JUDGMENT : DEBANGSU BASAK, J. 1. Three appeals that have emanated from the same impugned judgment and order dated June 5, 2024, passed in WPA 11359 of 2021 have been heard analogously as they involve similar issues. 2. By the impugned judgment and order, learned Single Judge has held the construction of a commercial-cum-residential complex to be unauthorised and directed demolition thereof. 3. MAT 930 of 2024 has been filed by the developer of the property. Appellant in MAT 1009 of 2024 has claimed itself to be lessor in respect of a portion of the property directed to be demolished. Appellant in MAT 1027 of 2024 has claimed itself to be the welfare association of the owners of the flats of the property concerned. 4. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the developer has contended that, the developer constructed a commercial-cum-residential complex after obtaining requisite sanction to do so from the Minister palette. He has contended that, the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the buildings constructed were unauthorized. According to him, the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the plot of land in front of the complex was a part of a highway. He has referred to the provisions of the West Bengal Highways Act, 1964 particularly to Section 2(c)(iii) thereof. 5. Referring to orders passed in writ petition, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the developer has contended that, unauthorized encroachment in respect of such plot in front of the building concerned were directed to be removed by invoking the provisions of the West Bengal Highways Act, 1964 in a writ petition filed by 3rd parties. He has contended that, both the State Government as also the municipality accepted the plot in front of the land concerned to be a highway. State government had removed the encroachment from such plot treating it as a highway. Therefore, taking such plot as a part of the highway, the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) granted was correct. 6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the developer has contended that, his client did not deviate from the revised sanction granted in respect of the land concerned. He has pointed out that, after obtaining the sanction, his client applied for and obtained a revised sanction plan. According to him, his client did not make any construction which is beyond the sanctioned FAR. He has pointed out that, after obtaining the sanction, his client applied for and obtained a revised sanction plan. According to him, his client did not make any construction which is beyond the sanctioned FAR. He has pointed out that, though the revised sanction contemplates construction of a basement; his client did not construct the basement. Non-construction of such basement cannot be construed as a deviation. 7. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the developer has questioned the locus of the Writ Petitioner to file the Writ Petition. He has contended that, no legal right of the Writ Petitioner was violated by the alleged unauthorized construction or deviation from the sanctioned building plan. In support of such contentions, he has relied upon the judgment and order dated December 21, 2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPA 2209 of 2021 (Prasun Sundar Tarafdar Vs. The State of West Bengal and others.), judgment and order dated April 19, 2024, passed by the Division Bench in MAT 1476 of 2022 (M/s. Sonai Food Marketing Private Limited Vs. M/s. Bippatarini Agency & Ors.), 2009 Volume 2 Calcutta High Court Notes 379 (DB) (Calcutta Swimming Club Vs. Lalit Singh & Ors.), 2013 Volume 4 Supreme Court Cases 465 (Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others). 8. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the developer has also drawn the attention of the Court to the order dated July 11, 2018 passed in WP 7625 (w) of 2018 (Rajesh Kumar Surana vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) and the appeal Courts judgment and order dated August 27, 2018 passed in MAT 721 of 2018 (Ashok Kumar Giri vs. Rajesh Surana & Ors). 9. Relying upon 2006 Volume 8 Supreme Court Cases 590 (Muni Suvrat-Swami Jain S.M.P. Sangh Vs. Arun Nathuram Gaikwad and others) learned Senior Advocate appearing for the developer has contended that, the learned single Judge ought not to have held that there was unauthorised construction and should have referred such issue to be decided by the municipality. 10. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent no. 5 in MAT 930 of 2024 has submitted that his client is the owner of the plots over which, the constructions were made. 10. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent no. 5 in MAT 930 of 2024 has submitted that his client is the owner of the plots over which, the constructions were made. He has referred to the definition of Floor Area Ratio, means of access and width of the street as appearing in Rules 2 (30), (45), (74) of the West Bengal Municipal (Building) Rules, 2007 as also to Rules 45, 48A and 49 thereof. He has submitted that, the FAR sanctioned cannot be held to be erroneous in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 11. Relying upon 1989 Volume (2) Supreme Court Cases 495 (M/s. Rajatha Enterprises Vs. S. K. Sharma and others), learned Senior Advocate appearing for the owner has contended that the issue as to whether there was any unauthorized construction should have been relegated to the Municipal authorities for consideration. Learned Single Judge has erred in deciding such issue on the basis of the materials made available. According to him, the materials produced before Court does not establish that the developer or his client have violated any of the building rules. 12. Learned Advocate appearing for the Municipality has referred to the prayers made in the Writ Petition. He has contended that, the Writ Petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs as prayed for therein. According to him, no right of the Writ Petitioner has been violated. Therefore, according to him, the Writ Petition is not maintainable. 13. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant in MAT 1027 of 2024 has contended that, the plot in front of the land in question was acquired by the State Government for the purpose of a highway. In support of such contention, he has relied upon photocopies of notices issued under the provisions of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. He has also referred to the documents relating to acquisition of such plot. Consequently, according to him, the plot in front of the land has to be treated as a part of the highway while calculating the FAR. 14. Relying upon 1996 Volume 3 Supreme Court Cases 587 (J. Jose Dahanapaul Vs. S. Thomas and others), learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant in MAT 1027 of 2024 has contended that, since his client was not made a party to the Writ Petition, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 14. Relying upon 1996 Volume 3 Supreme Court Cases 587 (J. Jose Dahanapaul Vs. S. Thomas and others), learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant in MAT 1027 of 2024 has contended that, since his client was not made a party to the Writ Petition, the impugned order cannot be sustained. According to him, the impugned judgment and order materially affects the right and interests of his client. 15. Relying upon an order dated October 12, 2024 passed in WPA 9762 of 2021 (Dipanjan Dutta Vs. Midnapur Municipality and Ors.), learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant in MAT 1027 of 2024 has contended that, the Writ Petitioner is the alter ego of such Dipanjan Dutta. 16. Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant in MAT 1009 of 2024 has contended that, although the Writ Petitioner claims to be an intending purchaser but was able to obtain a copy of the lease deed entered into between his client and the lessor. He has also questioned the locus of the Writ Petitioner in maintaining the Writ Petition. 17. Learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has also referred to the report of the Municipality which was submitted before the learned Single Judge. He has contended that, such report would demonstrate that there were deviations from the sanctioned building plan. 18. Referring to the report of the Municipality, learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has contended that, the site plan referred to was not approved. He has also drawn the attention of the Court to Rule 2(30)(35), Rule 3(3)(b) and Rule 4 of the Rules of 2007. He has also referred to the as built plan. He has contended that, Municipality did not have any power to sanction an as built plan. 19. Referring to the West Bengal Highways Act, 1964 and the West Bengal Municipal (Building) Rules, 2007, learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has contended that, the sanction granted by the authorities are in violation of the Act of 1994 and the Rules of 2007. He has contended that, violations are apparent on the face of the record. 20. On the issue of locus of the writ petitioner, learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to the contents of the representation made to the Municipality. He has contended that, violations are apparent on the face of the record. 20. On the issue of locus of the writ petitioner, learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to the contents of the representation made to the Municipality. He has referred to Section 63 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 and contended that, the Municipality is under obligation to ensure that no building is erected without sanctioned building plan. According to him, Municipality has failed to discharge the statutory obligations as envisaged under Section 63 of the Act of 1993. 21. Relying upon 1974 Volume 2 Supreme Court Cases 506 (Sri K. Ramadas Shenoy vs. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi and Others) learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has contended that, the Municipality acts for the public benefit. He has contended that, where the actions of the Municipality are in excess of the powers conferred by statute or where the Municipality abuses those powers then in those cases it is not an exercise of jurisdiction irregularly or wrongly but it is usurping powers which it does not possess. 22. Learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has relied upon an order dated April 27, 2022 passed in WPA 5602 of 2022 in support of his contention that a citizen can maintain a writ petition to bring to the notice of the court infractions of Article 12 authorities. Writ petitioner has done so. 23. Primarily two issues have fallen for consideration before us, namely, i. Whether the sanctioned building plan or the revised building plan is in accordance with the West Bengal Municipal (Building) Rules, 2007 or not and ii. Writ petitioner has any locus standi to file and maintain the writ petition. 24. Writ petitioner has filed a writ petition being WPA 11359 of 2021 alleging that, the appellants in MAT 930 of 2024 is constructing a commercial-cum-residential building under the name and style of Tamluk Downtown on several plots of land situated at Mouza Padumbasan being JL No. 144, Khatian 8797, LR Plot No. 4424, 4425, 4426, 4427, 4433, 4434 and 4436 at Tamluk Town Police Station, Tamluk District, Purba Medinipore. Such plots of land fell within the jurisdiction of Tamralipta Municipality. Such plots of land fell within the jurisdiction of Tamralipta Municipality. In its writ petition, the writ petitioner has alleged that, there existed a registered development agreement dated February 28, 2017 and a supplementary development agreement dated September 26, 2019 between the land owner namely, Mr. Siraj Khan and the Developer being the appellant in MAT 930 of 2024. Writ petitioner has also alleged that a provisional sanctioned building plan dated December 19, 2017 had been issued by the Tamralipta Municipality for construction of a commercial-cum-residential building complex consisting of seven plots with a total constructed area/ built up area of 20,817.49 square metre. Writ petitioner has alleged that, Tamralipta Municipality acted in excess of the Act of 1993 and the Rules of 2007 in granting such sanction. Writ petitioner has alleged various deviations from the so-called sanctioned building plan had been made. Writ petitioner has also claimed that it issued advocate’s notice dated April 21, 2021 and May 11, 2021 which were received by the Municipality. However, despite having received the same Municipality did not respond thereto. Writ petitioner has also alleged that, the appellant of MAT 1009 of 2024 had entered into the possession of Block A of the commercial building by virtue of a registered lease deed dated December 27, 2019. Writ petitioner has alleged that, Tamralipta Municipality could not have issued the occupancy certificate in respect of Block A of the commercial building as the construction was unauthorized. 25. In course of hearing of the three appeals we had called for the Mouza Map which was submitted on behalf of the developer of the property. The appearing parties did not question the authenticity of the Mouza Map so produced nor did they have raised any objections as to its consideration by the court. 26. The Mouza Map shows that three more or less parallel lines comprised in plot Nos. 4337, 4338 and 4339 have been treated by the District Administration as a highway within the meaning of the West Bengal Highways Act, 1964. 27. A commercial-cum-residential building complex has been erected on plot Nos. 4424, 4425, 4426, 4427, 4433, 4434 and 4436. These plots are in a contiguous formation with plot Nos. 4424, 4425, 4426 being analogous to plot No. 4439 which is designated a highway within the meaning of the Act of 1964. 27. A commercial-cum-residential building complex has been erected on plot Nos. 4424, 4425, 4426, 4427, 4433, 4434 and 4436. These plots are in a contiguous formation with plot Nos. 4424, 4425, 4426 being analogous to plot No. 4439 which is designated a highway within the meaning of the Act of 1964. In arriving at our finding that plot No. 4339 forms part of a highway within the meaning of the Act of 1964, we have taken into consideration the acquisition notice dated August 18, 1966 issued in respect of the plots forming part of such highway under the provisions of the West Bengal (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. Appellant of MAT 1027 of 2024 has produced the acquisition notice dated August 18, 1966 issued under Section 4 of the Act of 1948. Again none of the appearing parties have objected to the production and consideration thereof at the hearing of the appeals. 28. The subject land comprised in the development agreement and over which, Tamralipta Municipality has sanctioned building plan and a revised building plan therefore opens on to a highway within the meaning of the Act of 1964. Three of the plots of the subject land appertains the highway. 29. Calculation of FAR is defined by the Rules of 2007. In calculating the FAR width of the street in front of the plot is taken into consideration, amongst others. 30. Calculation of FAR as done by the Municipality has been questioned by the writ petitioner over which the sanction had been granted as it did not open to a highway. At least, it did not have the requisite width for the FAR that has been granted by the Municipality. In the facts and circumstances of the present case we are unable to accept such contention of the writ petitioner since, three of the plots comprised in the land over which the sanctioned and the revised sanctioned building plan have been granted by the municipality opens on to a highway within the meaning of the Act of 1964. Width of the highway concerned is sufficient for the FAR to be calculated in the manner that Municipality has done. Width of the highway concerned is sufficient for the FAR to be calculated in the manner that Municipality has done. In any event, as noted above, calculation of the FAR of the writ petitioner is premised upon an erroneous fact that, the land does not open to a highway therefore disentitling the owner and the developer of the quantum of FAR granted by the Municipality. 31. In its report submitted to the court, the municipality has taken the stand that, the FAR was calculated on the basis of the plots over which permission for construction was sought for by the proposed building plan, opened to a highway. Such factual position in respect of the plots concerned has not been established to be incorrect by the writ petitioner. 32. Muni Suvrat-Swami Jain S.M.P. Sangh (supra) has been rendered in the context of section 351 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 which granted discretion to the Municipal Commissioner for regularisation of an unauthorised construction. In the facts and circumstances of that case, it has been held that, High Court should have relegated the issue of unauthorised construction to the Municipal Commissioner as the Municipal Commissioner was vested with the discretion to decide on regularisation, under the statute. 33. M/s. Rajatha Enterprises (supra) has expressed the view that, the issue of unauthorised construction should be left to the decision of the concerned municipality. 34. Factual matrix in the present case is different than the authorities noted above. Writ petition is based on a claim of FAR which the writ petitioner failed to establish. Moreover, enquiry with regard to FAR was done by the learned Single Judge, with the Municipality submitting a report as noted above. 35. Writ petitioner has failed to establish that, the sanctioned building plan or the revised building plan granted by the Tamralipta Municipality is in violation of the Building Rules, 2007. 36. In view of the discussions above we answer the first issue in the negative, in favour of the appellants and against the writ petitioner. 37. Although a school of thought may suggest that with the answer to the first issue being given against the writ petitioner, the second issue as to the locus of the writ petitioner need not be answered. Nonetheless, since the parties have raised the issue of the locus of the writ petitioner, we are minded to deal with the same. 38. Although a school of thought may suggest that with the answer to the first issue being given against the writ petitioner, the second issue as to the locus of the writ petitioner need not be answered. Nonetheless, since the parties have raised the issue of the locus of the writ petitioner, we are minded to deal with the same. 38. The division bench in Calcutta Swimming Club (supra) has considered an appeal directed against an interim order passed in a suit for declaration and injunction. While dealing with the facts and circumstances of the case of the plaintiff, the division bench has held that, in order to maintain a suit, the plaintiff must prove that right to sue has accrued in his favour. Again in the facts and circumstances of that case, the division bench has found that, the learned Single Judge did not follow appropriate procedures which were required to be followed while disposing of an application for injunction. 39. Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) has dealt with the issue of person aggrieved in the context of a caste certificate. It has held as follows: – “9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the authority/court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order, etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can, of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. [Vide State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [1951 SCC 1024 : AIR 1952 SC 12 ], Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1954 SC 728 ], Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [ AIR 1962 SC 1044 ], Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [ (1996) 5 SCC 460 : AIR 1996 SC 2736 ] and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Assn. (2) v. S.C. Sekar [ (2009) 2 SCC 784 ].] 10. A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York [ (1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC 1719 ] and State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [ (1977) 3 SCC 592 : AIR 1977 SC 1361 ].) …………………………………………………………………………… 16. In Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal [ (2002) 1 SCC 33 ], this Court considered a similar issue and observed as under : (SCC p. 54, para 38) “38. There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid article. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in our country and the constitutional courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical grounds. … In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi.” 17. In view of the above, the law on the said point can be summarised to the effect that a person who raises a grievance, must show how he has suffered legal injury. Generally, a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, cannot be permitted to intervene in the affairs of others.” 40. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the writ petitioner did not belong to the Scheduled Tribes category and therefore was found not to be deprived of the legitimate right to be considered for the post at which a person was appointed on the basis of a Scheduled Tribe certificate. 41. In Rajesh Kumar Surana (supra) the issue of locus standi of a writ petitioner alleging unauthorised construction has been answered by holding that such a writ petition is maintainable since, there was complaint of an Article 12 authority violating statutory rules. It has also proceeded on the basis that, a citizen is entitled to approach the writ court upon the complaint of violation of statutory rules by a statutory body not being addressed by the statutory body. It has also held that, a writ petition is maintainable where a statutory authority has failed to discharge duties enjoined upon it by law. 42. It has also held that, a writ petition is maintainable where a statutory authority has failed to discharge duties enjoined upon it by law. 42. Ashok Kumar Giri (supra) has dismissed the appeal directed against Rajesh Kumar Surana (supra). 43. Rajesh Kumar Surana (supra) has been followed in Amarendra Nath Chanda and another (supra) after noticing it. 44. A learned Single Judge has considered the issue of locus standi of a writ petitioner to file a writ petition relating to service matter in Prasun Sundar Tarafdar (supra). In the facts of that case, the court has held that, the writ petitioner was without requisite locus as no right of the writ petitioner was established to be violated by the appointment of a Principal to a school. 45. On the issue of locus standi a division bench in M/s. Sonai Food Marketing Private Limited (supra) has noted Prasun Sundar Tarafdar (supra) with approval. 46. Sri K. Ramadas Shenoy (supra) has held that, if sanction to build something is granted contravening a byelaw, the jurisdiction of the courts can be invoked on the grounds that the approval by the authority of building plans which contravenes the byelaws made by that authority is illegal and inoperative. It has also noted that municipal authorities owe duty and obligation under the statute to see that the residential area is not spoiled by unauthorised construction. 47. Authorities on the issue of locus standi of a writ petitioner to maintain a writ petition suggest that, the writ petitioner must show that he has suffered a legal injury except in the case where the writ prayed is for habeas corpus or quo warranto or the writ petition is a public interest litigation. Authorities also note that, the rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a writ petitioner has undergone a change with the constitutional courts adopting a liberal approach. A writ petitioner can be non-suited on the ground of his not having locus standi only if the writ petitioner is found to be a mere stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property. We have drawn sustenance of this view from Sri K. Ramadas Shenoy (supra), (Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) and 2002 volume 1 Supreme Court Cases 33 (Ghulam Qadir vs. Special Tribunal) referred to and relied upon in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra). 48. We have drawn sustenance of this view from Sri K. Ramadas Shenoy (supra), (Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) and 2002 volume 1 Supreme Court Cases 33 (Ghulam Qadir vs. Special Tribunal) referred to and relied upon in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra). 48. Sri K. Ramadas Shenoy (supra) has held that an illegal construction materially affects the rights of all to the enjoyment of the property by persons residing in the residential area. Learned Single Judge while dealing with the issue of the locus standi of the writ petitioner, has referred to various authorities of the Supreme Court. In 2013 volume 5 Supreme Court Cases 336 (Dipak Kumar Mukherjee vs Kolkata Municipal Corporation and others) which has been noted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order, Supreme Court has allowed a writ petition of a concerned citizen regarding unauthorised construction. Menace of unscrupulous builders in connivance with officers of the municipal and regulatory authorities who under political influence or otherwise, are constructing buildings in blatant violation of the municipal laws has been noted by the Supreme Court in the authorities referred to by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order on the issue of locus standi. 49. Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) has explained the meaning of “legal right” and “person aggrieved”. It has held that, a legal right means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. It has defined legal right as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Person aggrieved has been understood to be one who’s right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised and not to include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury. 50. Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) has quoted paragraph 25 of 2011 Volume 7 Supreme Court Cases 616 (A. Subash Babu vs. State of AP) which is as follows: – “12. In A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P. [ (2011) 7 SCC 616 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 851 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 267 : AIR 2011 SC 3031 ], this Court held : (SCC pp. 628-29, para 25) “25. … The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. 628-29, para 25) “25. … The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which the contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant.” 51. In the context of a writ petition alleging construction in violation of the building rules and the municipality not taking any action on the complaints regarding such violations, a resident of such municipality has locus standi to maintain a writ petition. See Sri K. Ramadas Shenoy (supra) for such proposition. Even a concerned citizen can maintain such a writ petition. See Dipak Kumar Mukherjee (supra) for the same. 52. In the facts of the present case, the writ petitioner has claimed that he is a resident of the concerned municipality. Writ petitioner has alleged that, he intended to purchase a flat at the concerned commercial-cum-residential complex and that, in furtherance of such intention, he had undertaken a due diligence whereupon he has come to learn that, the concerned commercial-cum-residential complex is unauthorised as the concerned municipality could not have granted a sanction for building the same. He has also alleged that he made two several representations to the municipality pointing out the infractions of the municipal act and the building rules of which the builder and the owner of the property were guilty of. 53. We have no materials before us to disbelieve the claim of the writ petitioner that he is a resident of the municipality. Therefore, on the strength of Sri K. Ramadas Shenoy (supra) the writ petition cannot be said to be not maintainable. 54. The contention of the writ petitioner that he had evinced an intention to buy a flat at the concerned commercial-cum-residential complex has not been denied by the builder. Builder in its affidavit has acknowledged that, the writ petitioner initially approached it to purchase a flat at the complex but later on did not proceed with the transaction. 55. 54. The contention of the writ petitioner that he had evinced an intention to buy a flat at the concerned commercial-cum-residential complex has not been denied by the builder. Builder in its affidavit has acknowledged that, the writ petitioner initially approached it to purchase a flat at the complex but later on did not proceed with the transaction. 55. Writ petitioner has claimed that while intending to buy a flat at the concerned complex he had undertaken a due diligence whereupon he had learnt as to the violation of the building rules which he alleged in the written complaints to the municipality as also in the writ petition. In such perspective, the writ petitioner cannot be classified as a stranger or a busybody having no interest in the subject matter of the writ petition. 56. In view of the discussions above, the second issue is answered in favour of the writ petitioner and as against the appellants. The writ petition is held to be maintainable. 57. Courts have noted that there is a distinction between maintainability of a writ petition and it’s entertainability. A writ petition may be found to be maintainable but at the same time may not be entertained by the court. A writ petition which is otherwise maintainable may not result in no relief being granted to the writ petitioner. 58. We have already held in answer to the first issue that, the writ petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of unauthorised construction. The writ petitioner is therefore not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for in his writ petition. 59. In such circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment and order to the extent where it holds that there are unauthorised constructions and directs demolition of the same. 60. MAT 930 of 2024, MAT 1009 of 2024 and MAT 1027 of 2024 along with all connected applications therein are disposed of without any orders to cost. All interim orders stand vacated. 61. I agree.