ORDER : Pavan Kumar Dwivedi, J. 1. The appellants have preferred this appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (now Employee's Compensation Act, 1923). Being aggrieved by the award dated 14/3/2014 passed in Case No.66/WCF/2008 by Labour Cort, Indore. There are two appellants in the case. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants fairly conceded that the case against appellant No.2 Sarika is not tenable in view of the fact that she is not covered under the definition of dependent as provided under the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. As such the present appeal is being considered only with respect to appellant No.1 Manish Ajmera. 3. Short facts giving rise to the case are that deceased Gopal was in the employment of respondent No.1 Radheyshyam. He was working as a cleaner on the truck of the ownership of respondent No.1 bearing registration No. M.P. 09 K.C. 7963. 4 . On 14/10/2007 the said truck was loaded with 190 sacks of Soyabean for delivering the said goods to one Presti Company at Dewas. The truck was parked in front of Gate No.2. At around 9.00 PM driver of the truck namely Bheem, leaving Gopal at the truck, went to Dewas. In the night of 16th October, 2007, deceased Gopal was working as cleaner on the aforementioned truck. The said truck was stolen, with goods and Gopal in the same, by some unknown persons and on the next date i.e., 17/10/2007 the truck was found in which dead body of Gopal was also there. 5. In the backdrop of the above facts, claim petition came to be filed by the appellants Manish and Sarika before the Commissioner Workmen's Compensation/Labour Court, Indore which after recording evidence concluded that Gopal died during the course of employment of respondent No.1. It was also concluded by the Court that income of the deceased was Rs.3000/- per month but while deciding question with respect to dependency the Labour Court concluded that both the claimants/appellants were not dependent on Gopal. The basis of the conclusion of the learned Labour Court was that the appellant No. 2 Sarika was married before the death of Gopal and had attained the age of majority thus she was not dependent in terms of the provisions of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. The basis of the conclusion of the learned Labour Court was that the appellant No. 2 Sarika was married before the death of Gopal and had attained the age of majority thus she was not dependent in terms of the provisions of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. As regards the appellant No.1 Manish the Court concluded that as he was also more than 18 years of age thus he can also not be considered as dependent but while recording this conclusion with respect to appellant No.1 the claims tribunal in para 14 of the impugned order has referred to the statement of Manish in which he has stated that he is 20 years of age. While recording this conclusion the learned Labour Court had remained completely oblivious of the relevant date for considering the age in order to decide the dependency. 6 . This Court has admitted the present appeal vide order dated4/3/20216, however, subsequent to that on 01/07/2025 following substantial questions of law have been framed by this Court:- "(i) Whether the claimant who is the son of the deceased would be treated as dependent on the income of the deceased in terms of the definition provided under Section 2 (1)(d)(i) of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 as he was below the age of 18 years on the date of accident ? (ii) Whether the assessment of the income of the deceased on the date of the accident @ Rs.3000/- per month was on lower side ?." 7. Before adverting to the facts of the case it would be profitable to record at this stage that the appellants have also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC for taking additional document on record which is the mark sheet of Manish of high school in which his date of birth is recorded as 06/10/1990. The respondents have not chosen to file reply to the said application. No doubts have been raised on the genuineness of the mark sheet of Manish. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that claims tribunal while considering the question of dependency got swayed by the fact that the appellant No.1 while recording his statement at the time of cross examination on 15/07/2010 has stated that his age is 20 years. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the date of death of the father of the appellants is 16/10/2007. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the date of death of the father of the appellants is 16/10/2007. The date of filing claim application before the learned Court was 21/08/2008 and the date of birth of the appellant No.1 is 06/10/1990 as such on the date of death of the father of the appellant he was of the age of 17 years and when the claim petition was filed his age was 17 years 10 months. Thus even on the date of filing claim application the appellant No.1 was still minor. He submits that the learned Labour Court has considered the age of 20 years on the date of statement of appellant No.1 when he said my age is 20 years but this statement was recorded on 15/07/2010 ie., after almost 3 years of the death of the father of the appellant. Thus he submits that the conclusion drawn by the claims tribunal is totally unsustainable in view of the fact that the appellant is covered in the definition of dependent as provided under Section 2(d) of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. He thus prays for setting aside the impugned order with a further prayer to award appropriate compensation to the appellant No.1 for death of his father in the course of employment. 9 . Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 supports the findings of the impugned order. He refers to para 11 to 14 of the impugned order and submits that the claims tribunal has considered this aspect in detail and has recorded an inescapable finding that both the appellants being 18 years of age and the sister was married thus they were not dependent on Gopal (their father). 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. At the outset it has to be recorded that the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 does not dispute the genuineness of the mark sheet filed by the appellants along with application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. In the said mark sheet the date of birth of the appellant No.1 is mentioned as 06/10/1990, thus taking into account summery nature of proceedings before the learned Labour Court, the same is taken into account. 12. Now the consideration on the substential questions Substantial question No.1 :- 13. In the said mark sheet the date of birth of the appellant No.1 is mentioned as 06/10/1990, thus taking into account summery nature of proceedings before the learned Labour Court, the same is taken into account. 12. Now the consideration on the substential questions Substantial question No.1 :- 13. The appellant No.1 in his statement recorded on 15/07/2010 has stated that he is 20 years of age. As per his date of birth 06/10/1990 he would be around 20 years of age on 15/7/2010 thus his statement goes inline with the date of birth mentioned in his mark sheet of high school. Now the question is whether in light of these facts the appellant No.1 will be considered as dependent on the deceased Gopal or not. The definition of dependent in Section 2(1)(d) has been provided in the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 in the following words:- "(d) "dependant" means any of the following relatives of deceased (employee), namely :- (i) a widow, a minor [legitimate or adopted] son, an unmarried [legitimate or adopted] daughter or a widowed mother; and (ii) if wholly dependant on the earnings of the [employee] at the time of his death, a son or a daughter who has attained the age of 18 years and who is infirm; (iii) if wholly or in part dependant on the earnings of the [employee] at the time of his death,- (a) a widower, (b) a parent other than a widowed mother, (c) a minor illegitimate son, unmarried illegitimate daughter or a daughter [legitimate or illegitimate or adopted] if married and a minor or if widowed and a minor, (d) a minor brother or an unmarried sister or a widowed sister if a minor, (e) a widowed daughter-in-law, (f) a minor child of a pre-deceased son, (g) a minor child of a pre-deceased daughter where no parent of the child is alive, or (h) a paternal grandparent if no parent of the [employee] is alive;] (g) of sub-clause (iii), references to a son, daughter or child include an adopted son, daughter or child respectively.]" 14. It is thus clear that a minor legitimate or adopted son will be treated as dependent. Now the term minor has also been defined in Section 2(1)(ff) which provides as under:- "Section 2(1)(ff) :- A minor means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years." 15. It is thus clear that a minor legitimate or adopted son will be treated as dependent. Now the term minor has also been defined in Section 2(1)(ff) which provides as under:- "Section 2(1)(ff) :- A minor means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years." 15. Now the question is what will be the date in respect of which the age of 18 years has to be considered whether it would be date of death or it would be date of deciding claim. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of In Reference under Section 27 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, regarding Madho Singh, 1979 SCC Online M.P. 144 has considered the aspect of the date/point of time when the compensation becomes due. The Hon'ble Division Bench after considering in Para 3 and 4 in detail the cases of jurisdictional High Courts answered the question in para 5, for ready reference para 3, 4 and 5 are reproduced hereunder:- 3. The question whether their right to compensation vests in the deceased workman's dependant existing at the time of his death and passes on to his heirs if the dependant dies before receipt of the amount of compensation, was first considered by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Pasupati Dutt v. Kelvin Jute Mills [ AIR 1937 Cal. 495 .] . In that case it was held that though section 3 which imposes a liability on the employer to pay compensation does not specify the person or persons to whom it is payable, section 8 makes it clear that nobody has any right to it except the dependants. It was pointed out that though the Commissioner has got a discretion in the matter of appointment of compensation and he can allot the entire amount to one of the dependants, even so it can be said that the right accrues to the dependants as a class subject to the Commissioner's right of distribution in such way as he thinks proper; and in case of sole dependant it vests absolutely; and as it is a right which has been given to the dependants because of the workman's death, it must be deemed to accrue at the time of his death, there being no ground of postponing it to a further date. It was further pointed out that the duty of the Commissioner to refund the compensation arises only when there is no dependant “in existence” and this must mean in existence at the time of the workman's death. In holding that any other construction would be frustrating the object of the Act and place the right to compensation on an uncertain contingency, B.K. Mukherjee, J. (as he then was), made the following observations: “The enquiry before the Commissioner may be delayed for various reasons, and people who really depended upon the earnings of the deceased workman might die before or pending the enquiry and even just before the Commissioner makes the award. To say that the Commissioner is bound to refund the money to the employer under such circumstances would be to put an extremely narrow and unjust construction upon the section, which is not borne out by the purpose of the Act or the actual words used. As my Lord the Chief Justice pointed out in his Judgment, the House of Lords in England took a similar view in United Collieries Ltd. v. Simpson (or Hendry) [1909 AC 383.] , upon construction of the English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906. The English Act also provided for payment of the compensation into the County Court, which could deal with it in its discretion, and divide it in such manner as it thought best among the dependants of the deceased workman. It is true that there was no provision for refund of the money to the employer in the English Act of 1906, but that is really not very important as on total absence of any dependant the money could not really be retained by the County Court, and would have to be returned to the employer in exercise of its inherent powers. Mr. Banerjee for the respondent lays stress on the fact that in the English Act of 1925 an express provision was inserted in section 2, clause (3) under which the legal representative of a dependant had no right to the compensation payable to the latter, but here again it is significant to note that the Indian Act was amended on various occasions even after 1925, but the Indian Legislature did not think it proper to introduce any provision like the one mentioned above. It may be said indeed that to hold that the dependant's right to compensation is a vested right which passes to his legal representative would be to put an additional burden upon the employer, the effect of which might be to enrich the strangers and persons totally outside the scope of the Act, but the result would be exactly the same if the dependant dies the very day after receiving the compensation.” The same view of section 8 was taken by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Abdurahiman v. Beeran Koya [ AIR 1938 Mad. 402 .] . Section 9 of the Act, it seems, was not referred to before the Calcutta High Court in Pasupati Dutt's case. This section was, however, referred to by the Madras High Court in Abdurahiman's case. The argument on the basts of section 9 was that the amount of compensation cannot pass by operation of law i.e. by succession in view of section 9. Negativing this argument, the learned Judges of the Madras High Court observed as follows: “The other part of the section in section 9 is that no lump sum or half yearly payment shall pass to any person other than the workman. This contemplates that the compensation is payable to a workman and cannot be claimed by any person by operation of law. Therefore before that clause can come into operation there must be an existing workman to whom it is payable and it has no application to a case where the workman died before the award of compensation. In the case of a workman who is alive and to whom the compensation is payable, the Act says that it must be paid to him and it should not go to any other person, for example, if he becomes an insolvent, his trustee in bankruptcy cannot claim the sum for the benefit of his creditors.” The question whether compensation can be claimed by heirs of the dependant of a deceased workman who was not paid the compensation before his death was also considered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Radhakrishna Rice Mill v. Applelacharvulu [(1958) 1 An WR 316.] . The Andhra Pradesh High Court followed the Calcutta and Madras decisions referred to above. The Andhra Pradesh High Court followed the Calcutta and Madras decisions referred to above. The cases mentioned above had established the law that the right to compensation vests in a dependant and passes on to his heirs in case of the dependant's death before receipt of compensation. If he is also noteworthy that before 1976 the Act was amended on 10 occasions after 1937, yet no amendment was made to displace the law established as above by judicial decisions which impliedly shows that the decisions had correctly interpreted the Act. 4. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court, however, in B.M. Habeebullah v. Periaswami [ AIR 1977 Mad. 330 .] overruled its earlier decision in Abdurahman's case. It was held in this case that Abdurahiman's case had not correctly interpreted section 9 of the Act in the light of the definition of workman and the correct interpretation is that there is no passage of right of compensation from a dependant to his heirs if the dependant dies before receipt of the compensation under section 8. With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court. The relevant portion of section 9 of the Act reads as follows: “No lump sum or half monthly payment payable under this Act shall pass to any person other than the workman by operation of law.” Reading the word “workman” in the light of the definition given in section 2(1) (n) the above quoted portion of section 9 will read as under: “No lump sum or half monthly payment payable under this Act shall pass to any person other than the workman and where the workman is dead, his dependants, by operation of law.” Now the section quoted as above deals with prohibition of passing of compensation by operation of law. Ordinarily devolution by succession is also a mode of passing of property by operation of law, but in such a case there can be no question of passing of any property to the deceased. Had the intention under section 9 been to prohibit passing of property by devolution, the words “other than the workman” would not have been there. Ordinarily devolution by succession is also a mode of passing of property by operation of law, but in such a case there can be no question of passing of any property to the deceased. Had the intention under section 9 been to prohibit passing of property by devolution, the words “other than the workman” would not have been there. The section would have been simply worded as below: “Save as provided by this Act, no lump sum or half monthly payment payable under this Act shall——pass to any person by operation of law.” The words “other than the workman” signify that the workman or his dependant is in existence when the question of passing of property by operation of law arises. In our opinion, the earlier decision of the Madras High Court was correct that passing of property by operation of law which is prohibited or restrained by section 9, does not include passing of property by devolution or succession, but refers to other cases of passing of property by operation of law such as insolvency where the person whose property passes by operation of law is in existence. For example, even if the workman or in case of his death his dependant is adjudicated insolvent the amount payable to him under the Act will not pass by operation of law and vest in the Court or receiver and will be payable in accordance with the Act to the workman or the dependant, as the case may be. It is true, as observed by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court that the earlier Division Bench decision of that Court did not expressly refer to the definition of workman which includes a dependant in case of death of the workman, while construing section 9, but in our opinion, the criticism is not correct that if the definition is noticed and the section is read in the light of that definition it will cover a prohibition for passing of compensation by devolution. As earlier shown by us, reading section 9 along with the definition of workman makes no difference. The point made out by the earlier case is that the words “other than the workman” show that the passing of property by operation of law contemplated by section 9 is of that type which recognises the presence of the workman. As earlier shown by us, reading section 9 along with the definition of workman makes no difference. The point made out by the earlier case is that the words “other than the workman” show that the passing of property by operation of law contemplated by section 9 is of that type which recognises the presence of the workman. Reading section 9 with the aid of the definition as contained in section 2(1)(n) only shows that the passing of property by operation of law prohibited therein recognises the presence of the workman or in case of the death of his dependants. The section has absolutely no application for deciding the question of right to compensation on the death of the dependants. For these reasons, we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the earlier Division Bench case of the Madras High Court. Even assuming that the view expressed by the Full Bench is also a possible view of section 9, we do not think that there is justification for departing from the view taken as early as 1938 when the Legislature did not intervene to overrule that view which had prevailed for nearly forty years. If the view taken in the earlier Madras case or that taken by the Calcutta High Court was not correct, the Legislature would have intervened and made suitable amendments in the Act as was made in the corresponding English Act of 1906 in 1925. As earlier pointed out by us, the Act was amended on 10 occasions between 1937 and 1977 without displacing the interpretation adopted by the Calcutta, earlier Madras and the Andhra Pradesh decisions which is a very strong indication to show that these decisions were in line with the intention of the Legislature. No reference is made to this aspect of the matter by the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court. 5. Our answers to the questions referred are as follows :- (1) The heir of a deceased dependant can claim the amount deposited as compensation even though the dependant died before he could file a claim before the Commissioner and before compensation could be awarded to him. (2) The amount of compensation becomes the property of dependants and vests in them even before the Commissioner passes an order of disbursement." (Emphasis supplied) 16. (2) The amount of compensation becomes the property of dependants and vests in them even before the Commissioner passes an order of disbursement." (Emphasis supplied) 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the question of employer's liability to pay compensation in terms of Section 4-A of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd V/s. Siby George & Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 40 has held in para 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 as under :- "9. The matter once again came up before the Court when by amendments introduced in the Act by Act No. 30 of 1995 the amount of compensation and the rate of interest were increased with effect from 15.09.1995. The question arose whether the increased amount of compensation and the rate of interest would apply also to cases in which the accident took place before 15.09.1995. A three Judge Bench of the Court in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Valsala K., AIR 1999 SC 3502 answered the question in the negative holding, on the authority of Pratap Narain Singh Deo, that the payment of compensation fell due on the date of the accident. In paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the decision the Court observed as follows: “1.The neat question involved in these special leave petitions is whether the amendment of Ss.4 and 4A of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, made by Act No.30 of 1995 with effect from 15-9-1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest, would be attracted to cases where the claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident caused during the course of employment, took place prior to 15- 9-1995?2. Various High Courts in the country, while dealing with the claim for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act have uniformly taken the view that the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of the accident.3. A four Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, (1976) 1 SCC 289 :( AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 222) speaking through Singhal, J. has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workmen by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim. 10. The Court then referred to a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Alavi, 1998(1) KerLT 951(FB) and approved it in so far as it followed the decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo. 11. The decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo was by a four Judge Bench and in Valsala by a three Judge Bench of this Court. Both the decisions were, thus, fully binding on the Court in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir, each of which was heard by two Judges. But the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala were not brought to the notice of the Court in the two later decisions in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir. 12. In light of the decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala, it is not open to contend that the payment of compensation would fall due only after the Commissioner’s order or with reference to the date on which the claim application is made. The decisions in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir insofar as they took a contrary view to the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala do not express the correct view and do not make binding precedents. 13. In light of the discussion made above, we find no merit in the appeal and it is dismissed with costs amounting to Rs.20,000/-. The amount of cost must be paid to the respondents within six weeks from today." (Emphasis supplied) 17. Recently, the jurisdictional High court of Rajasthan in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd V/s. LR's Dhapur Kanwar, 2024 Supreme (Raj) 1019 after considering various case laws has held in para 32 and 33 as under :- 32. Before adverting to construe the provisions of a beneficial legislation like the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 , the object for which it was enacted has to be kept in mind. It is evident that the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 was enacted in India with the primary objective of providing financial compensation to workmen/employees who suffer injury or death during the course of their employment. It is evident that the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 was enacted in India with the primary objective of providing financial compensation to workmen/employees who suffer injury or death during the course of their employment. The Act is a significant piece of legislation aimed at protecting the rights and advancing the welfare of workmen/employees ensuring that their dependants are compensated for the loss of income resulting from workplace accidents. The key objects and reasons are protection of workmen and their families, accountability of employers, equitable compensation and judicial and administrative mechanism. Thus, the provisions of the Act are beneficial for the workmen and their families and therefore, have to be interpreted in the manner so as to advance the object with which it was enacted rather than putting any obstruction in the implementation. 33. It is clear from the bare perusal of Section 4A (1) of the Act that the compensation under Section 4 of the Act shall be paid as soon as it falls due. Now, it is important to understand the meaning of the expression ’as soon as it falls due’ as used in Section 4-A of the Act for understanding when the compensation under Section 4 of the Act falls due or becomes payable. The conjoint reading of Section 4A(1) and Section 8(1) and Section 8(5) of the Act suggests that the compensation under Section 4 of the Act falls due immediately on the date of the death of such workman and thus, becomes payable to any one dependant of such deceased workman. Thus, a right to receive compensation crystallizes in favour of any one dependant of the deceased workman immediately on the death of such workman. Therefore, the relevant date for ascertaining whether right to receive compensation accrued in favour of a dependant is the date of workman’s death and not the date when claim petition is filed. 18. It is thus clear that the Courts have determined consistently that the payment of compensation fell due on the date of accident/death. As the date of accrual of payment of compensation is date of death thus the dependency is to be seen on the date of death itself. In view of the above analysis, inescapable conclusion would be that the age of 18 years has to be considered on the date of death of the deceased workman. 19. As the date of accrual of payment of compensation is date of death thus the dependency is to be seen on the date of death itself. In view of the above analysis, inescapable conclusion would be that the age of 18 years has to be considered on the date of death of the deceased workman. 19. In view of the above analysis, the relevant date for considering dependency would be the date on which the workman dies. In the present case the appellant No.1 was 17 years of age on the date of death of his father, thus he was was not only minor and consequently dependent on the date of death of deceased Gopal his father but even on the date of filing of claim petition still he was a minor as he had not attained the age of 18 years thus even on the death of filing claim petition also he was a dependent in terms of the above quoted definition of dependent. The Workmen's Compensation Act is a beneficial legislation. Interpretation of the provisions of the Act must be made in such a manner that the object of the Act is achieved. In the present case, if any other interpretation other than the one as arrived at hereinabove is taken then it will defeat the very purpose of the legislation. It is thus hereby held that the appellant No.1 was dependent on deceased Gopal in terms of the definition of dependent as contained in the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. Thus, the compensation on the death of Gopal on 17/10/2007 has become due in favour of appellant No.1 which the employer/Insurance Co. are liable to pay. The question No.1 is answered accordingly in favour of the appellant. 20. As regards the question No.2 :- the appellants have not brought any material so as to establish anything contrary to the findings recorded by the claims tribunal about the income of the deceased at Rs.3000/- per month. As such the question No.2 is decided against the appellant No.1. 21. However, as the quantum of compensation has not been determined by the learned Labour Court in view of the fact that dependency was decided against the claimants thus the case is remanded back to the learned Labour Court for a limited purpose so as to ascertain the quantum of compensation in view of the evidence available in the present case. However, as the quantum of compensation has not been determined by the learned Labour Court in view of the fact that dependency was decided against the claimants thus the case is remanded back to the learned Labour Court for a limited purpose so as to ascertain the quantum of compensation in view of the evidence available in the present case. It is expected that the exercise be completed by the learned Labour Court as early as possible, preferably on or before 31/10/2025 looking to the fact that the concerned employee has died on 17.10.2007. 22. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed in part in above terms.