ORDER : SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR, J. 1. Present petition under section 528 of BNSS, 2023 is filed for quashing of FIR registered at Crime no.60/2024 dated 12.02.2024 at Police Station – Shajapur Kotwali, District Shajapur for the offence punishable under sections 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. The exposition of facts giving rise to present petition is as under : A) Smt. Aarti Yadav, aged around 27 years reported to S.H.O. of Police Station Shajapur kotwali, District Shajapur on 12.02.2024 that she was married to Amit Yadav on 27.04.2024 as per Hindu Rituals and Customs. Amit Yadav works in Army. They were blessed with daughter presently aged around 01 year. He husband Amit Yadav, mother-in-law Kalabai, father-in-law Basant Yadav and aunt of Amit, Tulsibai used to harass her physically and mentally for demand of dowry. They used to abuse her and demand money for purchasing a plot. When her husand was not at home, her mother-in-law Kalabai, father-in-law Basant and aunt Tusibai harassed her mentally and physically and manhandled her. She went to her paternal home at Shajapur. On 07.02.2024, she went to her matrimonial home for adding name of her daughter in Samagra ID Card of her husband. Her father-in-law Basant, mother-in-law Kalabai and aunt Tulsibai abused her in filthy language. They manhandled her and expelled her from matrimonial home. Therefore, she returned to her parental home. On such allegation, P.S. Kotwali, District Shajapur registered FIR at Crime No.60/2024 for offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act. The statement of complainant and her family members have been recorded. The final report has been submitted on completion of investigation. The trial is underway. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the facts and grounds mentioned in the petition contends that the petitioner is falsely implicated in this matter. The petitioner is paternal aunt of Amit Yadav, husband of the complainant. She lives separately. She has not interferencein the day to day affairs of the family of complainant. General and omnibus allegation have been made against the applicant. No offence, as alleged, is made out against the petitioner. The complainant is residing at her parental home for last one year due to matrimonial discord with her husband. She lives separately. She has not interferencein the day to day affairs of the family of complainant. General and omnibus allegation have been made against the applicant. No offence, as alleged, is made out against the petitioner. The complainant is residing at her parental home for last one year due to matrimonial discord with her husband. The F.I.R. is lodged with malafide intention and to pressurrize the family of husband for settlement. The FIR and consequential proceedings be quashed. 4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the State opposed the petition and contended that specific allegations have been made with regard to mental and physical harassment of the complainant in relation to demand of money. On 07.02.2024 complainant was manhandled and expelled from her matrimonial home, therefore, no ground is made out for quashment of proceedings. The petition is meritless and deserves to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the records. 6. The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration of the law and after referring to various earlier decisions, observed in para 108 as under:- ''108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously Instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.'' 7. In case of CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 1 75, it was held by the Supreme Court that FIR is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. It was observed that- “20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. It was observed that- “20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the police officer concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can.” 8. In case of Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 , the Supreme Court laid down following principles - 13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 , the following principles of law emerge: 13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences. 13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences. 13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. 13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the “rarest of rare cases”. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court.) 13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. 13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage. 13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. 13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. 13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage. 13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. 13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC. 9. Further, in case of S tate of M.P. v. Jogendra , (2022) 5 SCC 401, explaining the ambit of the term "Dowry" it was held that- 12. In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our opinion, the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand. In Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 468] referred to in the impugned judgment [Jogendra v. State of M.P., Criminal Appeal No. 48 of 2004, decided on 10-9-2008 (MP)] , this Court had held that a demand for money from the parents of the deceased woman to purchase manure would not fall within the purview of “dowry”, thereby strictly interpreting the definition of dowry. This view has, however, not been subscribed to in Rajinder Singh case [Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] wherein it has been held that the said decision as also the one in Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P. [Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P., (2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 15] , do not state the law correctly. Noting that the aforesaid decisions were distinct from four other decisions of this Court viz. Noting that the aforesaid decisions were distinct from four other decisions of this Court viz. Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana [Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana, (2011) 4 SCC 427 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 280] , Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab [Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 339] , Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana [Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 769] and Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab [Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 582 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 116], the Court opined that keeping in mind the fact that Section 304-B was inserted in IPC to combat the social evil of dowry demand that has reached alarming proportions, it cannot be argued that in case of an ambiguity in the language used in the provision, the same ought to be construed strictly as that would amount to defeating the very object of the provision. In other words, the Court leaned in favour of assigning an expansive meaning to the expression “dowry” and held thus : (Rajinder Singh case [Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , SCC p. 491, para 20) “20. [ Ed. : Para 20 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2015 dated 6-4-2015.] Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 468] followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal [Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P., (2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 15] do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.” (emphasis supplied) 14. In the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion that the trial court has correctly interpreted the demand for money raised by the respondents on the deceased for construction of a house as falling within the definition of the word “dowry”. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the deceased was also a party to such a demand as she had on her own asked her mother and maternal uncle to contribute to the construction of the house, must be understood in the correct perspective. It cannot be lost sight of that the respondents had been constantly tormenting the deceased and asking her to approach her family members for money to build a house and it was only on their persistence and insistence that she was compelled to ask them to contribute some amount for constructing a house. The Court must be sensitive to the social milieu from which the parties hail. The fact that the marriage of the deceased and Respondent was conducted in a community marriage organisation where some couples would have tied the knot goes to show that the parties were financially not so well off. This position is also borne out from the deposition of PW 1 who had stated that he used to bear the expenses of the couple. Before the marriage of the deceased also, PW 1 had stated that he used to bear her expenses and that of her mother and brother (his sister and nephew) as her father had abandoned them. In this background, the High Court fell in an error in drawing an inference that since the deceased had herself joined her husband and father-in-law, the respondents herein and asked her mother or uncle to contribute money to construct a house, such demand cannot be treated as a “dowry demand”. On the contrary, the evidence brought on record shows that the deceased was pressurised to make such a request for money to her mother and uncle. It was not a case of complicity but a case of sheer helplessness faced by the deceased in such adverse circumstances. 10 . A perusal of the complaint and subsequent FIR reveals specific allegations of cruelty against father-in-law Basant, mother- in-law Kalabai and aunt Tulsi Devi with regard to inadequacy of dowry and further demand of money. The complainant has alleged mental and physical harassment by her husband. 10 . A perusal of the complaint and subsequent FIR reveals specific allegations of cruelty against father-in-law Basant, mother- in-law Kalabai and aunt Tulsi Devi with regard to inadequacy of dowry and further demand of money. The complainant has alleged mental and physical harassment by her husband. The complainant has alleged specific incidents with relevant details of such incident. The allegations cannot be said to be inherently improbable or absurd. At this juncture, it cannot be said that possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to them. The respondent is pursuing legal remedies available to her, so it cannot be said that petitioners are unnecessarily harassed by the respondent. Therefore, no case is made out for quashing the FIR and consequential proceedings in exercise of inherent jurisdiction in view of the law laid down by the Apex court in cases of Bhajan Lal, Neeharika, Tapan and Jogendra (supra). In view of the above discussion, the precedents of law relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner above are of no assistance, as the same are distinguishable on facts. 11. Consequently, the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is dismissed. CC as per rules.