JUDGMENT : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. The Appellant/Plaintiff filed this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.') against the Judgment and decree, dated 05.11.1999 passed in A.S.No.131 of 1996 on the file of IV Additional District Judge, Guntur (for short, 'the 1 st Appellate Court') reversing the Judgment and decree, dated 28.08.1996 passed in O.S. No.1119 of 1995 on the file of II Additional District Munsif, Guntur (for short ‘the Trial Court’). 2. The Appellant/Respondent is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.1119 of 1995 seeking permanent injunction restraining the Defendants and their men from encroaching into her site beyond joint wall BC on the west or in any way interfering with her peaceful possession and enjoyment of her site ABCD as per plaint plan. 3. It is expedient to refer to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit in O.S.No.1119 of 1995 to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: The property BGHD, a 1000 sq. yard site with two terraced buildings, originally belonged to the late Myneni Krupamma, wife of the late M.L.N. John. During her lifetime, Krupamma executed two registered gift deeds (19.3.1974 and 17.4.1974) transferring 400 sq. yards (ABCD) with a terraced building (TUVW) to her eldest son, Jangaiah. She later executed a will (20.10.1978), bequeathing 100 sq. yards (AEFF1) to Jangaiah and 500 sq. yards (F1FGFCBF1), along with a terraced building (PQRS), to her minor grandson, Myneni Saibabu. After Krupamma’s death, Jangaiah retained possession of 400 sq. yards (ABCD) and 100 sq. yards (AEFF1), while Saibabu occupied 500 sq. yards (F1FGHCB). The two properties shared a joint boundary wall along BC, where Jangaiah’s sheds (A1A2A3B) were demolished, and Saibabu’s (BB1B2B3) remain. Upon Jangaiah’s death, his property passed to his wife (the plaintiff) and son, Satish. The plaintiff, along with Satish, sold 100 sq. yards (AEFF1) to Kolla Subbarao in 1993, who is now in possession. The 2 nd defendant, wife of the 1 st defendant, is a tenant under Saibabu. Saibabu sold portions of his property to the 1 st defendant in 1994, including a 226.5 sq. yard site (F1FGG1) and portions of the building. The defendants sought approval to construct excess measurements, which the plaintiff opposed. The 2 nd defendant, wife of the 1 st defendant, is a tenant under Saibabu. Saibabu sold portions of his property to the 1 st defendant in 1994, including a 226.5 sq. yard site (F1FGG1) and portions of the building. The defendants sought approval to construct excess measurements, which the plaintiff opposed. They have since attempted to encroach on the plaintiff’s property by breaking the boundary wall. The defendants have no right to encroach beyond the BC wall. The 1 st defendant is involved in multiple legal disputes, including one with Subbarao over the 226.5 sq. yard site. Despite mediation efforts, the defendants remain persistent, and the plaintiff faces potential loss and hardship. With documentary proof supporting her claim, the plaintiff seeks relief, as the balance of convenience is in her favour. 5. In the written statement, the defendants denied all the allegations in the plaint and contended that the plaintiff and her family do not own the land up to the BC boundary shown in the plaint plan, nor have they ever been in possession of it. The plaint plan is incorrect. The plaintiff lacks the standing to file the suit. The defendants are submitting a correct plan showing the actual boundary features. The boundary wall along XY, shown in the defendants' plan, was constructed properly, but the plaintiff, her son Satish, and accomplice Kolla Subba Rao dismantled part of it on 26.9.1994. The police are investigating this, and the wall still exists at a reduced height. The plaintiff claims 400 sq. yards of land in the suit, but her title deeds indicate ownership of only 400 sq. yards, with the remaining 100 sq. yards already sold to Kolla Subbarao. The wall along BB3 in the plaint plan does not match the actual construction, and there is no wall from C to North as claimed in the plaint. The defendants' sale deeds were properly measured, and there is no evidence to support the plaintiff's claims of encroachment. The building plans submitted by the defendants were approved by municipal authorities after proper inspection. The plaintiff's claim of a 441 sq. yard plot is unfounded, as her title deeds do not support such a claim. The plaintiff’s daughter did not relinquish her share, and the defendants purchased the land legally from M.Saibabu. The suit filed by Kolla Subbarao is frivolous and intended to delay the defendants' construction. The plaintiff's claim of a 441 sq. yard plot is unfounded, as her title deeds do not support such a claim. The plaintiff’s daughter did not relinquish her share, and the defendants purchased the land legally from M.Saibabu. The suit filed by Kolla Subbarao is frivolous and intended to delay the defendants' construction. The defendants assert that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief, and the suit should be dismissed with costs, as the court fee paid is also incorrect. The defendants request the dismissal of the suit. 6. Based on the above pleadings in O.S.No.1119 of 1995, the trial Court framed the following issues: 1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the permanent injunction as prayed for? 2) Whether the plaintiff has locus standi to file this suit? 3) Whether the plaint plan is correct? 4) Whether the Court fee paid by the plaintiff is correct? 5) To what relief? 7. During the trial, PW.1 was examined on behalf of the plaintiff and marked Exs.A.1 to A.6. Conversely, on behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 3 were examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.9. 8. After the trial concluded and both sides presented their arguments, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit without costs. 9. Aggrieved by the said Judgment and decree in O.S.No.1119 of 1995, the defendants preferred an Appeal in A.S.No.131 of 1996 on the file of the 1 st Appellate Court. The 1 st Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, framed the following point for consideration: Whether the respondent – plaintiff could establish possession and enjoyment of the schedule property and the decree for injunction in her favour can be sustained? 10. The 1 st Appellate Court, on scrutiny of oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, had allowed the Appeal without costs by its Judgment, dt. 05.11.1999. Aggrieved by the 1 st Appellate Court's Judgment passed in A.S.No.131 of 1996, the respondent - plaintiff preferred the present Second Appeal. 11. I heard Sri M.R.S. Srinivas, learned Counsel representing the appellant/plaintiff, and Sri A. Satya Prasad, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri, Prakash Buddarapu, learned Counsel for the respondents/defendants. 12. 05.11.1999. Aggrieved by the 1 st Appellate Court's Judgment passed in A.S.No.131 of 1996, the respondent - plaintiff preferred the present Second Appeal. 11. I heard Sri M.R.S. Srinivas, learned Counsel representing the appellant/plaintiff, and Sri A. Satya Prasad, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri, Prakash Buddarapu, learned Counsel for the respondents/defendants. 12. Based on the appellant’s contentions, the following substantial questions of law are involved in this Second Appeal: a) Whether the 1 st Appellate Court can rely on the evidence of a witness eschewed by the Trial Court, without setting aside the finding of the Trial Court? b) Whether an adverse inference of loss of possession can be drawn on an isolated act of the encroacher which was later rectified by the actual owner? 13. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the respective parties, I have gone through the Judgments, the pleadings and the evidence on record. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 of C.P.C., this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. 14. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs. and others , [2006 (3) A.L.T. 41 (S.C.)] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the Courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re- appreciation of evidence (see PanchugopalBarua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 713 ) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 )…… 15. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C., arise only when there is a substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based on facts. The learned Counsel for Respondent is right in placing reliance on these rulings. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in Second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in terms of law. 16. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial question of law involved in the Appeal. 16. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial question of law involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary evidence. Further, the existence of a substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 17. As per the records, the property BGHD, as shown in the plaint plan, consists of a 1000 sq. yards site with two terraced buildings (ground and first floor) as shown in PQRS and TUVW. It originally belonged to the late Myneni Kruppama, wife of M.L.N. John. During her lifetime, she executed two gift deeds, dated 19.03.1974 and 17.04.1974 (Exs.A1 and A2), in favour of her eldest son, Jangaiah, covering a total of 400 sq. yards of the site, and possession was delivered to him on those dates. It is undisputed that she also executed a registered will on 20.10.1978, bequeathing 100 sq. yards of the site to Jangaiah, and the remaining 500 sq. yards with the terraced buildings to her minor grandson, M. Sai Babu, the son of her late second son, Chalapathi Rao. In July 1994, the defendants, a husband and wife duo who are doctors, purchased the property from Sai Babu through sale deeds (Exs.B2 to B4). Prior to this purchase, the defendants were tenants of the plaintiff on the property. 18. The defendants submitted a certified copy of the will executed by M.Krupamma, along with a photostat copy of the original will, as additional evidence in the appeal. They argued that although both parties relied on a Xerox copy of the will, the Trial Court did not mark it. It appears that during the Appeal proceedings, the will was also not marked as an exhibit. However, both parties have admitted that out of the 1000 sq. yards of property described in the plaint, Jangaiah was allocated 500 sq. yards with the terraced ground floor and first floor, while the remaining 500 sq. yards with a similar terraced building was bequeathed to her minor grandson, M. Sai Babu. 19. However, both parties have admitted that out of the 1000 sq. yards of property described in the plaint, Jangaiah was allocated 500 sq. yards with the terraced ground floor and first floor, while the remaining 500 sq. yards with a similar terraced building was bequeathed to her minor grandson, M. Sai Babu. 19. It is an undisputed fact that the plaintiff and her son, Satish, sold 100 sq. yards of land as shown in AEFF1 in the plaint plan to one Kolla Subba Rao, son of Venkateswarulu, through a registered sale deed dated 8.2.1993, with the plaintiff’s daughter also joining in the execution of the deed. This 100 sq. yards site (AEFF1) is located to the north of the plaintiff's 400 sq. yards of property, as shown in the plaint plan. It is also not disputed that Kolla Subba Rao filed a suit in O.S.No.342 of 1995 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Guntur, alleging encroachment on his property. In the said suit, both the 1 st defendant and the plaintiff were shown as parties. In O.S.No.342 of 1995, a commissioner was appointed to measure the disputed property, and Exs.B8 and B9 are the commissioner's report and plan. 20. The defendants relied on Exs.B8 and B9, the commissioner’s report and plan, which show that the measurements, based on the title deeds and enjoyment, indicate that XY (as per the written statement plan) was the boundary line. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff argued that the 1 st Appellate Court should not have considered the plan relied on by the defendants. While this was not initially raised as a substantial question of law, the appellant's counsel contended that the court has the discretion to frame additional substantial questions of law during the appeal proceedings. 21. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant placed on the decision in Narayana Gramani v. Mariammal , [ (2018) 18 SCC 645 ] , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 17. Sub-section (1) of Section 100 says that the second appeal would be entertained by the High Court only if the High Court is “satisfied” that the case involves a “substantial question of law”. Sub-section (3) makes it obligatory upon the appellant to precisely state in memo of appeal the “substantial question of law” involved in the appeal. Sub-section (1) of Section 100 says that the second appeal would be entertained by the High Court only if the High Court is “satisfied” that the case involves a “substantial question of law”. Sub-section (3) makes it obligatory upon the appellant to precisely state in memo of appeal the “substantial question of law” involved in the appeal. Sub- section (4) provides that where the High Court is satisfied that any substantial question of law is involved in the case, it shall formulate that question. In other words, once the High Court is satisfied after hearing the appellant or his counsel, as the case may be, that the appeal involves a substantial question of law, it has to formulate that question and then direct issuance of notice to the respondent of the memo of appeal along with the question of law framed by the High Court. Sub-section (5) provides that the appeal shall be heard only on the question formulated by the High Court under sub-section (4). In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the second appeal is confined only to the question framed by the High Court under sub-section (4). The respondent, however, at the time of hearing of the appeal is given a right under sub-section (5) to raise an objection that the question framed by the High Court under sub- section (4) does not involve in the appeal. The reason for giving this right to the respondent for raising such objection at the time of hearing is because the High Court frames the question at the admission stage which is prior to issuance of the notice of appeal to the respondent. In other words, the question is framed behind the back of respondent and, therefore, sub-section (5) enables him to raise such objection at the time of hearing that the question framed does not arise in the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (5), however, also recognises the power of the High Court to hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law which was not initially framed by the High Court under sub-section (4). However, this power can be exercised by the High Court only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal. However, this power can be exercised by the High Court only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 ] and Surat Singh v. Siri Bhagwan [Surat Singh v. Siri Bhagwan, (2018) 4 SCC 562 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 94] ) Upon going through the citation, this Court finds merit in the submission of the appellant's counsel. It is indeed within the High Court's discretion to exercise the power to frame additional questions of law during the hearing of the appeal. 22. The learned counsel for the appellant requested the court to frame an additional substantial question of law, namely: (ii) Whether Exs. B8 and B9 are admissible in evidence, given that they pertain to O.S.No.342 of 1995 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Guntur, and considering that the advocate commissioner and surveyor were not examined in the present case, nor were their depositions, if any, from the earlier suit marked as evidence? 23. As previously noted, both the plaintiff and the defendants are parties to the suit in O.S.No.342 of 1995. It is undisputed that the properties of the parties were measured by the advocate commissioner with the help of a surveyor. Neither party has claimed that the Court, while disposing of the suit in O.S.No.342 of 1995, did not accept the report of the commissioner and surveyor. The property in question in O.S.No.342 of 1995 is located to the north of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff in O.S.No.342 of 1995 alleges encroachment on his property, and both parties contested this suit. Neither party claims that they were absent when the commissioner and surveyor took the measurements. The plaintiff contended that the document was inadmissible because the commissioner was not examined. However, since the report of the commissioner is part of the record, there is no difficulty in considering it. This Court views that, as the advocate commissioner measured the property with the assistance of the surveyor, and both parties were involved in the process, the 1 st Appellate Court was justified in considering the surveyor's report. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not object to the marking of report of the commissioner during the trial of O.S.No.342 of 1995, nor did the Court reject the report. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not object to the marking of report of the commissioner during the trial of O.S.No.342 of 1995, nor did the Court reject the report. As the property was measured with the help of the surveyor in the previous suit, and the commissioner’s report was considered by the Court in that suit, the objection raised by the plaintiff in this proceeding is not valid. The subject matter of the suit need not be demarcated again, as both parties were involved in the previous proceedings. Simply because the report does not support the plaintiff’s case does not mean it should be disregarded. It appears that the report and plan of the commissioner were marked without any objections at the time. 24. Having failed to raise any objections regarding the admissibility of the document at the time of its marking, it is not now open to the parties to question its admissibility during the Second Appeal. This Court finds no substantial merit in the plaintiff's contention. The plaintiff has also not provided any reasoning to support her argument. Therefore, the 1st appellate court was justified in considering the report and plan of the commissioner, vide Exs.B8 and B9. 25. The report of the commissioner indicates that the plaintiff/appellant was shown to be in possession of 412 sq. yards, although according to the plaintiff’s own case, she only has right to 400 sq. yards. In contrast, the defendants are entitled to 500 sq. yards, but the commissioner’s report shows that they were in possession of a total of 529 sq. yards. This means the plaintiff is in possession of 12 sq. yards more than what she claims, while the defendants are in possession of 29 sq. yards more than what they claim. Neither party disputes the possession of the excess land as indicated in the commissioner’s report; both parties acknowledge that they hold 400 sq. yards and 500 sq. yards according to their documents. However, the plaintiff has not taken any steps in this suit to measure her property to demonstrate that the defendants have encroached on the 29 sq. yards of her land. Since the defendants have been in possession of more land than they claim, the plaintiff wanted to justify the defendants are encroaching or encroached upon her property. The defendants were in possession of 529 sq. Yards, 29 sq. yards of her land. Since the defendants have been in possession of more land than they claim, the plaintiff wanted to justify the defendants are encroaching or encroached upon her property. The defendants were in possession of 529 sq. Yards, 29 sq. yards more than what they claimed and possessed, even before the suit was filed. The plaintiff has not specifically claimed that this excess 29 sq. yards of land, which the defendants possess, belongs to her, nor has she alleged that the defendants encroached upon it. If this were the case, she should have filed a suit for the recovery of this excess 29 sq. yards. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not provided any evidence or made a plea regarding this excess land. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot allege that the defendants encroached upon her property. 26. The plaintiff has invoked the doctrine of "Nemo datquod non habet," meaning "No one can confer a better title than they themselves have," as directly applicable to the facts of this case, citing the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1483. This Court views that the doctrine is equally applicable to the plaintiff’s case. The plaintiff claims to have purchased only 400 sq. yards of land, so it is incumbent upon her to explain how she came to possess 412 sq. yards. Both parties have failed to explain how they came up in possession of more property than what is stated in their respective documents. Before the doctrine of "Nemo datquod non habet" can be applied to the defendants’ case, the plaintiff must clarify how she justifies claiming possession of 412 sq. yards when her right to the property is limited to 400 sq. yards. Given that both parties possess more land than their sale deeds reflect, the suit in O.S.No.342 of 1995 appeared to have filed to address these discrepancies. 27. As correctly observed by the 1 st Appellate Court, although the respondent/plaintiff claimed the existence of a boundary wall, referred to as the BC wall in her plan, it was admitted by PW.1 (the plaintiff's brother) that the wall does not extend to point C, as stated in the plaint plan. 27. As correctly observed by the 1 st Appellate Court, although the respondent/plaintiff claimed the existence of a boundary wall, referred to as the BC wall in her plan, it was admitted by PW.1 (the plaintiff's brother) that the wall does not extend to point C, as stated in the plaint plan. The 1 st Appellate Court considered PW.1’s admissions, including that several months before the suit was filed, the 1 st defendant had dismantled the wall along the BA1B3C line; the 1 st defendant then constructed a new wall along the XY line, as shown in Ex. B.1, which was 6 feet high, and this wall was later demolished by the plaintiff to some extent. The report of the commissioner also confirmed the existence of the wall. Based on the cross-examination of PW.1, the 1 st Appellate Court rightly concluded that the 1 st defendant had constructed the XY wall well before the suit was filed, even according to the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to prove her claim regarding possession of the property beyond the XY wall to the east, up to the BB1B2B3 wall, as shown in the written statement plan. 28. The 1 st Appellate Court rightly concluded that even if the defendants had enjoyed the property as claimed prior to the suit, the admission of PW.1 indicates that the 1 st defendant had constructed the XY wall by the time the suit was filed. According to PW.1, the plaintiff had been dispossessed by the defendants, assuming she had any right to the disputed property earlier. The material on record does not support the plaintiff’s claim that the disputed property lies within the 400 sq. yards or 412 sq. yards she contends to own. The 1 st Appellate Court also correctly considered the testimony of DW.2, K.Sarat Kumar, an architect, who stated that he demarcated the property between the parties at the request of M. Krupamma. He testified that a wall was constructed up to a height of 7 feet between the plots of the plaintiff and Sai Babu, and that this wall was intact when the defendants purchased the property from Sai Babu. This undermines the plaintiff’s version, which suggests the 1 st defendant built the XY wall after the purchase. DW.2’s evidence suggests the wall existed well before the defendants acquired the property. This undermines the plaintiff’s version, which suggests the 1 st defendant built the XY wall after the purchase. DW.2’s evidence suggests the wall existed well before the defendants acquired the property. The 1 st Appellate Court, after carefully considering the evidence, accepted DW.2’s testimony and concluded that the boundary between the parties was the XY line. The court also noted that the evidence supported the contention that Saibabu, and later the defendants, were in possession of the disputed property up to the XY line. The 1 st Appellate Court duly assessed the evidence in relation to the pleadings and evidence adduced by both parties. This court finds no reason to interfere with the reasoning of the 1 st Appellate Court. 29. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the Trial Court provided cogent and convincing reasons in its judgment, and therefore, such findings should not have been disturbed by the 1 st Appellate Court. 30. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision in V.Prabhakara V. Basavaraj K , [ (2022) 1 SCC 115 ] , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 22. The first appellate court while exercising power under Section 96 can re-do the exercise of the trial court. However, such a power is expected to be exercised with caution. The reason being, the trial court alone has the pleasure of seeing the demeanour of the witness. Therefore, it has got its own advantage in assessing the statement of the witnesses which may not be available to the appellate court. In exercising such a power, the appellate court has to keep in mind the views of the trial court. If it finds that the trial court is wrong, its decision should be on the reasoning given. A mere substitution of views, without discussing the findings of the trial court, by the appellate court is not permissible. If two views are possible, it would only be appropriate to go with the view expressed by the trial court. While adopting reasoning in support of its findings, the appellate court is not expected to go on moral grounds alone. 24. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that though the first appellate court is the final court of fact and law, it has to fall in line with the scope and ambit of Section 96 of the Code. 31. While adopting reasoning in support of its findings, the appellate court is not expected to go on moral grounds alone. 24. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that though the first appellate court is the final court of fact and law, it has to fall in line with the scope and ambit of Section 96 of the Code. 31. I have carefully reviewed the judgment of the Trial Court in light of the submissions made by the plaintiff’s counsel. The Trial Court did not provide any substantial reasoning in its decision and failed to properly evaluate the evidence on record. It merely extracted some pleadings from both parties in the operative portion of the judgment and referred to certain pieces of evidence without critically assessing them. As a result, it passed a finding without thorough evaluation. Given that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence, the 1 st Appellate Court has made an effort to dispose of the Appeal, considering both parties' pleadings and conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence on record. 32. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court discerns no infirmity, much less perversity or illegality, in the judgment rendered by the 1 st Appellate Court. As rightly observed by the 1 st Appellate Court, the findings and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court are not based on the appreciation of evidence on record. The Trial Court's Judgment is erroneous and cannot be sustained. The 1 st Appellate Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has appropriately set aside the Judgment of the Trial Court. Consequently, the findings of the 1 st Appellate Court does not call for interference by this Court. The Second Appeal lacks merit in its entirety. 33. In these circumstances, finding no such questions that require consideration in the Second Appeal, which is a much less substantial question of law as pointed out for the Appellant, this Second Appeal has to be dismissed. 34. As a consequence, this Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. The judgment and decree dated 05.11.1999 of learned IV Additional District Judge, Guntur, in A.S.No.131 of 1996 stands confirmed. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.