JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing FIR no. 47 of 2019, dated 03.04.2019, registered in Police Station Gagret, Una, H.P and criminal proceedings arising out of it. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police asserting that the present petitioner was posted as Bank Manager in Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Branch Office at DaulatpurChowk, District Una. He told the informant to take a loan to purchase a truck for Rs.17,90,000/-. The informant mortgaged his land and paid the margin money to purchase the truck. The petitioner, in connivance with Ravi Kumar Jaswal and Lalit Jaswal, obtained the signatures of the informant on various documents. The petitioner was not taken to any showroom. The amount of the truck loan was transferred to the accounts of Lalit and Ravi. Rs.4,08,000/- deposited in the informant’s account was also withdrawn. The informant got no truck, and his land was also mortgaged. The petitioner and co-accused threatened the informant that he and his family members would be killed in case the matter was reported to any person. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. It was found after the investigation that Lalit Jaswal had prepared a forged quotation in connivance with Ravi Kumar. The petitioner sanctioned the loan on the forged quotation. A bank draft of Rs.17,90,000/- was sent to M/s Khalsa Enterprises Jalandhar Road Hoshiarpur, and there was no agency in the name of M/s Khalsa Enterprises Jalandhar Road Hoshiarpur. Admitted and specimen handwriting of Lalit Jaswal and Ravi Jaswal were taken. As per the report of RFSL, the signatures and handwriting of Lalit Jaswal matched the forged quotation. The handwriting of Ravi Kumar matched with the voucher. The loan was transferred to Sukhwinder Singh, who withdrew the amount. His specimen signatures matched the signatures on the vouchers. The petitioner did not verify whether any such agency existed or not; hence, the charge sheet was filed before the Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC. 3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the FIR, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the informant reached the Bank along with Ravi Kumar and Lalit Jaswal to avail the term loan facility. 3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the FIR, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the informant reached the Bank along with Ravi Kumar and Lalit Jaswal to avail the term loan facility. He opened a Saving Bank Account and a loan account in the bank. He executed a mortgage deed in favour of the Bank to avail the loan of Rs.13,90,000/-. He also produced a proforma invoice for getting the loan. The petitioner found all the documents in order and sanctioned the loan of Rs.13,90,000/-. The informant paid margin money of Rs.4,00,000/-. The amount of Rs.17,90,000/- was transferred to M/s Khalsa Enterprises, payable at Axis Bank, Shimla, for the purchase of the vehicle. Khalsa Enterprises issued a sale certificate showing the delivery of the vehicle to Kewal Krishan-informant. The informant handed over a temporary registration certificate to the Bank. He failed to produce the permanent registration number and insurance certificate. He failed to pay the loan instalments. The bank issued a letter asking him to deposit the amount. The informant lodged the FIR as a counterblast to the demand raised by the Bank. The complainant is an educated person. He had signed all the documents after reading them. The allegations in the FIR are false. He had voluntarily executed all the documents in favour of the Bank. The petitioner cannot be held liable for the forged invoice produced by the informant. The informant caused a loss to the Bank and filed a false complaint to avoid his liability. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by the respondents making preliminary submissions regarding lack of locus standi and the petitioner having concealed the material facts from the Court. It was asserted that the investigating agency conducted the investigation fairly, impartially and as per the law. It was found after the investigation that Lalit Jaswal and the co- accused had forged a quotation of the commercial vehicle, and they induced the informant to execute a mortgage deed. The petitioner sanctioned the loan in connivance with the other co-accused without verifying the genuineness of the invoice produced before him. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the competent court is seized the matter. The petitioner has the efficacious remedy of submitting his version before the learned Trial Court. The petitioner sanctioned the loan in connivance with the other co-accused without verifying the genuineness of the invoice produced before him. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the competent court is seized the matter. The petitioner has the efficacious remedy of submitting his version before the learned Trial Court. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have heard Mr. Vivek Singh Attri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 6. Mr Vivek Singh Attri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the FIR was lodged on the false facts. The informant himself had produced the forged documents, and he cheated the Bank and the petitioner. The petitioner was not supposed to verify the correctness of the documents submitted by the petitioner. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognisable offence. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 7. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 and 2/State submitted that the petitioner in connivance with the other co-accused had sanctioned the loan based on the forged document. The vehicle was never purchased and Sukhjinder Singh appropriated the money transferred to his account, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceeding can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. The status report clearly mentions that the forged invoice was used to sanction the loan. The petitioner asserted that the invoice was forged by the informant in connivance with Lalit and Ravi, whereas the prosecution has asserted that this was forged by Lalit and Ravi in connivance with the petitioner. These facts are to be verified by conducting a trial, and it is impermissible for this Court to determine the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations made by either party. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot conduct an inquiry to determine the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. It was observed: “13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot conduct an inquiry to determine the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. It was observed: “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court in a series of judgments has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) “6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 14. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 15. The petitioner was posted as a Bank Manager. He issued the Bank draft in favour of the Khalsa Enterprises. The status report shows that no such agency existed. Therefore, the issuance of the Bank draft in the name of a non-existing agency prima facie shows the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. 16. 15. The petitioner was posted as a Bank Manager. He issued the Bank draft in favour of the Khalsa Enterprises. The status report shows that no such agency existed. Therefore, the issuance of the Bank draft in the name of a non-existing agency prima facie shows the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. 16. A heavy reliance was placed upon the photocopies of the letters stated to have been written by the petitioner to the informant asking him to deposit the insurance certificate and the permanent registration certificate. The authenticity of these documents is yet to be verified and it is premature for this Court to say anything about these documents. It will be open for the petitioner to produce these documents before the learned Trial Court, which would be within the jurisdiction to comment on their authenticity and reliability. 17. Reliance was also placed upon the statements of the accounts, wherein some amount is stated to have been deposited by the informant. Again, these are photocopies, and their authenticity cannot be commented upon. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 18. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018 , that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018 , that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.” 19. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP , and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 20. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 20. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” 21. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 22. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: “63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into these documents. 24. No other point was urged. 25. Therefore, the allegations in the FIR constitute a commission of a cognisable offence, and the same cannot be quashed in the exercise of the inherent powers of this Court; consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 26. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no effect on the merits of the case.