24 [inclusive] shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. 31. It is settled proposition that if on examination of the relevant provisions of the Act and/or the Rules under examination it is found that the provisions of the Limitation Act are expressly excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be brought in for assistance to condone the delay under the Special Act. 32. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs. Lalit Narain Mishra , [1974] 2 SCC 133 , the question arose in connection with an election petition in the context of the Representation of the People Act [‘the R.P. Act’]. Section 81 of the R.P. Act has prescribed that an election petition has to be preferred within the period prescribed therein. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining the issue, has found the provision to be mandatory and non-compliance of its means dismissal of the election petition. Section 81 of the R.P. Act has prescribed that an election petition has to be preferred within the period prescribed therein. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining the issue, has found the provision to be mandatory and non-compliance of its means dismissal of the election petition. While explaining the applicability of the provisions contained in Section 29[2] of the Limitation Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :- 17. Though Section 29[2] of the Limitation Act has been made applicable to appeals both under the Act as well as under the Code of Criminal Procedure, no case has been brought to our notice where Section 29[2] has been made applicable to an election petition filed under Section 81 of the Act by virtue of which either Sections 4, 5 or 12 of the Limitation Act has been attracted. Even assuming that where a period of limitation has not been fixed for election petitions in the Schedule to the Limitation Act which is different from that fixed under Section 81 of the Act, Section 29[2] would be attracted, and what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this Section are expressly excluded in the case of an election petition. It is contended before us that the words ‘expressly excluded’ would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual the meaning given in the Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. The provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act that a suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed are provided for in Section 86 of the Act which gives a peremptory command that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 or 117. It will be seen that Section 81 is not the only Section mentioned in Section 86, and if the Limitation Act were to apply to an election petition under Section 81 it should equally apply to Sections 82 and 117 because under Section 86 the High Court cannot say that by an application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Section 81 is complied with while no such benefit is available in dismissing an application for non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 82 and 117 of the Act, or alternatively if the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to Section 82 and Section 117 of the Act, it cannot be said that they apply to Section 81. Again Section 6 of the Limitation Act which provides for the extension of the period of limitation till after the disability in the case of a person who is either a minor or insane or an idiot is inapplicable to an election petition. Similarly, Sections 7 to 24 are in terms inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act, particularly in respect of the filing of election petitions and their trial. 18. It was sought to be contended that only those provisions of the Limitation Act which are applicable to the nature of the proceedings under the Act, unless expressly excluded, would be attracted. Similarly, Sections 7 to 24 are in terms inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act, particularly in respect of the filing of election petitions and their trial. 18. It was sought to be contended that only those provisions of the Limitation Act which are applicable to the nature of the proceedings under the Act, unless expressly excluded, would be attracted. But this is not what Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act says, because it provides that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. If none of them are excluded, all of them would become applicable. Whether those Sections are applicable is not determined by the terms of those Sections, but by their applicability or inapplicability to the proceedings under the special or local law. A person who is a minor or is insane or is an idiot cannot file an election petition to challenge an election, nor is there any provision in the Act for legal representation of an election petitioner or respondent in that petition who dies, in order to make Section 16 of the Limitation Act applicable. The applicability of these provisions has, therefore, to be Judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Act relating to the filing of election petitions and their trial to ascertain whether it is a complete code in itself which does not admit of the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act mentioned in Section 29(2) of that Act. 33. From the above observation in Hukumdev Narain Yadav [supra], it is discernible that even in a case where a special law does not include the provisions of Section 4 to Section 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. 34. A similar question arose in K. Venkateswara Rao and another vs. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi and others , AIR 1969 SC 872 . The question arose there was whether provisions of Limitation Act applies to election petition filed under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act. 34. A similar question arose in K. Venkateswara Rao and another vs. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi and others , AIR 1969 SC 872 . The question arose there was whether provisions of Limitation Act applies to election petition filed under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act. The question was examined in the context of the provisions of the Limitation Act and the Representation of the People Act and held that the provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable to an election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :- 12. It is well settled that amendments to a petition in a civil proceeding and the addition of parties to such a proceeding are generally possible subject to the law of limitation. But an election petition stands on a different footing. The trial of such a petition and the powers of the court in respect thereof are all circumscribed by the Act. The Indian Limitation Act of 1963 is an Act to consolidate and amend the law of limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith. The provisions of this Act will apply to all civil proceedings and some special criminal proceedings which can be taken in a court of law unless the application thereof has been excluded by any enactment : the extent of such application is governed by Section 29[2] of the Limitation Act. In our opinion however the Limitation Act cannot apply to proceedings like an election petition inasmuch as the Representation of the People Act is a complete and self-contained code which does not admit of the introduction of the principles or the provisions of law contained in the Indian Limitation Act. 35. In Patel Brothers vs. State of Assam and Others, [2017] 2 SSC 350 the question came up for consideration concerning the provisions contained in the Assam Value Added Tax Act in the matter of condoning the delay in filing revision in the High Court and applicability or otherwise of the provisions of Section 5 and Section 29[2] of the Limitation Act. In the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :- 20. In the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :- 20. Thus, the approach which is to be adopted by the Court in such cases is to examine the provisions of the special law to arrive at a conclusion as to whether there was legislative intent to exclude the operation of the Limitation Act. In the instant case, we find that Section 84 of the VAT Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act. The apparent legislative intent, which can be clearly evinced, is to exclude other provisions, including Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 29[2] stipulates that in the absence of any express provision in a special law, provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. If the intention of the legislature was to make Section 5, or for that matter, other provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act, there was no necessity to make specific provision like Section 84 thereby making only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to such proceedings, inasmuch as these two sections would also have become applicable by virtue of Section 29[2] of the Limitation Act. It is, thus, clear that the legislature intended only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, out of Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act, applicable under the VAT Act thereby excluding the applicability of the other provisions. 21. The judgment in Mangu Ram [Mangu Ram v. MCD, (1976) 1 SCC 392 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 10] would not come to the aid of the appellant as the Court found that there was no provision under CrPC from which legislative intent to exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be discerned and, therefore, Section 29[2] of the Limitation Act was taken aid of. Similar situation prevailed in Anshuman Shukla case [State of M.P. v. Anshuman Shukla, (2014) 10 SCC 814 ] . On the contrary, in the instant case, a scrutiny of the scheme of the VAT Act goes to show that it is a complete code not only laying down the forum but also prescribing the time-limit within which each forum would be competent to entertain the appeal or revision. On the contrary, in the instant case, a scrutiny of the scheme of the VAT Act goes to show that it is a complete code not only laying down the forum but also prescribing the time-limit within which each forum would be competent to entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying object of the Act appears to be not only to shorten the length of the proceedings initiated under the different provisions contained therein, but also to ensure finality of the decision made thereunder. The fact that the period of limitation described therein has been equally made applicable to the assessee as well as the Revenue lends ample credence to such a conclusion. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceeding under Section 81[1] of the VAT Act stands excluded by necessary implication, by virtue of the language employed in Section 84. 36. The decision in Aslima Khatun [supra] is in the context of an election petition preferred under Section 129B of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 read with Rule 54 of the Assam Panchayat [Constitution] Rules. The Division Bench of this Court considered a question whether the provisions of Limitation Act would be applicable to an election petition and whether the Election Tribunal can take recourse to the provisions of Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing an election petition. The Hon’ble Division Bench on perusal of the scheme of the Act has recorded that since the Assam Panchayat Act is a Special Act and contains special provision for limitation in Section 129B for filing an election petition to challenge the election specified under the Act, the provisions of Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act, by seeking benefit under Section 29[2] of the Limitation Act, cannot be made applicable. In the case in hand, the Assam Municipal Act is a Special Act and it contains a special provisions for limitation in Section 16 and Rule 104-A of the Rules for filing an election petition to challenge an election specified in Section 18 of the Act. 37. From the above exposition of law with regard to applicability of Section 29[2], it is discernible that there can be express exclusion of the provisions of Section 29[2] of the Limitation Act. 37. From the above exposition of law with regard to applicability of Section 29[2], it is discernible that there can be express exclusion of the provisions of Section 29[2] of the Limitation Act. There can also be implied exclusion of the provisions of Section29[2] of the Limitation Act. Even in the absence of express exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act, it is open for the Court to consider about implied execution. By the provisions of the Assam Municipal Act and Rules framed thereunder, more particularly, Rule 104-A, only the provisions contained in Section 4, Section 9 and Section 12 of the Limitation Act have been made applicable to an appeal under Clause [c] of the second proviso to Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act. Thus, it is clear that no provision of the Limitation Act including Section 5 is applicable to an appeal preferred under the main enacting clause of Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act. 38. As all the decisions referred to by Mr. Das in the context of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is admittedly general law, the propositions laid down in those decisions is clearly not applicable for the reason that the Assam Municipal Act being a special law, the provision for limitation of the Assam Municipal Act would prevail over the general provisions contained in CPC. In such view of the matter, an elaborate discussion of those decisions is found not necessary for the sake of brevity. 39. In view of exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as emerged from the discussion above, this Court is for the considered view that an applicant-appellant cannot take recourse to the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to seek condonation of any period of delay in filing an election petition under the main enacting clause of Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act. The learned District Judge is, therefore, precluded from taking recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone any period of delay beyond twenty-one days in filing an election petition under the main enacting clause of Section 16 of the Assam Municipal Act. In such view of the matter, no interference is called for in the case in hand. It is, therefore, not necessary to examine whether there were any merits in the application for condonation of delay. 40. In such view of the matter, no interference is called for in the case in hand. It is, therefore, not necessary to examine whether there were any merits in the application for condonation of delay. 40. Consequently, agreeing with the reasons assigned in the impugned Order dated 23.08.2022 of the learned District Judge, Sonitpur passed in Misc. [J] Case no.44/2022, this Court finds that the writ petition is bereft of any merits and liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to cost.