ORDER : (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV and HON’BLE MR JUSTICE SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR) 1. This review petition is filed by petitioners (respondent Nos. 3-(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) in W.A. No. 898/1993) seeking review of judgment dated 23.04.2021 passed in W.A. No. 898/1993 and consequently to hear and dispose of W.A. No. 898/1993 afresh. 2. The gist of petitioner’s case is that, the land bearing survey No. 20/6 in Block No. 6 of Mosarahalli Village, Bhadravati taluk, measuring 3 acres was granted in favour of one Sri. Dakya Naika, son of Sri. Dodda Dharma Naika on 16.06.1957 under Darkasth Rules. It was indicated thereunder that non-alienation period is 15 years. Grantee sold the entire extent of 3 acres under a registered sale deed dated 20.03.1963 in favour of Smt. Krishna Bai and she in turn sold 1 acre out of total extent of 3 acres in favour of Sri. Javarappa (appellant in writ appeal and respondent No. 1 in this petition) under a registered sale deed dated 30.03.1967. The grantee – Sri. Dakya Naika claims to have filed an application before the Assistant Commissioner, Shivamogga, for resumption of land under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as `PTCL Act’). The Assistant Commissioner, Shivamogga Sub-Division, Shivamogga, in PTCL CR No. 290/1982-83, initiated proceedings under Section 5(1) of the PTCL Act, on the basis of report from the Tahsildar, in RRC.KR:188/78-79 dated 31.07.1982 and notice under Rule 3(3) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Rules, 1978 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as `PTCL Rules’) came to be issued to respondent No. 1 as to why sale deed executed in his favour should not be declared as null and void. 2A. The said suo motu proceedings resulted in an order being passed by the Assistant Commissioner on 13.03.1984, declaring the sale deed dated 30.03.1967 executed in favour of respondent No. 1 herein as null and void and it was further ordered that land has to be resumed by the State in favour of grantee. The appeal filed before the Deputy Commissioner, Shivamogga, in SC ST 283/1984-85 by respondent No. 1 herein did not yield any fruitful result in favour of respondent No. 1 herein or in other words, appeal came to be dismissed vide order dated 13.10.1988. The appeal filed before the Deputy Commissioner, Shivamogga, in SC ST 283/1984-85 by respondent No. 1 herein did not yield any fruitful result in favour of respondent No. 1 herein or in other words, appeal came to be dismissed vide order dated 13.10.1988. W.P. No. 15397/1988 filed challenging the said two orders also came to be dismissed on 18.03.1993. W.A. No. 898/1993 came to be filed challenging the order of learned Single Judge also came to be dismissed on 23.02.1995 against which respondent No. 1 filed SLP No. 17530/1995 (Civil Appeal No. 3953-60/1996) which was clubbed with other matters and the Hon’ble Apex Court by order dated 26.02.1996 disposed of the appeal in the light of judgment in the case of K.T. Huchegowda Vs. Deputy Commissioner and others reported in 1994 (3) SCC 536 and has requested this Court to examine individual grievance of the appellants in the background of facts obtained in respective cases. It was also made clear by the Hon’ble Apex Court that no opinion was being expressed on merits of the case. 2B. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and considering the contentions raised, judgment came to be passed allowing the appeal, setting aside the order dated 18.03.1993 passed in W.P. No. 15397/1988 and consequently quashing the order dated 13.03.1984 as affirmed in SC ST 263/84-85 dated 13.10.1988 passed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein. Said judgment is sought to be reviewed in the instant petition. 3. We have heard the arguments of Sri. Kantharaj H., learned Senior counsel appearing for petitioners, Sri. L. Lakshminarayana, learned Senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 and learned HCGP appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and perused the records of the writ appeal. Contentions of learned Senior counsel for petitioners 4. The reasonable time within which proceedings are to be initiated has to be reckoned from the date of coming into force of the PCTL Act, i.e., 01.01.1979 as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court and as such finding that there is unreasonable delay by reckoning the delay from the date of grant or sale is opposed to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka and another reported in (2018) 6 KLJ 792 (SC), Vivek M. Hinduja and others Vs. State of Karnataka and another reported in (2018) 6 KLJ 792 (SC), Vivek M. Hinduja and others Vs. M. Ashwatha and others, reported in (2018) 1 KLR 176 (SC) and in the case of Jagadish Vs. State of Karnataka and others reported in 2020 (4) KCCR 2484 (SC). 4A. The Hon’ble Apex Court under the PTCL ACT has considered that reasonable period of initiation of proceedings either suo motu or on an application has to be reckoned from the date of coming into force of the Act, i.e., 01.01.1979, when the cause of action accrued and as such the delay in the instant case taken under the impugned order at 21 years or 26 years or 20 years or at the average period of 22 years from the date of grant or sale thereby allowing the appeal is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and non-consideration of the same is error apparent on the face of it. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Satyan Vs. Deputy Commissioner and others, C.A. No. 1976-83/2019 decided on 30.04.2019, considering the delay of about 8 years in initiating the proceedings has held as under: “34. The period of eight (8) years cannot be said to be such, as to amount to such delay and latches as would make the action void, considering that it is in respect of a beneficial legislation for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Community.” 4B. He submits that it is well settled law that an error which is contrary to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court and an order overlooking the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court which is binding is a ground for review. 4C. He submits that it is well settled law that an error which is contrary to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court and an order overlooking the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court which is binding is a ground for review. 4C. With regard to the question of adverse possession, in the absence of plea at the earliest opportunity before the Assistant Commissioner and in the absence of plea of crucial facts to constitute adverse possession having not pleaded before the Assistant Commissioner or even before the Deputy Commissioner in appeal much less in writ petition, the Grant was a free grant and there was no transfer of absolute title to the grantee by the Government by such a grant as grant of land is admittedly hedged with conditions not to alienate and the class of persons to whom the lands are granted, such a contention of adverse possession was not at all available or proved in law. On that point he placed reliance on the following decisions: 1. D.N. Venaktarayappa and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Others – (1997) 7 SCC 567 2. R. Chandevarappa and others vs. State of Karnatka and Others – (1995) 6 SCC 309 3. Sri G M Venkatareddy and Another Vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District and Others –ILR 2012 KAR 3168(DB) 4. B N Yagatappa Vs. Gadlappa and Others – (1997) 7 Kar L J 377 5. Hanumappa Vs. Honnappa and Others – (1998) 1 Kar L.J 630 6. Basavegowda Vs. Smt. Nanjamma and Others – 1998 (2) Kar. L.J 81 4D. The order under review being contrary to law laid down by the said binding judgments constitute ground for review under Section 114 read with Order 7 Rule 1 of CPC. He contends that if the land has been allotted by way of grant and title remains with the State Government, then to extinguish title that has remained with the State Government by adverse possession by a transferee on the basis of alienation made in his favour by the allottee, the period of limitation shall be 30 years. On that point he placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Huche Gowda (supra). 4E. On that point he placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Huche Gowda (supra). 4E. Respondent No. 1 is concerned only with 1 acre of land out of 3 acres purchased from one Smt. Krishna Bai in the year 1967 and as such, he had filed the appeal. Smt. Krishna Bai who was a party and served with notice had suffered the order of restoration passed by the Assistant Commissioner for remaining 2 acres retained by her and had not challenged the order of the Assistant Commissioner before the Deputy Commissioner directing resumption and restoration and as such orders against her had become final insofar as 2 acres of land is concerned. After the order was passed by the Assistant Commissioner, the father of the petitioner/grantee was put in possession of the entire 3 acres of land and his name was entered in the revenue records. As such, quashing of the order of Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and learned Single Judge without specifically restricting it to 1 acre of land of respondent No.1 is an error which requires to be reviewed. Learned Senior counsel regarding the scope and powers of review has placed reliance on the following decisions: i. The Selection Committee for Admission to the Medical and Dental College, Bangalore Vs. M.P.Nagaraj – in AIR 1972 Mysore 44 (DB) ii. Additional District Magistrate and Police Commissioner, Hubli-Dharwad City and others Vs. Chandrakant Baddi – 2007 3 Kar 565 (DB) iii. The State of Karnataka by Chief Secretary to Government, Bangalore-1 Vs. The Harapanahalli Sri Venkataramanswamy Permanent Bhandar. Ltd., by its President – ILR 1980(2) Kar Page 1250(DB) iv. Mrs. Mallika and Others Vs. Chandrappa and Others – (2008) (1) Kar L J 482. v. Smt. Lingamma and Others Vs. Gangadharaiah and Others –ILR 2008 Kar 2450. vi. Board of Control for Cricket in India and Another Vs. Netaji Cricket Club and Others – 2005 (4) SCC 741 . Contentions of learned Senior counsel for respondent No. 1 5. Learned Senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 would contend that all grounds urged are grounds of appeal and they are not grounds for review. The judgment sought to be reviewed is a common judgment passed in W.A. No. 898/1993 and W.A. No. 449/2020. Sri. Contentions of learned Senior counsel for respondent No. 1 5. Learned Senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 would contend that all grounds urged are grounds of appeal and they are not grounds for review. The judgment sought to be reviewed is a common judgment passed in W.A. No. 898/1993 and W.A. No. 449/2020. Sri. V. Manjunath – appellant in W.A. No. 449/2020 has challenged the impugned judgment before the Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP No. 12949/2021 challenging the order of dismissal of his writ appeal and the said SLP came to be dismissed. As both the appeals were decided on limitation by the common judgment, in view of dismissal of SLP by the appellant in the other appeal, it will be a bar for these petitioners to file a review petition and review petition is not maintainable. As the judgment sought to be reviewed is passed on delay, not on merits, the petitioners have to prefer a SLP. He argued that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vs. State Tax Officer and another reported in 2023 INSC 963 , after referring to several of its decisions regarding the grounds for review, stated the gist of the said decisions which reads thus: “16. The gist of the afore–stated decisions is that:- (i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. (ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. (iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review. (iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.” (v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” (vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided. (vii) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions. (viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.” 5A. He submits that there is no error apparent on the face of record and no grounds are made out for reviewing the impugned judgment. 6. We have carefully considered the arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties, orders preceding the impugned judgment, gone through the records and given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. The only point that arises for consideration in this review petition is: Whether the petitioners have made out a case for reviewing the judgment dated 23.04.2021? 7. Our answer to the above question is in affirmative for the following reasons: Placing reliance on the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court in dismissing SLP No. 12949/2021 of Sri. V. Manjunath against the order of dismissal of his writ appeal in W.A. No. 449/2020, respondent No.1 contends that review petition is not maintainable or is unsustainable in law. 8. Order 47 Rule 1 sub-rule (1)(a) and sub-rule (2) CPC provides for filing of review and it reads thus: “Order 47 Rule 1(1) : Any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. Xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx Sub rule (2): A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate court the case on which he applies for the review.” 9. Petitioners have not preferred any SLP or appeal against the judgment passed in W.A. No. 898/1993 before the Hon’ble Apex Court and as such review is maintainable in view of Order 47 Rule 1 sub-rule (1)(a). The petitioners, not appealing against the impugned judgment, can maintain a review notwithstanding the dismissal of the SLP filed by the said Sri. Petitioners have not preferred any SLP or appeal against the judgment passed in W.A. No. 898/1993 before the Hon’ble Apex Court and as such review is maintainable in view of Order 47 Rule 1 sub-rule (1)(a). The petitioners, not appealing against the impugned judgment, can maintain a review notwithstanding the dismissal of the SLP filed by the said Sri. V. Manjunath as in his writ appeal facts, grounds and cause of action and even reasoning in the order passed are not common and entirely different from the case, facts and grounds of petitioners’ case. The petitioners are not respondents in the SLP filed by Sri. V. Manjunath. The facts and grounds in both the appeals are different and reasons for the decision in each appeal are given in separate paragraphs. Therefore, the filing of SLP by Sri. V. Manjunath – appellant in W.A. No. 449/2020 cannot be a bar for the petitioners to maintain this review petition in view of Order 47 Rule 1(a) and sub-rule (2) of CPC. 10. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of the Selection Committee for Admission to the Medical and Dental College, Bangalore Vs. M.P. Nagaraj reported in AIR 1972 Mysore 44 (DB) has held that where the Court has taken a view on the point which is not consistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court – constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record. 10A. In the case of Additional District Magistrate and Police Commissioner, Hubli-Dharwad City and others Vs. Chandrakant Baddi reported in (2007) 3 Kar.L.J. 565 (DB), the Division Bench of this Court has held that overlooking or ignoring the binding decisions of the Apex Court is a ground for review. 10B. Learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Smt. Lingamma and others Vs. Gangadharaiah and others, reported in ILR 2008 Kar. 2450 has held that overlooking a proposition of law well settled by the Supreme Court or error on a point of law is a ground for review. 10C. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Board of Control for Cricket in India and another Vs. Gangadharaiah and others, reported in ILR 2008 Kar. 2450 has held that overlooking a proposition of law well settled by the Supreme Court or error on a point of law is a ground for review. 10C. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Board of Control for Cricket in India and another Vs. Netaji Cricket Club and others reported in 2005 (4) SCC 741 has held that the words `sufficient reason’ in Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court and the same constitutes a ground for review. 10D. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajender Singh Vs. Lt. Governor, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and others reported in AIR 2006 SC 75 has held as under: “15. We are unable to countenance the argument advanced by learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondents. A careful perusal of the impugned judgment does not deal with decide many important issues as could be seen from the grounds of review and as raised in the grounds of special leave petition/ appeal. The High Court, in our opinion, is not justified in ignoring the materials on record which on proper consideration may justify the claim of the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant has also explained to this Court as to why the appellant could not place before the Division Bench some of these documents which were not in possession of the appellant at the time of hearing of the case. The High Court, in our opinion, is not correct in overlooking the documents relied on by the appellant and the respondents. In our opinion, review jurisdiction is available in the present case since the impugned judgment is a clear case of an error apparent on the face of the record and non-consideration of relevant documents. The appellant, in our opinion, has got a strong case in their favour and if the claim of the appellant in this appeal is not countenanced, the appellant will suffer immeasurable loss and injury. Law is well-settled that the power of judicial review of its own order by the High Court inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent mis-carriage of justice. 16. The power, in our opinion, extends to correct all errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. Law is well-settled that the power of judicial review of its own order by the High Court inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent mis-carriage of justice. 16. The power, in our opinion, extends to correct all errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. The courts should not hesitate to review its own earlier order when there exists an error on the face of the record and the interest of the justice so demands in appropriate cases. The grievance of the appellant is that though several vital issues were raised and documents placed, the High Court has not considered the same in its review jurisdiction. In our opinion, the High Court's order in the revision petition is not correct which really necessitates our interference.” 11. Respondent No.1 is concerned with only 1 acre of land out of 3 acres purchased by him from Smt. Krishna Bai in the year 1967 and as such he had filed the appeal. Smt. Krishna Bai who was a party and was served with notice suffered the order of restoration passed by the Assistant Commissioner for remaining 2 acres of land retained by her and had not challenged the order of the Assistant Commissioner before the Deputy Commissioner directing resumption and restoration and as such the orders against Smt. Krishna Bai had become final insofar as 2 acres of land is concerned. As such, quashing of the order of Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and learned Singe Judge without specifically restricting it to 1 acre of land of respondent No. 1 is an error apparent on the face of record. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), considering that the proceedings came to be initiated on an application dated 24.03.2004 i.e., approximately after 25 years after PCTL Act came into force and has held that the application made after an unreasonable long period of 25 years is not maintainable. 12A. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja (supra), has observed as under: “4. ……….. 12A. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja (supra), has observed as under: “4. ……….. In these two decisions, one of which arose under the Karnataka Act, this court has held that the Authorities entrusted with the powers to annul proceedings purported to have been made by the original grantees, must exercise their powers to do so, whether on an application or suo motu, within a reasonable time since no time is prescribed by law for taking such action. In the decided cases, action had been initiated after about 20 to 25 years of the coming into force of Karnataka Act. 5. In the present cases it is undisputed that the action had been initiated after almost 20 years from coming into force of Karnataka Act. In principle, we do not see any reason why the delay in present cases should be considered to be reasonable……..” 12B. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jagadish case (supra), in which an application was filed on 13.10.2009, i.e., after 30 years from the date of coming into force of the PTCL Act, i.e., on 01.01.1979, has held as under: “12…….We however do not see the need to examine them as, according to us, the appellant is disentitled to any relief on the short ground of having knocked the doors of the concerned Authorities three decades after the SC & ST Act came into force. It is this very aspect which forms subject matter of debate in a number of judgments and finally in Satyan’s case (supra),(they have been discussed para 12 extracted hereinabove). It was recognized that there was no limitation of time prescribed but it should be exercised within a reasonable period of time. It is in that context period of 20 years have been said to be too long a period for calling for interference by the concerned Authorities. Leave the said period, in the present case, we are confronted with the factual situation of 30 years period between the rights accruing an exercise of rights…….” 13. Considering the above decisions, period of limitation has to be calculated from the date of coming into force of the PTCL Act, i.e., from 01.01.1979. The period of limitation is to be calculated from the date the proceedings having been initiated either at the instance of the grantee or suo motu by the Assistant Commissioner. Considering the above decisions, period of limitation has to be calculated from the date of coming into force of the PTCL Act, i.e., from 01.01.1979. The period of limitation is to be calculated from the date the proceedings having been initiated either at the instance of the grantee or suo motu by the Assistant Commissioner. In the case on hand proceedings under the PTCL Act was initiated on the strength of report of the Tahsildar bearing No. RRC.KR:188/78-79 against the purchaser and respondent No.1 in PTCL CR No. 290/1982-83. Considering the said aspect, the proceedings initiated are suo motu proceedings by the Assistant Commissioner. Suo motu proceeding initiated by the Assistant Commissioner is in the year 1982-83 under PTCL CR No. 290/1982-83. The PTCL Act came into force on 01.01.1979 and if the period of initiation of suo motu proceedings is calculated from that date, it is within 5 years. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Satyan’s case (supra) has held that delay of 8 years in initiating the proceedings is reasonable and it is held thus: “34. The period of eight (8) years cannot be said to be such, as to amount to such delay and latches as would make the action void, considering that it is in respect of a beneficial legislation for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Community.” 14. Under the impugned judgment, in paragraph No. 34, the period is reckoned from the date of grant which reads as under: “(a) 21 years, if the period is reckoned from the date of grant i.e., 1957 to the report of the Tahsildar in RRC:KR:188/1978-79 i.e., 1978 ?? 1979. (b) 26 years, if the period is reckoned from the date of grant i.e., 1957 to the date of initiation of proceedings under Section 5 of the PTCL Act by issuance of show cause notice dated 17.03.1983. (c) 20 years, if the period is reckoned from the date of first sale i.e., 20.03.1963 to the date of issuance of show cause notice dated 17.03.1983 to the subsequent purchaser. Thus, the average period of delay would be 22 years. The said period cannot be construed as a reasonable period or the proceedings having been initiated either at the instance of the grantee or suo motu as a reasonable period.” 15. Thus, the average period of delay would be 22 years. The said period cannot be construed as a reasonable period or the proceedings having been initiated either at the instance of the grantee or suo motu as a reasonable period.” 15. Under the impugned judgment the average period of delay has been taken by calculating from the date of grant, from the date of first sale till the initiation of proceedings under Section 5 of the PTCL Act by issuance of show cause notice dated 17.03.1983. Said calculation of average period of delay is not in accordance with the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) and Vivek M. Hinduja (supra). Therefore, the said calculation of period of limitation, i.e., average period of limitation of 22 years is not in accordance with the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to supra which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioners and referred to in the impugned judgment. Therefore, there is a ground for review as the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court are not correctly read and followed. 16. The proceedings are initiated suo motu within a period of 5 years from the date of coming into force of the PTCL Act , i.e, 01.01.1979. Therefore, the said period of 5 years can be considered to be within reasonable time in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satyan (supra). 17. In the impugned judgment, while considering the plea claiming adverse possession, in paragraph No. 33, it is observed as under: “33. In the instant case, the first sale from the grantee in favour of Smt. Krishna Bai was on 20.03.1963. Thus, the period of 12 years to claim adverse possession would commence from the said date. The purchaser in the instant case having purchased an extent of 1 acre of land from Smt.Krishna Bai under registered sale deed dated 30.08.1967, the limitation to claim adverse possession would commence from 30.08.1967 and 12 years would lapse on 30.08.1979, by which time the Act had come into force namely, 01.01.1979. This plea of claiming advers possession was available to the writ petitioner and same had been raised at the first instance itself. This plea of claiming advers possession was available to the writ petitioner and same had been raised at the first instance itself. In the proceedings initiated against purchaser by the Assistant Commissioner, he had been placed exparte and against the said exparte order dated 13.03.1984, an appeal in SC/ST 263/84-85 had been filed by the writ petitioner and a specific plea was raised by the purchaser that he had perfected his right, title and interest over the property by long, continuous, peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land purchased by him. In fact, in the order dated 13.10.1988 (Annexure-C) the Deputy Commissioner as appellate authority has noticed this fact. Even in the earlier round of litigation this plea had been raised and it was taken note of by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.15397/1988 vide order dated 18.03.1993 and negatived. Reference can be had to paragraph 5 of the said order, which establishes that said contention had received the attention of the learned Single Judge also. Thus, the plea of adverse possession had been raised and in that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that petitioner had successfully proved he having perfected his title to the property in question by adverse possession.” (emphasis supplied) 18. In the said paragraph there is an observation that plea of adverse possession was available to the writ petitioner and the same had to be raised at the first instance itself. There is also observation that in the proceedings initiated by the Assistant Commissioner against respondent No. 1 he had been placed ex-parte and there is an ex-parte order dated 13.03.1984. Said fact itself indicate that at the first instance, i.e., before the Assistant Commissioner, there is no plea of adverse possession by respondent No. 1. Considering the decision relied upon by the learned Senior counsel for petitioners, plea of adverse possession has to be raised at the first instance, i.e., before the Assistant Commissioner. In the instant case there is no plea of adverse possession by respondent No.1 as he has not contested the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner even after notice and he remained ex-parte. In the instant case there is no plea of adverse possession by respondent No.1 as he has not contested the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner even after notice and he remained ex-parte. In the appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, in paragraph No. 4, respondent No. 1 has raised the plea regarding possession, “as the appellant and his predecessor in title were in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said land from 20.08.1963 and thereby they perfected their title”. Said plea is raised before the Appellate Authority i.e., the Deputy Commissioner. In the case of Sri. G.M. Venkatareddy and another Vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District and others reported in ILR 2012 Kar. 3168 (DB) this Court has held that necessary crucial pleas to constitute adverse possession must be pleaded at the earliest point before the authority and proved in terms of Huche Gowda’s case (supra). Therefore, there is an error apparent on the face of record that respondent No.1 has raised plea of claiming adverse possession at the first instance itself. Considering all these aspects there are grounds made out for review of the impugned judgment dated 23.04.2021 passed in W.A. No. 898/1993 and said judgment requires to be reviewed. The question of law framed is answered accordingly. 19. For the reasons stated supra, the following; ORDER i. Review petition is allowed. ii. Judgment dated 23.04.2021 passed in W.A. No. 898/1993 is reviewed. iii. The appeal filed by respondent No. 1 in W.A. No. 898/1993 is allowed upholding the orders passed in W.P. No. 15397/1988, order No. PTCL CR No. 290/1982-83 dated 13.03.1984 and order dated 13.10.1988 passed in SC ST 283/1984-85 passed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein. In view of disposal of the Review Petition, I.A. No. 1/2021 does not survive for consideration and it is disposed off.