JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. D. Das, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. P.K. Munir, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. P. Das, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3. And also heard Ms. D.D. Barman, learned Addl. Senior Government Advocate for the respondent No.4 and Ms. I. Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent No.5, 2. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, namely, Shahinur Alom Sarkar, has challenged the order dated 27.01.2025, issued under Memo No. IS/SSM/Transferred-Posting/04 /2023/409, issued by the Inspector of Schools, South Salmara Mankachar. Notably, vide impugned order dated 27.01.2025, the Inspector of Schools, South Salmara Mankachar, has transferred the petitioner from S. Ali Higher Secondary School, where he has been serving as Graduate Teacher (Science) to Kanaimara High School. 3. The impugned order is being challenged by the petitioner basically on the ground of being passed in absence of public interest and being punitive, arbitrary, unfair, illegal and violative of Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 4. The respondent No. 3 has filed affidavit-in-opposition denying the averments made in the petition. It is stated that there was several public complaint (Annexure-D and E), against the petitioner and he is irregular in attendance, his behavior is inappropriate and deteriorating school environment. The School Management Committee had also taken a resolution against the petitioner for his anti-administrative activities and he was transferred for maintaining better academic atmosphere in the S. Ali H.S. School and for greater public interest. It is also stated that he is irregular in attendance and he availed 23 days casual leave in the year 2023-2024, whereas he is entitled to 12 days leave only, also he remained absent unauthorizedly for 5 days and he is involved in anti administrative activities. And for maintaining better academic atmosphere and for greater public interest he was transferred. 5. Mr. D. Das, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner was serving as Graduate Teacher (Science) in S. Ali Higher Secondary School and vide impugned order; he has been transferred to Kanaimara High School in the same grade pay. He was suffering from neurological problem for which he was asked by Doctor to take rest for a week. He was suffering from neurological problem for which he was asked by Doctor to take rest for a week. Then he was served with a notice, asking for explanation for unauthorized absence for three days vide letter dated 27.12.2024 and he had submitted his reply on 30.12.2024. Thereafter, vide letter dated 02.01.2025, the Inspector of Schools, South Salmara Mankachar had issued another letter to him asking him to show cause for unauthorized absence and late attendance on 27.12.2024 to 28.12.2024 and late attendance thereafter. Mr. Das also submits that the petitioner had submitted one complaint to the Director Secondary Education for commission of some illegalities by the In-Charge Principal of S. Ali Higher Secondary School on 18th December, 2024 and thereafter, as a punitive measure the impugned transfer order was passed. Referring to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Somesh Tiwari vs. Union of India and Others, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 592 and another decision of Madras High Court in P. Karunakaran vs. Union of India and Others, reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 3958, Mr. Das submits that when an order of transfer was passed by way of or in lieu of punishment the same is liable to be set aside. Referring to the stand taken in the affidavit-in-opposition by the respondent No.3, Mr. Das submits that as no element of public interest is being shown in the impugned order, the respondent authorities cannot improve their case in their affidavit-in- opposition by incorporating the ground which was not there in the impugned order. In support of his submission Mr. Das has referred to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and Another vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405. Mr. Das further submits that there is no element of public interest in the impugned order and under such circumstances the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 6. Ms. P. Das, the learned standing counsel for the respondent No. 1, 2 and 3 has supported the impugned order. Ms. Das submits that transfer is a condition of service and as such by exercising the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this court cannot interfere with the same. Ms. 6. Ms. P. Das, the learned standing counsel for the respondent No. 1, 2 and 3 has supported the impugned order. Ms. Das submits that transfer is a condition of service and as such by exercising the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this court cannot interfere with the same. Ms. Das submits that the petitioner is involved in anti-administrative activities and he is irregular in attendance and remained absent unauthorisedly and as such for better academic atmosphere and in the interest of the student he was transferred and it cannot be said that there is no element of public interest involved in the transfer. Therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. 7. Per contra Ms. I. Hussain, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5, the Principal of the School also supported the impugned order. She also reiterated the grounds taken by Ms. P. Das, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent No. 1, 2 and 3. Supplementing further, Ms. Hussain submits that court can interfere with the transfer order only when- (i) the transfer order shown to be vitiated by mala-fides, or (ii) in violation of any statutory provision, or (iii) having been passed by an authority not competent to pass such an order and none of these ground have been satisfied by the petitioner herein, warranting interference of this court. In support of her submission Ms. Hussain has referred following decisions:- (i) State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, reported in (2004) 11 SCC 402 and (ii) Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 245 . Ms. Hussain also submits that the school to which the petitioner was transferred was located at a distance of few kilometers only and it was done in public interest i.e. interest of the students and staffs of the present school and also to afford the petitioner an opportunity to personnel growth. And as such, Ms. Hussain submits that no interference of the impugned order is warranted herein this case. 8. Having heard the submission of learned Advocates of both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record. Also perused the impugned order dated 27.01.2025, issued under Memo No. IS/SSM/Transferred-Posting/04 /2023/409, issued by the Inspector of Schools, South Salmara, Mankachar. 9. The law regarding transfer is well settled in catena of decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court. Also perused the impugned order dated 27.01.2025, issued under Memo No. IS/SSM/Transferred-Posting/04 /2023/409, issued by the Inspector of Schools, South Salmara, Mankachar. 9. The law regarding transfer is well settled in catena of decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the case of Gobardhan Lal (supra), it has been held as under:- “ 7. It is too late in the day for any government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision.” 10. Again in the case of Janardhan Debanath (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “ 12. That brings us to the other question as to whether the use of the expression “undesirable” warranted an enquiry before the transfer. Again in the case of Janardhan Debanath (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “ 12. That brings us to the other question as to whether the use of the expression “undesirable” warranted an enquiry before the transfer. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondents on a decision of this Court in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India [ AIR 1964 SC 449 ] (AIR p. 456, para 21) to contend that whenever there is a use of the word “undesirable” it casts a stigma and it cannot be done without holding a regular enquiry. The submission is clearly without substance. The said case relates to use of the expression “undesirable” in an order affecting the continuance in service by way of discharge. The decision has therefore no application to the facts of the present case. The manner, nature and extent of exercise to be undertaken by courts/tribunals in a case to adjudge whether it casts a stigma or constitutes one by way of punishment would also very much depend upon the consequences flowing from the order and as to whether it adversely affected any service conditions — status, service prospects financially — and the same yardstick, norms or standards cannot be applied to all categories of cases. Transfers unless they involve any such adverse impact or visit the persons concerned with any penal consequences, are not required to be subjected to same type of scrutiny, approach and assessment as in the case of dismissal, discharge, reversion or termination and utmost latitude should be left with the department concerned to enforce discipline, decency and decorum in public service which are indisputably essential to maintain quality of public service and meet untoward administrative exigencies to ensure smooth functioning of the administration. ………………………………… ………………………………………… 14. The allegations made against the respondents are of serious nature, and the conduct attributed is certainly unbecoming. Whether there was any misbehaviour is a question which can be gone into in a departmental proceeding. ………………………………… ………………………………………… 14. The allegations made against the respondents are of serious nature, and the conduct attributed is certainly unbecoming. Whether there was any misbehaviour is a question which can be gone into in a departmental proceeding. For the purposes of effecting a transfer, the question of holding an enquiry to find out whether there was misbehaviour or conduct unbecoming of an employee is unnecessary and what is needed is the prima facie satisfaction of the authority concerned on the contemporary reports about the occurrence complained of and if the requirement, as submitted by learned counsel for the respondents, of holding an elaborate enquiry is to be insisted upon the very purpose of transferring an employee in public interest or exigencies of administration to enforce decorum and ensure probity would get frustrated. The question whether the respondents could be transferred to a different division is a matter for the employer to consider depending upon the administrative necessities and the extent of solution for the problems faced by the administration. It is not for this Court to direct one way or the other. The judgment of the High Court is clearly indefensible and is set aside. The writ petitions filed before the High Court deserve to be dismissed which we direct. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs.” 11. In the case of K.B. Shukla and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1979) 4 SCC 673 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “ The responsibility for good administration is that of the Government. The maintenance of an efficient, honest and experienced administrative service is a must for the due discharge of that responsibility. Therefore, the Government alone is best suited to judge as to the existence of exigencies of such a service, requiring appointments by transfer. The term "exigency" being understood in its widest and pragmatic sense as a Rule, the Court would not judge the propriety or sufficiency of such opinion by objective standards, save where the subjective process of forming it, is vitiated by mala-fide s, dishonesty, extraneous purpose, or transgression of the limits circumscribed by the legislation.” 12. In the case of Somesh Tiwari (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “ 16. Indisputably an order of transfer is an administrative order. In the case of Somesh Tiwari (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “ 16. Indisputably an order of transfer is an administrative order. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that transfer, which is ordinarily an incident of service should not be interfered with, save in cases where inter alia mala fide on the part of the authority is proved. Mala fide is of two kinds —one malice in fact and the second malice in law. The order in question would attract the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made against the appellant in the anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that the employer is entitled to pass an order of transfer in administrative exigencies but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment. When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.” 13. Dealing with the principle governing transfer, a division bench of Madras High Court in the case of P. Karunakaran (supra) held as under:- “ 16. Once it is admitted by the authorities that transfer was made based on certain reasons of unbecoming attitude of the employee, more particularly, based on certain incident said to have taken place on a particular date, then the authorities cannot exercise the power of transfer on that ground without affording an opportunity of hearing and allowing the employee to defend his case. Administrative grounds can be put as the reason for transfer, so long as such administrative grounds do not affect the interest of the employee personally with civil consequences or such grounds do not attribute imputation on the character of the employee. If any of these elements are apparent based on admitted facts, then such grounds can no longer be termed as administrative grounds. Therefore, we are of the firm view that the order of transfer in this case was passed only as punitive measure to achieve the collateral purpose and therefore the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law as the same has been made in violation of principles of natural justice.” 14. Therefore, we are of the firm view that the order of transfer in this case was passed only as punitive measure to achieve the collateral purpose and therefore the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law as the same has been made in violation of principles of natural justice.” 14. The proposition of law, which can be crystallized from the illuminating discourse, is that - transfer of an employee is an incident inherent in the terms of appointment. It is an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, in the law governing conditions of service. Transfer is prerogative of the authority concerned. And court should not normally interfere therewith as a matter of course or routine manner for any or every type of grievance sought to be made except when:- (i) transfer order is shown to be vitiated by mala fide exercise of power, or (ii) in violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule), or (iii) having been passed by an authority not competent to do so. 14.1. The competent authority cannot be deprived or denied to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service unless the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments, cannot be deprived or denied. Unless it being shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision, the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights. 14.2. How the courts/tribunals adjudge a transfer order, the manner, nature and extent of exercise required to be undertaken, as to whether it casts a stigma or constitutes one by way of punishment would also very much depend upon the consequences flowing from the order and as to whether it adversely affected any service conditions — status, service prospects financially — and the same yardstick, norms or standards cannot be applied to all categories of cases. And utmost latitude should be left with the authority to enforce discipline, decency and decorum in public service which are indisputably essential to maintain quality of public service and meet untoward administrative exigencies to ensure smooth functioning of the administration. 14.3. And utmost latitude should be left with the authority to enforce discipline, decency and decorum in public service which are indisputably essential to maintain quality of public service and meet untoward administrative exigencies to ensure smooth functioning of the administration. 14.3. The authority alone is best suited to judge as to the existence of exigencies of such a service, requiring transfer. The courts/tribunals would not judge the propriety or sufficiency of such opinion by objective standards, subject however to exception as discussed herein above, in para No.14. 15. Now, adverting to the facts herein this case I find that regarding the basic facts there is no dispute. The impugned transfer order dated 27.01.2025 was passed by the respondent No.3, the Inspector of Schools and the same is reproduced herein below for better appreciation of the dispute in question:- “ ORDER In view of complaint received against SAHINUR ALOM SARKAR, Graduate Teacher (Science), S. Ali H.S. SCHOOL regarding his anti-administrative activities which has negatively impacted the overall educational atmosphere followed by show cause notice issued from this end vide No. ISSSMDC/Gen- corores/02/2023/359 dated 02.01.2025 and after careful examination of show cause reply and evidence thereof and to maintain a positive and productive learning environment of the student and staff, Sri SAHINUR ALOM SARKAR, Graduate Teacher (Science), S. Ali H.S. SCHOOL is hereby transferred and posted temporarily to KANAIMARA HIGH SCHOOL, with the same grade pay and other allowances as admissible under the rule. This transfer is intended to allow Sri SAHINUR ALOM SARKAR, Graduate Teacher (Science), S. Ali H.S. SCHOOL an opportunity for his professional growth and to ensure the continued smooth functioning of S. Ali H.S. SCHOOL. This order will come into force with immediate effect, and the person concern shall have to join within 5 (five days from the date of issue of this order. This has the approval of the District Commissioner, South Salmara Mankachar. Sd./ Inspector of Schools, South Salmara Mankachar” 16. Though Mr. Das, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that no element of public interest is therein in the impugned order, yet from a careful perusal of the impugned transfer order, it cannot be said that there is no element of public interest or exigencies of public service. It is a fact that in expressed terms the words -‘public interest’ has not been used in the impugned order. It is a fact that in expressed terms the words -‘public interest’ has not been used in the impugned order. But, it is implied from the words “ to maintain a positive and productive learning environment of the student and staff” , so used in the impugned order. The students are group of people, who shares a particular interest and the staffs are also group of people, who shares a particular interest, and as such they are the constituent of public in its ordinary meaning. Thus, it cannot be said that there is no element of public interest involved in passing the impugned transfer order of the petitioner. 17 . There is, however, no quarrel at the bar that the respondent authorities cannot improve their case in their affidavit-in-opposition by incorporating the ground which was not there in the impugned order. The law in this regard is well settled in the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and Another (supra). But, in view of existence of the element of public interest or exigencies of public service, in the impugned transfer order, as discussed herein above, this court is unable to record concurrence with the submission of Mr. Das, the learned Senior Counsel for the petition. 18. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was transferred temporarily with the same grade and pay and other allowance as admissible under the rule. That being so, the official status of the petitioner is not at all affected not to speak of adversely. There is also no whisper or averment that his seniority will be affected in the School, to which he has been transferred. Further, it appears that before passing the impugned transfer order, the petitioner was asked to show cause by the respondent No.3, vide No. ISSSMDC/Gen-corres/02/2023/359, dated 02.01.2025, in respect of the complaint received against him for his anti- administrative activities. And only after careful examination of show cause reply and evidence thereof the impugned transfer order was passed. Thus, it cannot be said that the right of the petitioner, as guaranteed by Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India was violated. 19. There is also no averment that the impugned transfer order is violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule), or being passed by an authority not competent to do so. Thus, it cannot be said that the right of the petitioner, as guaranteed by Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India was violated. 19. There is also no averment that the impugned transfer order is violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule), or being passed by an authority not competent to do so. Thus, out of the three principles laid down in the case of Gobardhan Lal (supra), under which the court or tribunal can interfere with the transfer order, two of them admittedly does not exists here in this case. Now, coming to the other principle i.e. mala fide exercise of power also could not be shown to have existed herein this case though Mr. Das, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner made a scathing attack upon the impugned transfer order on this count. 20. Before directing a discussion to this point, it would be apposite to understand how the plea of mala-fide is to be determined. The principal test for due and proper exercise of power and absence of mala-fides lies in the answer to the question - was the transfer made for real administrative exigency? In finding the answer, the court might have to pierce the veil of the transfer order and to see what the operative reason was for the transfer. If the finding reveals a nexus with administrative necessity, the exercise of power will be upheld. If however the operative reason has no such nexus then the transfer will be vulnerable. In the later case, it would be mala-fide exercise of power and will take within its sweep all situations where the nexus with administrative exigencies is absent. 21. As held in the case of K.B. Shukla and Ors.(supra), the term "exigency" has to be understood in its widest and pragmatic sense, and as a Rule, the Court would not judge the propriety or sufficiency of such opinion by objective standards, except however, the subjective process of forming it, is vitiated by mala-fides, dishonesty, extraneous purpose, or transgression of the limits circumscribed by the legislation. 22. In the case in hand, the impugned transfer order, would attract the principle of malice in law, as it is challenged for being passed on the allegations made against him. As held herein above, the order has not adversely affected any service conditions of the petitioner, i.e. status, service prospects financially. 22. In the case in hand, the impugned transfer order, would attract the principle of malice in law, as it is challenged for being passed on the allegations made against him. As held herein above, the order has not adversely affected any service conditions of the petitioner, i.e. status, service prospects financially. Further, it appears that the allegation made against him appears to be serious nature, and the conduct attributed to him appears to be unbecoming and not conducive for a positive and productive learning environment of the student and staff. Determination of veracity of the allegation in respect of anti-administrative activities is surely a question, which can be gone into in a departmental proceeding. 23. But, as held in the case of Janardhan Debanath (supra) for the purposes of effecting a transfer, the question of holding an enquiry to find out whether there was anti-administrative activities and it being unbecoming of an employee is unnecessary. What is being needed is the prima facie satisfaction of the authority concerned on the complaint about the anti-administrative activities that has been complained of and if an elaborate enquiry is to be insisted upon and conducted then the very purpose of transferring an employee in public interest or exigencies of administration to enforce decorum and ensure probity would get frustrated. 24. Thus, seeking the answer to the question, was the transfer made for real administrative exigency, this court, having pierced the veil of the transfer order, prima-facie satisfied that the operative reason for the transfer was administrative exigencies having a nexus with administrative necessity, i.e. to maintain a positive and productive learning environment of the student and staff and to maintain overall educational atmosphere, that has been negatively impacted by anti-administrative activities of the petitioner. And that being so, the exercise of power by the respondent No.2 has to be upheld. 25. I have carefully considered the submission of Mr. Das, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and also gone through the decisions referred by him. Though Mr. Das has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Somesh Tiwari (supra) and of Madras High Court in p . Karunakaran (supra), yet this court is of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in those cases would not advance his argument. Though Mr. Das has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Somesh Tiwari (supra) and of Madras High Court in p . Karunakaran (supra), yet this court is of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in those cases would not advance his argument. Firstly, the case of Sumesh Tiwari (supra) is factually distinguishable from the case in hand, as in that case, the complaint was an anonymous. This is not in the present case. Moreover, there is inadequacy of materials to suggest that the impugned order of transfer was passed in lieu of punishment, and in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.B. Shukla and Ors.(supra) the decision of Madras High Court would not mandate an acceptance of this court. In view of the settled position of law in the matter of transfer, as discussed herein above, this court is unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly, the same stands repudiated. 26. In the result, I find this petition devoid of merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. The parties have to bear their own costs.