JUDGMENT : (Arun Dev Choudhury, J.) 1. Heard Mr. M.A Sheikh, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. K.K. Das, learned Addl. PP, Assam. 2. The present revision petition is filed under section 401 read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 assailing the judgment and order dated 14.05.2009, passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Margherita in GR Case No.126/2008, convicting the accused petitioner under section 420 IPC and sentencing him to suffer Rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- in default to serve simple imprisonment for one month. 3. The further challenge is to the judgment and order dated 16.03.2012 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, F.T.C. No.2, Tinsukia in Criminal Appeal No.17(2)/2009, whereby the said criminal appeal was dismissed by affirming the judgment and sentence passed by the learned trial court. 4. Mr. Sheikh, learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the findings of both the courts below are vitiated by perversity, inasmuch as no material has been produced by the prosecution to establish any ingredients of section 420 IPC. Mr. Sheikh, further contends that from the prosecution witness, more particularly, from the evidence of PW-1, the informant himself, it is clearly established that the dispute was civil in nature, however, the learned trial court, had committed serious error of law as well as fact by concluding that it is an offence under section 420 IPC. Therefore, this court in exercise of its revisional power should interfere with such perverse judgment, concludes Mr. Sheikh. 5. Per contra, Mr. K.K. Das learned Addl. PP submits that this court in exercise of its revisional power may not like to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by both the courts below after the proper appreciation of prosecution evidence. He further contends that the decision under challenge cannot also be said to be grossly erroneous or perverse. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 7. As the primary argument revolves around the perversity of the judgment, this court has also perused the evidence available on record and produced by the prosecution. 8. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 7. As the primary argument revolves around the perversity of the judgment, this court has also perused the evidence available on record and produced by the prosecution. 8. From the FIR what is disclosed is that the accused person took cash amounting to Rs.80,000/- from the informant (PW-1) assuring him to hand over one 709 Mini Bus bearing registration No.AS 09 4788 on hire for four years. It is further alleged that in spite of receipt of the aforesaid amount, the accused petitioner did not hand over the vehicle to the informant. Though the informant made several attempts, but the accused avoided him. Accordingly, it is alleged that the accused person deceived the informant and took a sum of Rs.80,000/- only. 9. Based on the aforesaid FIR, Pengree PS Case No.15/2008 under section 420 IPC was registered. After completion of the investigation, the investigating officer submitted a charge sheet against the accused person under section 420 IPC. The case was numbered as GR Case No.126/2008. Thereafter the learned trial court took cognizance of offence under section 420 IPC against the accused person. The accused person entered appearance before the learned trial court on receipt of summons and thereafter charge under section 420 IPC was framed against the accused to which the accused pleaded not guilty. 10. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as five witnesses. PW-1 is the informant. PW-2 and PW-3 are the witnesses to the hiring agreement of the vehicle and PW-4 is another person who was also consulted regarding the execution of the contract between the accused and PW-1, and PW-5 is the investigating officer. 11. The statement of the accused was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C and the defence also led two witnesses DW-1 and DW-2. DW-1 is the accused himself. The defence projected a case that the amount taken was subsequently returned to the informant. 12. PW-1 in his deposition before the court stated that he had entered into an agreement with the accused and under the agreement the informant was allowed to ply the vehicle (709 Bus) belonging to the accused for four years for an amount of Rs.80,000. According to him, he paid Rs.80,000/-, however, the accused did not hand over the said vehicle and therefore, he filed the criminal case. 13. According to him, he paid Rs.80,000/-, however, the accused did not hand over the said vehicle and therefore, he filed the criminal case. 13. The witnesses to the agreement so entered were examined as PW-2 and PW-3. They proved the execution of the agreement. PW-4 who is another witness has also deposed that he is aware of the agreement between the accused and the informant. 14. Section 420 IPC provides that whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 15. Section 415 IPC defines the term ‘cheating’ and brings under its fold an act that is done by fraudulent or with dishonest intentions. The reading of the aforesaid provision shall clarify that there must be an inducement to deceive and to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, causing damage or harm to that person. Therefore, the dishonest or fraudulent intention on the part of the accused there must be prima facie material as regards dishonest or fraudulent inducement to deliver property. Thus, what is required is deception of a person, fraudulent or dishonest inducement leading to delivery of any property to any person and dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making such inducement, there must be initial inducement. Thus, the dishonest intention must be there from the inception when the promise and representations were made. 16. It is equally well settled that every deceitful act is not unlawful inasmuch as, every unlawful act is not deceitful. Those acts, which can be termed as unlawful and at the same deceitful, shall come within the purview of section 420 IPC. It is equally well settled proposition of law that a statement of fact is deemed deceitful when it is false, and is knowingly or recklessly made with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another person, resulting in damage or loss. It is equally well settled proposition of law that a statement of fact is deemed deceitful when it is false, and is knowingly or recklessly made with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another person, resulting in damage or loss. Cheating generally involves a preceding deceitful act that dishonestly induces a person to deliver any property or part of a valuable security, prompting the induced person to undertake the said act, which he would not have done but for the inducement. 17. From the evidence of these vital prosecution witnesses i.e., the PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, what is established is that there was a hiring agreement for the 709 Bus which was executed on 08.02.2008 between the informant and the accused and from the aforesaid agreement, it is seen that the hiring consideration was Rs.80,000 and the informant had paid an amount of Rs.80,000/- however, the accused has failed to hand over the vehicle. 18. In the considered opinion of this court, there is no material evidence even remotely suggesting any initial deception in the mind of the accused, or any dishonest or fraudulent inducement for delivery of property (Bus) and the prosecution has also failed to adduce any iota of evidence as regards deceiving the informant by the accused. What is discernible, in the considered opinion of this court, is non-performance of the responsibility and duties of the accused in terms of the agreement dated 08.02.2008. Therefore, at best this could have been a case of performance and/or non-performance of contract between the informant and the accused No.1 or recovery of money alleged to have been paid. 19. Yet another aspect of the matter is that a given set of facts may make out a purely civil wrong, or a purely criminal offence or a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. It is also well settled that a commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from arising a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. Though the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from criminal proceedings, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available, is not itself a ground for interfering with a conviction. Though the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from criminal proceedings, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available, is not itself a ground for interfering with a conviction. What is required is whether the prosecution has been able to establish commission of a criminal offence though the offence arises out of a commercial transaction. 20. Now coming into the case in hand as recorded hereinabove the prosecution has miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt, more particularly, through their star witnesses PW-1, PW-2 & PW-3 any ingredients of section 420 IPC. 21. However, both the learned courts below misdirected themselves and attributed criminality under section 420 IPC to the accused persons. Therefore, in view of the reasons recorded hereinabove, this court is in agreement with the arguments of Mr. M.A. Sheikh that the judgments are vitiated by perversity. Accordingly, the present revision petition stands allowed by setting aside the judgment and order dated 16.03.2012 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, FTC No.2, Tinsukia in Criminal Appeal No.17(2)/2009 & judgment and order dated 14.05.2009, passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Margherita in GR Case No.126/2008. 22. The bail bond stands discharged and the LCR be returned.