ORDER : 1. The Petitioner in W.P.No.20877/2024 is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Call for records in related to the proceedings bearing No. CO.100CCB2024 dated 29.07.2024; b. Issue writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the letter dated 29.07.2024 in CO.100CCB2024 issued by the R1 as per Annexure-K and order passed by the R2 Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies dated 30.7.2024 in No. JRB/AA.MAM.RA/28-A(5)/21/2023-24 as per Annexure-L c. Issue any other appropriate writ or order or direction as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and allow this writ petition in the ends of justice and equity. 2. The Petitioner in W.P.No.23569/2024 is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: i. Call for records in related to the proceedings bearing No. CO.100CCB2024 dated 29.07.2024; ii. Issue writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the letter dated 29.07.2024 in CO.100CCB2024 issued by the R1 as per Annexure-K and order passed by the R2 Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies dated 30.7.2024 in No. JRB/AA.MAM.RA/28-A(5)/21/2023-24 as per Annexure-L iii. Issue any other appropriate writ or order or direction as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and allow this writ petition in the ends of justice and equity. FACTS IN W.P. No.20877/2024: 3. The Petitioner claims to be a primary society and a member of the Respondent No.4-Kolar and Chikkaballapur Co-operative Bank [hereinafter referred to as ‘ DCC Bank ’]. The term of the elected body of DCC Bank expired on 17.11.2023; consequent upon the expiry, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Bangalore District, [hereinafter referred to as ‘ DRCS ’] appointed an Administrator in terms of Section 28A(5) of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 [hereinafter referred to as ‘ KCS Act ’]. 4. Elections were required to be held, and a resolution of the Board was passed on 23.03.2023 to that effect. The Board had on 08.05.2023 called for information to provide for a Group-A officer to be appointed as the returning officer. Meanwhile, the term of the Managing Committee expired on 17.11.2023. Prior to such expiry, the Assistant Commissioner, Kolar Sub-division was designated as its returning officer. 5. The Board had on 08.05.2023 called for information to provide for a Group-A officer to be appointed as the returning officer. Meanwhile, the term of the Managing Committee expired on 17.11.2023. Prior to such expiry, the Assistant Commissioner, Kolar Sub-division was designated as its returning officer. 5. The process of election being taken up, the preparation of voters list was going on, due to the intervention of the Parliamentary election in the year 2024, the election of all Co-operative societies was postponed by a Government Order dated 06.06.2024. 6. Upon the expiry of the period of postponement, elections were required to be held. However, it is contended that the Administrator appointed in terms of Section 28A(5) was lethargic and did not complete the process of election. Hence, the DCC Bank had approached this court in WP No. 23677 of 2023 and sought for directions to complete the process of election in a time-bound manner. The said writ petition came to be disposed on 03.07.2024 with a direction to the State Co-operation Election Authority, Regional Commissioner, Bangalore Division and the Apex Co-operative Societies Election Officer to continue the process of election in respect of the DCC Bank from the stage it was halted. 7. The District Election Officer was directed to ensure that the process of election shall be continued and ensure that the election will conclude as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. While doing so, this Court also referred to an earlier order in W.P. No. 15653 of 2024, which was disposed of on 19.06.2024, when a similar direction had been issued to the State Co-operative Election Authority, Regional Commissioner, Bengaluru Division and Apex Co-operative Societies, Election Officer to continue the process of election. 8. In pursuance of the said directions, a revised notification in Form No.11 was notified by the election authorities for the Federal societies on 10.07.2024 in terms of Rule 14(1) of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Rules, 1959 [hereinafter referred to as ‘ KCS Rules ’]. 9. 8. In pursuance of the said directions, a revised notification in Form No.11 was notified by the election authorities for the Federal societies on 10.07.2024 in terms of Rule 14(1) of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Rules, 1959 [hereinafter referred to as ‘ KCS Rules ’]. 9. On the same day, another notification had been issued there being certain contradictions, the same was challenged by the DCC Bank in WP No. 18829 of 2024, which came to be disposed of on 16.07.2024 directing the District Election Officer to comply with the direction issued by the Co-operative Election Authority in terms of the communication dated 15.07.2024, having regard to the earlier orders passed in WP No. 20454. 10. At this stage, the Secretary Co-operation Department, vide its letter dated 29.7.2024, recommended that the Regional Commissioner, Bangalore Region, be appointed as the Administrator. Respondent No.2 - Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies [hereinafter referred to as ‘ JRCS ’] passed an order on 20.7.2024, appointing the named officer, who is the Regional Commissioner , as the Administrator of Respondent No.4. 11. It is aggrieved by the said appointment of the Regional Commissioner, Bangalore Division as the Administrator that the Petitioners are before this court. 12. WP No. 23569 has also been filed for similar reliefs.The facts as stated therein are more or less identical to those stated in W.P. No.20877 of 2024. 13. Sri. M.R. Rajagopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 20877 of 2024, would submit that: 13.1. Respondent No.4-JRCS has not applied his independent mind, but has acted on the instruction of Respondent No. 1, Secretary. A letter having been issued by the Secretary on 29.07.2024, the JRCS has issued the appointment order on 30.07.2024. There is no requirement for the JRCS to have issued such an order of appointment. Firstly, there is no independent application of mind, secondly, a senior IAS officer could not be appointed as an administrator by the JRCS who is junior in rank. 13.2. The term of the elected members having expired on 17.11.2023, the elected members having taken steps for holding of elections prior to the expiry of the term, it was only on account of the intervention of the parliamentary election that the election was postponed. The elected members were not responsible for the delay, irrespective of which an administrator under Section 28A(5) has been appointed. The elected members were not responsible for the delay, irrespective of which an administrator under Section 28A(5) has been appointed. Now when the elections are required to be held, an administrator of an IAS officer cadre has been appointed only to delay the matter. The dates etc. having been fixed, it indicates that the State by such appointment at such a belated stage wishes only to delay the election. 13.3. A junior officer cannot appoint a senior officer as an administrator since the said Administrator is required to act under the supervision of the Registrar who is a junior officer. In this regard he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Air Line Pilots' Assn. of India v. DGCA , (2011) 5 SCC 435 , more particularly para nos. 26 to 28 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 26. The contention was raised before the High Court that the Circular dated 29-5-2008 has been issued by the authority having no competence, thus cannot be enforced. It is a settled legal proposition that the authority which has been conferred with the competence under the statute alone can pass the order. No other person, even a superior authority, can interfere with the functioning of the statutory authority. In a democratic set-up like ours, persons occupying key positions are not supposed to mortgage their discretion, volition and decision- making authority and be prepared to give way to carry out commands having no sanctity in law. Thus, if any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on suggestion of a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal. [Vide Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commr. of Bihar, (1969) 1 SCC 308 : AIR 1970 SC 1896 , Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar, (1984) 2 SCC 41 : AIR 1984 SC 322 , Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab, (2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524 and Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen, (2010) 11 SCC 557 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 524 : AIR 2010 SC 2210 ] 27. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Commr. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16 , Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia, (2004) 2 SCC 65 : AIR 2004 SC 1159 and Pancham Chand v. State of H.P. (2008) 7 SCC 117 : AIR 2008 SC 1888 observing that an authority vested with the power to act under the statute alone should exercise its discretion following the procedure prescribed therein and interference on the part of any authority upon whom the statute does not confer any jurisdiction, is wholly unwarranted in law. It violates the constitutional scheme. 28. In view of the above, the legal position emerges that the authority who has been vested with the power to exercise its discretion alone can pass the order. Even a senior official cannot provide for any guideline or direction to the authority under the statute to act in a particular manner. 13.4. By relying on Air Line Pilots' Assn. of India ’s case, he submits that it is only the authority which has been conferred with the competence under the statute who alone can pass the order. Such authority cannot act on the instruction of a superior authority and exercise its powers. Even a senior official cannot provide any guidance or directions to the authority to act in a particular manner. In the present case, the JRCS has acted on the instructions of the Secretary, and the order of appointment is bad in law. 13.5. He relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 SCC 671 more particularly para no. 13 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. This takes us to the further question: Who is an “aggrieved person” and what are the qualifications requisite for such a status? The expression “aggrieved person” denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. The expression “aggrieved person” denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the Petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression “aggrieved person”. However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or “standing” to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. 13.6. By referring to Jasbhai Motibhai Desai’s case he submits that even a member of a Federal Society would be an aggrieved party. The elections being conducted by the Administrator, the Petitioner being one of the members of the Federal Society, and the manner and methodology of holding the election and conducting it thereof would have a bearing on the members, including the Petitioner. Therefore, he submits that the Petitioner would be an aggrieved party who could agitate the issue before this court. 13.7. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh , (1980) 2 SCC 471 more particularly para no. 9 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 9. The question, then, is what is mala fides in the jurisprudence of power? Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power — sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions and satisfactions — is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested the court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in law when he stated: “I repeat . . . that all power is a trust — that we are accountable for its exercise — that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist”. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to effect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent of the power, whether this be malice-laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict or impel the action, mala fides or fraud on power vitiates the acquisition or other official act. 13.8. By referring to Gurdial Singh's case, he submits that there are malafides in the exercise of the powers by the JRCS and there is malice on part of the State. The State is trying to postpone the election by changing the Administrator just before the elections are to be held. The actions on part of the State are fraudulent in nature and as such, would have to be set-at-naught and this court would be required to pass necessary orders in relation thereto. 14. Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in W.P. No.23569 of 2024 reiterates the submissions made by Sri. M.R.Rajagopal, learned Senior counsel: 14.1. The actions on part of the State are fraudulent in nature and as such, would have to be set-at-naught and this court would be required to pass necessary orders in relation thereto. 14. Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in W.P. No.23569 of 2024 reiterates the submissions made by Sri. M.R.Rajagopal, learned Senior counsel: 14.1. He refers to Section 28A(5) of the KCS Act and submits that the Registrar or any other officer within whose jurisdiction the Society is situated and who is authorised by the Registrar shall be deemed to have assumed charge as Administrator and he shall for all purposes function as the Board of Management. Thus, he submits that it is the Registrar in whose jurisdiction the Society is situated who would be deemed to be the Administrator except for a formal order to be passed by the Registrar, the Regional Commissioner is not contemplated in the said section. 14.2. The Kolar-Chikkaballapura DCC Bank coming under the jurisdiction of Respondent No.2- JRCS, who has regional authority over Kolar and Chikkaballapura would be deemed to be the Administrator and in furtherance thereof, that the Registrar had earlier appointed the JRCS of this region as the Administrator, the change now made by the Registrar in appointing the Regional Commissioner is contrary to Subsection (5) of section 28A of the KCS Act. 14.3. There is no reason to appoint an officer as superior as the the Regional Commissioner to be/function as an Administrator in pursuance of holding elections to the Society. There is no reason forthcoming either in the recommendation made by the Secretary dated 29.07.2024 or in the order dated 30.07.2024 of the JRCS. There being no particular reason to deviate and depart from Subsection (5) of Section 28A, he submits that the order passed is completely malafide, requiring it to be set aside. 14.4. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of M.P. v. Sanjay Nagayach , (2013) 7 SCC 25 , more particularly para nos. 36, 37 and 42 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 37. The Registrar/Joint Registrar, while exercising powers of supersession has to form an opinion and that opinion must be based on some objective criteria, which has nexus with the final decision. 36, 37 and 42 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 37. The Registrar/Joint Registrar, while exercising powers of supersession has to form an opinion and that opinion must be based on some objective criteria, which has nexus with the final decision. A statutory authority shall not act with pre-conceived notion and shall not speak his masters' voice, because the formation of opinion must be his own, not of somebody else in power, to achieve some ulterior motive. There may be situations where the Registrar/Joint Registrar are expected to act in the best interest of the Society and its members, but in such situations, they have to act bona fide and within the four corners of the statute. In our view, the impugned order will not fall in that category. 42. Further, we are inclined to give the following general directions in view of the mushrooming of cases in various courts challenging orders of supersession of elected Committees: 42.1 . Supersession of an elected Managing Committee/Board is an exception and be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances and normally elected body be allowed to complete the term for which it is elected. 42.2. Elected Committee in office be not penalised for the shortcomings or illegalities committed by the previous Committee, unless there is any deliberate inaction in rectifying the illegalities committed by the previous Committees. 42.3. Elected Committee in office be given sufficient time, say at least six months, to rectify the defects, if any, pointed out in the audit report with regard to incidents which originated when the previous Committee was in office. 42.4. The Registrar/Joint Registrar are legally obliged to comply with all the statutory formalities, including consultation with the financing banks/controlling banks, etc. Only after getting their view, an opinion be formed as to whether an elected Committee be ousted or not. 42.5. The Registrar/Joint Registrar should always bear in mind the consequences of an order of supersession which has the effect of not only ousting the Board out of office, but also to disqualify them for standing for election in the succeeding elections. The Registrar/Joint Registrar therefore is duty-bound to exercise his powers bona fide and not on the dictation or direction of those who are in power. 42.6. The Registrar/Joint Registrar therefore is duty-bound to exercise his powers bona fide and not on the dictation or direction of those who are in power. 42.6. The Registrar/Joint Registrar shall not act under political pressure or influence and, if they do, be subjected to disciplinary proceedings and be also held personally liable for the cost of the legal proceedings. 2.7. Public money is not to be spent by the State Government or the Registrar for unnecessary litigation involving disputes between various factions in a co-operative society. Taxpayers' money is not expected to be spent for settling those disputes. If found necessary, the same is to be spent from the funds available with the Bank concerned. 14.5. Based on Sanjay Nagayach's case , he submits that statutory functionaries like the Registrar, Joint Registrar, etc., of Co-Operative Societies have to function independently and without external pressure. The powers and authority vested in them are required to be exercised by them without external guidance or pressure. In the present case, the JRCS has exercised powers as per the instruction of the Secretary, hence, the same is not an exercise of powers by the JRCS on his own. There is no opinion which has been formed by the JRCS based on any objective criteria. There is no particular nexus in the appointment of the Regional Commissioner as the Administrator when Subsection (5) of Section 28A indicates that it is the JRCS who would be deemed to be the Administrator. 14.6. His submission is, therefore, that the Secretary has acted under political pressure and influence, which has been passed on to the Registrar, and therefore, the impugned order is not one passed by the Registrar on his own. 14.7. He also relies upon the decision in Air Line Pilots' Assn. of India v. DGCA [supra], more particularly para nos. 26, 27 and 28 thereof, for the very same contention as contended by Sri.M.R. Rajagopal. 14.8. On the basis of all of the above, he submits that the writ petition is required to be allowed. 15. Ms. Prathima Honnapura, learned Additional Advocate General would submit that: 15.1. The petition is not maintainable since the Petitioner is only a member of the DCC Bank. A mere member cannot maintain the present writ petition. There is no locus for such a member to file and prosecute the above petition. 15.2. 15. Ms. Prathima Honnapura, learned Additional Advocate General would submit that: 15.1. The petition is not maintainable since the Petitioner is only a member of the DCC Bank. A mere member cannot maintain the present writ petition. There is no locus for such a member to file and prosecute the above petition. 15.2. The term of the Board having expired on17.11.2023 in view of Section 28A(5) of the KCS Act, there is a requirement for the appointment of an Administrator since the term of the earlier Board has expired, and they cannot discharge their duties as the Board. The Administrator who has been appointed would have to conduct the elections so as to facilitate the election of the new Board. The present petition is coming in the way of holding elections, and as such, this court ought to dismiss the petition in limine. 15.3. Any Co-operative society which has failed to arrange for elections within the time specified in section 39A is deemed to have vacated their office on the last day of the expiration of 5 years from the date of election. She refers to Section 2A(3) of the KCS Act, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 2A. Registrar, Additional Registrars, Joint Registrars, Deputy Registrars [State Representatives] and Assistant Registrars.- (1) Xxx (2) Xxx (3) The State Government may appoint such other officers with such designations as it deems fit to assist the Registrar. 15.4. By referring to Section 2A(3) she submits that the State Government may appoint such officers with such designation as it deems fit to assist the Registrar. Thus, the recommendation made by the Secretary is not one without power or jurisdiction. 15.5. The State Government has taken into consideration the requirement to appoint a senior person to conduct the elections, considering that the elections are to be held in two districts, Kolar and Chikkaballapura and the past elections, as also the events leading up to the present election have resulted in several litigations and disputes which cannot be effectively managed by a junior officer. 15.6. 15.6. The State Government in its wisdom, has chosen to appoint the Regional Commissioner as the Administrator who not only has rich experience but, by the very nature of the post held by him and on account of his seniority, would be better equipped and capable of handling elections in two different districts by issuing necessary directions and ensuring compliance with those directions by all the concerned officers. 15.7. Though normally, it is the Joint Registrar or a person junior to the Joint Registrar who is appointed as an administrator. In the peculiarity of the present case, taking into consideration the need of a senior person to conduct the elections, the State Government exercised its powers under Section 2A(3) and recommended that the Regional Commissioner be appointed as the Administrator, which has been accepted by the JRCSand the appointment so made cannot be challenged. 15.8. She submitted that the usage of the word ‘any other officer’ in Section 28A(5) cannot be restricted to an officer of the Co-operative department. The State and or the Registrar can appoint any other officer of the Government within whose jurisdiction the Society is situated. In the present case, the Society operating and situated both in Kolar and Chikkaballapura comes under the jurisdiction of the Regional Commissioner. The Regional Commissioner is an officer of the State within whose jurisdiction the Society is situate, the appointment of the Regional Commissioner is proper and correct. 15.9. She submits that it is the intention of the Legislature to grant wide discretion to the Government in the appointment of an Administrator. A restrictive definition as sought to be contended by the Petitioner, that it is to be a JRCS or an officer junior to him is not the intention of the Legislature as contained under Section 28A(5). In this regard, she relies upon the decision in Crawford v. Spooner , 1846 (4) MIA 179 , more particularly, the observation of Lord Brougham, at page 116 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:xx Lord Brougham.- Their Lordships are clearly of opinion, that the Judgment of the Court of Bombay cannot stand. The construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. The construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. We cannot fish out what possibly may have been the intention of the Legislature ; we cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of the Statute; we cannot add, and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there. If the Legislature did intend that which it has not expressed clearly ; much more, if the Legislature intended something very different; if the Legislature intended something pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for the Judges to invent something which they do not meet with in the words of the text (aiding their construction of the text always, of course, by the context); it is not for them so to supply a meaning, for, in reality, it would be supplying it: the true way in these cases is, to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered; and, therefore, if any other meaning was intended than that which the words purport plainly to import, them let another Act supply that meaning, and [188]supply the defect in the previous Act. 5.10. By relying on the observation in Crawford’s case, she submits that even if there is a defective phrasing in the statute, the court cannot add or amend by construction any deficiencies in the said statute. The intention of the Legislature would have to be given prime importance. The courts would have to take the words as the Legislature has given them and as they naturally imply. 15.11. In the present case, she submits that the authority under Section 28A(5) is available if a new committee is not constituted under Section 29A on the date of expiry of the term of the office of the Committee. The Registrar or any other officer within whose jurisdiction the Society is situated and who is authorised by the Registrar shall be deemed to have assumed charge as the Administrator, and he shall, for all purposes, function as the Committee of Management. 15.12. The Registrar or any other officer within whose jurisdiction the Society is situated and who is authorised by the Registrar shall be deemed to have assumed charge as the Administrator, and he shall, for all purposes, function as the Committee of Management. 15.12. Merely because the Administrator is subject to the control of the Registrar in exercising all powers and perform all the functions of the Committee of the Co-operative Society or any office bearer of the Co-operative Society and take all such action as may be required in the interest of the Co-operative Society. The usage of the words “subject to the control of the Registrar” would not require the officer to be junior to the Registrar. The Registrar would naturally exercise all powers under the KCS Act and Rules, and the Administrator would be subject to the said Act and Rules. The same would not make the Administrator subservient to the Registrar. 15.13. The usage of the word ‘or any other officer within whose jurisdiction society is situated’ and the usage of the words ‘subject to the control of the Registrar’, would not mean that “any other officer” has to be junior to that of the Registrar. 15.14. Relying on Gray vs. Pearson , (1857) 6 HLC 61 , she submits that the grammatical and ordinary sense of the word is required to be adhered to, unless they lead to some absurdity or repugnance. In the present case, there is no absurdity in the usage of the ordinary meaning ‘any other officer’, which would mean any other officer of the Government, including the Regional Commissioner. 15.15. She relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gurudevdatta v. State of Maharashtra , (2001) 4 SCC 534 , more particularly para no. 26 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 26. Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law giver. The Courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the Legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. 15.16. She further relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. Tata Chemicals Limited , (2014) 6 SCC 335 , which also relied on Gurudevdatta’s case, more particularly para no. 23 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 23. It is also well settled principle that the courts must interpret the provisions of the Statute upon ascertaining the object of the legislation through the medium or authoritative forms in which it is expressed. It is well settled that the Court should, while interpreting the provisions of the Statute, assign its ordinary meaning. 15.17. By relying on Gurudevdatta and Tata Chemicals Limited’s case, she again submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the cardinal principle of interpretation is to give natural, ordinary or popular meaning to the statute which has to be construed according to their grammatical meaning. The golden rule is to give a statute its ordinary meaning. It is also a well-settled principle that Courts ought to interpret legislation through its objects and the form in which it is expressed. 15.18. She further submits that it is only a Chief Executive Officer who can represent a Society. The present writ petition has been filed by a Director of the Society. The Director cannot sue or be sued in the name of the Society. Only the Chief Executive Officer can do so. 15.18. She further submits that it is only a Chief Executive Officer who can represent a Society. The present writ petition has been filed by a Director of the Society. The Director cannot sue or be sued in the name of the Society. Only the Chief Executive Officer can do so. In this regard, she relies upon Section 29G(4)(j), which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 29G(4) The Chief Executive shall be the Chief Administrative Officer of the Society and shall, subject to the general supervision and control of the Committee and such other conditions and restrictions as may be specified in the bye-laws,- (a) to (i) xxxxx (j) sue and be sued on behalf of the co- operative Society 15.19. She relies on the decision of this Court in Abdulla A.K. Vs. Nanjarayapatna Vyavasaya Seva , AIR Online 2018 Kar 96 , more particularly para nos. 26, 27 and 28 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 26. According to learned counsel for the respondent as per Section 29-G of KCS Act, Chief Executive has the power to sue and be sued on behalf of the Co- operative Society and that as per Section 2(a-3), the Manager is the Chief Executive of the Bank and as such, he can sue on behalf plaintiff. Section 29G(4)(j) of KCS Act reads as follows: “29-G. Appointment of Chief Executive- (1) For every co-operative Society there shall be a Chief Executive who shall, be appointed and be removable by the Society: xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx (4) The Chief Executive shall be the Chief Administrative Officer of the Society and shall, subject to the general supervision and control of the [board] and such other conditions and restrictions as may be specified in the bye-laws- xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx (j) sue and be sued on behalf of the co-operative Society;” 27. The said power of the Chief Executive to sue or be sued on behalf of the Co-operative Society is subject to the condition / restrictions as may be specified in the law. As already observed above, the Bye-law of the plaintiff at Clause 18(a)(5) clearly mentions that it is the Secretary only who can sue on behalf of the plaintiff, as such, the Bye-law of the Society restricts the power to sue only to its Secretary and to none else. As already observed above, the Bye-law of the plaintiff at Clause 18(a)(5) clearly mentions that it is the Secretary only who can sue on behalf of the plaintiff, as such, the Bye-law of the Society restricts the power to sue only to its Secretary and to none else. Section 2(a-3) of KCS Act defines the Chief Executive as below: “Chief Executive” means any employee of a co- operative society by whatever designation called and includes an official of the State Government, an employee of any other institution or co-operative society who discharges the functions of a Chief Executive under the Act, Rules or the Bye-laws; 28. A reading of the said Section go to show that though any employee of the Co-operative Society irrespective of their designation can be called as Chief Executive, but, for him to be called so, it must be shown that he was discharging the functions of a Chief Executive Officer under the Act, Rules or the Bye-laws. However, neither any material has been placed nor evidence has been led to the effect that the previous post of Secretary was later converted into the post of Manager of the plaintiff and the same was subsequently re-designated as Chief Executive. In the absence of any such pleading or evidence and in the presence of the Bye-law, it appears to have still retaining its Clause 18(A)(5) holding that the Secretary alone shall sue on behalf of the plaintiff, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the Secretary was the Manager and himself has now designated as a Chief Executive cannot be acceptable. Consequently, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit has instituted by the plaintiff, shown as being represented by its Manager was not maintainable as per the Bye-law of the plaintiff and in the absence of any resolution of the plaintiff in the General Body. As such, I answer the substantial question of law No.1 in the negative. 15.20. By relying on Section 29G4 and the aforesaid decision, she submits that a person needs to be designated as a chief executive officer to qualify to be a chief executive, and only the chief executive can sue on behalf of the Society. 15.21. As such, I answer the substantial question of law No.1 in the negative. 15.20. By relying on Section 29G4 and the aforesaid decision, she submits that a person needs to be designated as a chief executive officer to qualify to be a chief executive, and only the chief executive can sue on behalf of the Society. 15.21. She relies on the decision of this Court in Bharathi Souhardha Credit Co-operative Limited, Kaup, Udupi District v. State of Karnataka and others , 2008 SCC Online Kar 469 , more particularly para no. 9 and 10 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 9. Section 31(2)(b) of the Karnataka Souharda Sahakari Act, 1997 reads as under: “The Chief Executive shall be the Chief Administrative Officer of the Co-operative and shall, subject to the general control and superintendence of the Board, sign documents, enter into agreements and contracts, and institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings on behalf of Co-operative”. 10. From the above provision of law, it is clear that all legal proceedings are to be initiated only by the Chief Executive of the Co-operative Society under the Act. During the course of arguments, it is fairly conceded by the Petitioner's Counsel that there was no disability for the Chief Executive to institute legal proceedings. When there is a specific provision under the Act, the Chief Executive cannot delegate his power to the President to file the writ petition and when there is no disability of whatsoever nature for him to file the writ petition. Therefore, only on this short ground the petition filed by the Petitioner is to be dismissed. 15.22. She submits that there being a chief executive officer appointed for the Society, and there being no disability on the part of the said chief executive officer to file the present petition, the Chief Executive Officer not having filed the petition, but the petition has been filed by the Director, is not maintainable. The chief executive officer, as held in Bharathi Souhardha Credit Co-operative Limited’s case, cannot even delegate his power to the President. In the present case, no delegation or authorisation has been made to the Director to file the above petition. 15.23. She relies upon the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Dr. Veerendra Teggimani v. The District Registrar of Societies , W.P. No. 101894 of 2022 more particularly para nos. In the present case, no delegation or authorisation has been made to the Director to file the above petition. 15.23. She relies upon the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Dr. Veerendra Teggimani v. The District Registrar of Societies , W.P. No. 101894 of 2022 more particularly para nos. 3 and 4 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 3. On perusal of the impugned order at Annexure-C, it is clear that the Registrar has appointed an Enquiry Officer to go into the affairs of the respondent No.3-Society by virtue of the power conferred under Section 25 of the Act. Therefore, when a question was posed to the learned counsel for the Petitioner as to how the Petitioner, even if he is a member of the Society, is aggrieved of the impugned order and answer as to how he could challenge the impugned order and what is his locus- standi, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that under the guise of the impugned order dated 13.05.2022, the respondent-Registrar is seeking to hold an enquiry against the Petitioner, since a complaint has been made making allegations against the Petitioner and it is by virtue of the said complaint that the impugned order has been issued. 4 . It does not satisfy the requirement of law. It is clear from the impugned order that the respondent No.1-Registrar has appointed an Enquiry Officer to go into the affairs of the respondent No.3- Society. If at all anybody is aggrieved, it should be the respondent No.3-Society. It is also clear that the Petitioner has no locus-standi, as a member of the Society to call in question the impugned order. 15.24. By relying on Veerendra Taggimani's case, she submits that a member of the Society has no locus to question the order appointing an enquiry officer to go into the affairs of the Society. 15.25. She also relies on the decision of this Court in Gaddikeri Milk Producer v. The State of Karnataka , W.P. 107266 of 2023 more particularly para nos. 8 and 12 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 8. 15.25. She also relies on the decision of this Court in Gaddikeri Milk Producer v. The State of Karnataka , W.P. 107266 of 2023 more particularly para nos. 8 and 12 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 8. Learned counsel submits that, the petitioners being society members they would have the right to challenge the notification and in support of the said contention, learned counsel places reliance on the judgment rendered by the seven judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.C. Cooper Vs. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 . 12 . It cannot be denied that a member of a Corporate Society would have the right to challenge an order, which it feels would be inappropriate. It is however to be noticed that the decision of the Government, after taking into all relevant factors, cannot be questioned on the ground that the wisdom behind the decision was incorrect. The State Government, being the ultimate authority to monitor the financial conditions of the Milk Union would be at liberty to take an appropriate decision to safeguard the overall interests of the Milk Union. Merely because a few Constituent Members of the Union were of the view that the recruitment to a post or recruitment to various posts would have a detrimental effect on its finances, the same cannot be permitted to be stalled. 15.26. By relying on Gaddikeri Milk Producer’s case, she submits that the State Government, being the ultimate authority to monitor the financial conditions of the milk union, would be at liberty to take an appropriate decision to safeguard the overall interest of the Milk Union. The State, in the present case, being of the opinion that the Regional Commissioner is to be appointed as an Administrator, the said decision having been taken in the interest of the Society, one of the members of the Society cannot question the appointment of an Administrator. The said decision taken by the Government, being proper and correct, does not require any interference. 15.27. She also relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Joint Action Committee of Airline Pilots Association more particularly para no. 31 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 31. The said decision taken by the Government, being proper and correct, does not require any interference. 15.27. She also relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Joint Action Committee of Airline Pilots Association more particularly para no. 31 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 31. It is a question of challenging the public policy and it is well settled that public authorities must be given a very long rope, full freedom and full liberty in framing policies, though the discretion of the authorities cannot be absolute and unqualified, unfettered or uncanalised. The same can be the subject-matter of judicial scrutiny only in exceptional circumstances where it can be shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable or violative of the statutory provisions. More so, the courts are not well equipped to deal with technical matters, particularly, where the decisions are based on purely hypertechnical issues. The court may not be able to consider competing claims and conflicting interests and conclude on which way the balance tilts. 15.28. By relying on Airline Pilot’s case, she submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said decision has categorically held that the public authorities must be given a long rope, full freedom and full liberty in framing policies. The same can be subject matter of judicial scrutiny, only in exceptional circumstances where it is shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable or violative of statutory provisions. In the present case, the action taken by the Government is not arbitrary nor is it unreasonable or violative of the statutory provisions. The same is a decision well thought of and as per the statute. 15.29. On that basis, she submits that the above petitions are required to be dismissed. 16. An impleading application having been filed by the ex-director of the DCC bank, the impleading Applicant was permitted to assist the court as an intervener. The intervener is a member of, and ex-director of the DCC Bank: 16.1. He submits that in the year 2011-12, the DCC Bank had reached the stage of bankruptcy and it is only thereafter that the Government monitored the Bank under the supervision of an Administrator that the financial conditions of the DCC Bank has improved. 16.2. Sri. The intervener is a member of, and ex-director of the DCC Bank: 16.1. He submits that in the year 2011-12, the DCC Bank had reached the stage of bankruptcy and it is only thereafter that the Government monitored the Bank under the supervision of an Administrator that the financial conditions of the DCC Bank has improved. 16.2. Sri. M. Govinda Gowda, who is the Director of the Petitioner in W.P. No.23569 of 2024 was elected as the President of the DCC bank, who it is alleged has been instrumental in the misappropriation committed in the bank. He alleges that the said Director had misappropriated huge amounts of money running to crores of rupees. The entitlement of the farmers under the loan waiver scheme of the Government has not reached the farmers, as regards which a complaint has been lodged with Lokayukta police. 16.3. His further submission is that Sri M. Govinda Gowda also disbursed loans without verification to his near and dear ones. It is in order to cover up the same that they have challenged the appointment of a senior IAS officer as an Administrator. His contention is that the senior IAS officer/Regional Commissioner would unearth all these misdoings of the Board of Directors and take necessary action in that regard. It is for that reason that they wish to have a junior officer who would not be well equipped to deal with the complex situation in the matter at hand. 17. Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel, in reply, would submit as under: 17.1. He relies upon Section 30 of the KCS Act which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 30- Supersession or suspension of the board .- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law of the time being in force, no board of a co- operative society shall be superseded or kept under suspension for a period exceeding six months. Provided that in case of a co-operative society carrying on the business of banking, the provision of this clause, shall have effect as if for the words ?six months?, the words ?one year? had been substituted. Provided that in case of a co-operative society carrying on the business of banking, the provision of this clause, shall have effect as if for the words ?six months?, the words ?one year? had been substituted. (2) If in the opinion of the Registrar, the board of a co-operative society- (i) persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by this Act, or the rules or the bye-laws; or (ii) commits any act, which is prejudicial to the interest of the Society or its members; or (iii) where there is a stalemate in the constitution or functioning of the board; or (iv) has serious financial irregularities or frauds which have been detected; or (v) fails to provide books and records, necessary information and assistance to the election commission as per the calendar set out by the election commission to conduct elections to the board within the stipulated time and as a result or 80 otherwise, the election commission has failed to conduct elections to the board within the stipulated time; Registrar, may, after giving the board an opportunity to state objections, if any, by order in writing, superceed or suspend the said board and appoint an administrator to manage the affairs of the Society for such period not exceeding six months. Provided that the board of any co-operative society shall not be superseded or kept under suspension where there is no Government share holding or loan or financial assistance or any guarantee by the Government. Provided further that the supersession or suspension of the board of a co-operative bank shall be done only after consultation with the Reserve Bank of India / National Bank as the case may be and the provisions of Banking Regulation Act,, 1949 shall also apply. Provided further that the supersession or suspension of the board of a co-operative bank shall be done only after consultation with the Reserve Bank of India / National Bank as the case may be and the provisions of Banking Regulation Act,, 1949 shall also apply. Provided also that, no member of the board superceded under sub-section (2) shall, be eligible for being elected as a member of the board of such Society or any other Co-operative Society for a period of one year from the date of removal of such board and no such order of disqualification for contesting the election to the Board shall be made unless a reasonable opportunity of being heard, is given to the person against whom such order is made] and (3) The Administrator so appointed shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and such instructions as he may give from time to time, exercise all or any of the functions of the board or of any office- bearer of the co-operative Society and take such action as he may consider necessary in the interest of the Society. (4) In case of supersession of a board, the Administrator shall, before the expiry of his term of office, arrange for the conduct of elections and the constitution of a new board in accordance with this Act,, the rules and the bye-laws of the co-operative Society and hand over management to the elected board. (5) In case of suspension of a board, the Registrar shall reinstate the said board and the Administrator shall, on the expiry of his term of office, handover the management to the said board and the period of suspension shall be reckoned while computing the original term of office of the board. (5) In case of suspension of a board, the Registrar shall reinstate the said board and the Administrator shall, on the expiry of his term of office, handover the management to the said board and the period of suspension shall be reckoned while computing the original term of office of the board. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,, the Registrar shall, in the case of a co-operative bank, if so required in writing by the Reserve Bank of India, in public interest or for preventing the affairs of the co-operative bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors or for securing the proper management of the co-operative 81 bank, by order in writing, remove the board of that co-operative bank and appoint an administrator to manage the affairs of the co-operative bank for such period not exceeding one year as may be specified by the Reserve Bank of India: [Provided that no member of the board, removed shall, be eligible for being elected as a member of the board of such Bank or any other Co-operative Society for a period of one year from the date of removal of the board and no such order of disqualification shall be made unless a reasonable opportunity of being heard, is given to the persons against whom the order is made.] (7) Any officer or employee of the Government or a Co-operative organisation may be appointed as Administrator of a co-operative society- (i) if he is appointed on full time basis, his pay and other allowances shall be borne by the co-operative Society. The service rules applicable to him in the department or organisation shall continue to govern his service as Administrator of the Society; (ii) if he is appointed as Administrator in addition to his regular post, he shall be paid remuneration at the rate of ten percent of his basic pay out of the funds of the co-operative Society. The service rules applicable to him in the department or organisation shall continue to govern his service as Administrator of the Society] 30-A- Appointment of Special Officer- xxx 30B. The service rules applicable to him in the department or organisation shall continue to govern his service as Administrator of the Society] 30-A- Appointment of Special Officer- xxx 30B. Powers to give direction in public interest .- (1) Where the State Government is satisfied that in public interest and for the purposes of securing proper implementation of co-operative and other development programmes approved or undertaken by the State Government or for specially safeguarding the interest of the members belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes and ensuring reservation to persons belonging to such Castes, Tribes or Classes in the services under the Co- operative Societies, it is necessary to issue directions to any class of Co-operative Societies generally or to any Co-operative Society or Co- operative Societies in particular, it may issue directions from time to time and all such Co- opertaive Socities or the Co-operative Society concerned shall be bound to comply with such directions. (2) The State Government may modify or cancel any directions issued under sub-section (1) and in modifying or cancelling such directions may impose such conditions as it mat deem fit. (3) The State Government may by notification, delegate its powers under this section to the Registrar subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the notification. 17.2. He submits that the Registrar could appoint an Administrator under Section 30, for the reasons stated in Section 32(i) to (v), there is no restriction therein as regards who has to be appointed as an Administrator. 17.3. By relying on Section 28A(5), he submits that the Registrar or any other officer within whose jurisdiction the Society is situated and who is authorised by the Registrar shall be deemed to have assumed charge as an Administrator. Thus, he submits that the same can only be referred to an officer in Co-operative department and not an officer outside the Co- operative department since there would be several such officers, the reference of a Registrar can only mean the Registrar under whose jurisdiction the Society is situated. That would imply the JRCS under whose jurisdiction Kolar and Chikkaballapura districts are situated. 17.4. He again reiterates that an Administrator cannot be so senior as a Regional Commissioner. That would imply the JRCS under whose jurisdiction Kolar and Chikkaballapura districts are situated. 17.4. He again reiterates that an Administrator cannot be so senior as a Regional Commissioner. In the present case, since the Regional Commissioner cannot be controlled by the Registrar, who is much junior to him in the exercise of the powers by the Administrator. Thus, he submits that the powers have been exercised by the Government in a malafide manner. The Regional Commissioner, being superior to the Registrar, would exercise powers independently and not under the control of the Registrar, and therefore, he submits that the writ petitions are required to be allowed. 18. Heard Sri. M.R. Rajagopal, learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner in W.P.No.20877/2024, Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner in W.P.No.23569/2024, Smt. Prathima Honnapura, learned Additional Advocate General along with Sri. Yogesh D. Naik, for Respondents in both the matters and Smt. Rakshitha P. Singh, learned counsel for impleading applicant in I.A.No.2/2024 in W.P.No.23569/2024. Perused papers. 19. The points that would arise for the consideration of this Court are: 1. Can the State Government suggest and/or nominate any particular officer to be an Administrator, which is required to be followed and implemented by the Registrar? 2. Would the term ‘any other officer' in section 28A(5) mean only an officer of the Co- operative Department or an officer outside the Co-operative Department? 3. Can an officer senior in cadre to the Registrar be appointed as an Administrator, or can only a junior officer in cadre be appointed? 4. Whether the order of appointment of the Regional Commissioner as an Administrator is proper and correct? 5. What order? 20. I answer the above points as under. 21. Answer to Point No. 1: Can the State Government suggest and/or nominate any particular officer to be an Administrator, which is required to be followed and implemented by the Registrar? 21.1. The submission of Sri. M.R. Rajagopal, learned Senior counsel is that the Administrator in the present matter has not been appointed by the Registrar but has been appointed at the instruction of the State Government. Therefore, there is no application of mind on part of the Registrar. Any appointment of Administrator under Subsection (5) of Section 28A would have to be made by the Registrar by applying his own individual mind. Therefore, there is no application of mind on part of the Registrar. Any appointment of Administrator under Subsection (5) of Section 28A would have to be made by the Registrar by applying his own individual mind. The same not having been done, the appointment of the Administrator is required to be set aside. 21.2. The submission of Ms. Prathima Honnapura learned Additional Advocate General is that the term of the Board having expired, there is a requirement for the appointment of an Administrator under Subsection (5) of Section 28A and in that regard, she relies upon Subsection (3) of Section 2A to contend that the State Government may appoint such other officers with such designation as it deems fit to assist the Registrar. By relying on the phrase “the State Government may appoint”, she submits that the State Government has an inherent interest in the administration being carried out properly. The State Government, taking into consideration the innumerable litigations with respect to Respondent No.4- society, taking into consideration that this society functions from two districts, has thought it fit to recommend the Regional Commissioner to be appointed as the Administrator. The reason for the same being that a person of the capacity and calibre, as also the cadre of the Regional Commissioner, is one who can better handle the election and the disputes which have arisen therein, and it is for that reason that the recommendation has been made by the State Government to the Registrar to consider appointment of the Regional Commissioner as the Administrator which has been accepted by the Registrar and an appointment made of the Regional Commissioner as the Administrator under Subsection (5) of Section 28A. 21.3. It is this aspect as to whether the State Government can nominate or recommend any particular officer to be an Administrator which is required to be considered. The Petitioners contending that the Government has no such right or authority, whereas, the State Government contends that it has the right. 21.4. The other submission made by Sri. M.R.Rajagopal, learned Senior Counsel, is that there is malice on the part of the State inasmuch as there being an Administrator who had already been appointed. The said Administrator is proposed to be changed by the impugned order which would result in delay in election. Countering that, the submission of the Learned Additional Advocate General is that there would not be any delay. The said Administrator is proposed to be changed by the impugned order which would result in delay in election. Countering that, the submission of the Learned Additional Advocate General is that there would not be any delay. The calendar of events have already been issued in terms of directions passed by this Court as also in the contempt petition, the elections would be held as per the schedule fixed therein. 21.5. The submission of Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in certain other matters, is that in terms of Subsection (5) of Section 28A, it is the Registrar in whose jurisdiction society is situate who would be deemed to be the Administrator and only a formal order has to be passed by the Registrar. In so far as Respondent No.4 is concerned, the same coming under the jurisdiction of Respondent No.2-JRCS, he would be the Administrator in terms of Subsection (5) of Section 28A. Subsection (5) of Section 28A is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 28A - Management of co-operative societies vest in the Committee (5) If the new Committee is not constituted under section 29A, on the date of expiry of the term of office of the Committee, the Registrar or any other officer within whose jurisdiction the society is situated, and who is authorised by the Registrar, shall be deemed to have assumed charge as Administrator and he shall, for all purposes function as such Committee of management. The Administrator shall, subject to the control of the Registrar, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions of the Committee of the co-operative society or any office bearer of the co-operative society and take all such actions as may be required, in the interest of the co-operative society.[Provided that the Registrar shall appoint an administrator to a Co-operative Society or each of the co-operative Societies formed after amalgamation or reorganisation or division in accordance with section 14 for a period of three months and the administrator so appointed shall arrange for holding elections to a Committee of such Co-operative Society or Societies as the case may be. 21.6. 21.6. The reading of the above Sub-section would indicate that if a new Board is not constituted under Section 29A on the date of expiry of the term of the office of the board or if elections are not held within the time frame specified in Section 39A, then the Registrar or any other officer within whose jurisdiction society is situate and who is authorised by the Registrar shall be deemed to have assumed charge as Administrator and he shall for all purposes function as Board of Management. In the present case, it is not in dispute that a new Board has not been constituted under Section 29A, it is also not in dispute that the term of the Board has expired and elections have not been held within the time specified under Section 39A. 21.7. In those circumstances, Subsection (5)indicates that the Registrar or any other officer within whose jurisdiction society is situate and who is authorised by the Registrar shall be deemed to have assumed charge of the Administrator. Thus, there are two components for this: the Registrar or any other officer within whose jurisdiction society is situated, and such person to be authorised by the Registrar. 21.8. Though the submission of Sri.Jayakumar S.Patil is that it is the JRCS within whose jurisdiction respondent No.4 is situated who is deemed to be the Administrator. The usage of the words “Registrar or any other officer”, in the said Subsection (5) of Section 28A does not mandate that is only the Registrar, it could be any other officer. Registrar is defined under Subsection (i) of Section 2 which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 2(i) " Registrar " means a person appointed to perform the functions of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under this Act, and includes an Additional Registrar of Co-operative Societies, a Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, a Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies and an Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies appointed to assist the Registrar when exercising all or any of the powers of the Registrar; 21.9. A perusal of the above definition would indicate that a Registrar would mean a person appointed to perform the function of the Registrar of the co-operative societies under the Act and includes an Additional Registrar, a Joint Registrar, a Deputy Registrar, and an Assistant Registrar appointed to assist the Registrar. A perusal of the above definition would indicate that a Registrar would mean a person appointed to perform the function of the Registrar of the co-operative societies under the Act and includes an Additional Registrar, a Joint Registrar, a Deputy Registrar, and an Assistant Registrar appointed to assist the Registrar. Thus, the usage of the word ‘Registrar’ in Subsection (5) of Section 28A would include all the above as indicated under Subsection (I) of Section 2. If the contention of Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil that any other officer would mean the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies within whose jurisdiction the society is situated would render the usage of the words “any other officer” redundant, since as indicated supra, the word ‘Registrar’ would include JRCS in terms of Subsection (I) of Section 2. 21.10. In the above background, the disjunctive “or any other officer” would have to be read, complementing Subsection (I) of Section 2 of the KCS Act. 21.11. The second contention is that such a person would have to be authorised by the Registrar, that is to say, merely because the society is situate within the jurisdiction of the Registrar or any other officer such person would not automatically assume charge as Administrator just because the society is within his jurisdiction. For such an assumption of charge as administrator, there must be an authorisation by the Registrar; that is, without such authorisation by the Registrar no one can take charge as an Administrator. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the harmonious reading of the phrases “or any other officer” and “who is authorised by the Registrar” has to be given, and any other officer, therefore, cannot be said to be the JRCS, DRCS or ARCS, it could also be any other officer of the State Government. 21.12. Subsection (3) of Section 2A provides power to the State Government to appoint such other officers with such designation as it deems fit. Subsection (1), Subsection (2), Subsection (4), and Subsection (5) are all relating to the Registrar and officers of the co-operative department. Subsection (3), therefore, stands out as a standalone provision which empowers the State Government to appoint such other officers with such designation as it deems fit to assist the Registrar. 21.13. Subsection (1), Subsection (2), Subsection (4), and Subsection (5) are all relating to the Registrar and officers of the co-operative department. Subsection (3), therefore, stands out as a standalone provision which empowers the State Government to appoint such other officers with such designation as it deems fit to assist the Registrar. 21.13. It is in that background that the State Government being vested with an obligation to see that the affairs of the society are conducted properly, would also be vested with a discretion and right to recommend the appointment of such other person other than the Registrar in terms of Subsection (3) of Section 2A and it is that appointment which could be made either by the State Government directly or a recommendation could be made by a State Government to the Registrar for appointment. It is exercising such power that the State Government recommended that the Regional Commissioner be appointed as an Administrator. The Registrar, accepting the recommendation, appointed the Regional Commissioner as the Administrator of respond No. 4 society. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the decision in Gurudayal Singh's case (supra) relied upon by Sri. M.R. Rajagopal, learned Senior ounsel would not be applicable. Firstly, for the reason that there are no malafides which have been alleged against the Regional Commissioner, let alone established, secondly, the apprehension on part of Sri. M.R. Rajagopal that the election will be postponed is negated by the statement of the learned Additional Advocate General that the election will be held as per the calendar of events submitted before the Contempt Court. 21.14. The decision in Sanjay Nagaraj's case (supra)relied upon by Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil would also be of no assistance to the Petitioners inasmuch as under Subsection (3) of Section 2A, the State Government has the power to directly appoint such officer as may be required. Subsection (5) of Section 2A not only refers to the Registrar but “or any other officer within whose jurisdiction the society is situated”. The power of appointment under Subsection (3) of Section 2A read with the jurisdiction under Subsection (5) of Section 28A would indicate that any other person apart from the Registrar could also be appointed as an Administrator. 21.15. Though it is contended by Sri. The power of appointment under Subsection (3) of Section 2A read with the jurisdiction under Subsection (5) of Section 28A would indicate that any other person apart from the Registrar could also be appointed as an Administrator. 21.15. Though it is contended by Sri. Jayakumar S.Patil that there is no nexus in the appointment of Regional Commissioner, as could be seen from the flood of litigations relating to Respondent No.4-society, almost all aspects relating to Respondent No.4-society have been litigated by one party or the other. There have been several factions, the conduct of the election is on the face of the record a challenging task and it is for that reason that the State Government has probably thought it fit to appoint the Regional Commissioner. 21.16. In fact, all the directions which have been issued by this court in the earlier matters in W.P. No. 23677 of 2023 were issued to the State Co-operation Election Authority, Regional Commissioner, Bangalore division and the Apex Co-operative Society Election Officer. In WP 15653 of 2024 it had been issued to the State Co-operative Election Authority, Regional Commissioner Bangalore division and the Apex Co-operative Societies Election Officer and it is in furtherance thereof, that the Secretary, Co-operation Department by his letter dated 29.07.2024 recommended that the Regional Commissioner, Bangalore region be appointed as the Administrator. It is not that the Regional Commissioner has no nexus with Respondent No. 4-society or its election. In fact, it is under the jurisdiction of the Regional Commissioner that both Kolar and Chikkballapura lie, and therefore, the Regional Commissioner, being one of the top officers of the said region, has been identified by the State Government as an Administrator. I do not therefore, find any basis to accept the contention of Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil that the Regional Commissioner is not associated with or that the Regional Commissioner has no nexus to the election of Respondent No.4-society. 21.17. In my considered opinion, the Regional Commissioner, being the top functionary in the said region would have an obligation to ensure that the elections are conducted in a proper and required manner. It is not always that a junior officer can assist a senior officer, the form of assistance can be in several methods, manners and modes. 21.17. In my considered opinion, the Regional Commissioner, being the top functionary in the said region would have an obligation to ensure that the elections are conducted in a proper and required manner. It is not always that a junior officer can assist a senior officer, the form of assistance can be in several methods, manners and modes. Assistance does not in all cases mean by a sub-ordinate officer to a superior officer, a superior officer can also be assistance to a sub-ordinate officer when circumstances so demand it. In the present cases though the matter relates to elections of a federal Co- operative soceity, there is apparently no Co- operation amongst the members, which has resulted in large scale disputes over all kinds of matters. Fortunately our country being governed by the principles of Rule of Law, most of those disputes are agitated accordingly before the appropriate forum. 21.18. I’am therefore of the considered opinion that there being no allegations or malafides alleged against the Regional Commissioner who has been appointed, to the contra all the counsels having expressed their faith in him, there would be nothing wrong in the Regional Commissioner being of Assistance to the sub-ordinate Registrar of Co-operative societies for the purposes of conducting of a free, fair and transparent election in a democratic manner. 21.19. Hence, I answer point No.1 by holding that in terms of Subsection (3) of Section 2A, the State Government can suggest and or nominate any particular officer to be an Administrator so long as such officer by the nature of post held by him/her as on that date exercises jurisdiction over the area of operation of the co- operative society and if such a suggestion or recommendation is made by the State Government, the Registrar would have to consider the same positively and pass necessary orders by following and implementing such a request/suggestion/recomendation. 22. Answer to Point No. 2: Would the term ‘any other officer' in section 28A(5) mean only an officer of the Co-operative Department or an officer outside the Co-operative Department? 22.1. This aspect has been considered in detail in answer to point No. 1. 22. Answer to Point No. 2: Would the term ‘any other officer' in section 28A(5) mean only an officer of the Co-operative Department or an officer outside the Co-operative Department? 22.1. This aspect has been considered in detail in answer to point No. 1. As indicated above, any other officer mentioned in Subsection (5) of Section 28A would not only include an officer of the Co-operative department but would also include an officer outside the Co-operative department inasmuch as the Regional Commissioner within whose jurisdiction the society functions would also be any other officer within the meaning of Subsection (5) of Section28. 22.2. This court taking into consideration the manner in which the litigations have been filed can well appreciate the intention of the State Government to appoint a senior officer to be an Administrator for the limited purposes of conducting and completing the Electro process, the said senior officer being a Regional Commissioner coming within the definition of “any other officer” under Subsection (5) of Section 28. 22.3. As held by this court in Gadikeri milk Producers’ case (supra), it is the State Government's obligation and duty to monitor the financial condition of the DCC Bank, namely Respondent No.4-Society which should have an impact on the residents of Kolar and Chikkaballapura, apart from the State of Karnataka. In my opinion, the State Government has sought to discharge the obligation by appointing a high-ranking official, such as the Regional Commissioner as an Administrator. 22.4. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Airline Pilots Association’s case (supra) unless there are malafides which have been attributed and or there are personal allegations made against the officer in question which in the present case has not been made, the State Government would have to be given a long rope, full freedom and full liberty for safeguarding the interest of its citizens. Merely on the allegation that there is bias on part of the State Government without any allegation against the concerned officer and merely on the ground that the elections may be postponed, this Court is not required to intercede in the circumstances of appointment of the Regional Commissioner as the Administrator. 22.5. Merely on the allegation that there is bias on part of the State Government without any allegation against the concerned officer and merely on the ground that the elections may be postponed, this Court is not required to intercede in the circumstances of appointment of the Regional Commissioner as the Administrator. 22.5. As such I answer point No. 2 by holding that any other officer in Subsection (5) of Section 28A would not only mean an officer of the Co-operative Department but also an officer outside the Co-operative Department, subject however, to such officer having jurisdiction over the area of operation of the Co-operative Society. 23. Answer to Point No. 3: Can an officer senior in cadre to the Registrar be appointed as an Administrator, or can only a junior officer in cadre be appointed? And Answer to Point No. 4: Whether the order of appointment of the Regional Commissioner as an Administrator is proper and correct? 23.1. Much has been made out by Sri. M.R.Rajagopal, learned Senior Counsel and Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel as regards the ranking of the Regional Commissioner, to contend that the Regional Commissioner, being senior in cadre to Registrar, cannot be appointed as the Administrator. The Administrator has to be lower in cadre to the Registrar inasmuch as the Administrator shall be under the control of the Registrar. It is on that basis that it is contended that the Regional Commissioner cannot act under the control of the Registrar, as he is superior in rank. This submission will not hold this Court much longer inasmuch as the Regional Commissioner has jurisdiction over both Kolar and Chikkaballapura, where the society functions. 23.2. The decision relied upon by both Sri. M.R.Rajagopal and Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil in Airline Pilots Association's case (supra) to contend that the Registrar could not have acted under the instruction of a superior authority and further that a superior authority cannot be appointed as Administrator is negatived by the dicta laid down in the very same decision in para 31 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that public authority must be given a long rope, full freedom and full liberty and thus, the decision in Airline Pilots Association would enure to the benefit of the Society and to the petitioners. 23.3. 23.3. What is required is for the Administrator to discharge his duties effectively and for the elections to be conducted in a proper manner. There being no allegation against the proposed Administrator, the Administrator being a senior ranking IAS officer holding a post of Regional Commissioner having jurisdiction over both Kolar and Chikkaballapura, merely because the usage of the words “subject to the control of the registrar” is used under Subsection (5) of Section 28A would not mean that the Administrator would always be under control of the Registrar. The duties of the Administrator are clear enough for the Administrator to discharge. In the present case, the State Government being of the considered opinion that the Regional Commissioner would be a fit person to be appointed as Administrator and has done so, the Administrator would have to discharge his duties in terms of the KCS Act 1959 and the KCS Rules 1960, which is what the Registrar would have to do. Thus, both the Registrar and the Regional Commissioner being bound by the KCS Act, 1959 and KCS Rules 1960, all the actions of the Administrator being required to be taken in terms of the above, it cannot be said that the Regional Commissioner would have to be under the control of the Registrar, both the Regional Commissioner and the Registrar being under the control of the Act and Rules. In my opinion, the Regional Commissioner and all other officers involved in the electoral process would have to act as a team to ensure the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections. 23.4. Thus, I answer point Nos.3 and 4 by holding that an officer, senior in rank or cadre to the Registrar can be appointed as an Administrator, so long as such officer exercises jurisdiction over the area of operation of the society. In the present case, the appointment of a Regional Commissioner as an Administrator in terms of Subsection (5) of Section 28A of KCS Act, is proper and correct and cannot be faulted with. 24. Answer to Point No. 5: What Order? 24.1. In view of my answers to Point Nos. 1 to 4, I pass the following; ORDER i. Writ Petition Nos. 20877/2024 and 23569/2025 are dismissed. ii. 24. Answer to Point No. 5: What Order? 24.1. In view of my answers to Point Nos. 1 to 4, I pass the following; ORDER i. Writ Petition Nos. 20877/2024 and 23569/2025 are dismissed. ii. The Administrator is directed to conduct the elections as expeditiously as possible in terms of the calendar of events filed before the contempt court and ensure that the election is carried out and conducted in a free, fair, transparent, lawful and peaceful manner.