ORDER : Moushumi Bhattacharya, J. The petitioner has challenged an order dated 10.05.2024 passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, at Kolkata (‘DRAT’) in Miscellaneous Appeal No.35 of 2023 filed by the respondent Bank from an order dated 05.07.2023 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal – II, at Hyderabad (‘DRT’) in I.A.No.885 of 2023 in S.A.No.425 of 2019. 2. The DRT passed the order dated 05.07.2023 in I.A.No.885 of 2023 in S.A.No.425 of 2019 filed by the petitioner for making payment of the outstanding amount mentioned in the Demand Notice dated 04.10.2016 minus the payments made by the petitioner after receipt of the Demand Notice at the rate of 6% interest from the date of the Demand Notice till realization of the amount mentioned thereof. By the impugned order dated 10.05.2024, which forms the subject matter in the present writ petition, the DRAT set aside the order passed by the DRT and allowed the Appeal filed by the respondent Bank. 3. The petitioner, represented by learned Senior Counsel, argues that the DRAT erred in interfering with the order passed by the DRT since the latter has the power to reduce the rate of interest under the provisions of The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’) as well as The Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (‘the 1993 Act’). Counsel submits that the interference is arbitrary and unjustified since the borrower/petitioner is eager to pay off the amount demanded by the respondent Bank in the Notice issued under section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and the discretion exercised by the DRT in reducing the rate of interest cannot be said to be perverse under the law. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank recounts the facts before the petitioner filed the S.A. in the DRT. Counsel submits that the petitioner obtained a mortgage loan of Rs.770 Lakhs from the respondent Bank in 2015 for purchase of commercial property which was to be repaid in 108 equated monthly installments commencing from 28.08.2015 and ending on 05.09.2024. Counsel submits that the petitioner was irregular in payment of EMIs and breached several terms of the sanction letter. The petitioner issued 27 cheques amounting to Rs.40,50,000/- towards repayment which were dishonoured leading to cases being filed under The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Counsel submits that the petitioner was irregular in payment of EMIs and breached several terms of the sanction letter. The petitioner issued 27 cheques amounting to Rs.40,50,000/- towards repayment which were dishonoured leading to cases being filed under The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The petitioner paid an amount of Rs.40,50,000/- during trial of the criminal proceedings. Counsel submits that other complaints are pending against the petitioner for subsequent dishonour of cheques. 5. Counsel further submits that the respondent Bank issued a Demand Notice on 04.10.2018 under section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and a Possession Notice on 26.12.2017 under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act despite which the petitioner leased the portions of the mortgaged property and has been collecting substantial rents as of January, 2025. The respondent Bank moved a petition under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and obtained a warrant for delivery of possession of the secured property through an Advocate Commissioner and thereafter took physical possession of the secured property on 15.03.2018. Counsel submits that the petitioner’s S.A. before the DRT challenging the SARFAESI action was dismissed on 17.07.2019 and the Appeal before the DRAT as well as the writ petition filed by the petitioner were also dismissed on 23.09.2019. Counsel submits that the petitioner has failed to repay the loan amount despite collecting rents from the secured property and assails the order passed by the DRT on the ground that section 17 of the SARFAESI Act does not permit the DRT to reduce pendente lite interest. 6. We have heard the respective submissions made on behalf of the parties and considered the material placed before the Court. 7. The point for adjudication is whether the DRT was authorized to reduce the future/pendente lite interest under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and whether the DRAT should have interfered with the discretion exercised by the DRT. 8. Before we enter into the adjudication, it is important to first address the fundamental point of whether the petitioner is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. 8. Before we enter into the adjudication, it is important to first address the fundamental point of whether the petitioner is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court for issuing a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records of Miscellaneous Appeal No.35 of 2023 on the file of the DRAT arising out of an order passed by the DRT and for setting aside the impugned order of the DRAT dated 10.05.2024. It is undeniable that a Writ of Certiorari can be issued if there is a perceived illegality in an order passed by a judicial authority including a Tribunal which is lower down in the hierarchy on the ground of irrationality and procedural impropriety. Upon hearing the competing contentions of the parties, we do not have any doubt that the present writ petition is maintainable. Whether the impugned order passed by the DRAT should be set aside is another matter which will be dealt with in the following part of this order. 10. The contentions made on behalf of the respondent Bank show that the petitioner may be a wily customer (literally, of the Bank) who has allegedly led the Bank to file multiple legal proceedings for recovery of the loan to the petitioner. This conduct is however not relevant for adjudication of the present writ petition. The writ petition is only concerned with the order passed by the DRAT in setting aside the earlier order of the DRT by which the petitioner was allowed a certain amount of leeway in terms of a reduced rate future/pendente lite interest. The petitioner’s conduct prior to the impugned order may be relevant to the respondent Bank for initiating measures for recovery of loan but does not affect the law under which the DRT allowed the reduction of rate of interest. The only matter of concern before us is the legality of the impugned order passed by the DRAT on 10.05.2024. 11. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides for an application by a person, including a borrower, against measures taken by a Secured Creditor for recovery of a Secured Debt. The only matter of concern before us is the legality of the impugned order passed by the DRAT on 10.05.2024. 11. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides for an application by a person, including a borrower, against measures taken by a Secured Creditor for recovery of a Secured Debt. Section 17(1) authorises a person aggrieved or any other person under section 13(4) initiated by the Secured Creditor to make an application to the jurisdictional DRT within the statutory limit provided under section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. Section 17(7) confers the power on the DRT to dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of The Recovery of Debts Due To Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDDB Act) and the Rules thereunder. 12. Section 19(25) of the 1993 Act empowers a Tribunal, as defined under sections 2(o) read with 3(1) of the said Act, to pass such orders and to give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders, to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice (reproduced verbatim from section 19(25)). Section 19(1) provides for the procedure of Tribunals where a Bank or a Financial Institution has filed an application to recover a debt from any person. 13. The omnibus power conferred on the Tribunal under the 1993 Act and the mandate of the DRT under the SARFAESI Act to follow the provisions of the 1993 Act would include the power to pass any orders which may be necessary for the ends of justice. 14. The language of section 19(25) of the 1993 Act reflects exercise of discretion by the DRT for passing orders including for reduction of the rate of future/pendente lite interest. The power to reduce the interest would also be in line with section 34 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which confers a similar power on the decretal Court to order interest at a rate which the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the Suit till the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the Suit. The power of the DRT to order reduction of pendente lite interest has also been confirmed by the Courts. 15. In Punjab and Sind Bank Vs. The power of the DRT to order reduction of pendente lite interest has also been confirmed by the Courts. 15. In Punjab and Sind Bank Vs. Allied Beverage Company Private Limited, (2010) 10 SCC 640 , the Supreme Court held that the award of interest pendente lite and post-decree is discretionary and is essentially governed by section 34 of the CPC dehors the contract between the parties. However, this discretion must be exercised judiciously and not in an arbitrary or fanciful manner: Central Bank of India Vs. Ravindra , [ (2002) 1 SCC 367 ] . In State Bank of India Vs. Patwa Foundation Trust , [ AIR 2014 MP 17 ] , a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court relied on C.K. Sasankan Vs. Dhanalakshmi Bank Limited, (2009) 11 SCC 60 and confirmed that the Tribunal has the discretion to reduce the rate of interest analogous to the power under section 34 of the CPC even before the Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act. 16. On the other hand, State Bank of India Vs. Yasangi Venkateswara Rao , [ (1999) 2 SCC 375 ] , relied upon by the respondent Bank, involved the vires of section 21-A of The Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had held that Parliament had no jurisdiction to enact section 21-A of the 1949 Act. The judgment of the DRAT, Allahabad, in Regular Appeal No.86 of 2018 is contrary to section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act read with section 19 (25) of the 1993 Act. The decision involved a completely different factual context and in any event overlooks the inherent jurisdiction of the Tribunal to reduce the pendente lite/future rate of interest, to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. 17. Further, common sense dictates that the ultimate objective of any bank, including the respondent herein, is to ensure repayment of the loan given to the borrower. Therefore, the interference of the DRAT setting aside reduction of the rate of pendente lite/future interest for facilitating repayment of the loan is unreasonable from a practical standpoint. After all, the DRT merely reduced the rate of interest from 13.5% to 10% on the outstanding loan amount of Rs.8,05,58,253/-. Therefore, the interference of the DRAT setting aside reduction of the rate of pendente lite/future interest for facilitating repayment of the loan is unreasonable from a practical standpoint. After all, the DRT merely reduced the rate of interest from 13.5% to 10% on the outstanding loan amount of Rs.8,05,58,253/-. This would be evident from the order passed by the DRT on 05.07.2023 as well as the order passed by the DRAT on 10.05.2024, which is the subject matter of the present writ petition. 18. It is evident that the DRAT set aside the DRT’s order for reduction of the rate of pendente lite/future interest on the ground of absence of reasons. The other reason given is that Patwa Foundation Trust (supra) would not apply to the facts of the present case, as the borrower in Patwa Foundation Trust (supra) was an educational institution, as opposed to the loan being granted to the present petitioner for a commercial purpose. 19. We are unable to see any justification for this view since the terms of repayment in a loan transaction are not governed by the nature or status of the borrower or the purpose for which the loan was given. 20. Moreover, contrary to the reason given by the DRAT for interference, we find that the DRT in its order dated 05.07.2023 clearly articulated its reasons for reducing the rate of future interest from 13.50% to 10% per annum. According to the DRT, the ultimate aim of a secured creditor is to recover the outstanding dues. Hence, easing the rate of interest would only facilitate the repayment particularly where the petitioner is keen to clear the dues. The DRT, accordingly, deemed it necessary to give such an opportunity to the petitioner. The DRT also relied on Patwa Foundation Trust (supra) and C.K. Sasankan (supra) to conclude that the DRT has the discretion to reduce the rate of interest. 21. We also reiterate that the alleged conduct of the petitioner prior to the order of the DRT/DRAT is irrelevant since the conduct complained of cannot have any bearing on the legality of the impugned order. The only issue before us is whether the impugned order of the DRAT is supported by the relevant law. 22. 21. We also reiterate that the alleged conduct of the petitioner prior to the order of the DRT/DRAT is irrelevant since the conduct complained of cannot have any bearing on the legality of the impugned order. The only issue before us is whether the impugned order of the DRAT is supported by the relevant law. 22. The above discussion leads us to the firm view that the impugned order is perverse for being contrary to the SARFAESI Act read with the 1993 Act as well as to the law settled by the Courts. 23. W.P.No.22458 of 2024 is accordingly allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 10.05.2024 passed by the DRAT. The order dated 05.07.2023 passed by the DRT is accordingly restored. 24. All connected applications are disposed of. Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.