Judgment : V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. The appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dated 23-3-1990 in O.S.No.56 of 1982 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Ramachandrapuram, East Godavari District. The suit was filed by the plaintiff Angara Mosque, represented by its Mutavalli Md. Madina Khan, against the defendants 1 to 12 for declaration that the plaint schedule property as a Wakf property and inalienable under law and for possession of the same after evicting the defendants therefrom and for costs of the suit. 2. The case of the plaintiff as narrated in the plaint, in brief, is as follows: (a) It is pleaded that the plaint schedule property is part of the Wakf property that was endowed for the service of the mosque, more than hundred years ago. In the year 1860, the Inam Commissioner after due enquiry confirmed the schedule land as mosque service inam land of the Angara Mosque (plaintiff) and granted a title deed No.3561 to the then Mutavalli of the mosque. The said Mutavalli managed the property and rendered service to the mosque till 1949, when for the first time the then Mutavalli alienated illegally the said property by way of sale to the outsiders, who in their turn alienated the same by way of sale deed in the year 1968 to M/s. Srinivasa Sugar Factory, represented by its Proprietor Chittoori Suryanarayana. The said Suryanarayana sold away the said property to the defendants herein in March, 1982 and they are now in possession of the same. (b) It is further pleaded that the schedule property is a Muslim Wakf property and it is inalienable under law. All the sale deeds executed are ab initio void. The defendants did not get any valid title to the suit property as the title deeds in their favour are void under law. The property being Wakf endowed for the service of the plaintiff mosque, the plaintiff mosque is entitled under law to take possession of the said property. Hence, the suit. 3. Brief averments in the written statement filed by the 1 st defendant, which was adopted by the other defendants by filing memos, are as follows: (a) It is contended that the schedule property has all along been possessed and enjoyed as private property by the 1 st defendant and other defendants and their predecessors-in-title. Hence, the suit. 3. Brief averments in the written statement filed by the 1 st defendant, which was adopted by the other defendants by filing memos, are as follows: (a) It is contended that the schedule property has all along been possessed and enjoyed as private property by the 1 st defendant and other defendants and their predecessors-in-title. Even if the schedule property be assumed to be such, it lost its character as Wakf property and as such, the 1 st defendant and other defendants prescribed title to the schedule property by adverse possession. For that very reason, the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and is liable to be dismissed with costs. (b) It is further contended that the schedule property is the personal property of one Molla Sheik Madeena Saheb. After his death, his wife Fakeer Beebi Saheba, his first wife's daughter Ammerunni Saheba, 2nd wife's daughters Safrunni Saheba, Feezunni Saheba and 2 nd wife's son Mohammad Dawood Saheb and Salma Beebi Saheba partitioned the plaint schedule property along with other properties belonging to Molla Sheik Madeena Saheb under registered partition deed dated 12-9-1944. Subsequently, some properties referred to in the said partition deed were sold away. Regarding the remaining properties, the sharers having been dissatisfied with the division, Mohammed Daweed Saheb, Fakeer Beebi Saheba, and Ammerunnisa, Safrunnisa, Feezunnisa and Salma Saheba, who are the son, wife and daughters of Molla Sheik Madeena Saheb, respectively, repartitioned the remaining properties under registered partition deed dated 24-4-1949 among themselves. In the said partition, Fakeer Beebi Saheba got Ac.1-00 in R.S.No.60/2 of West Khandrika to her share; while Mohammad Dawood Saheb got to his share an extent of Ac.1-05 cents in the same Survey number. (c) It is further contended that Fakeer Beebi Saheba sold away Ac.0-63 cents in R.S.No.60/2 of West Khandrika to one Subbayamma under registered sale deed dated 02-6-1949, who in turn sold the same to one Chittoori Suryanarayana, Managing Partner of Sri Srinivasa Sugars, West Khandrika, under registered sale deed dated 04-01-1968. Likewise, Fakeer Beebi Saheba sold away Ac.0-40 cents in R.S.No.60/2 of West Khandrika to one Bobba Ramana under registered sale deed dated 02-6-1949. The said Ramana along with his sons sold away the same to one K. Bagayya under registered sale deed dated 15-9-1966. Likewise, Fakeer Beebi Saheba sold away Ac.0-40 cents in R.S.No.60/2 of West Khandrika to one Bobba Ramana under registered sale deed dated 02-6-1949. The said Ramana along with his sons sold away the same to one K. Bagayya under registered sale deed dated 15-9-1966. The said Bagayya along with his sons sold away the said extent in their turn to Sri Srinivasa Sugars, West Khandrika under registered sale deed dated 10-01-1968. So also, Fakeer Beebi Saheba sold away Ac.0-50 cents in R.S.No.60/2 of West Khandrika to one Brahmayya under registered sale deed dated 02-6-1949. The sons and grandsons of the said Brahmayya also sold away an extent of Ac.0-50 cents to Sri Srinivasa Sugars, West Khandrika under registered sale deed dated 10-01-1968. (d) It is further contended that after spending considerable amount, the partners of the firm Sri Srinivasa Sugars constructed and installed a Khandasari Sugar Unit in the plaint schedule property. After running the said Unit for some years, the said Unit was not found to be lucrative and as the partners of the firm were also not cooperating in its working, they put up for sale the buildings, machinery with all its accessories and the plaint schedule property. One Harichand, Musaddilal's son, purchased the same under registered sale deed dated 19-8-1972. (e) It is further contended that after disposing of the constructions, machinery etc., Satyanaraian and other co-owner sold away the entire plaint schedule property to the 1 st defendant and other defendants under two registered sale deeds dated 16-3-1982 and 17-3-1982. The 1 st defendant and other defendants purchased Ac.1-51 cents out of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deed dated 16-3-1982 and Ac.1-50 cents under registered sale deed dated 17-3-1982. After purchase of the plaint schedule property, the 1 st defendant and other defendants formed into a partnership and invested huge amounts for construction of an up to date Rice Mill under the name and style of Srinivasa Rice Mill. (f) It is further contended that the present plaintiff has no locus standi to file the above suit. The allegation in para-4 of the plaint that Madeena Khan now representing the plaintiff is interested in the alleged mosque does not entitle him to file the present suit. (f) It is further contended that the present plaintiff has no locus standi to file the above suit. The allegation in para-4 of the plaint that Madeena Khan now representing the plaintiff is interested in the alleged mosque does not entitle him to file the present suit. The 1 st defendant and other defendants are not aware of the enquiry said to have been conducted by the Inam Commissioner in 1860 confirming the schedule land as a mosque service inam land of Angara village. The schedule property is never a Wakf property and even otherwise, it lost its character and as such, the 1 st defendant and other defendants prescribed title to the schedule property by adverse possession and enjoyment. The suit is barred by limitation and also res judicata. Therefore, the 1 st defendant and other defendants prayed to dismiss the suit with costs. 4. Based upon the pleadings of both the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? (2) Whether the suit is barred by res judicata ? (3) Whether the schedule property is a Wakf property ? (4) Whether the defendants prescribed title by adverse possession? (5) Whether the suit is maintainable ? and (6) To what relief ? 5. During the course of trial, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-11 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-35 were marked. 6. After completion of the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court dismissed the suit with costs. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the trial Court in dismissing the suit, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. 8. During the pendency of the appeal before this Court, the appeal against the 11 th respondent was dismissed as abated as per Court order dated 25-4-2016. 9. Heard Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of Sri Shaik Khaja Basha, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Sri Gurram Peda Babu, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of Sri Venkata Subbaiah Pogula, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants. 10. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would contend that the judgment and decree passed by the Court below is contrary to law, perverse to the facts of the case and evidence on record. 10. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would contend that the judgment and decree passed by the Court below is contrary to law, perverse to the facts of the case and evidence on record. He would further contend that instead of decreeing the suit as prayed for based on the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit contrary to law. He would further contend that the Court below committed grave irregularity in holding that the suit is not maintainable on the ground that the property was not registered before or after commencement of the Wakf Fact, 1984, which finding is not sustainable under law. He would further contend that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge and consequently the suit in O.S.No.56 of 1982 may be decreed. 11. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly dismissed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the findings arrived by the learned trial Judge and that the appeal may be dismissed. 12. Having regard to the pleadings in the suit and the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: (1) Whether the appellant/plaintiff proved its title in the plaint schedule property and whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration of title as sought for ? (2) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation ? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property ? (4) Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court needs any interference ? and (5) To what extent ? 13. Point No.1: Whether the appellant/plaintiff proved its title in the plaint schedule property and whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration of title as sought for ? The case of the appellant/plaintiff is that the plaint schedule property is part of the Wakf property and the then Mutavalli managed the property and rendered service to the mosque more than 100 years ago. The case of the appellant/plaintiff is that the plaint schedule property is part of the Wakf property and the then Mutavalli managed the property and rendered service to the mosque more than 100 years ago. In the plaint itself it was pleaded that the then Mutavalli of the plaintiff mosque managed the property and rendered service to the mosque till 1949, when for the first time the then Mutavalli alienated illegally the said property by way of sale to outsiders, who in their turn alienated the same by way of sale deed in the year 1968 to M/s. Srinivasa Sugar Factory, represented by its Proprietor Chittoori Suryanarayana. The plaintiff further pleaded that the said Suryanarayana sold away the suit property to the defendants herein in the year 1982 and they are in possession and enjoyment of the same. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that the suit schedule property is not a mosque property and it is a private property. They pleaded that the suit schedule property along with other properties belongs to Molla Sheik Madeena Saheb under a registered partition deed dated 12-9-1944 and subsequently some properties referred to in the said partition deed were sold away. The respondents/defendants further pleaded that regarding the remaining properties, the sharers having been dissatisfied with the division, Mohammad Dawood Saheb, Molla Sheik Madeena's son, Fakeer Beebi Saheba, Molla Sheik Madeena's wife, Ammerunnisa, Safrunnisa, Feezunnisa and Salma Saheba, Molla Sheik Madeena's daughters, repartitioned the remaining properties under registered partition deed dated 24-4-1949 among them and in the said partition, Fakeer Beebi Saheba got Ac.1-00 in R.S.No.60/2 of West Khandrika to her share while Mohammad Dawood Saheb got his share to an extent of Ac.1-05 cents in the same Survey number and subsequently they sold away the same to M/s. Srinivasa Sugars. The title of the plaintiff is severely disputing by the defendants, therefore, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the plaintiff is having right and valid title in the plaint schedule property. 14. The legal position in this regard is no more res integra. The title of the plaintiff is severely disputing by the defendants, therefore, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the plaintiff is having right and valid title in the plaint schedule property. 14. The legal position in this regard is no more res integra. The same has been well settled by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited , [ (2014) 2 SCC 269 ] that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not. 15. It is a trite law that in a suit for declaration of title, the burden that lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish clear case for granting such declaration and the weaknesses, if any, of the case set up by the defendant would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. 16. In order to prove the case of the plaintiff, the plaintiff relied on Ex.A-1. The plaint schedule Survey number shown in Ex.A-1 is not tallied with the plaint schedule. Column No.8 mentioned in Ex.A-1 is shown as 'inam land'. Column Nos.10 and 11 in Ex.A-1 are shown as 'not known'. In the schedule, it was mentioned that the plaint schedule property is situated in R.S.No.60/2 and plaint schedule property is in an extent of Ac.3-01 cents out of Ac.4-80 cents. There is no evidence on record that the suit schedule property Survey No.60/2 corresponds to the Survey number as stated in Ex.A-1. 17. The defendants relied on Section 55 of the A.P. Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1964. Admittedly in the suit, the plaintiff did not produce any document to show that the plaint schedule property is registered as a Wakf property. The plaintiff relied on Ex.A-10 Gazette Notification. It does not contain Survey number or extent. The plaintiff also relied on Exs.A-2 to A-4. As per the recitals in the plaint, the then Mutavalli of the plaintiff alienated the suit property in the year 1949 to the outsiders. The plaintiff relied on Ex.A-10 Gazette Notification. It does not contain Survey number or extent. The plaintiff also relied on Exs.A-2 to A-4. As per the recitals in the plaint, the then Mutavalli of the plaintiff alienated the suit property in the year 1949 to the outsiders. Moreover, the main witness of the plaintiff-P.W.1, who is the Mutavalli of the mosque, deposed in his evidence that for the last 25 years he is acting as Mutavalli of the mosque situated at Angara village. He further deposed that the then Mutavalli of the mosque and his relatives alienated the suit lands to third parties in the year 1949 and subsequently the purchasers from Mutavalli and his family members sold the suit schedule lands to third parties, who are the defendants now before the Court in the suit. He further deposed in chief-examination itself that the previous Mutavalli and his relations after selling away the suit schedule lands, left away from the village. He further deposed that previously, his father used to render service to the mosque and after the death of his father, his brother Mohammad Ismail Khan and himself rendering service to the mosque and after the death of his brother, he is rendering service to the mosque and acting as Mutavalli from 25 years. 18. In view of the oral and documentary evidence on record produced, the plaintiff failed to prove title in the plaint schedule property. The own admissions of P.W.1 itself are not supporting the case of the plaintiff. The material on record clearly goes to show that the predecessors-in-title of the defendants are enjoying the plaint schedule properties since 1949 to the knowledge of the plaintiff, one and all. 19. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant placed a reliance on Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad , [ (1998) 2 SCC 642 ] . The Apex Court held as follows: “ 13. … … … a wakf is a permanent dedication of property for purposes recognized by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and the property having been found as wakf would always retain its character as a wakf. In other words, once a wakf always a wakf and the grant of patta in favour of Mokhasadar under the Inams Act does not, in any manner, nullify the earlier dedication made of the property constituting the same as wakf. In other words, once a wakf always a wakf and the grant of patta in favour of Mokhasadar under the Inams Act does not, in any manner, nullify the earlier dedication made of the property constituting the same as wakf. After a wakf has been created, it continues to be so for all time to come and further continues to be governed by the provisions of the Wakf Act and a grant of patta in favour of Mokhasadar does not affect the original character of the wakf property. … … …” 20. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant placed another reliance on Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary v. State of Andhra Pradesh , [ 2016 (2) ALD 236 (FB)] A Full Bench of the common High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held as follows: “91. … … … once the property finds place in a Gazette published as envisaged under Section 5 or in the Register of Auqaf, which is the prescribed Register, it is prima facie proof that the property is a Wakf. And, if that property is included in the list of prohibited properties communicated to the Registrar concerned, then, any document presented for registration dealing with such property comes within the prohibition under clause (c) of the Section 5, insofar as the properties of Wakfs falling under the Wakfs Act.” 21. The plaintiff relied on Ex.A-10 Gazette Notification published on 19-4-1962. Ex.A-11 is Errata. As stated supra, Ex.A-10 does not contain the suit Survey number. The plaintiff relied on Ex.A-11 Errata dated 30-5-1974. Ex.A-11 is an addendum to Ex.A-10. Ex.A-11 is dated 30-5-1974. It is pertinent to state that in the year 1971 itself i.e. 3 years prior to issuance of Ex.A-11, the A.P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad, filed a suit in O.S.No.67 of 1971 on the file of Subordinate Judge's Court at Rajahmundry against the plaintiff's vendors for the self-same relief and the pleadings and defence put-forth by the parties to the said suit and in the present suit are one and the same for the self-same relief. The said suit was dismissed for default. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a petition for restitution of the suit and that petition was dismissed on merits by the learned trial Judge, against which an appeal was pending before this Court. The said appeal was also dismissed on merits by this Court. Therefore, no weightage can be given to Ex.A-11. 22. The said suit was dismissed for default. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a petition for restitution of the suit and that petition was dismissed on merits by the learned trial Judge, against which an appeal was pending before this Court. The said appeal was also dismissed on merits by this Court. Therefore, no weightage can be given to Ex.A-11. 22. It was held by the Apex Court in the case of Salem Muslim Burial Ground Protection Committee v. State of Tamil Nadu , [ AIR 2023 SC 2769 ] as follows: “ 31. The Wakf Act, 1954, which actually is relevant for our purpose, provides that, first, a preliminary survey of wakfs has to be conducted and the Survey Commission shall, after such inquiry as may be deemed necessary, submit its report to the State Government about certain factors enumerated therein whereupon the State Government by a notification in the Official Gazette direct for a second survey to be conducted. Once the above procedure of survey is completed and the disputes arising thereto have been settled, on receipt of the report, the State Government shall forward it to the Wakf Board. The Wakf Board on examining the same shall publish the list of wakfs in existence with full particulars in the Official Gazette as contemplated under Section 5 of the Act. Similar provisions exist under the Waqf Act, 1995.” The principle laid down in the aforesaid case law is that certain procedure has to be followed before issuing a Gazette Notification. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court further held as follows: “ 32. A plain reading of the provisions of the above two Acts would reveal that the notification under Section 5 of both the Acts declaring the list of the wakfs shall only be published after completion of the process as laid down under Section 4 of the above Acts, which provides for two surveys, settlement of disputes arising thereto and the submission of the report to the State Government and to the Board. Therefore, conducting of the surveys before declaring a property a wakf property is a sine qua non. In the case at hand, there is no material or evidence on record that before issuing notification under Section 5 of the Wakf Act, 1954, any procedure or the survey was conducted as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act. Therefore, conducting of the surveys before declaring a property a wakf property is a sine qua non. In the case at hand, there is no material or evidence on record that before issuing notification under Section 5 of the Wakf Act, 1954, any procedure or the survey was conducted as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act. In the absence of such a material, the mere issuance of the notification under Section 5 of the Act would not constitute a valid wakf in respect of the suit land. Therefore, the Notification dated 29-4-1959 is not a conclusive proof of the fact that the suit land is a wakf property. It is for this reason probably that the appellant Committee had never pressed the said notification into service up till 1999.” In the aforesaid case law, the Supreme Court reiterated that mere issuance of notification is not a conclusive proof of the fact that the suit land is a Wakf property. As stated supra, before issuance of Gazette publication, the A.P. Wakf Board has to follow certain procedure before issuing a Gazette notification. Even for publication of Errata Ex.A-11 also, they have to follow the same procedure. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record that notices were issued to the affected parties prior to publishing Exs.A-10 and A-11. Furthermore, there is no material on record to show that even before issuing the notification, any procedure or survey was conducted as contemplated under Section 4 of the Act. It is pertinent to say that even before issuance of Ex.A-11 Errata, the plaintiff filed the suit in the year 1971 against the vendors of the defendants i.e. 3 years prior to the issuance of Ex.A-11, that was dismissed for default and the same was ended with finality before this Court. It shows that Ex.A-11 is a post litem motam document as litigation already commenced in the said case in O.S.No.67 of 1971 in between the plaintiff and defendants' vendors even before Ex.A-11 Errata is issued. Therefore, no sanctity can be given to Ex.A-11 because it is nothing but a post litem motam as litigation has been started in the year 1971 itself in O.S.No.67 of 1971 in between the plaintiff and defendants' vendors. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, the plaintiff failed to prove that the plaintiff is having title to the plaint schedule property. Therefore, no sanctity can be given to Ex.A-11 because it is nothing but a post litem motam as litigation has been started in the year 1971 itself in O.S.No.67 of 1971 in between the plaintiff and defendants' vendors. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, the plaintiff failed to prove that the plaintiff is having title to the plaint schedule property. On the other hand, as per the own admissions of P.W.1 and documentary evidence produced by the defendants and recitals in the plaint, go to show that the predecessors-in- title of the defendants are in possession of the plaint schedule property since 1949 and they are enjoying the property to the own knowledge of one and all including the officials of the plaintiff since 1949 peacefully and continuously till the date of filing of the suit in the year 1982 i.e. more than 30 years. Whatever the rights the vendors are having, the vendees will get the same in respect of immovable properties including adverse possession the defendants’ vendors had . For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the plaintiff failed to prove that the plaintiff is having right and title in the plaint schedule property, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of declaration of title. I do not find any illegality in the said finding given by the learned trial Judge. Accordingly, point No.1 is answered against the appellant. 24. Point No.2: Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation ? The case of the appellant/plaintiff is that the plaint schedule property is a Wakf property, unalienable under law and the plaintiff alleged that the then Mutavalli alienated the plaint schedule property illegally by way of sale to the outsiders, who in their turn alienated the same by executing registered sale deeds in the year 1968 to M/s. Srinivasa Sugar Factory, which in turn alienated the same in favour of the respondents in the month of March, 1982 and the plaintiff further pleaded that the said Mutavalli has no authority to alienate the plaint schedule property to the outsiders and the said alienations are contrary to law. The first and foremost contention of the respondents/ defendants is that the suit schedule property is not a Wakf property and the suit is barred by law of limitation. The first and foremost contention of the respondents/ defendants is that the suit schedule property is not a Wakf property and the suit is barred by law of limitation. The respondents/defendants pleaded that the plaint schedule property is a private property, the predecessors-in-title possessed the property by way of registered sale deeds and they enjoyed the property openly, peacefully and to the knowledge of one and all including the plaintiff and their predecessors perfected their title by way of adverse possession. 25. The recitals in the plaint go to show that the then Mutavalli of the plaintiff alienated the plaint schedule property by way of registered sale deeds to the outsiders, who in turn alienated the same by way of sale deed on 04-01-1968 to M/s. Srinivasa Sugar Factory, represented by its Proprietor by name Chittoori Suryanarayana. The said Suryanarayana sold away the said property to the defendants in the year 1982. The respondents/ defendants specifically pleaded in the written statement itself that the schedule property is a personal property of Molla Sheik Madeena Saheb, after his death, his wife Fakeer Beebi Saheba and the 1 st wife's daughter Ammerunni Saheba, 2 nd wife's daughters Safrunni Saheba, Feezunni Saheba and 2nd wife's son Mohammad Dawood Saheb partitioned the properties under a registered partition deed dated 24-4-1949 and in the said partition, Fakeer Beebi Saheba got Ac.1-00 and subsequently the said Fakeer Beebi Saheba sold away Ac.0-63 cents in R.S.No.60/2 to one Subbayamma under a registered sale deed, dated 02-6-1949, who in turn sold the same to one Chittoori Suryanarayana, Managing Partner of Sri Srinivasa Sugars, West Khandrika, under a registered sale deed, dated 04-01-1968. They further pleaded that likewise, Fakeer Beebi Saheba sold away Ac.0-40 cents in R.S.No.60/2 to Bobba Ramanna under a registered sale deed, dated 02-6-1949 and he, in turn, along with his sons, sold away the same to one K. Bagayya under a registered sale deed, dated 15-9-1966 and the said Bagayya along with his son sold away the said extent in turn to Sri Srinivasa Sugars, West Khandrika, under a registered sale deed, dated 10-01-1968. P.W.1, the then Mutavalli of the plaintiff, admits in his evidence in chief-examination itself that the previous Mutavalli of the mosque and his relatives alienated the suit lands to third parties in the year 1949 itself and subsequently, the purchasers from Mutavalli and his family members sold the suit schedule lands to third parties and subsequently who are the defendants and the previous Mutavalli and his relatives after selling the suit schedule lands, left the village. As seen from the evidence of P.W.1, the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit schedule property since 1949 itself. Admittedly, the suit is filed before the trial Court on 14-6-1982. 26. The suit is filed for the relief of declaration and recovery of possession of the immovable property based on a title. Therefore, Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the present case. Limitation prescribed for filing of such suit is 12 years from the day the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Initially, the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove its title, as stated supra. But, the plaintiff failed to prove their title and the defendants and their predecessors-in-title proved their right by way of adverse possession. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would contend that in view of Section 107 of the Wakf Act, 1995, limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act does not apply to the present facts of the case. But, the Wakf Act, 1995, came into force with effect from 01-01-1996, the present suit is filed before the trial Court on 14-6-1982, therefore, the provisions of Amended Act, 1995 are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. Further, Section 66(g) is inserted to the Wakf Act from 23-6-1986. The present suit is filed on 14-6-1982 much earlier to the insertion of Section 66(g) of the Act. Therefore, the Wakf Act, 1995 is not at all applicable to the present facts of the case. In my view, Section 107 of the Act has no retrospective effect. The law is well settled that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation until its language is such that would require such conclusion. Therefore, the Wakf Act, 1995 is not at all applicable to the present facts of the case. In my view, Section 107 of the Act has no retrospective effect. The law is well settled that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation until its language is such that would require such conclusion. The law of limitation, being a procedural law, is retrospective in operation in the sense that it will apply to the proceedings pending at the time of the enactment as also apply to proceedings commenced thereafter, notwithstanding that the cause of action may have arisen before the new provisions came into force The important exception to this rule is “where the right of suit is barred under the law of limitation in force before the new provision came into operation and a vested right has accrued to another, the new provision cannot revive the barred right or take away the accrued vested right”. 27. The law is well settled by the Apex Court in the case of T. Kaliamurthy v. Five Gori Thaikkal Wakf , [ (2008) 9 SCC 306 ] . In the said case, the Apex Court held as follows: “ 53. In view of the above authorities, we are of the view that in the present case, once it is held that the suit for possession of the suit properties filed at the instance of the Wakf were barred under the Limitation Act, 1908, the necessary corollary would be to hold that the right of the Wakf to the suit properties stood extinguished in view of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and, therefore, when Section 107 came into force, it could not revive the extinguished rights. … … …” 28. In the case of Sabir Ali Khan v. Syed Mohd. Ahmad Ali Khan , [2023 SCC Online SC 415] the Apex Court held as follows: “ 68. The argument that Section 107 of the Act will assist the appellant in tiding over the bar of limitation does not appeal to us. Section 107 of the Act, no doubt, proclaims that nothing in the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to any suit for possession of the immovable property comprised in any waqf or for possession of any interest in such property.” The Apex Court in Sabir Ali Khan 's case (6 supra), further held as follows: “ 69. Section 107 of the Act, no doubt, proclaims that nothing in the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to any suit for possession of the immovable property comprised in any waqf or for possession of any interest in such property.” The Apex Court in Sabir Ali Khan 's case (6 supra), further held as follows: “ 69. The Act came into force on 01.01.1996. The first sale was effected on 14.10.1960. The second sale was effected on 26.09.1974. As far as the first sale is concerned, we have already found that Article 96 cannot be pressed into service as the transfer was not purported to be made by the Mutawalli. The doors stood open for the application of Article 65. As far as the second sale is concerned which was effected in the year 1974 in view of our finding that Article 96 was not applicable, the only other competing Article vying for acceptance, appears to be Article 65. Applying Article 65 and as the adverse possession would kick in from the date of the transfer, on the expiry of twelve years, i.e., in 1986 applying Section 27 of the Limitation Act whatever title remained within the meaning of Section 65 would stand extinguished. The Act was brought into force only with effect from 01.01.1996. We cannot understand the purport of Section 107 to be that it would revive an extinguished title as nothing stood in the way of running of time from the date of the second sale under the law as it stood.” In the light of the aforesaid legal position and for the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that Section 107 of the Wakf Act, 1995 is not at all applicable to the present facts of the case. 29. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the contention of respondents/defendants is that their predecessors-in-title purchased the suit schedule property in the year 1968 under a registered sale deed, who in turn alienated the same in favour of the respondents in the month of March, 1982. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would contend that the defendants are in possession of the plaint schedule property since 1982, therefore, their possession cannot be merged with the possession of their vendors, who purchased the same in the year 1968. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would contend that the defendants are in possession of the plaint schedule property since 1982, therefore, their possession cannot be merged with the possession of their vendors, who purchased the same in the year 1968. In my view, there is no subsistence in the contention taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that adversary possessory rights accrued by their predecessors-in- title do not ensure the benefit of the defendants. The plaint schedule property is an immovable property. In my view, the vendees will get whatever rights of their vendors had. Therefore, this Court holds that whatever adversary possession the vendors have, the vendees will get the same in respect of the immovable property. 30. In the plaint itself, the plaintiff pleaded that since in the year 1949, the then Mutavalli alienated the schedule property to the outsiders and they in turn alienated the schedule property to third parties and the said third parties alienated the schedule property to the vendors of the defendants in the year1968 and the vendors of the defendants alienated the schedule property in the year 1982 to the defendants. The specific case of the respondents is that the suit property was divided between the legal heirs of the deceased Molla Sheik Madeena Saheb under a registered partition deed in the year 1944 under Ex.B-1 and in the year 1949 under Ex.B-2 and later they sold away and left the village by delivering the property to the buyers, the then Mutavalli has alienated the same to third party purchasers and the third party purchasers also alienated the same to others under registered sale deeds. The plaint averments itself go to show that then Mutavalli, who managed the property and rendered the service to the mosque till 1949, alienated the property to the outsiders by way of various registered sale deeds since 1949 and who in turn, alienated the same to third parties. Possession of the suit property by the respondents also stands admitted. Registration of a document as well as possession would construe a notice, the same is evident from Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Admittedly, the suit was instituted on 14-6-1982. Admitted case of both the parties to the suit is that the defendants' vendors purchased the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed on 04-01-1968 under Ex.B-4. Admittedly, the suit was instituted on 14-6-1982. Admitted case of both the parties to the suit is that the defendants' vendors purchased the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed on 04-01-1968 under Ex.B-4. In Ex.B-4 document, the title of the vendors is mentioned as registered document on 02-6-1949 under Ex.B-8. Furthermore, it is evidenced under Ex.B-1 that the suit property was divided under a registered partition deed, dated 12-9-1944, under the original of Ex.B-2. The defendants relied on Ex.B-29. Ex.B-29 goes to show that the plaintiff filed the suit in the year 1971 vide O.S.No.67 of 1971 against the plaintiff's vendors. That suit was dismissed for default. Later, they filed a petition to set aside the dismissal order, that petition was also dismissed on merits. Later, the plaintiffs filed an appeal before the High Court and the said appeal was also dismissed by this Court on merits. Therefore, the possession of the predecessors-in-title of the defendants is within the knowledge of the plaintiff for a period of 30 years much prior to the institution of the suit. As per the own pleadings of the plaintiff, in the year 1949 the suit schedule property was alienated by the said Mutavalli to third parties. As per the evidence of P.W.1, the plaintiff is not in possession of the schedule property since 1949 onwards. As noticed supra, the suit was filed in the year 1982. For the aforesaid reasons, it is clear that since the defendants together with their predecessors- in-title have been in possession of the plaint schedule property since more than 30 years prior to institution of the suit, therefore, the suit is hopelessly barred by law of limitation. Accordingly, point No.2 is answered against the appellant/plaintiff. 31. Point No.3 : Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property ? In view of my findings on points 1 and 2, since the plaintiff is not entitled to the declaration of title in the plaint schedule property and the suit filed by the plaintiff for the relief of declaration and recovery of possession is barred by law of limitation, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of recovery of possession. Accordingly, point No.3 is answered against the appellant. 32. Point No.4 : Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court needs any interference ? Accordingly, point No.3 is answered against the appellant. 32. Point No.4 : Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court needs any interference ? In view of my findings on points 1 to 3, I do not find any illegality in the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 33. Point No.5 : To what extent ? In the result, the appeal suit is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.