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2025 DIGILAW 51 (GUJ)

Desingbhai Viriyabhai Rathwa v. State of Gujarat

2025-02-03

PRANAV TRIVEDI, SUNITA AGARWAL

body2025
ORDER : SUNITA AGARWAL, C.J. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 2. By means of the present petition, the petitioner is challenging the communication dated 24.10.2024 whereby the application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (old Act), filed by the petitioner in the month of July, 2024 and October, 2024 in respect of the land in question has been rejected on the ground of limitation. In order to assail the reasoning given in the communication dated 24.10.2024 sent to the petitioner rejecting the application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1894”), it is sought to be submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is the purchaser of the lands in question by way of two registered sale deeds executed in the year 2008. The acquisition notifications under the land acquisition Act, 1894 came to be published in the year 2009-10. The award with respect to the land in question came to be made on 10.10.2012. 2.1. As there was a dispute pertaining to the ownership of the land in question and the question as to who was entitled for disbursement of compensation, on the objections raised by the petitioner about the name of the original owner being reflected in the award, the matter was referred under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, 1894 and was registered as LAR Case No. 460 of 2013. It is stated in the writ petition that the petitioner had filed an objection on 15.07.2011 by filing a written objection against reflection of the name of the original owner throughout acquisition process and requested the Special Land Acquisition Officer, namely respondent no. 3 not to pass any award in favour of the original owner without hearing the petitioner herein. The petitioner had also filed a Regular Civil Suit No. 13 of 2010 challenging the subsequent sale deed dated 15.12.2009 executed by the original owner, but the same was also disposed of as withdrawn vide judgment and order dated 08.07.2017. 3. The contention is that the registered sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioner had never been challenged by any person nor there is any such proceeding pending as on date. 3. The contention is that the registered sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioner had never been challenged by any person nor there is any such proceeding pending as on date. With this contention, it is sought to be submitted that the reference made under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, 1894 had been decided by the Court concerned vide judgment and order dated 15.06.2024. After decision on the reference wherein entitlement of the petitioner to the compensation amount has been determined, the petitioner immediately rushed to challenge the determination made under the original award dated 10.10.2012 by filing an application under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. 3.1. By placing reliance on Section 18 of the Act, 1894, it was sought to be argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that for computation of limitation under Section 18 of the Act, 1894, there are only two contingencies, namely :- (a) The limitation would run with respect to a person who was present or represented before the Collector at the time of making of the award, from the date of Collector’s award and six weeks time period is provided for the purpose of making an application under Section 18 as per Section 18(2) (a). Whereas, in all other cases, six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of Collector’s award, whichever period expires first, is the limitation under Section 12 (2) (b). It is contended that in the present case, no notice under Section 12(2) was ever issued to the petitioner and the notice if any, must have been sent to the original owner who was litigating with the petitioner and whose name finds place in the award. In such a situation, the limitation as prescribed in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, 1894 cannot run out in the case of the petitioners. 4. As regards sub-section (2) (a) of Section 18, the time period of six weeks from the date of Collector’s award has to be reckoned from the date of the declaration of the award itself. Since the petitioner has participated in the proceedings before the Collector while making an objection in writing on 15.07.2011, it cannot be assumed that the petitioner was aware of the date of making of the award i.e. 10.10.2012. Since the petitioner has participated in the proceedings before the Collector while making an objection in writing on 15.07.2011, it cannot be assumed that the petitioner was aware of the date of making of the award i.e. 10.10.2012. Thus, in both the situations, limitation cannot run out insofar as the case of the petitioner is concerned. 5. The reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Madan v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2014 (2) SCC 720 , to submit that the respondent no. 2, namely the reference making authority has committed an error of law in rejecting the application for making of reference on the premise that the petitioner was aware of the proceedings under the award and there is a delay of approximately 12 years in making of the application. 6. Testing all these submissions of the learned counsel for petitioner, suffice it to say that as per own case of the petitioner, the petitioner was well aware of the proceedings of making of the award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 with his objection having been filed on 15.07.2011. Being aware of the proceedings of making of the award, it is difficult for us to accept that the petitioner was not aware of the date of the declaration of the award, i.e. 10.10.2012. Moreover, as per own case of the petitioner, on his objection a reference was made under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, 1894 which was registered as LAR Case No. 460 of 2013, which the petitioner was pursuing for about 12 years. However, no steps have been taken by the petitioner to agitate his claim for re-determination of compensation amount on the premise that the acquired land has been under valued in the award dated 10.10.2012. 7. We may note that the provisions of Section 30 and 18 of the Act, 1894 are independent to each other. While Section 30 of the Act, 1894 would be attracted in a situation when there is a dispute pertaining to disbursement of compensation, inasmuch as, as to who is the person interested who would be entitled to receive the compensation amount determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 the question is about the determination of compensation amount i.e. the market value of the land in question. On an application filed by any person interested, about the determination of market value of the acquired land, the Collector would be required to make a reference to the Court to consider his objection as to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation and the apportionment thereof among the person interested. Even during the pendency of the proceeding under Section 30 of the Act, 1894, which is confined to the dispute as to the apportionment, namely the disbursement of compensation amongst the persons interested, there was no impediment in the way of the petitioner to move an application under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 to make a reference by the Collector subject to the outcome of the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, 1894. There cannot be a dispute that the petitioner was well aware of the proceedings of making of the award and participated in the proceedings having submitted his objection on 15.07.2011, thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 18(2) (a) of the Act, 1894 is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is liable to be turned down. 8. Be that as it may, it was permissible for the petitioner to proceed simultaneously, on the one hand in the proceedings under Section 30 claiming to be a person interested . Both the proceedings being independent to each other could have been continued simultaneously or clubbed together in one Court inasmuch, as the proceedings under Section 30 and Section 18 of the Act, 1894, both were to be decided by the Civil Court. 8.1. As this has not been done and the petitioner waited for the outcome of proceeding under Section 30 of the Act, 1894, the acquiring body cannot be saddled with the additional liability of interest by entertaining the reference application after 12 years of making of the award. 9. On a query made by the Court as to whether the petitioner is ready and willing to forego the interest for the aforesaid period, no plausible answer could be given. Be that as it may, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not find any error in the order passed by the Collector in rejecting the application for making reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. 9.1. Be that as it may, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not find any error in the order passed by the Collector in rejecting the application for making reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. 9.1. The filing of the application under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 after the decision in the proceeding under Section 30 of the Act, 1894 on 15.06.2024 may be because of the wrong legal advise but no benefit can be derived by the petitioner out of the said fact. 10. In the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not find any merit in the writ petition the same is, accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost.