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2025 DIGILAW 512 (HP)

Sad Mohammad v. State of H. P

2025-03-26

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the order dated03.12.2022 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, vide which, the appeal filed by the petitioner (respondent before learned Trial Court) was dismissed as having become infructuous. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that Desh Raj, Range Forest OfÏcer, Rattan Lal, Block OfÏcer and Onkar Mishra, Forest Guard, found a truck bearingregistration No. HP-19B-4409, covered with tarpaulin, parked near Hanuman Mandir Nagrota Bagwan on National Highway-154 on 27.6.2019. The driver was sitting in the truck. Santosh Kumar and Raj Kumar were found standing near the truck. The driver revealed his name as Sad Mohammad. Four hundred twenty-four (424) resin tins were found loaded in the truck. The police also reached the spot. Since no permit regarding the transportation of the resin could be produced, FIR No.112/19 was registered against Sad Mohammad for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 of IPC and Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act. 3. Sad Mohammad subsequently applied to release the truck. This application was dismissed by the Authorized OfÏcer vide order dated 10.01.2020. 4. Being aggrieved from the order, the owner filed an appeal, which was assigned to learned Additional Sessions Judge- III, Kangra, at Dharamshala, District Kangra (learned Appellate Court). The appeal came for hearing on 03.12.2022, and it was found that the Authorised OfÏcer had decided the main petition on 28.02.2022; hence, the appeal was dismissed as having become infructuous. 5. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the learned Appellate Court, the present revision has been filed asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in dismissing the appeal. There was no complaint of theft by the owner or anybody. The proceedings under Section 52A of Indian Forest Act could not have been initiated. Learned Appellate Court erred in not examining the final order, therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 6. I have heard Mr. N.K. Thakur learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr Karan Veer Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 7. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in dismissing the appeal. 6. I have heard Mr. N.K. Thakur learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr Karan Veer Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 7. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in dismissing the appeal. The appeal was filed against the interim order and when it came to the notice of learned First Appellate Court that the main matter had been decided, the main matter should have been examined, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgment/order passed by learned Appellate Court be set aside. 8. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the learned Appellate Court had rightly dismissed the appeal as having become infructuous. Once, it was found that the final order was passed in the main appeal, the appeal had become infructuous and there was no question of examining the merits of the main case. The main order was not assailed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge and he had no jurisdiction to decide the validity of the main order; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. It is not disputed that the petitioner had only assailed the interim order before the learned Appellate Court, and there was no challenge to the main order. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Chandra Agarwal v. U.P. Financial Corpn. (2009) 11 SCC 479 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 881 , that all the interim orders merge into the final order and the interim orders cease to exist after passing of the final order. An appeal against an interim order becomes infructuous after the passing of the main order. It was observed at page 479: “3. It is a well-settled principle that once a final order is passed, all the earlier interim orders merge into the final order, and the interim orders cease to exist. In this appeal, since the final order has been passed by the High Court, obviously, all the interim orders passed by the High Court in the same writ petition cease to exist automatically. Consequently, any direction given in the interim order dated 24-4-2008 also ceases to exist. In this appeal, since the final order has been passed by the High Court, obviously, all the interim orders passed by the High Court in the same writ petition cease to exist automatically. Consequently, any direction given in the interim order dated 24-4-2008 also ceases to exist. In view of the final order passed by the High Court, the impugned interim order and any direction therein have ceased to exist. The appeal has become infructuous and is, accordingly, dismissed.” 11. No judgment to the contrary was brought to the notice of this Court. In the present case, the appeal against the interim order had become infructuous after the passing of the main order, and the learned Appellate Court had rightly dismissed the appeal as having become infructuous. 12. It was submitted that the learned Appellate Court should have examined the merits of the final order. This was not permissible. There was no challenge to the final order. No provision was brought to the notice of this Court, which provides that a criminal appeal filed against an interim order can be amended to challenge the final order; therefore, the learned Appellate Court could not have exercised this jurisdiction. 13. Consequently, there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Appellate Court; hence, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, it is expressly made clear that this order will not prevent the petitioner from challenging the main order if otherwise permissible as per the law. 14. The revision petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.