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2025 DIGILAW 515 (GAU)

Fakar Uddin @ Md. Fokar Uddin, S/o. Lt Mahammad Ali v. Union of India, Rep. By The Secy. To The Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs

2025-03-24

KALYAN RAI SURANA, MALASRI NANDI

body2025
ORDER : (K.R. Surana, J.) Heard Mr. J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. J. Sarmah, learned CGC, Mr. M. Islam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. A.I. Ali, learned standing counsel for the ECI, Mr. G. Sarma, learned standing counsel for the FT matters, Mr. P. Sarmah, learned Additional Senior Govt.Advocate and Mr. R. Talukdar, learned Govt. Advocate for the State. 2. By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the impugned opinion dated 11.06.2018, passed by the nd learned Member, Foreigner’s Tribunal 2 , Morigaon, Assam in Case No. F.T. 06/17, arising out of Police Reference F.T. Case No. 12/2017, dated 18.02.2017 by which the petitioner was declared as an illegal migrant. 3. On being served with a notice of the proceedings, the petitioner had appeared before the learned Tribunal and filed his written statement on 17.04.2018, wherein it was stated that the case registered against the petitioner was false and baseless and there was no doubt that the petitioner had illegally entered in India without any valid documents and it was stated that the case was registered without examining any document and without any proper investigation. The petitioner had specifically denied every statement made in the report against him. The petitioner had stated that he is an Indian citizen and was born at Lelaibori village under Laharighat Police Station in the District of Morigaon and his name was enrolled in the electoral roll of 2005 and thereafter, he has been casting his vote till date. He had stated that before that, his father was residing at Village Goraimari under Laharighat Police Station and as the said village was eroded by the river Brahmaputra, his father started to permanently reside in the present Lelaibori village and that the name of his father was enrolled in the electoral roll of 1966 and 1970 and he has Gaonbura certificate issue by the local Gaonbura. 4. The petitioner claimed that he had sufficient document to prove his Indian nationality and accordingly, he had prayed to exonerate him from the proceedings. 4. The petitioner claimed that he had sufficient document to prove his Indian nationality and accordingly, he had prayed to exonerate him from the proceedings. The examination in chief of the petitioner was recorded in note by the learned Tribunal on 14.05.2018, wherein he had reiterated that he was born in village Lelaibori under Laharighat Police Station and he had taken his education in Lelaibori L.P School and studied High School at Goroimari High School. His father’s name was Md. Ali (deceased) and name of his deceased grandfather was Late Sahed Ali. He had stated that his father cast his vote in the year 1966 and continuing to cast his vote till his death in the year 2013. He had stated in the name of his mother is Sultun Nessa. He had cast his vote for the first time in the year 2005 and he was exercising his franchise till then he was a citizen of India by birth. He had exhibited 6 documents in support of his bail, viz., (i) Voter list of 1966 in the name of my father and grandfather (Ext.1), (ii) Copy of my voter ID card (Ext.2), (iii) Certificate issued by Gaon Bura (Ext.3), (iv) School certificate of Garaimari High School issued by the Head Master on 14-11-18 (Ext.4), (v) Domicile certificate issued by Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Morigaon on 12-6-18 (Ext.5) and (vi) Medical certificate of death of Mohamad Ali dated 30-4-13 (Ext.6) 5. It would be relevant to mention here that responding to the Court query, the petitioner had stated before the learned Tribunal that he was born on 02.04.1988 and that he had not submitted his birth certificate or any land documents of his parents and grandparents prior to 1966. He had not submitted any voter list of his father after 1966 and prior to his death and he had not obtain any death certificate of his father from the authorities under the Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969. He has 4(four) brothers and 2(two) sisters. His mother was alive and he has not submitted any voter list of his mother. 6. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Tribunal had rejected the evidence of the petitioner in a mechanical manner. He has 4(four) brothers and 2(two) sisters. His mother was alive and he has not submitted any voter list of his mother. 6. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Tribunal had rejected the evidence of the petitioner in a mechanical manner. Moreover, it was submitted that the petitioner could not collect many documents like electoral roll of 1970 and 2018 at the relevant time, for which proper pleading could not be made before the learned Foreigners Tribunal. It was further submitted that the petitioner had exhibited the electoral roll of 1966, which established that his grandfather, namely, Sahedali and grandmother, namely, Halemon Nessa were voters and thus, their presence in India was established prior to 01.01.1966. It was submitted that even if it is assumed that the 1966 electoral roll was prepared after 01.01.1966, it would make the petitioner a foreigner who has illegally entered into Assam after 01.01.1966 but before 25.03.1971, which would entitle him to be registered with the jurisdictional FRRO (Foreigner Regional Registration Office). It was also submitted that the mother of the petitioner was bedridden and she had died on 30.05.2018 due to prolonged illness for which she could not be examined before the learned Tribunal. However, the learned Tribunal suspected the petitioner to be a foreign national as the petitioner did not examine her as witness. 7. It was submitted that though there may be absence of pleadings, but the contents of the documentary exhibits like electoral roll of 1966 and 1970 established the presence of the father and grandfather in Assam. The subsequent electoral rolls, if allowed to be proved would also establish continuous stay of the petitioner’s grandfather, father and his own stay in India since 01.01.1966. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was not furnished with the police verification report and thus, this was a case where the grounds of suspecting the petitioner to be a foreigner was not furnished to the petitioner, which had vitiated the entire proceeding. It was submitted that without being informed about the basis to allege the petitioner to be a foreigner, a proper defence could not be taken by the petitioner. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the case of Md. It was submitted that without being informed about the basis to allege the petitioner to be a foreigner, a proper defence could not be taken by the petitioner. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the case of Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim v. The State of Assam & Ors., (2024) 0 Supreme(SC) 575: AIR 2024 SC 3551 . 9. It was submitted that during the pendency of this writ petition, the petitioner has procured several other documents which would show that his name appears in the electoral roll of 2005, 2013 and 2019 and that his father’s name appeared in the electoral roll of 1975. It was submitted that the said documents have been annexed to the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner on 05.03.2025. Accordingly, by relying on the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Haidar Ali v. Union of India & Ors., 2021 (3) GLT 85, it was submitted that matter be remanded back to the learned Foreigners Tribunal so as to give one opportunity to the petitioner to prove the said documents in the manner envisaged under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the CPC, which would establish that he was an Indian national. In this regard, it was submitted that the petitioner is entitled to a further reasonable opportunity to produce additional evidence in support of his defence. 10. Per contra, the learned standing counsel for the FT matters has submitted that on facts the present case was distinguishable with the facts of the two cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was submitted that when the case of Haidar Ali (supra) was decided the earlier judgments of this Court was not placed and therefore, it was submitted that the decision rendered by the coordinate Bench in the case of Haidar Ali (supra) was per incuriam. In this regard, the case of Rashminara Begum v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 4 GLR 282; 2017 (4) GLT 346: (2017) 4 NEJ 652 : (2017) 0 Supreme(Gau) 411 has been referred to. In this regard, the case of Rashminara Begum v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 4 GLR 282; 2017 (4) GLT 346: (2017) 4 NEJ 652 : (2017) 0 Supreme(Gau) 411 has been referred to. Moreover, it was submitted that in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, it is not for the Constitutional Courts to set aside the opinion of the learned Foreigners Tribunal so as to allow the petitioner to make a fresh pleading and to lead further evidence in a particular manner so as to prove his defence. Hence, it was submitted that the petitioner has failed to show that the impugned opinion is vitiated due to any perversity in appreciation of pleadings and evidence. 11. From the nature of submissions made, three following points of determination arises for decision in this case: a. Whether the impugned opinion is vitiated because of non- furnishing of main grounds/ allegations for suspecting the petitioner to be a foreigner, who has illegally entered into India (Assam) from the specified territory? b. Whether it would be appropriate for this Constitutional Court, in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to hold that the written statement filed by the petitioner before the learned Foreigners Tribunal was deficit in disclosure of complete facts, and remand the matter for a fresh decision after giving opportunity to the petitioner to file further pleadings and evidence? c. Whether the impugned opinion is liable to be interfered with? 12. The point of determination no. (a) is taken up first. The petitioner had submitted his written statement before the learned Tribunal in Assamese language. However, a certified to be true copy thereof has been filed by the petitioner along with additional affidavit filed on 05.03.2025, in this writ petition. In paragraph 4 of the English translated copy of the written statement it has been stated – “That the opposite party has strongly denied every statement stated against the petitioner in the report.” In paragraph 10 thereof, it has been stated – “That actually the opposite party has strongly denied the allegation made against the opposite party in the aforesaid case and the petitioner submitted his written statement with at liberty to filed conclusive written statement if necessary.” 13. Thus, in light of the petitioner’s statement made in paragraph 4 of his written statement, it cannot be accepted that the petitioner has pleaded specific denial of every statement made against him in the police verification report without knowledge of the contents of the said police verification report, which is accompanying the reference made by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Morigaon. The Tribunal’s record, which was called for, has been carefully perused. The petitioner has not filed any petition seeking a copy of the police verification report. Thus, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to sustain his allegation that he was not furnished with the grounds of suspecting him to be a foreigner. 14. Moreover, though under paragraph 10 of his written statement, the petitioner had reserved his right to file comprehensive written statement, such right was never exercised by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not made any attempt to show from the record that the petitioner has sought for any assistance from the learned Foreigners Tribunal to call for any record, document or witness, which was refused and/or rejected by the learned Tribunal. 15. The Tribunal’s record discloses that vide memo dated 18.02.2017, the Superintendent of Police (Border), Morigaon had informed the S.I.(B) of Lahorighat Police Station that the petitioner is suspected to be a foreign national who has entered in between 01.01.1966 and 21.03.1971/ after 25.03.1971 and therefore, direction was issued to start an enquiry under the provision of Foreigners Tribunals Amendment Order 1985 and submit immediately. Accordingly, the Enquiry Officer had submitted a report in the prescribed Form-I, inter alia, stating that the petitioner is staying in India after 25.03.1971. Against serial no. 15(b) of Form-I, it was stated in the report that – “Failed to produce any valid document in respect of his nationality.” Against serial no. 18, it was stated in the report that – “During interrogation he could not produce any valid document in respect of his nationality. Hence, the case may be forwarded to the honourable Foreigner’s Tribunal for trial.” In Form-II, the address of the petitioner in his Country of origin is stated as – “Nilakaja Char, Issarganj, District Maimansing, Bangladesh.” 16. 18, it was stated in the report that – “During interrogation he could not produce any valid document in respect of his nationality. Hence, the case may be forwarded to the honourable Foreigner’s Tribunal for trial.” In Form-II, the address of the petitioner in his Country of origin is stated as – “Nilakaja Char, Issarganj, District Maimansing, Bangladesh.” 16. It would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2006) 0 Supreme(SC) 1233: AIR 2007 SC 1372, which as extracted from (2006) 0 Supreme(SC) 1233, is quoted below:- 50 . Having regard to the fact that the Tribunal in the notice to be sent to the procedure is required to set out the main grounds; evidently the primary onus in relation thereto would be on the State. However, once the Tribunal satisfied itself about the existence of grounds, the burden of proof would be upon the procedure. 51 . In Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665 , this Court clearly held that the burden of proof would be upon the procedure as he would be possessing the necessary documents to show that he is a citizen not only within the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution of India but also within the provisions of the Citizenship Act. It was stated: "26. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish ones citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6 - A(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the fact and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him." The Court noticed that even in criminal cases, under certain statutes, the burden of proof would be on the accused.” 17. The Border Police would not have the power and authority to enter into Bangladesh in order to make enquiry. Such a move can only be done though the Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India as per procedure laid down for the purpose. Thus, the Border Police would have to rely on the materials produced by the petitioner to show either his existence in India from prior to 01.01.1966 or that his grandfather or father was residing continuously in India from 01.01.1966. In this regard, the petitioner has failed to prove that his grandfather and/or father stayed in India continuously from prior to 01.01.1966. 18. The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the police could have collected better particulars of the petitioner’s alleged origin in Bangladesh has led this Court to examine several aspects of the matter, which is discussed hereinafter: a. Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 and determination of foreigners under the Foreigners’ (Tribunals) Order, 1964 have a civil consequences. b. Nonetheless, assuming but not admitting that penal consequences are attached to determination of foreigners under the 1964 Order, it is seen that under the provisions of Section 166A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, request for investigation outside India can be made. The said provision is as follows:- 166A. b. Nonetheless, assuming but not admitting that penal consequences are attached to determination of foreigners under the 1964 Order, it is seen that under the provisions of Section 166A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, request for investigation outside India can be made. The said provision is as follows:- 166A. Letter of request to competent authority for investigation in a country or place outside India.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, if, in the course of an investigation into an offence, an application is made by the investigating officer or any officer superior in rank to the investigating officer that evidence may be available in a country or place outside India, any Criminal Court may issue a letter of request to a Court or an authority in that country or place competent to deal with such request to examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case and to record his statement made in the course of such examination and also to require such person or any other person to produce any document or thing which may be in his possession pertaining to the case and to forward all the evidence so taken or collected or the authenticated copies thereof or the thing so collected to the Court issuing such letter. (2) The letter of request shall be transmitted in such manner as the Central Government may specify in this behalf. (3) Every statement recorded or document or thing received under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be the evidence collected during the course of investigation under this Chapter. c. Thus, it appears that the Letter Rogatory is a request letter issued by an Indian court to a foreign court or judge to take testimony of a witness residing within the jurisdiction of that foreign court and transmit it to the court making such request for use in a pending legal case. Moreover, in an appropriate case, Letter Rogatory can be issued under Section 166A of Cr.P.C. so as to extradite an accused after due process. Hence, it can be said that Section 166A of Cr.P.C. allows any Criminal Court to issue a letter of request. Moreover, in an appropriate case, Letter Rogatory can be issued under Section 166A of Cr.P.C. so as to extradite an accused after due process. Hence, it can be said that Section 166A of Cr.P.C. allows any Criminal Court to issue a letter of request. d. The Government of India, through Ministry of Home Affairs, IS-II Division/Legal Cell-I vide letter under F.No. 25016/52/2019-LC dated 04.12.2019, has issued a comprehensive guidelines regarding investigation abroad and issue Letters Rogatory and service of summons/ notices/ judicial process on persons residing abroad. e. It has not come to the notice of the Court regarding any guidelines by the Ministry of Home Affairs or Ministry of External Affairs for allowing fact finding through police in any foreign country in respect of any Act and Rules, which has civil consequences, Therefore, the State of Assam cannot send police or any criminal investigating agency to a foreign country to find out the address and other particulars or any document of a suspected foreigner in the State of Assam. f. In the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665 , a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India had made elaborate discussion on growth of immigrant population, dominantly of Muslim origin from Bangladesh, and has compared it with “aggression” and has also referred it as a root cause of rise of insurgency in Assam. Accordingly, it was observed that “… This being the situation there can be no manner of doubt that the State of Assam is facing "external aggression and internal disturbance" on account of large scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals. It, therefore, becomes the duty of Union of India to take all measures for protection of the State of Assam from such external aggression and internal disturbance as enjoined in Article 355 of the Constitution. Having regard to this constitutional mandate, the question arises whether the Union of India has taken any measures for that purpose.” Resultantly Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act was struck down. g. The LVO (Local Verification Officer) is required to fill-up forms. But what would happen if no information is divulged by the proceedee. There is no power to the police to arrest the proceedee, search the house of the proceedee or his person. Therefore, the form is usually left blank or response is recorded as “no”. g. The LVO (Local Verification Officer) is required to fill-up forms. But what would happen if no information is divulged by the proceedee. There is no power to the police to arrest the proceedee, search the house of the proceedee or his person. Therefore, the form is usually left blank or response is recorded as “no”. We cannot agree to the proposition that by deliberate non- disclosure, a foreigner can be allowed to become a citizen of India. h. The non-disclosure of any information by the proceedee that he/she is an Indian citizen, cannot be accepted to be an “insufficient ground” to suspect the proceedee to be a foreigner. i. Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 provides for burden of proof, which is as follows:- 9 . Burden of proof.- If in any case not falling under section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person. j. Therefore, when there is adequate statutory safeguard available to the proceedee, the proceeding against the proceedee ought not to be terminated merely because a part of the Form submitted by LVO is left blank. Otherwise, it would be allowing a person who withholds information to take advantage of his own fault and become a citizen of India without discharging his burden under section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not made any endeavour to show that the proceeding before a Foreigners Tribunal is a criminal or penal proceeding, where the proceedee has a right to remain silent. k. However, in this case, as mentioned hereinbefore, the Enquiry Officer has disclosed the Bangladesh address of the petitioner. 19. Accordingly, the point of determination no. (a) is answered in the negative and against the petitioner by holding that the impugned opinion is not found to be vitiated because of non-furnishing of main grounds/ allegations for suspecting the petitioner to be a foreigner, who has illegally entered into India (Assam) from the specified territory. 20. The point of determination no. Accordingly, the point of determination no. (a) is answered in the negative and against the petitioner by holding that the impugned opinion is not found to be vitiated because of non-furnishing of main grounds/ allegations for suspecting the petitioner to be a foreigner, who has illegally entered into India (Assam) from the specified territory. 20. The point of determination no. (b) is now taken up. 21. The contents of the petitioner’s written statement has briefly been stated hereinbefore. It is too well settled that merely from entry made in the electoral roll of 1966, the petitioner cannot establish that the persons whose names are entered therein are his grandfather and father. The said electoral roll contains three names, viz., Sahedali, son of Soyedali; Halemon Nessa, wife of Sahedali; Mohammad Ali, son of –Do-. The petitioner in his examination-in-chief, had only stated that the name of his father is Md. Ali (deceased) and name of his grandfather is Late Sahed Ali and had exhibited the electoral roll of 1966 regarding the said two names. However, the petitioner did not state or prove about his relationship with Halemon Nessa, wife of Sahedali. The petitioner did not take any steps to prove Gaonburah’s certificate (Ext.3) by calling and examining its author; school certificate of Goraimari High School (Ext.4) by calling and examining its author; domicile certificate issued by Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Morigaon (Ext.5); or Medical certificate of death of Mohammad Ali (Ext.6) by calling and examining its author. It is clarified herein that the said certificate is a medical certificate and not a death certificate issued under the Assam Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1934. In respect of school certificate referred above, it may be mentioned herein that in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 (Supp.) SCC 604 , the Supreme Court of India has held that the author of the certificate would have to prove the certificate on the basis of school register. 22. It is well settled that an Elector Photo Identity Card (EPIC for short) (Ext.2) is not a proof of parentage or sonship. In this regard, we may refer to the case of Md. Babul Islam v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 3547/2016, decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 09.05.2018, wherein it has been held that EPIC is not a valid piece of evidence in absence of any supporting evidence. In this regard, we may refer to the case of Md. Babul Islam v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 3547/2016, decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 09.05.2018, wherein it has been held that EPIC is not a valid piece of evidence in absence of any supporting evidence. Moreover, it was held that it was a post reference document and it was further held that if the date of birth is known to the petitioner, it should have been mentioned in the written statement. 23. Moreover, it is well known that copy of voter list is available in public domain. Therefore, in the absence of any cogent, reliable and admissible document showing relationship between two persons as father and son or father and daughter, mere existence of a name in the electoral roll is not a proof of relationship as father and son or father and daughter. Thus, the electoral roll of 1966 (Ext.1) is not an acceptable proof that the petitioner has been able to prove his relationship with his projected father and grandfather. 24. In the case of Haidar Ali (supra), this Court had referred to power of appellate Court under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the CPC. However, when the said case was decided, it was not brought to the notice of this Court that this Court was exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which conferred certiorari jurisdiction to this Court and not the appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, the principles of Order XLI, Rule 27 cannot be applied. 25. It would be apposite to quote hereinbelow paragraph 29 of the case of Haidar Ali (supra), which has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The said paragraph reads as follows:- 29 . From the above, what is important to note is that the Foreigners Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 merely provides a proceedee a reasonable opportunity for making a representation and producing evidence in support of his case before the Tribunal and as such, normally, the rules of pleadings including that of “written statement” as provided under the CPC are not applicable. As a corollary, the principles contained in the CPC relating to the scope of written statement and limitations placed thereon cannot be strictly applied in the proceedings before the Tribunal though the principles may generally be applied. As a corollary, the principles contained in the CPC relating to the scope of written statement and limitations placed thereon cannot be strictly applied in the proceedings before the Tribunal though the principles may generally be applied. In fact, all opportunities should be given to a proceedee to enable him to produce all such documents which come to his possession even at a later stage also, to substantiate his claim that he is an Indian. No pedantic view should be taken, if there has been some delay or if the same is not mentioned in the written statement. Even under the scheme of the CPC, the right to file any document at a later stage, even if at the appellate stage, is always there, subject to leave of the court and if such documents are relevant and highly necessary and could not be produced earlier after exercise of due diligence (vide Order XLI Rule 27 CPC). Thus, if the proceedee is able to make out a case for filing a document at a later stage, the same cannot be denied and no adverse inference can be drawn. Similarly, if any fact is introduced at the time of adducing evidence, though the same is not mentioned in the written statement, no exception can be made. It cannot be said to be improvement and adverse inference accordingly taken thereof. Non-mentioning of any person or fact or document in the written statement, if mentioned later, cannot be said to cause any surprise or prejudice to the State so as to ignore such new fact or document. In any event, liberty is always with the State to rebut any evidence after the proceedee has completed adducing evidence. We have also noted that the witnesses who adduced evidence are cross-examined by the State and as such, if such deposition cannot be shaken during the cross-examination, no adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioner. 26. In this case, the petitioners have not been able to demonstrate that why despite due diligence, more documents could not be proved when the petitioner no. 1 was examined as DW-1. Now we may refer to the observations made in paragraph 36 of the same judgment, which is extracted below:- 36 . 26. In this case, the petitioners have not been able to demonstrate that why despite due diligence, more documents could not be proved when the petitioner no. 1 was examined as DW-1. Now we may refer to the observations made in paragraph 36 of the same judgment, which is extracted below:- 36 . What is also to be noted is that in any proceeding, whether, criminal or civil, the fact allegedly concealed and not disclosed must be something which is detrimental to the person expected to disclose, which is the reason the person is avoiding disclosure. If the fact is not detrimental, but rather beneficial to the interest of the person concerned, it defies logic that such beneficial fact should be kept undisclosed. That is the reason, a person knowingly conceals and does not disclose certain fact which is within his personal knowledge, as the person thinks that it may prove detrimental to his interest, if disclosed. Accordingly, non- disclosure of such incriminating facts may warrant drawing of adverse inference against such a person. However, the said principle cannot be applicable in the present case in as much as the facts which the petitioner is alleged to have not disclosed in the written statement but subsequently disclosed during the cross-examination, cannot be said to be adverse or incriminating to the claim of the petitioner for the reason that existence of other relatives of the petitioner or that of his father does not in any way impeach upon credibility of his statement. Neither, such a disclosure is inconsistent with or contradict any previous evidence. Nor does it make any difference to the “fact in issue.” Of course, if the petitioner deliberately gives false information or avoids giving correct information when asked, the issue of drawing adverse inference may arise. But that is not the case here. 27. The sub-paragraph to paragraph 36 discloses the reason why this Court had accepted the plea of the petitioner in the case of Haidar Ali (supra) to examine the documents in writ proceeding. Thus, on facts, the present case is distinguishable. Moreover, with greatest respect of the case of Haidar Ali (supra), it appears that though this Court had referred to the provision of Order 41, Rule 27 CPC in paragraph 29, the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors. Vs. Thus, on facts, the present case is distinguishable. Moreover, with greatest respect of the case of Haidar Ali (supra), it appears that though this Court had referred to the provision of Order 41, Rule 27 CPC in paragraph 29, the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2017) 4 SCC 760 , was not placed before this Court for consideration. In the case, the Supreme Court of India had referred to the principles of additional evidence and held to the effect that when neither the trial court has refused to receive evidence, nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence, nor it could be held to be necessary to pronounce the judgment, additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill up the lacuna or to patch up the weak points in the case. The relevant paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof are quoted below:- 19 . The other part of the impugned order permitting additional evidence and remanding the case for fresh decision is uncalled for. No case was made out for permitting additional evidence on settled principles under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. The provision is reproduced below:- “27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if - (a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, The Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission." 20 . (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission." 20 . It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the case N. Kamalam v. Ayyaswami, (2001) 7 SCC 503 . There was no ground for remand in these circumstances. 28. It is also seen that when the case of Haidar Ali (supra), was decided, the previous decision of this Court in the case of Musstt. Ayesha Khatun @ Aisha Khatun v. Union of India, (2017) 3 GLR 820: (2017) 0 Supreme(Gau) 283, was not placed for consideration of this Court. In paragraph 12 thereof, this Court had held as follows:- 12 . Written statement submitted by a noticee facing a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 read with Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 is the foundation of his or her defence. Since citizenship of the noticee is questioned, the noticee should come out with all material facts within his or her exclusive knowledge in terms of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and disclose them in the written statement. The averments made in the written statement are thereafter required to be proved by adducing cogent and reliable evidence. Failure to disclose materials particulars in the written statement by itself will raise a serious question mark on the citizenship status of the noticee. 29. Similarly, in the case of Rashminara Begum v. Union of India, 2017 (4) GLT 346, this Court had held that material facts pleaded have to be proved by adducing cogent, reliable and admissible evidence. Again in the case of Momin Ali v. Union of India, 2017 (2) GLT 1076: (2017) 0 Supreme(Gau) 802, it has been held by this Court that variance between pleadings and proof not permissible. The relevant paragraphs 12 and 13 thereof are quoted below:- 12 . This written statement of the petitioner was wholly inadequate and did not disclose any material facts. As noticed above, it was the allegation of the State that petitioner was a foreigner. The relevant paragraphs 12 and 13 thereof are quoted below:- 12 . This written statement of the petitioner was wholly inadequate and did not disclose any material facts. As noticed above, it was the allegation of the State that petitioner was a foreigner. Therefore, as per mandate of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, it was the bounden duty of the petitioner to have disclosed all material facts which were specifically within his knowledge in the written statement but he did not do so. Petitioner neither mentioned his date of birth nor his age. He was silent regarding the name of his mother and identity of his grandparents - both paternal and maternal. He did not mention anything about his brothers and sisters or about his marital status. On the basis of such a written statement, it cannot be said that petitioner had stated anything substantial to show that he was not a foreigner but a citizen of India. 13 . It is a settled proposition of law that where a party fails to set up a case in his pleadings, he would be debarred from adducing evidence in his support at the stage of trial. As a matter of principle, variance between pleading and proof is not permissible. 30. Thus, in light of the observations made by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Satish Kumar Gupta (supra), as the facts of the present case is found distinguishable on facts under which the case of Haidar Ali (supra), was decided, the decision in the case of Haidar Ali (supra) would not help the petitioners in any manner whatsoever. Similarly, as the previous order of this Court in the case of Musstt. Ayesha Khatun @ Aisha Khatun (supra), Rashminara Begum (supra) and Momin Ali (supra), the subsequent decision taken without referring to the previous decisions would not have the effect of a binding precedent and thus, the decision in the case of Haidar Ali (supra) does not help the petitioner in any way. 31. In the case of Haidar Ali (supra), the father of the proceedee had come to depose as witness. However, in this writ petition, the petitioner claims that his mother was alive but bedridden for which she was not examined as witness. 31. In the case of Haidar Ali (supra), the father of the proceedee had come to depose as witness. However, in this writ petition, the petitioner claims that his mother was alive but bedridden for which she was not examined as witness. However, this disclosure has been made for the first time in this writ petition, but during trial stage, the petitioner did not make any prayer before the learned Foreigners Tribunal to allow him to examine his mother on Commission. 32. Be that as it may, in respect of challenge to the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal, this Court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction, rather, the Court is exercising certiorari jurisdiction. Therefore, a corollary issue also arises as to whether the Writ Court, in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction can substitute its discretion over the decision of the Tribunal, which is otherwise lawful. 33. In the quest to answer the said corollary issue, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Anr. v. Bikartan Das & Ors., 2023 INSC 733 : (2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 763. Paragraphs 51 to 53 thereof [as extracted from (2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 763] are quoted below:- “51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not. 52. The essential features of a writ of certiorari, including a brief history, have been very exhaustively explained by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another, reported in AIR 1954 SC 440 . The Court held that a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued in ‘all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner’ so long as the broad and fundamental principles were kept in mind. Those principles were delineated as follows: “7. … In granting a writ of ‘certiorari’, the superior court does not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous, but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal ….. 8. The supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer in King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited [(1922) 2 AC 128, 156]. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. …. 9. Certiorari may lie and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.” 53. Relying on T.C. Basappa (supra), the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 233 , laid down the following propositions as well established: “(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous.” 34. From the records of the learned Tribunal, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not show that the reference was decided without giving a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of being heard or that the principles of natural justice had been violated and/or that the learned Tribunal had denied reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to file additional written statement and to give further evidence and to prove any documentary evidence. Therefore, the writ Court ought to be slow in interfering with the impugned opinion of the learned Tribunal by substituting it view on the otherwise lawful opinion of the learned Tribunal. 35. Therefore, in light of the discussions above, the point of determination no. (b) is answered in the negative and against the petitioner by holding that it would not be appropriate for this Constitutional Court, in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to hold that the written statement filed by the petitioner before the learned Foreigners Tribunal was deficit in disclosure of complete facts, and remand the matter for a fresh decision after giving opportunity to the petitioner to file further pleadings and lead further evidence. 36. In light of the discussions above on point of determination nos. (a) and (b) above, the point of determination no. (c) is also answered in the negative and against the petitioner by holding that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case warranting interference of this Court in respect of the opinion dated 11.06.2018, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal nd No. 2 , Morigaon, in Case No. F.T. 06/2017 (bearing Police Reference F.T. Case No. 12/2017 dated 18.02.2017), by which the petitioner was declared to be a foreigner who have entered into India (Assam) on or after 25.03.1971. 37. Thus, this writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. 38. 37. Thus, this writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. 38. The parties are left to bear their own cost. 39. The Registry shall send the requisitioned records back to the concerned Tribunal along with a copy of this order so as to make this order a part of the record.