ORDER : The second appeal under Section 100 of CPC has been filed against the order dated 7-7-2015 passed by Seventh Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Appeal Number 38A/2012, by which the Court below has refused to grant leave to the appellant to prefer an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 30-03-2012 passed by Seventh Civil Judge Class I, Gwalior, District Gwalior in Civil Suit Number 22A/2012. 2. The facts necessary for disposal of present appeal in short are that Jahar Singh filed a suit for permanent injunction to the effect that the plaintiff may not be dispossessed forcefully and no third-party right be created. Initially, the suit was also filed against plaintiff No.2 - Bhoori, but later on she was transposed as plaintiff. Jahar Singh died during the pendency of suit. Accordingly, his legal representatives were taken on record. The respondents No.1 to 5 are the legal representatives of Jahar Singh, whereas respondent number 6 is the plaintiff No.2. 3. Kailashibai, one of the legal representatives of Jahar Singh, also died during pendency of this appeal. Therefore, her legal representatives were brought on record. Similarly, Rambeti, the daughter of Jahar Singh, also died during the pendency of this appeal and accordingly her legal representatives were brought on record. 4. It is suffice to mention here that the trial Court by order dated 30-10- 2006 issued a temporary injunction order thereby restraining the parties from alienating the suit property and they were directed to maintain the status quo. It appears that defendants, namely Son Devi and Sarnam, executed sale deeds in favour of the appellant on 15.04.2008 and 21.04.2008 and the entire subject matter of the suit was alienated to the appellant. No application under Order I Rule 10 CPC was filed before the trial Court. The trial Court by judgment and decree dated 30-03-2012 passed in Civil Suit No.22A/2012 decreed the suit and held that the plaintiffs have 1/4th share in the property in dispute in khasra Nos. 228, 233, and 239. A decree for permanent injunction was issued against defendants No. 1 to 3 to the effect that neither they shall dispossess the plaintiffs nor they shall transfer the property in any manner. 5. It appears that the appellant preferred an appeal under Section 96 of CPC along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. A decree for permanent injunction was issued against defendants No. 1 to 3 to the effect that neither they shall dispossess the plaintiffs nor they shall transfer the property in any manner. 5. It appears that the appellant preferred an appeal under Section 96 of CPC along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Later on, an application under Section 151 of CPC was filed seeking leave of the appellate Court to prefer an appeal. By the impugned order, the appeal has been dismissed and the leave has been refused on the ground that the appellant had purchased the property in dispute during the pendency of suit and that too in violation of the order of temporary injunction. 6. Challenging the order passed by the appellate Court, counsel for the appellant submits that in the light of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd. and Others, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 397 , even in a case where the suit property was sold in violation of the temporary injunction order, still the subsequent purchaser can be permitted to be impleaded as defendant in the civil suit and proposed the following substantial questions of law : "1. Whether the learned First Appellate Court erred in rejecting the application for permission to file appeal wrongly, illegally and against the law? 2. Whether the finding given by learned First Appellate Court that the sale deed of the appellant is null and void is contrary to law, liable to be set aside? 3. Whether learned First Appellate Court erred in not granting opportunity to the appellant to contest the case on merit and without granting opportunity of hearing order impugned has wrongly been passed? 4. Whether learned First Appellate Court erred in not considering the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act and without considering the same dismissal of the appeal is wrong, against the law? 5. Whether the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court is wrong and contrary to the facts and law available on record? 6. Whether the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Court is collusive decree by the parties and the same is liable to be set aside?" 7. Heard the learned counsel for appellant. 8. 5. Whether the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court is wrong and contrary to the facts and law available on record? 6. Whether the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Court is collusive decree by the parties and the same is liable to be set aside?" 7. Heard the learned counsel for appellant. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Singh vs. Harbans Singh, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 50 , has held as under: “4. As said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be registered. That has instantly been done. It is per se property, for it relates to the immovable property involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make any appreciable difference whether property per se had been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam Singh and his assignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be impleaded as parties on the basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have been impleaded by the trial court as parties to the suit, in disobedience of its orders. The principles of lis pendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not propose to examine their involvement presently. All what is emphasised is that the assignees in the present facts and circumstances had no cause to be impleaded as parties to the suit. The principles of lis pendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not propose to examine their involvement presently. All what is emphasised is that the assignees in the present facts and circumstances had no cause to be impleaded as parties to the suit. On that basis, there was no cause for going into the question of interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the settlement deed. The path treaded by the courts below was, in our view, out of their bounds. Unhesitatingly, we upset all the three orders of the courts below and reject the application of the assignees for impleadment under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC.” (underline supplied) 9. However, it is the case of the appellant that Supreme Court in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. (supra) after considering the law laid down in the case of Surjit Singh (supra), has held that the subsequent purchaser who had purchased the property in spite of the order of temporary injunction can be impleaded as defendant in the suit. 10. Now, the moot question for consideration is as to whether the appellant, who had purchased the property during pendency of suit as well as during currency of the temporary injunction order, can be granted leave to file an appeal against the decree passed against his vendor, or has to seek a remedy against the vendor for the loss, appellant has suffered on account of the decree. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of H. Anjanappa & Ors. Vs. A.Prabhakar & Ors., decided on 29th January 2025 in Civil Appeal Nos.1180-1181 of 2025, has held as under : "51. A decree passed against the defendant is available for execution against the transferee or assignee of the defendant-judgment-debtor and it does not make any difference whether such transfer or assignment has taken place after the passing of the decree or before the passing of the decree without notice or leave of the Court. 52. The law laid down by a four-Judge Bench of this Court in Smt. Saila Bala Dassi vs. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and Anr., [1958] SCR 1287, is apt for resolving the issue arising for decision herein. A transferee of property from defendant during the pendency of the suit sought himself to be brought on record at the stage of appeal. The law laid down by a four-Judge Bench of this Court in Smt. Saila Bala Dassi vs. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and Anr., [1958] SCR 1287, is apt for resolving the issue arising for decision herein. A transferee of property from defendant during the pendency of the suit sought himself to be brought on record at the stage of appeal. The High Court dismissed the application as it was pressed only by reference to Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC and it was conceded by the applicant that, not being a person who had obtained a transfer pending appeal, he was not covered within the scope of Order 22 Rule 10. In an appeal preferred by such transferee, this Court upheld the view of the High Court that a transferee prior to the filing of the appeal could not be brought on record in appeal by reference to Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC. However, the Court held that an appeal is a proceeding for the purpose of Section 146 and further the expression “claiming under” is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in Order XXII Rule 10. Whoever is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under Order XXII Rule 10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed therein if his assignor could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against it in the CPC. A person having acquired an interest in suit property during the pendency of the suit and seeking to be brought on record at the stage of the appeal can do so by reference to Section 146 of the CPC which provision being a beneficent provision should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense. Their Lordships held that being a purchaser pendente lite, a person will be bound by the proceedings taken by the successful party in execution of decree and justice requires that such purchaser should be given an opportunity to protect his rights. [See : Raj Kumar vs. Sardari Lal, (2004) 2 SCC 601 ] 53. Their Lordships held that being a purchaser pendente lite, a person will be bound by the proceedings taken by the successful party in execution of decree and justice requires that such purchaser should be given an opportunity to protect his rights. [See : Raj Kumar vs. Sardari Lal, (2004) 2 SCC 601 ] 53. In Dhurandhar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 534 , this Court held that the plain language of Order XXII Rule 10 CPC does not suggest that leave can be sought by that person alone upon whom the interest has devolved. It simply says that the suit may be continued by the person upon whom such an interest has devolved and this applies in a case where the interest of the plaintiff has devolved. Likewise, in a case where interest of the defendant has devolved, the suit may be continued against such a person upon whom interest has devolved, but in either eventuality, for continuance of the suit against the persons upon whom the interest has devolved during the pendency of the suit, leave of the court has to be obtained. If it is laid down that leave can be obtained by that person alone upon whom interest of a party to the suit has devolved during its pendency, then there may be preposterous results as such a party might not be knowing about the litigation and consequently not feasible for him to apply for leave and if a duty is cast upon him, then in such an eventuality he would be bound by the decree even in cases of failure to apply for leave. As a rule of prudence, initial duty lies upon the plaintiff to apply for leave in case the factum of devolution was within his knowledge or with due diligence could have been known by him. The person upon whom the interest has devolved may also apply for such a leave so that his interest may be properly represented as the original party, if it ceased to have an interest in the subject-matter of dispute by virtue of devolution of interest upon another person, may not take interest therein, in ordinary course, which is but natural, or by colluding with the other side. If the submission of Mr. If the submission of Mr. Nuli is accepted, a party upon whom interest has devolved, upon his failure to apply for leave, would be deprived from challenging correctness of the decree by filing a properly constituted suit on the ground that the original party having lost interest in the subject of dispute, did not properly prosecute or defend the litigation or, in doing so, colluded with the adversary. 54. In Amit Kumar Shaw vs. Farida Khatoon, AIR 2005 SC 2209 , this Court held that a transferee pendente lite to the extent he has acquired interest from the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lis pendens transferee a party, under Order XXII Rule 10 an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The court has held that a transferee pendente lite of an interest in immovable property is a representative- in-interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case. This judgment has been followed in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. (supra). 55. In fact, the scope of Order I Rule 10 and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC is similar. Therefore, the principles applicable to Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, in order to bring a purchaser pendente lite on record, are applicable to Order I Rule 10 CPC. Under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, the Court is required to record a finding that person sought to be impleaded as party in the suit is either necessary or proper party. While Section 146 and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC confers right upon the legal representative of a party to the suit to be impleaded with the leave of the Court and continue the litigation. While Section 146 and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC confers right upon the legal representative of a party to the suit to be impleaded with the leave of the Court and continue the litigation. While deciding an application under Section 146 and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, the Court is not require to go in the controversy as to whether person sought to be impleaded as party in the suit is either necessary or proper party. If the person sought to be impleaded as party is legal representative of a party to the suit, it is sufficient for the Court to order impleadment/substitution of such person. 56. Thus, a lis pendens transferee though not brought on record under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, is entitled to seek leave to appeal against the final decree passed against this transferor, the defendant in the suit. However, whether to grant such leave or not is within the discretion of the court and such discretion should be exercised judiciously in the facts and circumstances of each case. 57. Having regard to the fact that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively purchased the suit property during the pendency of the suit instituted for specific performance and that too, while the injunction against the original owner (transferor) was operating, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively could not be said to have even made out any good case for grant of leave to appeal. 58. From a conspectus of all the aforesaid judgments, touching upon the present aspect, broadly, the following would emerge: i. First, for the purpose of impleading a transferee pendente lite, the facts and circumstances should be gone into and basing on the necessary facts, the Court can permit such a party to come on record, either under Order I Rule 10 CPC or under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, as a general principle; ii. Secondly, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on record as a matter of right; iii. Thirdly, there is no absolute rule that such a transferee pendente lite, with the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed to come on record as a party; iv. Secondly, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on record as a matter of right; iii. Thirdly, there is no absolute rule that such a transferee pendente lite, with the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed to come on record as a party; iv. Fourthly, the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite would depend upon the nature of the suit and appreciation of the material available on record; v. Fifthly, where a transferee pendente lite does not ask for leave to come on record, that would obviously be at his peril, and the suit may be improperly conducted by the plaintiff on record; vi. Sixthly, merely because such transferee pendente lite does not come on record, the concept of him (transferee pendente lite) not being bound by the judgment does not arise and consequently he would be bound by the result of the litigation, though he remains unrepresented; vii. Seventhly, the sale transaction pendente lite is hit by the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; and, viii. Eighthly, a transferee pendente lite, being an assignee of interest in the property, as envisaged under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, can seek leave of the Court to come record on his own or at the instance of either party to the suit. CONCLUSION 59. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the impugned order passed by the High Court is unsustainable in law. 60. In the result, the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. 61. If the Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 feel that they have been duped or cheated by the Respondent No. 7/Defendant No. 3, then it shall be open for them to avail appropriate legal remedy before the appropriate forum in accordance with law for the purpose of recovery of the amount towards sale consideration paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. 62. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly." 12. It is not out of place to mention here that the Supreme Court in H. Anjanappa (supra) has also taken note of judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. (supra). 13. 62. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly." 12. It is not out of place to mention here that the Supreme Court in H. Anjanappa (supra) has also taken note of judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. (supra). 13. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that since the appellant had purchased the property in dispute during the pendency of suit and that too in spite of the fact that an order of temporary injunction was already in force, the appellate Court did not commit any mistake by rejecting the application filed by the appellant under Section 151 of CPC. 14. During the course of arguments, it was not submitted by counsel for appellant, that they would not take any independent defence and would confine themselves to the defence, documents and evidence led and relied upon by their vendor. 15. However, the appellant is granted liberty that in case appellant feels that he has been duped or cheated by his vendors, then it shall be open for him to avail appropriate legal remedy before the appropriate forum in accordance with law for the purpose of recovery of amount towards sale consideration paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. 16. No other argument has been advanced by counsel for the appellant. 17. As a consequence, the order dated 07-07-2015 passed by Seventh Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Appeal Number 38A/2012 is hereby affirmed. 18. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.