Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 509 (MP)

Bharat Singh Indoliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2025-08-18

ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT

body2025
ORDER : The present petition has been submitted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs:- (i) That the order dated 6.12.2018 Anneuxre P/1, order dated 25.10.2017 Annexure P/2 and order dated 31.03.2017 Annexure P/3 be quashed. (ii) That, other relief which is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that petitioner was working as constable SAF No. 451 and at the relevant time he was working in 18th batalion SAF Shivpuri. He was placed under suspension on 18.5.2014 and thereafter he was charge-sheeted on 01.07.2014 Annexure P/4, relevant para of which is quoted herein below:- 3. Thereafter petitioner has filed reply to the charge-sheet. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in criminal case petitioner was granted bail in M.Cr.C. No. 12117/2014 by order dated 28.2.2015 the suspension was revoked, thereafter, enquiry officer and presenting officer has been appointed and enquiry officer has conducted the enquiry and conveyed the enquiry report dated 25.03.2015 Annexure P/6. Enquiry Officer has proved both the charges. Thereafter, respondent issued a notice dated 25.03.2015. A copy of enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner. Thereafter petitioner submitted reply to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority by order dated 31.03.2017 has not proved charge No. 1 and mentioned that charge No. 1 will be decided after decision taken in the criminal case. On the basis of charge No. 2 the petitioner's services have been terminated. Against that the petitioner has submitted appeal. That appeal has been decided by order dated 25.10.2017. Thereafter, a mercy petition was also rejected by order dated 29.12. 2018. 4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, the present petition has been filed mainly, on the ground that in the charge-sheet, the allegation was leveled against the petitioner that the petitioner in the Forest Guard Selection Return Examination, 2013 through Mediator got help of Bhanej Damad Dilip Tagore in his selection. The second charge against the petitioner was that STF registered crime No. 9/14 under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 ? IPC read with Section 3 gh (1-2) 4 of Madhya Pradesh Recognized Examination Act 1937. 5. The counsel for petitioner has submitted that the main charge against the petitioner was that he got help through Mediator of his Bhanej Damad on the post of Forest Guard. IPC read with Section 3 gh (1-2) 4 of Madhya Pradesh Recognized Examination Act 1937. 5. The counsel for petitioner has submitted that the main charge against the petitioner was that he got help through Mediator of his Bhanej Damad on the post of Forest Guard. However, the disciplinary authority has cancelled the charge No. 1 and the counsel for the petitioner further submitted that charge No. 2 is co- related/dependent upon charge No. 1 and once the charge no. 1 has not been proved, the petitioner cannot be punished by a major penalty of removal from service. 6. Per contra, learned Govt. had opposed the prayer made by the petitioner and submitted that the impugned orders Annexures P/1 dated 6.12.2018, P/2 dated 25.10.2017 and P/3 dated 31.03.2017 do not suffer from any illegality. He further submitted that it is settled position that the Court is not an appellate authority and cannot sit in appeal over the disciplinary proceedings nor it can reapreciate the material on record and cannot interfere in the findings of enquiry proceedings. Scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in disciplinary matters is very limited and also submitted that the Court can interfere in the matter only when the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are perverse or the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the quantum of misconduct. He further submitted that petitioner remain suspended for 299 days, out of which he was under judicial custody for 123 days from 2.5.2014 to 1.9.2014 in Central Jail, Bhopal and after getting released from Central Jail Bhopal, from 2.9.2014 to 10.11.2014, he remained absent from duty and was absconded for 70 days. Even after joining the unit on 11.11.2014 and during the suspension, petitioner again remained absent himself for 11 days from 6.12.2014 to 16.12.2014 for 18 days from 29.12.2014 to 15.1.2015 and 11 days again from 9.2.2015 to 20.2.2015. Thus, for total suspension period petitioner remained absent for 110 days and remained in judicial custody for 123 days. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that charge No. 1 was cancelled to the effect that the charge will be considered on the basis of the finding that will come after conclusion of the proceedings before criminal Court. He further contended that charge No. 2 has been found to be proved against petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that charge No. 1 was cancelled to the effect that the charge will be considered on the basis of the finding that will come after conclusion of the proceedings before criminal Court. He further contended that charge No. 2 has been found to be proved against petitioner. Hence disciplinary authority observed that conduct of the petitioner is clearly unbecoming a police personnel and not proper for government service, therefore, by exercising power as per Police Regulation, punishment of removal from service has been imposed vide order dated 31.03.2017, which is justified. Learned counsel for respondent further submitted that charge No. 1 and charge No. 2 is separate and not dependent/co-related on each other. To bolster his submission, learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance in the case of Regional Manager, Uco Bank and Anr. v. Krishna Kumar Bharadwaj reported in (2022) 5 SCC 695 , relevant paras of which are quoted herein below:- 17. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is well circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has earlier been examined by this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India³; H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya and recently by a three-Judge Bench of this Court (of which one of us is a member) in SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava wherein this Court has held as under. "24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry. 27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 28. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained." 18. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the Division Bench has proceeded on the premise that the responsibility was of the Branch Manager along with the Assistant Manager (Cash). Hence, the respondent could not have been held responsible for the lapses of those officers and proceeding on the said foundation, set aside the penalty inflicted upon the respondent delinquent but the record of enquiry clearly manifests that it was a factual error being committed by the High Court while setting aside the domestic inquiry and the consequential punishment inflicted upon the respondent delinquent. 19. In the course of enquiry, a documentary evidence came on record that although Mr Vinod Kumar Khanna was the Manager of the Branch but the date i.c. 10-11-1999/11-11-1999 on which the theft was committed, the custodian of cash were the respondent along with the Assistant Manager (Cash). The finding has been recorded by the inquiry officer in his report holding that the respondent delinquent was the custodian of cash in keeping the keys in cash safe/strong room in the almirah of the stationery room overnight and not keeping the same in his personal custody as per rules of the Bank along with Assistant Manager (Cash). The finding has been recorded by the inquiry officer in his report holding that the respondent delinquent was the custodian of cash in keeping the keys in cash safe/strong room in the almirah of the stationery room overnight and not keeping the same in his personal custody as per rules of the Bank along with Assistant Manager (Cash). The finding of fact was confirmed by the disciplinary/appellate authority in upholding the guilt of the respondent as he had failed in discharge of his duties as a custodian when the theft had taken place on 10-11-1999/11-11-1999 but the High Court in the impugned judgment has not taken pains to examine the finding recorded by the inquiry officer in reference to the responsibility which the respondent delinquent failed to discharge as a custodian of cash at the relevant point of time when the theft was committed. 20. That apart, what has been recorded by the inquiry officer has been revisited by the disciplinary/appellate authority and after re- appreciation of record of inquiry and due application of mind, the appellate authority while exonerating the respondent delinquent from Charge 3 held Charges 1 and 4 proved against him and punished him by an order dated 23-12-2002. Neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court has taken pains to look into the finding which was recorded by the inquiry officer in reference to Charges 1 and 4 and appreciated thereafter by the disciplinary/appellate authority in passing of the order of penalty inflicted upon the respondent delinquent. 21. In our considered view, the finding which has been recorded by the High Court in the impugned order is unsustainable and not supported with the report of inquiry available on record. 22. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the inquiry officer was biased and that caused prejudice to him, suffice it to say, that merely making allegation that he was biased is not sufficient unless supported by the material placed by him either during the course of inquiry or before the disciplinary/appellate authority. Even no submission was made before the High Court also and it deserves no consideration except rejection. 23. Even no submission was made before the High Court also and it deserves no consideration except rejection. 23. So far as the submission regarding non-supply of document is concerned, inquiry officer has observed that the record which was demanded by the respondent delinquent was made available to him except the one which was confidential in nature still he was permitted for inspection. At the same time, the respondent failed to show as to what prejudice has been caused to him in reference to the alleged non- supply of the documents demanded by him. 8. Heard the counsel for parties and perused the record. 9. The main charge against the petitioner was that he got help through mediator Bhanej Damad on the post of Forest Guard and the charge No. 2 is also dependent on charge No. 1 as the criminal case at Crime No. 9/2014 registered under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 ? IPC read with Section 3 gh (1-2) 4 of Madhya Pradesh Recognized Examination Act 1937 is mentioned in charge No. 1 and both the charges are related to the criminal case. Learned counsel for petitioner makes statement at bar that criminal case is still pending and as the disciplinary authority has mentioned that charge No. 1 at present cannot be proved and the charge No. 1 will be decided after the decision taken by the criminal court in criminal case S.T. No. 9500875/2014 (State v. Rajesh Kumar Vittal and Ors.) pending at Special Court Bhopal. 10. The disciplinary authority has also cancelled the charge No. 1 in following manner:- 11. The disciplinary authority proved charge No. 2 which is totally dependent/co-related to each other, then disciplinary authority cannot pass the order of removal of petitioner from service vide order dated 31.03.2017, even the appellate authority has not considered the aforesaid position and upheld the punishment order dated 31.03.2017 and mercy petition has also been rejected without considering the aforesaid fact. 12. On the aforesaid basis, this Court finds that since the charge is co-related and the criminal case is still pending, therefore, the present petition is allowed. Impugned orders Annexures P/1 dated 6.12.2018, P/2 dated 25.10.2017 and P/3 dated 31.03.2017 are hereby quashed and set aside. 13. 12. On the aforesaid basis, this Court finds that since the charge is co-related and the criminal case is still pending, therefore, the present petition is allowed. Impugned orders Annexures P/1 dated 6.12.2018, P/2 dated 25.10.2017 and P/3 dated 31.03.2017 are hereby quashed and set aside. 13. Respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner along with all consequential benefits without back wages, on the basis of no work no pay, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 14. However, liberty is granted to the disciplinary authority to reconsider the matter after decision of the criminal case S.T. No. 9500875/2014 (State of M.P. v. Rajesh Kumar Vittal and Ors.) pending at Special Court Bhopal.