JUDGMENT : Kaushik Goswami, J. Heard Mr. M. Talukdar, learned Counsel and Mr. P.P. Dutta, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. D.K. Sarmah, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing for the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3, & 5, and Ms. P. Sarma, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. T.J. Mahanta, learned Senior Advocate, Standing Counsel, APSC, appearing for the respondent No.4. 2. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the advertisement dated 25.08.2023 published in the English Daily, namely, Assam Tribune, issued by the Assam Public Service Commission, for recruitment to the post of Director of Economics & Statistics under the Transformation and Development Department, Government of Assam as per The Assam Economic and Statistical Service (Amendment) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the “impugned amended Rules”). 3. The brief facts of the case are that pursuant to an advertisement, the petitioner applied for the post of Statistical Officer under the Transformation and Development Department in Assam Economic and Statistical Service. Thereafter, the petitioner was called for interview and accordingly, he appeared and after the selection process being duly completed, he was appointed to the post of Statistical Officer in the year 1992. Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Research Officer and later on again promoted to the post of Senior Research Officer. Thereafter, the petitioner’s service was regularized as Senior Research Officer. Later on, the petitioner was promoted to the next higher rank of Joint Director of Economics and Statistic which was regularized by order dated 17.06.2019. It is the case of the petitioner that the next promotional post is the post of Additional Director of Economics and Statistic and the writ petitioner is placed at Serial No.5 in the final gradation list. It is the further case of the petitioner that the petitioner came to know from the advertisement dated 25.08.2023 published in the Assam Tribune for the subject post of Director of Economic and Statistic that the requisite educational qualification for eligibility for the said post was prescribed as minimum second Class in Master Degree in Statistics, Mathematics, Economics from a recognized University or its equivalent. It is the further case of the petitioner that the respondent authorities, by amendment of the 1973 Rules, deleted ‘Commerce’ from the educational qualification for the post of Director and Master Degree in Commerce, which was also one of the prescribed educational qualifications under the Assam Economic and Statistical Service Rule, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “1973 Rules”), was arbitrarily removed from the advertisement. Consequently, the petitioner, being a Commerce Master Degree holder, is going to be totally deprived for appointment to the said post of Director. Being aggrieved, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Mr. M. Talukdar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that with the deletion of ‘Commerce’ from the 1973 Rules, the petitioner is being deprived for promotion to the subject post of Director. He further submits that the impugned amendment is unconstitutional, unreasonable and discriminatory. In support of the aforesaid submission, he relies upon the following decisions: - (i) F. Lalhminglina and 3 Ors., V. State of Mizoram and Ors., in WP(C) No.2986/2017. (ii) The Punjab State Co-operative Agricultural Development Bank Ltd. V. The Registrar Co- operative Societies and Ors ., in Civil Appeal No(S). 297-298 of 2022 (iii) Union Public Service Commission V. Girishh Jayanti Lal Vaghela and Ors ., in Civil Appeal No. 933 of 2006 (iv) Ajay Kumar Shukla and Ors., V. Arvind Raj and Others , in Civil Appeal No.5966 of 2021 (v) Major General H.M. Singh, USM V. Union of India and Another , in Civil Appeal No.192 of 2014 (vi) Syed Habibur Rahman V. The State of Assam and Ors ., in WP(C) No.688/2014 (vii) Ravi Kumar Dhansukhal Maheta and Another V. High Court of Gujarat and Ors., in WP(C) No.432/2023 (viii) Sri Krishna Kumar Sharma V. The State of Assam, Represented by Chief Secretary and Ors ., in WP(C) No.4945/2009 5. Per contra, Mr. D. K. Sharma, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate submits that in the 1973 Rules, ‘Commerce’ had been inadvertently added along with the subjects of Statistics, Mathematics and Economics as requisite educational qualifications for the post of subject Director, as a result of which the candidates, who do not have Master Degree in the subject of Statistics, Mathematics and Economics, but possess Master Degree in Commerce stream, were applying to the post of Director, which needed to be rectified and accordingly, the impugned amendment was done. 6. 6. We have considered the submission of the learned Counsel appearing for both the contending parties, and have perused the material available on record. We have also considered the case laws submitted at the bar. 7. Apt to refer at the outset to the relevant part of the advertisement prescribing the educational qualification as the eligibility criteria for appointment to the subject post of Director under the advertisement dated 25.08.2023, which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: - “5. Education Qualification: (a) At least 2 nd Class Master Degree in Statistics, Mathematics, Economics from a Recognized University or its equivalent. Or Degree of a Recognized University with Mathematics, Statistics, Economics as a Subject and a Diploma Recognized by Govt. obtained after at least 2 (two) years Post Graduate Training in Statistics. (Upload valid supporting documents) Note: Doctorate or Other Research Degree in Statistics, Mathematics & Economics is desirable. (b) Not less than 10 (ten) years experience in Statistical Works/Investigation/Research in a Govt. Deptt. or Commercial concern of repute or in conducting and guiding Research in Statistics in a University or Institute of Training & Research as evidented by published work. Administrative experience for not less than 5 years in a responsible capacity.” 8. Apt also to refer to Rule 10 of 1973 Rules, which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: - “(a) At least second class Master Degree in Statistic, Mathematics, Economics or Commerce from recognized university or its equivalent. Or Degree of recognized University with Mathematics, Statistics, Economics or Commerce as a subject and a Diploma recognized by Government obtained after at least two years Post Graduate Training in Statistics.” 9. Thereafter, the said Rule 10 was amended by notification dated 24.02.1995 which was published in the Assam Gazette Extraordinary, which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: - “170. The Assam Gazettee Extra Ordinary Feb, 24, 1991 The Governor of Assam is pleased to make the following rules to amend the Assam Economic and Statistical Service Rules, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the principal rules namely:- Short title and commencement 1. (1) These rules may be called (2) The Assam Economic and Statistical Service (Amendment Rules), 1995. 2. They shall come into force on the day of their publication in the Official Gazettee Amendment of Rule-2 2. (1) These rules may be called (2) The Assam Economic and Statistical Service (Amendment Rules), 1995. 2. They shall come into force on the day of their publication in the Official Gazettee Amendment of Rule-2 2. In the principal rules, in rule-2, for suit rule (v), the following shall be substituted, namely (V) ‘prescribed subject’ means economics or statistics or mathematics.” 10. Reading of the aforesaid amendment, it appears that the stream of Commerce has been deleted from the prescribed listed subjects in the 1973 Rules for being eligible for promotion to the post of Director. It further appears that the advertisement is issued after the amendment. 11. Apt at this juncture to refer to paragraphs 8 & 9 of the affidavit in opposition filed by the respondent No.3 which are reproduced hereunder for ready reference: - “8. That with regards to the statement made in paragraph 10 of the writ petition the deponent begs to state that in response of the representation filed by the petitioner, the Director of Economics & Statistics was requested to submit draft Comprehensive proposal vide proposal vide PDS 96746/DFA/127627 dated 20th January 2023 and also a reminder for the same vide PDS.96746/DFA/200535 dated 11th May, 2023 incorporating all the proposals mentioned in the Letter No. DES/75/2020/Estt-DES/18 dated 22.11.22 and Letter No. PDS.89/2013/164 dated 23 rd June, 2022. The said draft comprehensive proposal was submitted by DES, on 2nd September, 2023 after publishing of the advertisement by APSC on 24th August 2023 which was done as per the provisions of existing Assam Economic & Statistical Service Rules, 1973 as amended in 1995. 9. That with regards to the statement made in paragraphs 11 of the writ petition the deponent begs to state that the representation dated 08.04 .2019, the petitioner requested the Government to consider his subject M. Com. as one of the subject for recruitment to the post of Director which is against the provisions of the existing service Rules as amended in 1995. Further, as stated at Para No. 11 in the writ petition, Late L.K. Bhattacharya, M. Com. was selected as Director of Economics & Statistics which cannot be admitted since, as per records, Late Shri A.K.Bhattacharya was appointed as the Director of Economics & Statistics on 5.09.1994 which was prior to the amendment of the Service Rules in 1995. Further, as stated at Para No. 11 in the writ petition, Late L.K. Bhattacharya, M. Com. was selected as Director of Economics & Statistics which cannot be admitted since, as per records, Late Shri A.K.Bhattacharya was appointed as the Director of Economics & Statistics on 5.09.1994 which was prior to the amendment of the Service Rules in 1995. In response to the representation dated 3.11.22 submitted by Shri Ranjit Kumar Pegu & 2 Others which was forwarded by Director of Economics & Statistics dated 22.11.22, the Director was requested to submit a draft comprehensive proposal vide PDS.96746/DFA/127627 dated 20 th January 2023 and also a reminder for the same vide PDS.96746/DFA/200535 dated 11 May, 2023 incorporating all the proposals mentioned in the Letter No. PDS.89/2013/164 dated 23rd June, 2022 and Letter No. DESI75/2020/Estt-DES/18 dated 22.11.22. Consequently, the said draft comprehensive proposal was submitted by DES, on 2nd September, 2023 after publishing of the advertisement by APSC on 24th August 2023 which was done as per the provisions of existing Assam Economics & Statistical Service Rules, 1973 as amended in 1995.” 12. It appears that vide the impugned amendment the respondent authorities have deleted ‘Commerce’ from the list of the prescribed subjects for appointments to the subject post of Director. It further appears that the advertisement under challenge is in conformity with the amendment. It further appears that since Commerce is not a subject but only a stream which, having been inadvertently added as a subject required for being eligible for appointment, was later on deleted by the impugned amendment. Thus, it appears that the word ‘Commerce’ was a misnomer in the 1973 Rules. That being so, the impugned amendment, whereby the stream of Commerce was deleted, appears to be reasonable. 13. This Court does not have the expertise to decide the required educational qualification for being eligible for appointment to the subject post of Director. It is for the State respondents to set out the requisite eligibility criteria/educational qualifications for consideration for appointment to a particular post. 14. Apt also to refer to the relevant paragraphs in the writ petition averred in support of the challenge made to the validity of the impugned amendment and the advertisement. Paragraphs 14 to 20 are extracted hereunder for ready reference: - “14. 14. Apt also to refer to the relevant paragraphs in the writ petition averred in support of the challenge made to the validity of the impugned amendment and the advertisement. Paragraphs 14 to 20 are extracted hereunder for ready reference: - “14. That the Petitioner states that some vested interested persons for their personal benefit earlier Service Rule, 1973, the Assam Economic and Statistical and also Extra-Ordinary Notification published on 09.09.1991 has been revised or amended vide Notification dated 24.02.1995 as published in Extra-Ordinary Rule Gazette as amended of Rule 3/5. ‘(i) in sub-rule (1), in Clause (a) the word commerce wherever occurred shall be deleted. (a) At least Second Class Master Degree in Economics, Statistic or Mathematics of a recognised University or its equivalent.’ which is gross illegal and in discrimination and as a result this Writ Petitioner going to be suffer a loss in his service period and which is required to be declared ultra-vires or void, illegal for the ends of justice and equity. 15. That the Petitioner states that other states of India in respect of Economic and Statistic Department regarding the recruitment of the said Department, commerce subject is also included as one of the subject from the initial appointment upto the Director of Economic and Statistics in the recruitment process for example Haryana Government and also Maharashtra DES Recruitment, 2023, educational qualification extract copies are enclosed herewith for the convenience of this Hon'ble Court. 16. That the Petitioner states that Director of Economic and Statistic, Assam wrote a letter along with the proposal for ‘Draft Comprehensive Service Rule Amendment Proposal’ vide No. DES.75/2020/Estt-DES/24 as latest representation of Officers with the Commerce back ground for inclusion of the subject deleted by the Amendment made in 1995 to make them eligible to apply for the post of Director which was forwarded by the undersigned vide Letter No. DES.75/2020/Estt-DES/18 dated 22.11.2022 will become redundant as soon as the present Amendment become effective as Director of Economics and Statistics has suggested re- inclusion of the subject of Commerce at entry level post and also proposed the post of the Director would be made through promotion only of the senior most officer of the Directorate. However, the Director of Economics and Statistics would like to request to insert the suggestion of remaining service period of such officer preferably shall not be less than one year. However, the Director of Economics and Statistics would like to request to insert the suggestion of remaining service period of such officer preferably shall not be less than one year. In view of the above, it is also requested that Department may take necessary steps to withdraw the recruitment process initiated through Assam Public Service Commission. 17. That the Petitioner states that after publication of the Advertisement No. 22/2023 in the Assam Tribune dated 25.08.2023 being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied, submitted a representation before the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Transformation and Development Department, Dispur, Guwahati 6 inter-alia with other genuine ground requested the authority concerned for consideration of his educational qualification of M.Com Degree from Gauhati University as one of the subject for applying in the recruitment to the post of Director of Economic and Statistic, Government of Assam and selection by the Assam Public Service Commission as existing employees in service, otherwise he shall be deprived of applying to the post of Director of Economic and Statistic, Government of Assam. But no any favourable action till today and hence Writ Petition filed before Your Lordship for the ends of justice. 18. That the Petitioner states that in this connection a Writ Petition vide W.P.(C) No. 5875/2023 has been filed before this Hon'ble Court regarding the post of Director of Economic & Statistic under Transformation and Development Department, Guwahati as per advertisement dated 25.08.2023 in the Assam Tribune and after hearing by the Hon'ble Court, the said Writ Petition is dismissed on 04.10.2023. However with liberty to challenge the said Rule if so advised and in accordance with law. Thereafter, again a writ petition was filed vide No. W.P.(C) 6279/2023 and the said Writ Petitioner is dismissed on no relief can be granted in view of the earlier order. However, it is observed that the liberty which was granted to the Petitioner vide earlier order dated 04.10.2023 still remains and the Petitioner can avail of that liberty by filing appropriate application. Hence this Writ Petition again for the ends of justice and also for kind consideration as prayed for. 19. However, it is observed that the liberty which was granted to the Petitioner vide earlier order dated 04.10.2023 still remains and the Petitioner can avail of that liberty by filing appropriate application. Hence this Writ Petition again for the ends of justice and also for kind consideration as prayed for. 19. That the Respondent Authorities most mischievously are trying to oust present Petitioner by filling up the post without concerning his legitimate demand by way of recruitment vide impugned advertisement dated 25.08.2023 on the Assam Tribune, the Respondent Authorities by this advertisement is trying to deprive as well as prejudice the Petitioner indirectly through this advertisement. 20. That the Petitioner states that if the Respondent Authorities are allowed to go ahead with the said recruitment process to fill up the post of Director of Economic and Statistic under Transformation and Development Department, the present Petitioner shall suffer irreparable loss and injury. The balance of convenience is in favour of the Petitioner as the Petitioner has requisite qualification and experience as per the service Rule. Therefore, it is a fit case for granting interim so as to protect the accrued right of the Petitioner.” 15. On a reading of the aforesaid paragraphs, as contained in the writ petition, it appears that the pleadings in support of the subject challenge are vague. Merely saying that a particular provision is unconstitutional or discriminatory will not suffice. It is imperative for the petitioner to plead prima facie acceptable grounds in support of the challenge in order to sustain the same. In the absence of any such pleadings, the challenge to the Constitutional validity of a statutory provision is liable to be rejected in limine. 16. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana V. State of Punjab and Another , reported in (2004) 12 SCC 673 Paragraph 82 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: - “82. The challenge to Section 14 of the 1956 Act has been made ‘without prejudice to Punjab's pending application under Section 5(3) of the Act’. Assuming such a reservation is legally possible, the ground for submitting that Section 14 of the 1956 Act is ‘unsustainable’ is legally impermissible. The challenge to Section 14 of the 1956 Act has been made ‘without prejudice to Punjab's pending application under Section 5(3) of the Act’. Assuming such a reservation is legally possible, the ground for submitting that Section 14 of the 1956 Act is ‘unsustainable’ is legally impermissible. It is well established that constitutional invalidity (presumably that is what Punjab means when it uses the word ‘unsustainable’) of a statutory provision can be made either on the basis of legislative incompetence or because the statute is otherwise violative of the provisions of the Constitution. Neither the reason for the particular enactment nor the fact that the reason for the legislation has become redundant, would justify the striking down of the legislation or for holding that a statute or statutory provision is ultra vires. Yet these are the grounds pleaded in sub-paragraphs (i), (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) to declare Section 14 invalid. Furthermore, merely saying that a particular provision is legislatively incompetent [ground (ii)] or discriminatory [ground (iii)] will not do. At least prima facie acceptable grounds in support have to be pleaded to sustain the challenge. In the absence of any such pleading the challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or statutory provision is liable to be rejected in limine.” 17. As such, the contention of the writ petitioner to the fact that the impugned amendment has been made to suit the vested interest of some persons, being devoid of any particulars or materials whatsoever, the same is rejected. Further, the contention of the writ petitioner that the said amendment is illegal and discriminatory is also not based on prima facie grounds or material particulars whatsoever and, therefore, the same is also rejected. The amendment cannot be interfered with by this Court solely on the ground that the petitioner is going to suffer loss in his service period. It appears that no other ground has been taken in the writ petition in support of the challenge made to the impugned amendment. Having duly considered the case laws cited by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, this Court is of the view that the same are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Having duly considered the case laws cited by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, this Court is of the view that the same are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is settled law that a particular law or a statutory provision can be invalidated on 2 grounds namely- (i) it is not within the competence of the legislature which passed the law and or (ii) it is in contravention of any of the fundamental rights stipulated in Part III of the Constitution of India, or any other provision of the Constitution. 18. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Binoy Viswam V. Union of India and Others , reported in (2017) 7 SCC 59 . Paragraphs 76 to 83 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced hereunder for ready reference: - “76. Under the Constitution, Supreme Court as well as High Courts are vested with the power of judicial review of not only administrative acts of the executive but legislative enactments passed by the legislature as well. This power is given to the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution and to the Supreme Court under Article 32 as well as Article 136 of the Constitution. At the same time, the parameters on which the power of judicial review of administrative act is to be undertaken are different from the parameters on which validity of legislative enactment is to be examined. No doubt, in exercises of its power of judicial review of legislative action, the Supreme Court, or for that matter, the High Courts can declare law passed by Parliament or the State Legislature as invalid. However, the power to strike down primary legislation enacted by the Union or the State Legislatures is on limited grounds. Courts can strike down legislation either on the basis that it falls foul of federal distribution of powers or that it contravenes fundamental rights or other constitutional rights/provisions of the Constitution of India. No doubt, since the Supreme Court and the High Courts are treated as the ultimate arbiter in all matters involving interpretation of the Constitution, it is the courts which have the final say on questions relating to rights and whether such a right is violated or not. No doubt, since the Supreme Court and the High Courts are treated as the ultimate arbiter in all matters involving interpretation of the Constitution, it is the courts which have the final say on questions relating to rights and whether such a right is violated or not. The basis of the aforesaid statement lies in Article 13(2) of the Constitution which proscribes the State from making ‘any law which takes away or abridges the right conferred by Part III’, enshrining fundamental rights. It categorically states that any law made in contravention thereof, to the extent of the contravention, be void. 77. We can also take note of Article 372 of the Constitution at this stage which applies to pre-constitutional laws. Article 372(1) reads as under: ‘372. Continuance in force of existing laws and their adaptation.-(1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in Article 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority.’ In the context of judicial review of legislation, this provision gives an indication that all laws enforced prior to the commencement of the Constitution can be tested for compliance with the provisions of the Constitution by courts. Such a power is recognised by this Court in Union of India v. SICOM Ltd. In that judgment, it was also held that since the term ‘laws’, as per Article 372, includes common law the power of judicial review of legislation, which is a part of common law applicable in India before the Constitution came into force, would continue to vest in the Indian courts. 78. With this, we advert to the discussion on the grounds of judicial review that are available to adjudge the validity of a piece of legislation passed by the legislature. We have already mentioned that a particular law or a provision contained in a statute can be invalidated on two grounds, namely: (i) it is not within the competence of the legislature which passed the law, and/or (ii) it is in contravention of any of the fundamental rights stipulated in Part III of the Constitution or any other right/provision of the Constitution. These contours of the judicial review are spelled out in the clear terms in Rakesh Kohli, and particularly in the following paragraphs: (SCC pp. 321-22 & 325-27, paras 16-17, 26-28 & 30) ‘16. The statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provision under challenge cannot stand. Sans flagrant violation of the constitutional provisions, the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature is not declared bad. 17. This Court has repeatedly stated that legislative enactment can be struck down by court only on two grounds, namely (i) that the appropriate legislature does not have the competence to make the law, and (ii) that it does not (sic) take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provisions. In McDowell and Co. while dealing with the challenge to an enactment based on Article 14, this Court stated in para 43 of the Report as follows: (SCC pp. 737-38) ‘43. … A law made by Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by courts on two grounds and two grounds alone viz. (1) lack of legislative competence, and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. … if an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19(1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or the other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that court thinks it unjustified. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or the other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom.’ 26. In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi, the Constitution Bench further observed that there was always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. It stated in para 15 of the Report as under: (AIR pp. 740-41) ‘15.... The courts, it is accepted, must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It must be borne in mind that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest and finally that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation.’ 27. The above legal position has been reiterated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi. 28. In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, inter alia, while referring to the earlier two decisions, namely, Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. and Mahant Moti Das49, it was observed in para 8 of the Report as follows: (Hamdard Dawakhana case 50, AIR p. 559) ‘8. Therefore, when the constitutionality of an enactment is challenged on the ground of violation of any of the articles in Part III of the Constitution, the ascertainment of its true nature and character becomes necessary i.e. its subject-matter, the area in which it is intended to operate, its purport and intent have to be determined. Therefore, when the constitutionality of an enactment is challenged on the ground of violation of any of the articles in Part III of the Constitution, the ascertainment of its true nature and character becomes necessary i.e. its subject-matter, the area in which it is intended to operate, its purport and intent have to be determined. In order to do so it is legitimate to take into consideration all the factors such as history of the legislation, the purpose thereof, the surrounding circumstances and conditions, the mischief which it intended to suppress, the remedy for the disease which the legislature resolved to cure and the true reason for the remedy....’ In Hamdard Dawakhana, the Court also followed the statement of law in Mahant Moti Das and the two earlier decisions, namely, Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of Indias and State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara and reiterated the principle that presumption was always in favour of constitutionality of an enactment. 30. A well-known principle that in the field of taxation, the legislature enjoys a greater latitude for classification, has been noted by this Court in a long line of cases. Some of these decisions are Steelworth Ltd. v. State of Assam, Gopal Narain v. State of U.P., Ganga Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. State of U.P., R.K. Garg v. Union of India and State of W.B. v. E.I.T.A. India Ltd’. 79. Again, in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, this Court made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 524, para 219) ‘219. A legislation passed by Parliament can be challenged only on constitutionally recognised grounds. Ordinarily, grounds of attack of a legislation is whether the legislature has legislative competence or whether the legislation is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. If any of the provisions of the legislation violates fundamental rights or any other provisions of the Constitution, it could certainly be a valid ground to set aside the legislation by invoking the power of judicial review. A legislation could also be challenged as unreasonable if it violates the principles of equality adumbrated in our Constitution or it unreasonably restricts the fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution. A legislation cannot be challenged simply on the ground of unreasonableness because that by itself does not constitute a ground. A legislation could also be challenged as unreasonable if it violates the principles of equality adumbrated in our Constitution or it unreasonably restricts the fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution. A legislation cannot be challenged simply on the ground of unreasonableness because that by itself does not constitute a ground. The validity of a constitutional amendment and the validity of plenary legislation have to be decided purely as questions of constitutional law. This Court in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India 60 said: (SCC p. 660, para 149) ‘149.... if a question brought before the court is purely a political question not involving determination of any legal or constitutional right or obligation, the court would not entertain it, since the court is concerned only with adjudication of legal rights and liabilities.' Therefore, the plea of the petitioner that the legislation itself was intended to please a section of the community as part of the vote catching mechanism is not a legally acceptable plea and it is only to be rejected.’ 80. Furthermore, it also needs to be specifically noted that this Court emphasised that apart from the aforesaid two grounds no third ground is available to invalidate any piece of legislation. In this behalf it would be apposite to reproduce the following observations from State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co., which is a judgment rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court: (SCC pp. 737-38, para 43) ‘43.... A law made by Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by courts on two grounds and two grounds alone viz. (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. We do not wish to enter into a discussion of the concepts of procedural unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness-concepts inspired by the decisions of United States Supreme Court. Even in USA, these concepts and in particular the concept of substantive due process have proved to be of unending controversy, the latest thinking tending towards a severe curtailment of this ground (substantive due process). The main criticism against the ground of substantive due process being that it seeks to set up the courts as arbiters of the wisdom of the legislature in enacting the particular piece of legislation. The main criticism against the ground of substantive due process being that it seeks to set up the courts as arbiters of the wisdom of the legislature in enacting the particular piece of legislation. It is enough for us to say that by whatever name it is characterised, the ground of invalidation must fall within the four corners of the two grounds mentioned above. In other words, say, if an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19(1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. In this connection, it should be remembered that even in the case of administrative action, the scope of judicial review is limited to three grounds viz. (i) unreasonableness, which can more appropriately be called irrationality, (ii) illegality, and (iii) procedural impropriety (see Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service which decision has been accepted by this Court as well). The applicability of doctrine of proportionality even in administrative law sphere is yet a debatable issue. (See the opinions of Lords Lowry and Ackner in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Brind, AC at pp. 766-67 and 762.) It would be rather odd if an enactment were to be struck down by applying the said principle when its applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled.’ 81. (See the opinions of Lords Lowry and Ackner in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Brind, AC at pp. 766-67 and 762.) It would be rather odd if an enactment were to be struck down by applying the said principle when its applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled.’ 81. Another aspect in this context, which needs to be emphasised, is that a legislation cannot be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is ‘arbitrary’ inasmuch as examining as to whether a particular Act is arbitrary or not implies a value judgment and the courts do not examine the wisdom of legislative choices and, therefore, cannot undertake this exercise. This was so recognised in a recent judgment of this Court Rajbala v. State of Haryana wherein this Court held as under: (SCC p. 481, paras 64-65) ‘64. From the above extract from McDowell & Co. case it is clear that the courts in this country do not undertake the task of declaring a piece of legislation unconstitutional on the ground that the legislation is ‘arbitrary’ since such an exercise implies a value judgment and courts do not examine the wisdom of legislative choices unless the legislation is otherwise violative of some specific provision of the Constitution. To undertake such an examination would amount to virtually importing the doctrine of ‘substantive due process’ employed by the American Supreme Court at an earlier point of time while examining the constitutionality of Indian legislation. As pointed out in the above extract, even in United States the doctrine is currently of doubtful legitimacy. This Court long back in A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras declared that the doctrine of due process has no application under the Indian Constitution. As pointed out by Frankfurter, J.. arbitrariness became a mantra. 65. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that it is not permissible for this Court to declare a statute unconstitutional on the ground that it is ‘arbitrary’.’ 82. Same sentiments were expressed earlier by this Court in K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd.33 in the following words: (SCC p. 58, para 205) ‘205. Plea of unreasonableness, arbitrariness, proportionality, etc. always raises an element of subjectivity on which a court cannot strike down a statute or a statutory provision, especially when the right to property is no more a fundamental right. Same sentiments were expressed earlier by this Court in K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd.33 in the following words: (SCC p. 58, para 205) ‘205. Plea of unreasonableness, arbitrariness, proportionality, etc. always raises an element of subjectivity on which a court cannot strike down a statute or a statutory provision, especially when the right to property is no more a fundamental right. Otherwise the court will be substituting its wisdom to that of the legislature, which is impermissible in our constitutional democracy.’ A fortiori, a law cannot be invalidated on the ground that the legislature did not apply its mind or it was prompted by some improper motive. 83. It is, thus, clear that in exercise of power of judicial review, the Indian courts are invested with powers to strike down primary legislation enacted by Parliament or the State Legislatures. However, while undertaking this exercise of judicial review, the same is to be done at three levels. In the first stage. the Court would examine as to whether impugned provision in a legislation is compatible with the fundamental rights or the constitutional provisions (substantive judicial review) or it falls foul of the federal distribution of powers (procedural judicial review). If it is not found to be so, no further exercise is needed as challenge would fail. On the other hand, if it is found that legislature lacks competence as the subject legislated was not within the powers assigned in the List in Schedule VII, no further enquiry is needed and such a law is to be declared as ultra vires the Constitution. However, while undertaking substantive judicial review, if it is found that the impugned provision appears to be violative of fundamental rights or other constitutional rights, the Court reaches the second stage of review. At this second phase of enquiry, the Court is supposed to undertake the exercise as to whether the impugned provision can still be saved by reading it down so as to bring it in conformity with the constitutional provisions. If that is not achievable then the enquiry enters the third stage. If the offending portion of the statute is severable, it is severed and the Court strikes down the impugned provision declaring the same as unconstitutional.’ 19. If that is not achievable then the enquiry enters the third stage. If the offending portion of the statute is severable, it is severed and the Court strikes down the impugned provision declaring the same as unconstitutional.’ 19. Thus, upon careful consideration of the matter, we are of the considered view that the impugned amendment is not unconstitutional and/or unreasonable and therefore the same warrants no interference from this Court. The impugned advertisement having been issued in terms of the amendment in question, the same also cannot be faulted with. Hence, the writ petition is devoid of any merit whatsoever. 20. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs.