JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.08.2010, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code(IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the informant, Ramesh Chand (PW-1), was carrying out the construction of Suresh Bakshi’s building. A motorcycle bearing registration No. HP37-2108 came from Tang at a high speed at 4:45 p.m. Two persons were riding the motorcycle. Dulo Ram (since deceased) was coming from Narwana Bazar with a gunny bag on his head. The motorcycle hit Dulo Ram, and he fell on the road. Motorcycle riders stopped the motorcycle at some distance and ran away from the spot. The informant and other persons reached the spot.They found that Dulo Ram had sustained injuries. He subsequently succumbed to his injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the motorcycle rider. The police were informed about the accident. An entry (Ext.PW-10/A) was recorded at the Police Station. ASI Geeta Parkash (PW-8) went to the spot for verification of the information. He recorded the statement of Ramesh Chand (Ext.PW-8/A)and sent it to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-8/B) was registered. ASI Geeta Parkash (PW-8)conducted the investigation. Raj Kumar (PW-14) took the photographs (Ext.PW-14/A to Ext.PW-14/G) of the spot whose negatives are Ext.PW-14/H to Ext.PW-14/N. ASI Geeta Parkash (PW-8) prepared a site plan (Ext.PW-8/D).He conducted an inquest of the dead body and prepared a report (Ext.PW-8/F).He filed an application (Ext.PW-8/E) for conducting the post- mortem of the deceased. Dr Harjinder Singh Sohal (PW-4) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased and found that Dulo Ram had died due to haemorrhagic shock caused by ante mortem head injury. He issued the report (Ext.PW-4/A). ASI Geeta Parkash (PW-8) seized the motorcycle vide memo(Ext.PW- 2/A).HHC Mangal Singh (PW-13) conducted the mechanical examination of the motorcycle and found that there was no defect in it, which could have led to the accident.He issued the report (Ext.PW-13/A). The accused was arrested, and it was found that he had sustained injuries in the incident. ASI Geeta Parkash (PW-8) seized the motorcycle vide memo(Ext.PW- 2/A).HHC Mangal Singh (PW-13) conducted the mechanical examination of the motorcycle and found that there was no defect in it, which could have led to the accident.He issued the report (Ext.PW-13/A). The accused was arrested, and it was found that he had sustained injuries in the incident. An application was filed for his medical examination, and Dr. Veena Pathiarch (PW-9) conducted his medical examination.She found that he had sustained grievous injuries, which could have been caused within 24 hours of examination. She issued MLC (Ext.PW9/A). ASI Geeta Parkash recorded the statements of the remaining witnesses as per their version. After completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court put notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined fourteen (14)witnesses to prove its case. Ramesh Chand (PW-1)did not support the prosecution case. Tarsem Lal (PW-2) is the witness to the recovery of the motorcycle. Subhash Chand (PW-3) is an eyewitness. Dr Harjinder Singh (PW-4) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. Sanjay Kumar (PW-5) heard the noise and found that Dulo Ram had died. Ajay Kumar (PW-6) is the owner of the motorcycle. Amar Chandel (PW-7) did not support the prosecution case. ASI Geeta Parkash (PW-8) conducted the investigation.Dr Veena Pathiarch (PW-9) conducted the medical examination of the accused. Ramesh Kumar (PW-10) proved the entry in the daily diary.R.P.Jaswal (PW-11) signed the challan. Sushil Kumar (PW-12) signed the F.I.R. HHC Mangal Singh (PW-13) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. Raj Kumar (PW-14) took the photographs of the spot. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 ofCr.P.C.,denied that he was driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident. He admitted that he had sustained injuries and that he was medically examined. He stated that he had sustained an injury due to a fall. He claimed that he was innocent and that he was falsely implicated. He did not lead any defence evidence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that Ramesh Chand (PW-1) and Amar Chandel (PW-7) had not supported the prosecution case. The presence of Subhash Chand (PW-3) was not established on the spot. He claimed that he was innocent and that he was falsely implicated. He did not lead any defence evidence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that Ramesh Chand (PW-1) and Amar Chandel (PW-7) had not supported the prosecution case. The presence of Subhash Chand (PW-3) was not established on the spot. He stated that the accused was driving the motorcycle at a high speed, which is not sufficient to establish his negligence. Hence, the accused was acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The evidence was not properly appreciated, and the reasoning of the learned Trial Court is unsustainable. The testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses were discarded on untenable grounds. Subhash Chand (PW-3) specifically stated that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. This part of the statement was wrongly discarded. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State and Mr Tarun Brakta, vice counsel representing the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in discarding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Subhash Chand (PW-3) had categorically stated that the accused was driving the motorcycle at a high speed, and the motorcycle had hit Dulo Ram, who was walking on the side of the road. The accused should not have driven the vehicle at a high speed when he had seen a person walking on the road. His negligence led to the accident. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Tarun Brakta, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. The accused cannot be held liable simply because the witness has used the term “High Speed”.There should be some evidence of approximate speed in the absence of which the negligence is not established. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. The accused cannot be held liable simply because the witness has used the term “High Speed”.There should be some evidence of approximate speed in the absence of which the negligence is not established. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu SahebagoudaRudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035 , a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “ 38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: ( Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 ], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Ramesh Chand (PW-1),the informant, did not support the prosecution case. He stated that he heard a noise. He went to the spot and saw Dulo Ram lying on the road. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Ramesh Chand (PW-1),the informant, did not support the prosecution case. He stated that he heard a noise. He went to the spot and saw Dulo Ram lying on the road. The motorcycle was lying at some distance; however, the accused was not present on the spot. He denied that he had seen the accused driving the motorcycle, and the motorcycle had hit Dulo Ram in his presence. Thus, this witness has not proved that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the accused. 15. Tarsem Lal (PW-2) stated that he came to know that his uncle had met with an accident. He reached the spot and found the dead body of his uncle on the road. The motorcycle was lying at some distance. He had heard the name of the accused from people. He had seen the accused going towards Dharamshala, and injuries were visible on the body of the accused. His testimony that he heard the people mentioning the name of the accused does not establish that the accused was driving the motorcycle. His statement that he had seen the accused going towards Dharamshala on the bus is an improvement because he admitted that he had not mentioned this fact to the police during the investigation. Thus, his testimony does not establish the prosecution case. 16. Sanjay Kumar (PW-5) stated that he had heard a noise. He came out and saw that a motorcycle was lying on the road. One person was also lying on the road in an injured condition.The person subsequently succumbed to his injuries. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He denied that he was making a false statement at the instance of the accused. His testimony also does not establish the prosecution’s case. 17. Subhash Chand (PW-3) stated that he was going to Chakki Balhehar on 05.09.2005 at 4:45 p.m. DuloRam was coming towards Balhehar. The accused was riding the motorcycle at a high speed. The motorcycle hit Dulo Ram. Dulo Ram fell. Motorcycle riders also fell at some distance. They boarded a bus and went away from the spot. Many people had gathered at the spot. Dulo Ram succumbed to his injuries. He stated in his cross-examination that Ramesh Chand (PW-1) arrived five minutes after his arrival. The motorcycle hit Dulo Ram. Dulo Ram fell. Motorcycle riders also fell at some distance. They boarded a bus and went away from the spot. Many people had gathered at the spot. Dulo Ram succumbed to his injuries. He stated in his cross-examination that Ramesh Chand (PW-1) arrived five minutes after his arrival. This is contradictory to the prosecution case because Ramesh was the person who had seen the incident first. Further, he stated that the accident had occurred due to the high speed of the motorcycle. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that merely using the term ‘high speed’ does not establish negligence. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it was elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath dey was struck by the bus, though not: from the front side of the bus as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 18. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur".” 19. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed:- “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 20. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh, 2008 Latest HLJ(2) 1360 wherein it was held:- “Thus negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res-ipsa-loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 21. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable based on high speed alone without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care which he had failed to do so. 22. It was submitted that the motorcycle had hit the deceased on the side of the road, which amounts to negligence. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable based on high speed alone without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care which he had failed to do so. 22. It was submitted that the motorcycle had hit the deceased on the side of the road, which amounts to negligence. A perusal of the site plan (Ext.PW-8/D) shows that the motorcycle was being driven on the left side of the road. Hence, there was no breach of duty to drive the vehicle because the Rules of Road Regulations provide that the vehicle is to be driven towards the left side of the road or as close to the left as possible. 23. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while holding that mere high speed does not amount to any negligence on the part of the accused. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view taken by the learned Trial Court while deciding the appeal against the acquittal, even if another view is possible. 24 No other point was urged. 25. Therefore, the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is sustainable. Consequently, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. 26. The present appeal is disposed of in aforesaid terms, so also pending application(s), if any. 27. A copy of the judgment alongwith the record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.