ORDER : This criminal revision under section 397 r/w section 401 of the Cr.P.C, 1973 is preferred being aggrieved by the order dated 26.11.2024 in S.T. No.29/2024 whereby the charges under sections 294, 147, 148, 323/ 149(06 Counts), 324/ 149(02 Counts), 307/ 149(02 Counts), 201, 506(Part-2), 427 of IPC have been framed against revision petitioner Rajesh Chouhan and charges under sections 294, 147, 148, 323/149 (06 Counts), 324/149(02 Counts), 307/149(02 Counts), 201, 506(Part-2), 427 of IPC have been framed against revision petitioner Mithun Parmar, Ravi@Umesh Goswami, Ajgar Khan and Rakesh Chouhan in a case arising out of Crime No.358/2024 registered at P.S. Betma, District- Indore (M.P.). 2. The main grievance of the petitioner relates to framing of charges under sections 307 of the IPC for attempt to committing the murder to Chittar Singh and Shubham and revision petition is preferred on the ground that it is a case of free fight between two group and total number of accused in present case are 10 and total number of accused in cross case are 5 registered as crime no.357/2024 at P.S. Betma, District Indore (M.P.) under section 294, 323, 325, 506, 190/34 of the IPC against Chittar Singh, Mukesh, Shubham Mamta and Sundhar Bai. 3. It is also submitted that the incident took place at the spur of moment, so intention, motive and common object will not attract for framing charges under section 307/149 of the IPC for attempting the murder off Chittar Singh and Shubham. As per MLC and other documents filed by the prosecution did not mention that sustained injuries are dangerous to life. They sustained no fracture and injuries are simple. The review petitioners relied on the case of Kailash Vs. State of Rajasthan (2002) Cri.L.J. 390 and the case of Bholu alias Hanuman Vs. State of Rajasthan (2008) Cri.L.J. 3744. 4. Heard. 5. Counsel for the respondent no.1/State opposes the prayer submitting that charges have been framed on the basis of material available with the final report submitting under section 173(2) of Cr.P.C., 1973 & only "grievous suspicion" is required at the Stage of framing of charges. No injury is required for framing charges under section 307 of the IPC. 6. Counsel for the respondent no.2 also opposes the revision petition. 7. Perused the record. Basic Ingredients/ Necessary requirements for constituting offence u/s 307 of the IPC are:- 8. No injury is required for framing charges under section 307 of the IPC. 6. Counsel for the respondent no.2 also opposes the revision petition. 7. Perused the record. Basic Ingredients/ Necessary requirements for constituting offence u/s 307 of the IPC are:- 8. Before discussing & examining the facts of the case, it would be appropriate to refer the basic/fundamental ingredients/requirements necessary in law to constitute the offence u/s 307 of IPC. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jage Ram Vs. State of Haryana, (2015)11 SCC 366 , has held as under:- “12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given etc. 9. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Balram Bama Patil, (1983) 2 SCC 28 , Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is not necessary that a bodily injury sufficient under normal circumstances to cause death should have been inflicted: “9…To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. In State of M.P. Vs. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “13.It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Hon’ble Apex Court in para 16 of The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kanha @ Omprakash, (2019) 3 SCC 605 has held that the lack of forensic evidence to prove grievous or a life threatening injury cannot be a basis to hold that section 307 is inapplicable. This proposition of law has been elucidated by a two judge bench of Apex Court in Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 369 :- “18.There is no merit in the contention that the statement of Medical Officer that there is no danger to life unless there is dislocation or rupture of the thyroid bone due to strangulation means that the accused did not intend, or have the knowledge, that their act would cause death. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 369 :- “18.There is no merit in the contention that the statement of Medical Officer that there is no danger to life unless there is dislocation or rupture of the thyroid bone due to strangulation means that the accused did not intend, or have the knowledge, that their act would cause death. The circumstances of this case clearly attract the second part of this Section since the act resulted in injury No.5 which is a ligature mark of 34 cm x 0.5 cm. It must be noted that Section 307 IPC provides for imprisonment for life if the act causes ‘hurt’. It does not require that the hurt should be grievous or of any particular degree. The intention to cause death is clearly attributable to the accused since the victim was strangulated after throwing a telephone wire around his neck and telling him he should die. We also do not find any merit in the contention on behalf of the appellant that there was no intention to cause death because the victim admitted that the accused were not armed with weapons. Very few persons would normally describe the Thums-up bottle and a telephone wire used as weapons. That the victim honestly admitted that the accused did not have any weapons cannot be held against him and in favour of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. In State of M.P. Vs. Kashiram, (2009) 4 SCC 26 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” 13. In this connection, I would also like to refer the decision in S.K. Khaja Vs. The State of Maharashtra, 2023 Live Law (SC) 715. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” 13. In this connection, I would also like to refer the decision in S.K. Khaja Vs. The State of Maharashtra, 2023 Live Law (SC) 715. In this case, when injured was trying to catch & get hold of the accused, he tried to assault the injured on his head by a gupti. However, injured while avoiding the blow on his head, got injury on his right shoulder. In above factual scenario, Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:- “8. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State, merely because the injuries sustained by the complainant-Mohammad Khan Pathan (PW-2) were very simple in nature, that would not absolve the appellant accused from being convicted for the offence under Section 307 of IPC. What is important is an intention coupled with the overt act committed by the appellant/accused. In the instant case, it was proved by cogent evidence that the appellant/accused had tried to assault the complainant-Mohammad Khan Pathan (PW-2) with Gupti and that too on his head. Though the complaint received injury on his right shoulder while avoiding blow on his head, from the blunt part of the Gupti, such an overt act on the part of the appellant/accused would be covered by the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC.” 14. Hon’ble Apex Court in para 6 of Sarju Prasad Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 843 (3-judge Bench) has held that therefore, the mere fact that the injury actually inflicted by the appellant did not cut any vital organ of Shankar Prasad is not by itself sufficient to take the act out of the purview of section 307 of IPC. 15. Thus, it is well settled principle of law that nature of the injury/actual injury sustained, is not the sole criteria to determine whether the offence u/s 307 of IPC is made out or not. Summarizing the law on the subject, Hon’ble Apex Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh VS. Kanha @ Omprakash (supra) in para 11 has held as under:- “…….The above judgments of this court lead us to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under 307 of the Penal Code. Kanha @ Omprakash (supra) in para 11 has held as under:- “…….The above judgments of this court lead us to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used & the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.” 16. Hon’ble Apex Court in M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2020) 2 SCC 768 , after referring to (2011) 14 SCC 608 , State of A.P. V. Obulapuram Mining Co. (P) Ltd., (2010) 2 SCC 398 , P. Vijayan V. State of Kerala, (2005) 1 SCC 568 , State of Orissa V. Debendra Nath Padhi. (2002) 2 SCC 135 , Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 4 SCC 181 , State of J &K V. Sudarshan Chakkar, (1979) 3 SCC 4 , Union of India Vs. Prafulla Samal, has held as under:- “17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions, viz., P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and another (2010) 2 SCC 398 and discern the following principles: 17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused. 17.2. The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution. 17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court. 17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”. 17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. 17.6. 17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. 17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. 17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. viii. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused. 17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused. 18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 of the Cr.PC (See State of J & K v. Sudershan Chakkar (1995) 4 SCC). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 of the Cr.PC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the 3 AIR 1995 SC 1954 charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the Police (See State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568 ). 28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Cr.PC. The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross- examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would enure to the benefit of the accused warranting the Trial Court to discharge the accused. 29. 29. It is not open to the accused to rely on material by way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him. 30. However, what is the meaning of the expression “materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of the court’s”, which is not explained away? Can the accused explain away the material only with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage? 31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him.” 17. Having set out the legal principles, as aforesaid, facts of the case will be examined in the light of above legal principles. 18. In this case, discharge certificate of Shubham Parmar issued by Unique Super Speciality Centre, Neema Hospital Pvt. Ltd., Indore mentioned that Shubham Parmar was treated from 27.05.2024 to 04.06.2024 for the injuries sustained in right parietal region, right wrist ventral aspect, left wrist and right shoulder and discharge certificate of Chittar Singh issued by Unique Super Speciality Centre, Neema Hospital Pvt. Ltd., Indore discloses that Chittar Singh was admitted from 27.05.2024 and remained in hospital till 05.06.2024 for treatment of injuries left hand with active bleeding in nasal, forehead and right lower thigh. The weapon used in the offence for causing the injuries to Chittar Singh and Shubham is sword. The statement recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C.,1973 presently section 180 of the B.N.S.S., 2023 mentioned that after inflicting the injuries to Chittar Singh and Shubham they were chased by one accused Umesh Giri and Rajesh and caused the injuries to family members who tried to save Shubham and Chittar Singh and thereafter, other family members were also assaulted after threatening that their houses will be burnt and when the victims were taken to the hospital for treatment then their car was damaged by colliding with vehicle. 19. 19. The nature of weapon used in the offence is sword, part of body selected for causing the injuries as vital and frustrating the every attempt of escape and to save their body coupled with the words that were used at the time of the incident taken collectively does not render the order of the trial court in framing the charge under section 307 of the IPC illegal in the light of State through Deputy Superintendent of Police Vs. R Soundri Ramsau AIR 2022 SC 4218 which is reproduced below:- "77. This Court in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299 , has held that interference in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in the rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction." 20. Accordingly, this instant criminal revision is hereby dismissed and the impugned order dated 26.11.2024 passed in S.T. No.29/2024 is hereby affirmed.