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2025 DIGILAW 497 (AP)

Achenavalli Suresh v. State Of A. P.

2025-03-20

Y.LAKSHMANA RAO

body2025
ORDER : (Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J.) The three Criminal Revision Cases are heard and disposed of by this Common Order inasmuch as the petitioner is same in the three cases. 2. Crl.R.C.No.1762 of 2008 has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C ’) challenging the judgment dated 03.10.2008 in Crl.A.No.33 of 2005 on the file of the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Kadapa at Proddatur, confirming the judgment dated 12.01.2006 in C.C.No.122 of 2005 on the file of learned I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Proddatur, whereby and whereunder the petitioner was found guilty under Section 248(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C .,’ for the offence under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C’) and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-. 3. Crl.R.C.No.1766 of 2008 has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C ’) challenging the judgment dated 30.09.2008 in Crl.A.No.199 of 2005 on the file of the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Kadapa at Proddatur, confirming the judgment dated 11.07.2005 in C.C.No.47 of 2004 on the file of learned I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Proddatur, whereby and whereunder the petitioner was found guilty under Section 248(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C .,’ for the offence under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. 4. Crl.R.C.No.1768 of 2008 has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C ’) challenging the judgment dated 30.09.2008 in Crl.A.No.200 of 2008 on the file of the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Kadapa at Proddatur, confirming the judgment dated 11.07.2005 in C.C.No.50 of 2004 on the file of learned I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Proddatur, whereby and whereunder the petitioner was found guilty under Section 248(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C .,’ for the offence under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. 5. I have heard the arguments Mr. T.Diwakar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 6. Mr. 5. I have heard the arguments Mr. T.Diwakar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 6. Mr. T.Diwakar Reddy, the learned counsel submits that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt as the learned Trial Court committed the error in relying on the evidence of P.W.2, who is stock witness and whose evidence was not trust worthy. The learned Courts below failed to appreciate that the false case were foisted for statistical purpose against an innocent person. 7. It is argued that in regard to Crl.R.C.No.1766 of 2008, P.W.3, who was a stock witness, whose evidence was not trust worthy. 8. In regard to Crl.R.C.No.1768 of 2008, P.W.4, who was a stock witness, whose evidence was not trust worthy and the learned Courts below wrongly relied on the evidence and found the petitioner guilty, and urged to allow the Criminal Revision Cases. 9. Alternatively, it is submitted that the petitioner, who was 20 years age at the time of the commission of the alleged offence; nearly more than 22 years have passed by; right to speedy trial, a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is being violated. This right to speedy trial includes speedy disposal of the Appeal and Revision. It is urged that taking into account the above submissions, sentence the petitioner to the sentence which he had already undergone. 10. Ms.P.Akila Naidu, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that in all the three cases the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the petitioner. Similarly, the learned Appellate Court confirmed the conviction and sentence thus concurrent finding is about the guilty of the petitioner. There was no misreading of the evidence and material irregularities in conducting the trial. Hence, urged to dismiss the Revision Case. 11. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 12. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgments in Crl.A.No.33 of 2005, dated 03.10.2008, Crl.A.No.199 of 2005, dated 30.09.2008 and Crl.A.No.200 of 2005, dated 30.09.2008 passed by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Kadapa at Proddatur, are correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? 12. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgments in Crl.A.No.33 of 2005, dated 03.10.2008, Crl.A.No.199 of 2005, dated 30.09.2008 and Crl.A.No.200 of 2005, dated 30.09.2008 passed by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Kadapa at Proddatur, are correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 13. It is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar , [ (2002) 6 SCC 650 ] wherein at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as under: “12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice.The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. 13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D. Stephens v Nosibolla , [ AIR 1951 SC 196 ] at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C ., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP , [ AIR 1962 SC 1788 ] , at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 16. In regard to C.C.No.122 of 2005, the prosecution had examined P.Ws.1 to 3 got marked Exs.P.1 to 6 and M.O.1, to prove the guilt of the petitioner. The evidence of P.W.2, who happened to be mediator, played pivotal role in this case. In regard to C.C.No.122 of 2005, the prosecution had examined P.Ws.1 to 3 got marked Exs.P.1 to 6 and M.O.1, to prove the guilt of the petitioner. The evidence of P.W.2, who happened to be mediator, played pivotal role in this case. The learned Magistrate having satisfied with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses found that he was in possession of M.O.1-Gold Talibottu sarudu worth of RS.7,500/- and found the petitioner guilty for the charge. The learned Appellate Court did not incline to interfere with the findings of the learned Magistrate and confirmed the guilty and dismissed the Appeal. 17. In regard to C.C.No.47 of 2004, the learned Magistrate examined P.Ws.1 to 5, marked Exs.P.1 to 6 and M.O.1 and M.O.2. The learned Magistrate relied upon the evidence of P.W.3 mediator and also Investigating Officer and convinced that the petitioner was found in possession of M.O.1- one gold chain, M.O.2-one gold black beads chain and convicted and sentenced the petitioner. 18. In regard to C.C.No.50 of 2004, the learned Magistrate examined P.Ws.1 to 5, Exs.P.1 and 8 and M.O.1 and M.O.2 were marked. The learned Magistrate relied on the evidence of P.W.4 mediator and also the Investigating Officers and believing the version of the prosecution that the petitioner was found in possession of M.O.1-Gold chain and M.O.2- Gold chain and convicted and sentenced the petitioner. The learned Appellate Court also had not interfered with the finding and dismissed the Appeal. 19. In all three impugned judgments passed by the learned Appellate Court, the observations indicate that there were no material irregularities or misreading of evidence. No flagrant miscarriage of justice was caused to the petitioner. Nothing concrete was elicited from the mediator that he was speaking false to help the police and the petitioner was not found in possession of the material objects. Even in the 313 examination recorded by the learned Magistrate, the petitioner except denying the incriminating material available against him as false, the petitioner had not spoken anything. A mediator cannot be branded as a stock mediator or a stock witness inasmuch as nothing concrete was elicited otherwise from his cross examination. This Court cannot sit like a Second Appellate Court for evaluating or reappreciating the evidence. This Court cannot disturb the concurrent findings in the absence of any misreading of the evidence or material irregularities resorted by the learned Courts below. This Court cannot sit like a Second Appellate Court for evaluating or reappreciating the evidence. This Court cannot disturb the concurrent findings in the absence of any misreading of the evidence or material irregularities resorted by the learned Courts below. Therefore, the convictions for the offence under Section 411 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ shall be sustained. 20. Coming to the quantum of sentence that could be imposed on the petitioner, it is brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner was in incarceration either as remand prisoner or under trial prisoner or convict prisoner for more than seventy (70) days in several cases. No doubt, the petitioner was indulged in three similar crimes. However, his age has to be taken into consideration at the time of the commission of the offence; he was just 20 years old. Undeniably, the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar , [ Air 1979 SC 1360 ] . This right includes speedy disposal of appeals. In addition to the appeals, the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar , [2000 (1) BLJR 37] . As per nominal rolls submitted by the Superintendent of Jails, Central Prison, Kadapa, more than 21 years ago the offences were committed. The petitioner has been facing lot of mental agony because of the delay in disposal of the revision cases. The petitioner suffered substantial duration in the incarceration. Interest of justice would be sub served, if the petitioner is sentenced to the imprisonment to which he had already undergone. 21. In the result, the three Criminal Revision Cases are disposed of while maintaining the convictions for the offence under Section 411 of ‘the IPC .,’ against the petitioner while modifying the sentence to which the petitioner had already undergone. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.