ORDER : 1. Sri T.S. Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax, for respondent Nos.1 to 4 and Sri Dominic Fernandes, learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC, for respondent No.5. 2. The appellate order dated 17.08.2024 is subject matter of challenge in this petition. 3. The singular ground raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that against the basic order, the petitioner preferred a statutory appeal which is running in almost seven pages. 4. The petitioner has mentioned the facts and grounds, on the strength of which, said statutory appeal was preferred. However, the “discussion and findings” paragraph of the impugned appellate order shows that there is no iota of discussion about the grounds raised by the petitioner in its appeal memo. In absence of reasons, the consideration was an empty formality and therefore, the impugned appellate order may be set aside and the appellate authority may be directed to rehear the petitioner and pass a fresh order. 5. Learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax raised formal objection. 6. We have examined the “discussion and findings” given by the appellate authority and we find substance in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the grounds raised by the petitioner in its appeal memo have not been considered by the appellate authority. 7. The Apex Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 opined that the reasons are heartbeat of conclusions. In administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial orders, the reasons must be given. The relative portion reads thus: “12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 . 13........ 14. The expression “speaking order” was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. 13........ 14. The expression “speaking order” was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of the writ of certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. 15. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the “inscrutable face of a sphinx”. 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber- stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. [See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor, (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-737] (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions.” (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process.” 8. If the impugned appellate order is tested on the envil of principles laid down in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. (supra), it could not sustain the judicial scrutiny because it does not deal with the grounds and does not assign reasons for rejection. 9. Resultantly, the impugned appellate order is set aside. The petitioner shall now appear before the appellate authority on 27.02.2025 at 11:30 A.M., for which, no separate notice will be required to be issued. The appellate authority shall rehear the petitioner and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Consequent upon passing of the impugned appellate order, if the petitioner’s bank account is attached, it be provisionally lifted which will remain subject to final outcome of the appeal. 10. The appellate authority shall rehear the petitioner and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Consequent upon passing of the impugned appellate order, if the petitioner’s bank account is attached, it be provisionally lifted which will remain subject to final outcome of the appeal. 10. The Writ Petition is disposed of without expressing any opinion on merits of the case. No costs. Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall also stand closed.