JUDGMENT : MALASRI NANDI, J. Heard Mr. D. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff. Also heard Mr. B. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants. 2. The appellant as plaintiff has preferred this appeal u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter CPC) against the judgment and order dated 03.03.2017, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Tinsukia in T.A No. 4/2016 affirming the judgment and order dated 18.01.2016, passed by the learned Munsiff No.2, Tinsukia in T.S No.47/2014. 3. The appellant being the plaintiff filed a title suit before the Court of Munsiff, Tinsukia vide T.S No.47/2014. The case of the plaintiff/appellant is that the plaintiff is in absolute possession in respect of 2 Bighas 2 Kathas of land covered by Dag No.109 and 110 of Touzi Patta No.43 situated at Monkhuli Gaon, Mouza- Tipling since 2007 and he was having his cultivation over the said land. He used to pay land revenue regularly for the said land. The respondents/defendants are his neighbors and they tried to disturb his peaceful possession over the said land. 4. On 22.04.2014, at around 2 PM, the respondents/defendants armed with weapons like spears, daos, etc. entered into the suit land and started destroying the bamboo fencing erected thereon. When the appellant raised objection over such nuisance, the defendants attacked him by uttering filthy languages and threatened him with dire consequences. Subsequently, at the intervention of Police of Bordubi P.S, the defendants were not successful in their attempts and left the suit land. It is also the case of the plaintiff/appellant that the defendants had never been in possession of the suit land prior to trespass and he has been in continuous possession over the said land. 5. After examination of the witnesses of both sides and hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the trial court dismissed the title suit filed by the plaintiff on the ground that – “ the suit land is a government land and the suit land is under Touzi Patta No.43 which makes it evident that the appellant used to pay “bedakhali jorimond” for the same. The case record does not reveal anywhere that there was any settlement in favour of the plaintiff. Moreover, payment of Touzi revenue cannot confer any title to anybody over any plot of land.” 6. The case record does not reveal anywhere that there was any settlement in favour of the plaintiff. Moreover, payment of Touzi revenue cannot confer any title to anybody over any plot of land.” 6. Against the judgment of the trial court, the plaintiff/appellant preferred an appeal before the Civil Judge, Tinsukia, vide T.A No.04/2016. The learned Civil Judge after hearing the learned counsel for the parties affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the ground which is reproduced as follows – “ In our suit at hand, it does not reveal that any settlement has been made in favour of the plaintiff so as to enter his name in the record of rights. Neither is there any lease granted by the Deputy Commissioner to the plaintiff in respect of the suit land. Entry of the name in the touzi register is not sufficient to hold that lease has been granted by the Deputy Commissioner to the plaintiff and neither does it amount to entry of name in the records of right, so as to create any right in favour of the plaintiff to retain possession of the land….” 7. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law- “ Whether the decision of the Courts below on issue no.2 and 3 are perverse for non-consideration of the relevant evidence and for not recording any finding on issue no.2 as to whether the suit land is a Touzi land or annual patta land ! ” 8. It was argued by learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant that the decision of the trial court as well as the first appellate court on issue no.2 as to whether the suit land is covered by Touzi patta No.43 is not sustainable in law as the same is based on perverse finding for non-consideration of the evidence of PW-3, Lat Mandal of Tinsukia Revenue Circle, who produced the Register of Touzi Patta No.43 vide Ext. 6 and 6(1) which contains the name of the appellant. As such, the plaintiff’s suit for declaration of possessory right over the suit land has been illegally dismissed by the trial court and the first appellate court. 9. Further submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant is that while deciding issue no.3 regarding possession of the plaintiff/appellant over the suit land, the courts below have not considered the relevant documentary evidence i.e. Ext. 9. Further submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant is that while deciding issue no.3 regarding possession of the plaintiff/appellant over the suit land, the courts below have not considered the relevant documentary evidence i.e. Ext. 6 and 6(1) which supports the possession of the plaintiff/appellant over the suit land in addition to the oral evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4. 10. It is also submitted that the learned courts below failed to appreciate the oral evidence of the defence witnesses that the suit land is a ceiling surplus land is beyond and contrary to the pleaded case of the defendants/respondents who has specifically stated in the written statement that the suit land is an annual patta land. Accordingly, learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant has submitted that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned court below is not tenable in law as no independent assessment of the pleadings and evidence were made before confirming the findings of the learned trial court. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant has relied on the following case laws- a) (2018) 11 SCC 564 (Narendra and others Vs. Ajabrao [dead] through legal representatives ) b) (2013) 6 SCC 602 (S.R. Tiwari Vs. Union of India and Another) 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants have submitted that the defendants/respondents are in possession of the suit land since 1982 which is ceiling surplus land and a part of the total land measuring 5 Bighas 2 Kathas covered by Patta No. 6C and 2C of Dag Nos.108, 109 and 110 of Mouza -Tipling of Itakhuli Tea Estate. In support of the fact, DW-1 has exhibited some revenue paying receipts vide Ext. B, C, D and E 12. It is further contended by learned counsel for the respondents/defendants that the memo of second appeal filed by the plaintiff/appellant before the High Court suffered from a serious infirmity. Section 100 of the Code restricts the jurisdictions of the High Court to hear a second appeal only on substantial question of law involved in the case. An obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memo of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the High Court. An obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memo of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the High Court. The High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. But in the case in hand, the plaintiff/appellant has filed the second appeal without formulating any substantial question of law and the appeal was admitted accordingly, which is not permissible in the eye of law. 13. It is further submitted that the points raised in the appeal by the plaintiff/appellant before the High Court is one of question of facts which cannot be taken into consideration in second appeal before the High Court and learned counsel for the respondents prays for dismissal of the second appeal. Learned counsel for the respondents/defendants has relied on the following case laws – a) 2001 AIR (SC) 965 (Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari) b) (2000) 3 GLT 330 (Konsam Ningol Mikoi Devi and Another Vs. Kumam Achouba Singh and others) 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the moot question raised in this appeal is whether the substantial question of law so formulated by this Court at the time of admission of this appeal is involved in the instant appeal. 15. Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. 16. In State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. S.N. Goyal, AIR 2008 SC 2594 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the terms “substantial question of law” and observed as under - “The word ‘substantial’ prefixed to ‘question of law’ does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. ‘Substantial questions of law’ means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. ‘Substantial questions of law’ means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. In the context of Section 100 CPC, any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law. Where there is a clear and settled enunciation on a question of law, by this Court or by the High Court concerned, it cannot be said that the case involves a substantial question of law. It is said that a substantial question of law arises when a question of law, which is not finally settled by this court (or by the concerned High Court so far as the State is concerned), arises for consideration in the case. But this statement has to be understood in the correct perspective. Where there is a clear enunciation of law and the lower court has followed or rightly applied such clear enunciation of law, obviously the case will not be considered as giving rise to a substantial question of law, even if the question of law may be one of general importance. On the other hand, if there is a clear enunciation of law by this Court (or by the concerned High Court), but the lower court had ignored or misinterpreted or misapplied the same, and correct application of the law as declared or enunciated by this Court (or the concerned High Court) would have led to a different decision, the appeal would involve a substantial question of law as between the parties. Even where there is an enunciation of law by this court (or the concerned High Court) and the same has been followed by the lower court, if the appellant is able to persuade the High Court that the enunciated legal position needs reconsideration, alteration, modification or clarification or that there is a need to resolve an apparent conflict between two view points, it can be said that a substantial question of law arises for consideration….” 17. In Vijay Kumar Talwar Vs. In Vijay Kumar Talwar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 673 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that- “ A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be 'substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case, whether a question of law is a substantial one or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 18. In Vijay Kumar Talwar (Supra), it was further observed that – “The Court, for the reasons to be recorded, may also entertain a second appeal even on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the Court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. Therefore, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine-qua- non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 CPC. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. There may be a question, which may be a “question of fact”, “question of law”, “mixed question of fact and law” and “substantial question of law.” Question means anything inquired; an issue to be decided. The “question of fact” is whether a particular factual situation exists or not. A question of fact, in the Realm of Jurisprudence, has been explained as under - “A question of fact is one capable of being answered by way of demonstration. A question of opinion is one that cannot be so answered. The “question of fact” is whether a particular factual situation exists or not. A question of fact, in the Realm of Jurisprudence, has been explained as under - “A question of fact is one capable of being answered by way of demonstration. A question of opinion is one that cannot be so answered. An answer to it is a matter of speculation which cannot be proved by any available evidence to be right or wrong.” (Vide: Salmond, on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., cited in Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao Vs. E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil & ors., AIR 1994 SC 678 ).” 19 Vide case of Jagdish Singh Vs. Nathu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604 ; Smt.Prativa Devi (Smt.) Vs. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 ; Satya Gupta (Smt.)@ Madhu Gupta Vs. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423 ; Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary & Co., AIR 2000 SC 534 ; Molar Mal (dead) through Lrs. Vs. M/s. Kay Iron Works Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1261 ; Bharatha Matha & Anr. Vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2685 ;and Dinesh Kumar Vs. Yusuf Ali, (2010) 12 SCC 740 , it was held that- “There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even on question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of the courts below were vitiated by non- consideration of relevant evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter and findings recorded in the court below are perverse.” 20. In Jai Singh Vs. Shakuntala, AIR 2002 SC 1428 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is permissible to interfere even on question of fact but it may be only in “very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible, it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can thus be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection.” Similar view has been taken in the case of Kashmir Singh Vs. Harnam Singh & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 1749 21. Admittedly, in the instant case, the suit land belongs to the Government and the plaintiff/appellant occupied the said land by paying Touzi revenue. Harnam Singh & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 1749 21. Admittedly, in the instant case, the suit land belongs to the Government and the plaintiff/appellant occupied the said land by paying Touzi revenue. The learned trial court as well as the first appellate court by referring the judgment vide State of Assam and others Vs. Smt. Radha Kanoo and others reported in 1996 8 SCC 692 , wherein it was held that the payment of Touzi Bahira Revenue does not confer any legal right upon the occupier of the government land. 22. The plaintiff/appellant in the present case, has prayed for declaration of possessory right over the suit land with permanent injunction restraining the defendants from entering into the suit land and from making any kind of construction over the said land. In that event, possession of the plaintiff/appellant was a permissive one and an permissive occupier cannot acquire right, title and interest with respect to a land for long possession until and unless title vests on him in any of the recognized means of transfer of title or by settlement by the Government under the provisions of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. 23. In the case in hand, the plaintiff/appellant prayed for his possessory right over the suit land which is a government khas land. The status of any occupier can be no better than that of an encroacher and in this context, it must be observed that deposit of Touzi Bahira Revenue which is nothing but a fine realized from an encroacher, will not confer any legal right on the occupier. But through a wrong interpretation, this Court in Radha Kanoo Vs. Assam Board of Revenue, reported in (1994) 1 GLR, 122 declared that person in occupation of government land by depositing Touzi Bahira fine should be categorized as occupants with implied permission of the Revenue Authority and they should not be condemned as encroachers. But this decision was reversed and corrected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Assam Vs. Radha Kanoo, reported in (1996) 8 SCC 692 , where the Court observed as follows – “ 5….. But this decision was reversed and corrected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Assam Vs. Radha Kanoo, reported in (1996) 8 SCC 692 , where the Court observed as follows – “ 5….. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that Touzi Bahira Revenue collected by Mouzadar would amount to collection of revenue and that the possession of such person would not become unlawful and no action under Rule 18 is called for unless action is taken to terminate a non-existent lease or to pass any proper order and then, to recover possession of lands from the encroacher in accordance with the provisions of the Assam Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1976 24. Thus, what follows from the above that, collection of Touzi Bahira fine from the occupier of government land does not confer any legal right on the occupier and eviction of such encroachers can be ordered under Rule 18 of the Land Revenue Regulation. 25. In the instant case, plaintiff/appellant has failed to make averment in the plaint and did not produce a scrap of paper to show that he was settled with the suit land. As such, he cannot claim any right, rather possessory right with respect to the suit land. 26. The learned trial court as well as the first appellate court did not appear to have committed any error in dismissing the suit for declaration of possessory right of the plaintiff/appellant over the suit land. Considering the entirety of circumstances, this Court does not find any scope to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court as well as the first appellate court which have been passed after due deliberation and after due consideration of the attending facts and circumstances of the case. 27. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 28. Transmit the trial court records. 29. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.