JUDGMENT : SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR, J. This first appeal is filed feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 4.9.2001 passed in RCS No. 5B/2000 by Ms. Bharati Baghel, Additional District Judge, Badwah, West Nimar granting compensation of Rs. 1,44,000/- to the plaintiffs with interest @ 6% per annum till the date of payment. 2. The plaintiffs Anitabai, Varsha, Reena and Nandkishore had filed civil suit for damages regarding death of husband of Anitabai and father of Varsha, Reena and Nandkishore, namely Ramesh, due to electrocution. It is pleaded in the plaint that on 21.5.1998, Ramesh was returning home after labour job from village Ratanpur. As he reached near agricultural field of Chhitar, he came into contact of live electric wire which had fallen down on the way. Ramesh came into contact of live wires due to darkness and got electrocuted. Ramesh died on the spot. The plaintiffs are dependent on Ramesh. Ramesh was only earning member of the family. He was earning Rs. 100/- per day from carpenter work. The incident was reported to Police Station Badwah. The P.S. Badwah registered unnatural death intimation No. 23 of 1998. The plaintiff claimed damages of Rs. 12,80,000/- jointly and severely from defendants. 3. The defendants denied the plaint averments. It was denied that Ramesh had electrocuted due to negligence on part of defendants. 4. The trial court framed the issues. On completion of the trial, partly allowed the claim vide impugned judgment and decree dated 4.9.2001. The judgment and decree of the trial Court is assailed in the present first appeal on following grounds: I. The trial court committed gross error in appreciation of evidence. The trial court overlooked important material contradictions in the evidence of plaintiff and wrongly concluded that Ramesh has died due to electric current in the broken electric wires. II. The material on record shows that electric wires were broken and fallen on the field due to heavy winds and rains. The incident was natural calamity and an act of god beyond human control. III. The learned trial court did not consider that the defendants did not commit any negligence, they cannot be held responsible for natural calamity. IV. The decreed amount is unreasonable considering the earning capacity of the deceased in the light of statement of Bag Singh (PW-3). The incident was natural calamity and an act of god beyond human control. III. The learned trial court did not consider that the defendants did not commit any negligence, they cannot be held responsible for natural calamity. IV. The decreed amount is unreasonable considering the earning capacity of the deceased in the light of statement of Bag Singh (PW-3). V. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court is illegal, improper and based on surmises and conjectures. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant, in addition to the facts and grounds mentioned in the appeal memo, referred to the evidence on record and contended that the witness for plaintiff have admitted that there was heavy wind and rains at the time of incident. There was no negligence on the part of defendants. The defendants cannot be held responsible for the incident caused by natural calamity. Learned counsel further contends that death of Ramesh due to electrocution attributable to the negligence of defendants was not proved. Learned trial court committed error in granting the damage to plaintiffs without properly considering the earning capacity of deceased Ramesh. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents submits that the oral and documentary evidence on record clearly established that death of Ramesh was caused by electrocution from broken electric wires. Defendants were responsible for up-keep of the electric wires. They failed to perform their duties, therefore, the trial court did not commit any error in granting damages to the plaintiffs, who were dependent on deceased Ramesh. 7. Heard both the parties. Perused the record. 8. The points for determination, in the present first appeal, are as under: 1. Whether death of Ramesh, husband of plaintiff no.1 and father of plaintiffs No. 2,3 and 4, was caused due to negligence attributable to defendant No. 1, 2 and 3? 2. Whether the trial court committed an error in granting the compensation of Rs. 1,44,000/- to the plaintiffs and making the defendants No. 1, 2 and 3, jointly and severely, liable to pay the compensation amount? The Point no. 1 – reasons for conclusion 9. The Supreme court in the case of M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 162 held as under:- 7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. The Point no. 1 – reasons for conclusion 9. The Supreme court in the case of M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 162 held as under:- 7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the lookout of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. 9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] . Blackburn, J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision : (All ER p. 7E-F) “[T]he true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.” 10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this:“Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply.” (Vide p. 535, Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.) 11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. [(1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL)] The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [ (1990) 1 SCC 613 ] and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [ (1987) 3 SCC 234 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 482] had followed with approval the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] . By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [ (2001) 2 SCC 9 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 268] 12. By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [ (2001) 2 SCC 9 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 268] 12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [ (1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37] this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that : (SCC p. 421, para 31) Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] . 14. The Privy Council has observed in Quebec Rly., Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry [1920 AC 662 : 89 LJPC 99 : 123 LT 1] that the company supplying electricity is liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high-tension current found its way through the low-tension cable into the premises of the respondents was held to be not a justifiable defence. Thus, merely because the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the Board regarding the live wire lying on the road. 10. In Manoharlal Gupta And Ors. vs The Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board 1975 MPLJ 744 , it was observed that:- 4. The defendant has a statutory authority under the Electricity Act, 1910 read with the The Electricity Supply Act, 1948 to transmit electric energy. The defendant, therefore, cannot be made liable for nuisance for the escape of electrical energy on the principle accepted in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1866) LR 1 Ex 265. The defendant, however, is still liable for negligence. It is negligence to omit to use all reasonable known means to keep the electricity harmless; (see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 13th Edition, paragraph 1536), The burden of proving that there was no negligence is on the defendant and there is no obligation on the plaintiff to prove negligence. The defendant, however, is still liable for negligence. It is negligence to omit to use all reasonable known means to keep the electricity harmless; (see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 13th Edition, paragraph 1536), The burden of proving that there was no negligence is on the defendant and there is no obligation on the plaintiff to prove negligence. Further, the standard of care required is a high one owing to the dangerous nature of electricity; (see Charlesworth on Negligence, 5th Edition, p. 531). If the defendant produces no material and offers no evidence to negative negligence, negligence will be presumed. This result will also follow on the principle of res ipsa loquitur. Live broken electric wires carrying, high tension energy are generally not found in a public place, street or road and, therefore, if such a thing happens a prima facie inference can be drawn that there has been some carelessness on the part of the defendant in transmitting electric energy or in properly maintaining the transmission lines. This inference is further supported by Rule 91 of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956. This rule provides that every over head line which is not covered with insulating material and which is erected over any part of a street or other public place or any factory or mine or on any consumer's premises shall be protected with a device approved by the Inspector for rendering the line electrically harmless in ease it breaks. If the precaution under this rule is taken the line in case it breaks would become dead and harmless. The fact that the line after it broke did not become harmless shows that necessary precaution was not taken. As the defendant has not produced any evidence whatsoever to place the facts showing that all necessary precautions were taken and there was no negligence on its part, it must be held that the accident happened because of the negligence of the defendant. 11 . The material on record examined in the light of the aforestated preposition of law. 12 Anitabai (PW-1), Bagsingh (PW-2) deposed that Ramesh was returning from Ratanpur on his bicycle. Ramesh came in contact with the electricity live wire and got electrocuted. The live electricity wires were broken and fallen on the road. Ramesh could not see them due to darkness. Bagsingh further deposed that he went to the spot of incident. 12 Anitabai (PW-1), Bagsingh (PW-2) deposed that Ramesh was returning from Ratanpur on his bicycle. Ramesh came in contact with the electricity live wire and got electrocuted. The live electricity wires were broken and fallen on the road. Ramesh could not see them due to darkness. Bagsingh further deposed that he went to the spot of incident. The electricity wire was wrapped on the neck of Ramesh. Ramesh and his bicycle were lying on the road. 13. Shersingh Verma (PW-5) deposed that Ramesh died due to electrocution when he was returning from Ratanpur. Ramesh got electrocuted by coming in contact with the broken electricity wires and died. He informed the incident to the Police Station Badwah. Sher Singh deposed that he has seen dead body of Ramesh on the spot. His neck and abdomen had burn injury due to electrocution. The electricity wire was lying on the body of Ramesh. Head Constable Hanif Khan (PW-2) recorded unnatural death intimation (Annexure P-6) at the intimation of Sher Singh. Sher Singh had informed that Ramesh has died due to electrocution around 8 p.m. on 21.5.1998. Sub Inspector B.R. Solanki conducted Panchanama (Ex.P-7) of dead body of Ramesh and forwarded the dead body for postmortem examination. Dr. N.D. Dubey (PW-4) deposed that he conducted postmortem examination of dead body of Ramesh. There were burn marks on left side of chest and left palm. Dr. Dubey opined that Ramesh has died due to shock caused by electric burn. This evidence remained unrebutted. 14. Junior Engineer Shiv Kumar Yadav (DW-1) and Lineman Heeralal (DW-2) deposed that one person was found dead near village Saltanpur. The electricity wires were found near him. When they checked the transformer, L.T. fuse was found blown out. Shiv Kumar (DW-1) and Heeralal (DW-2) attempted to portray that the electricity lines were properly maintained and on the fateful night around 8.00 pm, the electricity line was disrupted due to heavy wind and rains. Shiv Kumar Yadav (DW-1) admitted that three wires from electricity pole were found broken and fallen on the road at the spot of incident. He further admitted that if any person comes in contact with live electricity wire, the electricity line gets disrupted due to earthing through body of such person. Shiv Kumar Yadav (DW-1) admitted his signatures on report (Ex.D-1) and Panchanama (Ex.D-2) prepared after the incident. He further admitted that if any person comes in contact with live electricity wire, the electricity line gets disrupted due to earthing through body of such person. Shiv Kumar Yadav (DW-1) admitted his signatures on report (Ex.D-1) and Panchanama (Ex.D-2) prepared after the incident. The report (Ex.D-1) and Panchanama (Ex.D-2) supports the plaintiff's evidence with regard to death of Ramesh due to electrocution from live electric wire. The Court of first instance in paras 15 to 19 of the impugned judgment appreciated the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that Ramesh has died due to electrocution from live electricity wire of electricity company. The defendants had failed to establish due care in maintaining the electricity line. The defendants cannot escape the liability by making out a defence that the electricity wires were broken due to heavy wind and rains. They were under responsibility to ensure shutting down of the electricity line immediately on disruption or breakage of electricity wires due to heavy wind. Therefore, the trial court committed no error in concluding that death of Ramesh was caused due to negligence attributable to defendants no. 1, 2 and 3. The Point no. 2 – reasons for conclusion 15. The Court of first instance in paras 21 to 24 of the judgment considered all the relevant factors with regard to determination of compensation for death of Ramesh. Considering the age, income and dependency, the court of first instance committed no error in determining the amount of compensation to Rs. 1,44,000/- No interference is called for. 16 . In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the court of first instance committed no error in granting the decree for payment of Rs. 1,44,000/- to the plaintiffs and making defendants no. 1, 2 and 3, jointly and severely, liable to pay the compensation amount. 17 . Consequently, present first appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 4.9.2001 passed in RCS No. 5B/2000 by Additional District Judge, Badwah, West Nimar is affirmed. 18 . The cost of present appeal shall be borne by the appellant. Decree be drawn accordingly.