JUDGMENT : Sushil Kukreja, J. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State under Section 419 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) against judgment, dated 12.04.2024, passed by learned Special Judge, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P., in Criminal Case No. 21-N/7 of 2015, whereby, the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act (for short ‘NDPS Act’). 2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the prosecution story, can be summarized as under: 2(a). On 18.05.2015, a police team was on patrolling and traffic checking duty towards Paonta Sahib-Yamuna Nagar road and was checking the vehicles near Behral School and around 04:25 p.m. a motorcycle (applied for) came from Satiwala side, which was stopped for checking. Two persons were travelling on the said motorcycle and they disclosed their names as Ashok Kumar and Paramjit. Police checked the documents of the aforesaid motorcycle. Thereafter, around 04:30 p.m., accused (Firoz Khan) came on motorcycle, bearing Registration No. HP- 17C-3826, from Behral side and he was stopped. On being asked about the documents of the vehicle, he said that he was a local person and tried to move away from that place. The police suspected that he might be carrying some contraband and when the police inquired about the name and parentage of the accused, he tried to conceal a green bag, which was kept by him in between his legs near the fuel tank of the motorcycle. Police checked said bag in presence of Paramjit Singh and Ashok Kumar and other police officials and it was found containing another bag stuffed with some brown powdered substance. The said substance, on checking, was found to be churapost. On weighment, the recovered contraband alongwith the bag was found to be 2 kgs. Thereafter, the police completed all the codal formalities, i.e., the contraband was taken into possession and sealed in a cloth parcel, photographs were clicked, statements of the witnesses were recorded, spot map was prepared, motorcycle bearing Registration No. HP-17C-3826 was taken into possession and NCB form, in triplicate, was filled in. Ruka was prepared and sent to the police station, whereupon FIR was registered and the accused was arrested. Ruka was prepared and sent to the police station, whereupon FIR was registered and the accused was arrested. After completion of the investigation, police presented the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court against the accused for commission of the offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS Act. 3. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined fourteen witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was also recorded, wherein, he claimed innocence and denied the prosecution case, however, he did not lead any evidence in defence. 4. The learned Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 12.04.2024 acquitted the accused for commission of the offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS Act, hence, the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State. 5. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State contended that the impugned judgment is against the law and facts, based upon mis-appreciation of evidence, which ultimately resulted into miscarriage of justice, as such the same is liable to be set-aside. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has appreciated the evidence in a slip-shod and perfunctory manner and the impugned judgment is based on hypothetical reasoning, surmises and conjectures. Lastly, he submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be quashed and set-aside by allowing the instant appeal and the accused be convicted. 6. Conversely, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/accused contended that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is the result of proper appreciation of the material on record and the same was passed after appreciating the evidence and law in its right and true perspective. She has further contended that there was nothing against the accused and the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is a well-reasoned judgment, which does not require any interference, thus the instant appeal, which sans merits, be dismissed. 7. We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/accused, and carefully examined the entire records. 8. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. 8. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proven guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the learned trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court. 9. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another vs. State of Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730 , which reads as under: "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , observed as under: “31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352 ] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse; (a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v.Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99 ] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445 ] 31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice; (a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502 ] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v.Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ].” 11. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under: “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under: “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the learned Trial Court. 13. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as many as fourteen witnesses, however, its case mainly rests upon the statements of PW-1 SI Nokh Ram, PW-2 Ashok Kumar, PW-3 Paramjit Singh, PW-13 ASI Mohar Singh and PW-14 HC Nav Raj. Out of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses PWs 2 and 3, who are independent witnesses, have turned hostile. 14. PW-1 SI Nokh Ram, deposed that on 18.05.2015, around 03:00 p.m., he alongwith ASI Mohar Singh, HC Dharam Singh, HHC Sewa Singh, HHC Sukhbir Singh and Constable Nav Raj was on patrolling and traffic checking duty in official vehicle, which was being driven by Constable Tapender, towards Behral School near Paonta Sahib-Yamnuna Nagar road. Around 04:00 p.m., he had challaned two motorcycles and one more at 04:00- 04:15 p.m. He further stated that around 04:30 p.m., ASI Mohar Singh stopped a motorcycle, bearing Registration No. HP-17C- 3826. The motorcyclist had kept a bag on the fuel tank between his legs. Around 04:00 p.m., he had challaned two motorcycles and one more at 04:00- 04:15 p.m. He further stated that around 04:30 p.m., ASI Mohar Singh stopped a motorcycle, bearing Registration No. HP-17C- 3826. The motorcyclist had kept a bag on the fuel tank between his legs. As per version of this witness, ASI Mohar Singh had also stopped another motorcycle, which was applied for, whereupon two persons were sitting who disclosed their names as Ashok Kumar (rider) and Paramjit Singh (pillion rider). He also stated that in presence of Ashok Kumar and Paramjit Singh, ASI Mohar Singh checked the carry-bag which was being kept by the accused between his legs on the fuel tank and it was found containing some substance, which was found to be churapost (poppy-husk). Thereafter, ASI Mohar Singh sent Constable Nav Raj for bringing weighing scale, who brought the same and in presence of the aforesaid witnesses, the recovered contraband was weighed, which was found to be 2 kgs. 15. PW-2, Ashok Kumar, one of the independent witnesses, did not support the prosecution case and he was declared hostile. He was cross-examined at length by the learned Public Prosecutor, but nothing fruitful was elicited from him. This witness, in his cross-examination, deposed that on 18.05.2015, he alongwith Paramjit went towards Satiwala from Behral upon a motorcycle and around 04:25 p.m. at Behral, Police stopped them. He has further stated that at that relevant time, motorcycle bearing Registration No.HP-17C-3826, came from Behral side and it was also stopped for checking. As per this witness, when they were standing at the spot, Police associated them in the police investigation by explaining the proceedings of the investigation. This witness denied that in their presence, Investigating Officer inquired about the name and address of the motorcyclist i.e. HP- 17C-3826, who disclosed his name as Firoz Khan. He also denied that Investigating Officer inquired about the carry-bag which was being kept by the motorcyclist (accused) between his legs on the fuel tank and he was unable to answer. This witness denied the checking of the carry-bag and recovery of any substance from the accused. 16. PW3, Paramjit Singh, another independent witness, also did not support the prosecution case and he was also declared hostile. This witness was cross-examined at length by the learned Public Prosecutor, but nothing fruitful was elicited from him. This witness denied the checking of the carry-bag and recovery of any substance from the accused. 16. PW3, Paramjit Singh, another independent witness, also did not support the prosecution case and he was also declared hostile. This witness was cross-examined at length by the learned Public Prosecutor, but nothing fruitful was elicited from him. In his cross-examination by the defence counsel, he deposed that accused had not come at Batapul Chowk on his motorcycle in his presence. He stated that he was not present at Behral Village around 03:00 to 04:00 p.m. and no search of accused was conducted in his presence. He also deposed that no churapost (poppy-husk) was recovered in his presence from the accused. 17. PW-4, HASI Sukhbir Singh, No.294, deposed that on 18.05.2015, he along with ASI Mohar Singh, ASI Nokh Ram, HC Dharam Singh, HHC Sewa Singh and Constable Nav Raj was on patrolling and traffic checking duty towards Paonta Sahib-Yamuna Nagar road, near Behral School, in their official vehicle, which was being driven by Constable Tapender Singh. He further stated that ASI Nokh Ram started challaning the vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act and a motorcycle (applied for) came from Behral towards Paonta Sahib and it was stopped by ASI Nokh Ram. On the aforesaid motorcycle, two persons were sitting and they disclosed their names as Ashok Kumar (rider) and Paramjit (pillion rider). In the interregnum, another motorcycle bearing Registration No. HP-17C-3826 came from Satiwala towards Batapul side, Paonta Sahib and it was stopped for checking by ASI Mohar Singh. This witness has further stated that ASI Mohar Singh inquired the name from the rider of the motorcycle upon which he told that he was a local resident and tried to leave the spot but he was again stopped by ASI Mohar Singh. Upon inquiry, the rider of the motorcycle disclosed his name as Firoz Khan (accused). He also stated that ASI Mohar Singh saw a green Thaili (carry-bag) which was lying between the legs of the rider of the motorcycle near the fuel tank and the same was checked by ASI Mohar Singh in presence of the witnesses and it was found containing another dusty bag (mutmaili thaili), which was found to be stuffed with a substance in the form of wheat flour, which was churapost (poppy- husk). Thereafter, Constable Nav Raj was sent by ASI Mohar Singh to bring weighing scale, who brought the same, and the recovered contraband, on weighment was found to be 2 kgs. 18. PW-13, SI Mohar Singh, Investigating Officer deposed that on 18.05.2015 at around 03:00 p.m., he along with ASI Nokh Ram, HHC Sukhbir, HC Dharam Singh, Constable Navraj, HHC Sewa Singh, proceeded from Police Station for patrolling and traffic checking towards Paonta Sahib-Yamuna Nagar road in government vehicle, bearing registration No. HP-17C-1222, which was being driven by driver Tapender Singh, He further deposed that they were present near Behral School and were checking the vehicles and around 04:25 p.m. an applied for motorcycle came from Satiwala side and two persons were travelling on it. He also deposed that the aforesaid motorcycle was stopped for checking and the rider disclosed his name as Ashok Kumar and other person disclosed his name as Paramjeet. At about 04:30 p.m. another motorcycle, bearing registration No. HP-17C-3826, came from Behral side and HHC Sukhbir Singh stopped it and the driver of the said motorcycle disclosed his name as Firoz Khan (accused herein) and he tried to conceal a green bag, which he was carrying between his legs on the petrol tank of the motorcycle. As per this witness, the said bag was checked in presence of Paramjit Singh and Ashok Kumar on the spot and constable Navraj was directed to click photographs from his mobile phone. On being checked, the aforesaid green bag was found containing another matmaila bag, which contained some brown powdered substance. The said substance was found to be chura post and on weighment it was found to be 2 kgs. 19. We have meticulously scrutinized the entire evidence and upon close scrutiny thereof, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond the scope of reasonable doubt. 20. It is well settled that the conviction can be based upon the testimony of the police officials, provided that such testimony is reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring. The evidence of police witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved, merely on account of their official status. The testimony of official witnesses, including police officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The evidence of police witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved, merely on account of their official status. The testimony of official witnesses, including police officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that Courts have to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. In Pramod Kumar Versus State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 588, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the Court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinizing the evidence, the Court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the Court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. Para-13 of the judgment reads as under:- “13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large show their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence.” 21. Similarly, in Baldev Singh Versus State of Haryana, (2015) 17 Supreme Court Cases 554, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Similarly, in Baldev Singh Versus State of Haryana, (2015) 17 Supreme Court Cases 554, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. However, prudence requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “10. There is no legal proposition that evidence of police officials unless supported by independent evidence is unworthy of acceptance. Evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Prudence however requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. Mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness.” 22. In Surinder Kumar Versus State of Punjab, (2020) 2 Supreme Court Cases 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. Para-16 of judgment reads as under:- “16. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Sunil it was held as under (SCC p.655): “It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature”. 23. In Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557 , it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that non- association of the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinize the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. 23. In Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557 , it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that non- association of the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinize the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed as under:- "19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution case. [Kalpnath Rai vs. State, (1998) AIR SC 201] However, such omissions cast an added duty on Courts to adopt a greater degree of care while scrutinising the testimonies of the police officers, which if found reliable can form the basis of a successful conviction." 24. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the testimony of police witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non-corroboration by independent witnesses, however such testimony needs to be carefully scrutinized. The same must inspire confidence and should be consistent with the case set up by the prosecution. In case there are material contradictions, which goes to the root of the case and make the prosecution case highly doubtful, then this Court would obviously be circumspect while placing reliance on such testimony. 25. Now, applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case on hand. The case of the prosecution is that 2 kgs of poppy-husk was recovered by the Police from the accused in presence of two independent witnesses, i.e. Ashok Kumar and Paramjit. However, both the aforesaid independent witnesses did not support the prosecution case and they have turned hostile. They were subjected to cross-examination by the learned Public Prosecutor, however, nothing favourable could be elicited from their exhaustive cross-examination. Both of them had denied the recovery of any contraband from the accused. Both of them claimed that they were standing/passing-by Batapul, when the police called them and took their signatures and they have not witnessed any recovery from the accused. As per the story of the prosecution, the Investigating Officer had sent Constable Nav Raj (PW-14) to bring weighing scale and weights, who brought the same from the shop of Charan Singh (PW-6). However, while appearing in the witness-box as PW-6, the aforesaid Charan Singh, did not support the prosecution case and had turned hostile. As per the story of the prosecution, the Investigating Officer had sent Constable Nav Raj (PW-14) to bring weighing scale and weights, who brought the same from the shop of Charan Singh (PW-6). However, while appearing in the witness-box as PW-6, the aforesaid Charan Singh, did not support the prosecution case and had turned hostile. In cross-examination by the learned Public Prosecutor, he specifically denied that on 18.05.2015, at about 04:50 p.m., Constable Nav Raj came to his shop to take weighing scale and weights. He further denied that he gave weighing scale and weights of 2 kg, 1 kg, 500 grams, 200 grams, 100 grams and 50 grams to him. Hence, in view of the material discrepancies, contradictions and inconsistencies in the case of the prosecution, the statements of the police/official witnesses cannot be believed. 26. Another ground on which the learned Trial Court has acquitted that accused is that the contraband allegedly seized from the accused was never produced before the Magistrate. The perusal of the record reveals that the case property, in the instant case, was never produced before the concerned Magistrate for certification of inventory as provided under Section 52A of the NDPS Act. For ready reference Section 52A of the NDPS Act is extracted hereunder:- “[52A. Disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.-- 2 (1) The Central Government may, having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution, constraint of proper storage space or any other relevant consideration, in respect of any narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify such narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyance or class of narcotic drugs, class of psychotropic substances, class of controlled substances or conveyances, which shall, as soon as may be after their seizure, be disposed of by such officer and in such manner as that Government may, from time to time, determine after following the procedure hereinafter specified. (2) Where any 3 [narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances] has been seized and forwarded to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station or to the officer empowered under section 53, the officer referred to in sub-section (1) shall prepare an inventory of such 3 [narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances] containing such details relating to their description, quality, quantity, mode of packing, marks, numbers or such other identifying particulars of the 3 [narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances] or conveyances or the packing in which they are packed, country of origin and other particulars as the officer referred to in sub-section (1) may consider relevant to the identity of the 3 [narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances] in any proceedings under this Act and make an application, to any Magistrate for the purpose of-- (a) certifying the correctness of the inventory so prepared; or (b) taking, in the presence of such magistrate, photographs of 4 [such drugs, substances or conveyances] and certifying such photographs as true; or (c) allowing to draw representative samples of such drugs or substances, in the presence of such magistrate and certifying the correctness of any list of samples so drawn. (3) Where an application is made under sub-section (2), the Magistrate shall, as soon as may be, allow the application. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1972) or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every court trying an offence under this Act, shall treat the inventory, the photographs of 5 [narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances] and any list of samples drawn under sub-section (2) and certified by the Magistrate, as primary evidence in respect of such offence.” 27. Thus, Section 52-A of the NDPS Act mandates the procedure for disposal of seized Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance and Section 52-A(4) of the NDPS Act lays down that every Court trying an offence under the Act shall treat the inventory, the photographs (Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance, Control Substance or conveyances) and any list of samples drawn under Sub-Section(2) and certified by the Magistrate as primary evidence in respect of such offence. Section 52-A(2) of NDPS Act lays down interalia for any Magistrate to certify the correctness of the inventory so prepared; or certifying the photographs of such Drugs or substances taken in his presence as true; or certifying the correctness of any list of samples so drawn in his presence. 28. In the instant case, there is absolute non-compliance of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act, as the Investigating Officer has failed to adopt the procedure as prescribed by the statute, which creates a serious doubt about the entire story of the prosecution. The prosecution has failed to bring any evidence to show any inventory or photographs taken by it, so also no Magistrate has certified any photographs or inventory so prepared or list of samples so drawn which is the mandate of compliance of Sec. 52- A of the NDPS Act. Therefore, non-compliance of Section 52A of the Act renders the entire prosecution case vitiated. 29. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no interference in the judgment of acquittal dated 12.04.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P., in Criminal Case No. 21-N/7 of 2015 is required, as the same is result of proper appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.