ORDER : The present petition has been filed challenging the charge sheet Annexure P-1 dated 14.12.2020 issued to the petitioner therein as many as 5 charges against the petitioner, who is working on the post of Manager in Marketing Department of respondent – M.P. Laghu Udyog Ltd., a public sector corporation owned and run by the Government of M.P. 2. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the charges as levelled on the petitioner by the impugned charge sheet Annexure P-1 are actuated by malice and that the charges are not made out. It is contended that the charges relate to 35 years prior to the date of issuance of charges as the same relate to some events happening at the time of appointment of the petitioner. It is further contended that is it only when petitioner raised the grievance of grant of time scale etc. that the officials unleashed vendetta against the petitioner so that the voice of the petitioner can be suppressed. It is further argued that the charges so alleged do not constitute any misconduct even if they are true on the very face of it, because these charges do not disclose any misconduct. 3. It is further contended that though there are disputes going on in the matter of voluntary retirement of the petitioner, but it is undisputed that now the petitioner has even crossed the age of superannuation and is now not in service of the Corporation. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent – Corporation has argued that the petitioner has no locus to challenge the charge sheet, because challenge to the charge sheet is premature because the allegations made in the charge sheet are only allegations, which are yet to be proved and petition against mere charge sheet is not maintainable as it is open for him to controvert the charges by adducing evidence. Reference is made to various judgments on the issue that interference by the Court should not be easily made against mere charge sheet and that the petition should be dismissed and the petitioner should be asked to face the charges and put forth all the defences during the course of enquiry. 5. Heard. 6. The charge sheet which has been issued to the petitioner vide Annexure P-1 dated 14.12.2020 contains 5 charges.
5. Heard. 6. The charge sheet which has been issued to the petitioner vide Annexure P-1 dated 14.12.2020 contains 5 charges. First charge related to allegation that the petitioner applied for appointment as Stenographer in the Corporation on 19.11.1985 and did not have the required qualification from concerned Board at Madhya Pradesh, but had some qualifications from Kerala State Board, which was not acceptable and therefore, he was appointed without having requisite qualification. Second charge related to allegation that the requisite selection process was not followed while appointing the petitioner despite that he accepted the appointment. Third charge related to allegation that the petitioner did not submit the documents relating to the essential educational qualifications and obtained relaxation from the authorities of Corporation, which amounts to misconduct. Fourth charge alleged that the petitioner was granted promotion without being qualified for the same, which amounts to misconduct. Fifth charge was that he was posted as Manager Marketing on 08.07.2020 and by submitting letter dated 04.09.2020 in the office he refused to deal with UPEC pipes and all other similar pipes, which have filed various clause by noting that he cannot understand price variation clause perfectly, which amounts to refusal to perform the duties assigned to him. 7. So far as the charge Nos.1 to 4 are concerned, these charges relate to some events happening at the time of appointment of petitioner or promotion of the petitioner, which are many years prior to issuance of the charge sheet. These charges do not relate to any discovery being made suddenly at a later point of time, that there has been some fraud or forgery committed by the petitioner or suppression of facts committed by the petitioner at some prior point of time and the said fact was suddenly discovered by the employer at a late date so that the employer could be said to be justified in issuing the charge sheet at later date. 8. The appointment of the petitioner took place in the year 1985 and he has been charge sheeted at the fag end of his service career nearing his retirement in the year 2020, that his initial appointment was without having requisite qualification and promotion was also bad because he did not have requisite qualification. 9.
8. The appointment of the petitioner took place in the year 1985 and he has been charge sheeted at the fag end of his service career nearing his retirement in the year 2020, that his initial appointment was without having requisite qualification and promotion was also bad because he did not have requisite qualification. 9. It has been alleged against the petitioner that as per Rules 3 should have qualified Shorthand Examination from M.P. Board, but he had qualified Shorthand Examination from Kerala Board, which was not acceptable at the time of retirement and this has been mentioned in the imputation to charge No.2 in the charge sheet Annexure P-1. 10. It is settled in law that charge sheet cannot be issued to an employee many years after the alleged conduct has taken place if the conduct was in knowledge of the employer and the employer had acquiesced in the said conduct of the employee. In the case of State of M.P. vs. Bani Singh and Others reported as 1990 Supp SCC 738 , it was held as under :- 4. The appeal against the order dated December 16, 1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal.
There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. N. Radhakishan reported as (1998) 4 SCC 154 , it was held as under :- “19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings.
Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.” 11. Not only this, but from a perusal of the charge sheet as to charge No.4, it is clear that the respondents do not allege that the certificates and qualifications, which have been relied by the petitioner while seeking appointment were forged or manufactured documents. The only allegation is that the certificates are procured from Kerala Board, but they should have been procured from M.P. Board. The charge sheet does not mention that any fraud has been committed by the petitioner in the matter of issuance of certificate by Kerala Board or that he did not move application for appointment by bye- passing the appointment process. No allegation is that his application for appointment made to the Managing Director was fraud or forged. 12. Once the petitioner submitted particular set of documents to seek appointment and moved application before the Managing Director, then it was for the Managing Director to have taken note of the fact that what process is to be adopted for appointment and whether the process being adopted by the Managing Director is contrary to the regulations of the Corporation. The petitioner being an unemployed person had submitted application annexing his documents to the competent authority and it was for the competent authority to have taken a call whether the qualifications are sufficient and whether the process he is adopting is proper. 13. Acceptance of unacceptable qualification is one aspect, if it is done with open eyes by the competent authority and acceptance of a certificate obtained with fraud is another aspect. It is undisputed that fraud vitiates everything, but in the present case as to charge Nos.1 to 4 there is no allegation against the petitioner that the certificate that he has relied upon or the qualifications or applications were forged. If the allegations had been that the certificate obtained from Kerala Board is forged or fraudulent, then it would have been a different matter and it would have been a case of fraud and forgery.
If the allegations had been that the certificate obtained from Kerala Board is forged or fraudulent, then it would have been a different matter and it would have been a case of fraud and forgery. However, none of these allegations are contained the charge sheet against the petitioner and the allegation is that his qualification for improperly accepted by the authority of the Corporation. 14. It is not the case of suppression or misrepresentation of any facts. It is settled in law that if the authority has accepted some qualification as acceptable at the time of appointment and the order is issued in favour of selectee and he settles down in his position then after long years if any complaint is filed and it is found that the qualification was actually not proper then it is not appropriate to disturb the selectee who has settled down in the post, once he had not resorted to any fraud. 15. In the case of admission of students it has been held by the Supreme Court that admission of the students which though were illegal but was not based on any suppression of fact or misrepresentation of fact will not result in cancellation of admission and the Court refused to interfere with the admissions. See Shri Krishan vs. The Kurukshetra University reported in AIR 1976 SC 376 (para-7) and Guru Nanak Dev University vs. Sanjay Kumar Katwal and Another reported in (2009) 1 SCC 610 (para 19,22). 16. Similarly, in cases of Vikas Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2013) 14 SCC 494 , the Supreme Court in the case of a public servant, held as under :- “27. Admittedly, in the instant case the error committed by the respondent Board in the matter of evaluation of the answer scripts could not be attributed to the appellants as they have neither been found to have committed any fraud or misrepresentation in being appointed qua the first merit list nor has the preparation of the erroneous model answer key or the specious result contributed to them. Had the contrary been the case, it would have justified their ouster upon re- evaluation and deprived them of any sympathy from this Court irrespective of their length of service. 28.
Had the contrary been the case, it would have justified their ouster upon re- evaluation and deprived them of any sympathy from this Court irrespective of their length of service. 28. In our considered view, the appellants have successfully undergone training and are efficiently serving the respondent State for more than three years and undoubtedly their termination would not only impinge upon the economic security of the appellants and their dependants but also adversely affect their careers. This would be highly unjust and grossly unfair to the appellants who are innocent appointees of an erroneous evaluation of the answer scripts. However, their continuation in service should neither give any unfair advantage to the appellants nor cause undue prejudice to the candidates selected qua the revised merit list. In Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. v. State of Gujarat, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591, the following has been held : 11. The entire appointment of direct recruits, therefore, from the waiting list was not proper. But these persons have been appointed and are working now at least for five years. It would, therefore, be unjust and harsh to quash their selection at this stage. Therefore, while refraining from quashing the appointment made in pursuance of the direction issued by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the waiting list for one year cannot furnish source of recruitment for future years, except in very exceptional cases. It is, however, necessary to add that non-holding of examination at the instance of the Government could not result in reducing the quota of direct recruits to be worked out on the principle for determination of such vacancies. Therefore, if vacancies had collected between 1983 and 1993 due to interim orders passed by the courts, and they have not been taken into account when the examination for 1993 was held then it would be expedient to direct the Government to work out the same immediately and send the requisition to the Commission for holding selection for if the next examination is going to be held within one year from today. We may clarify that it is nobody's case that the quota rule has broken. Therefore the direction is being issued to protect the quota of direct recruits during 1983 to 1993 in the peculiar facts of the present case.
We may clarify that it is nobody's case that the quota rule has broken. Therefore the direction is being issued to protect the quota of direct recruits during 1983 to 1993 in the peculiar facts of the present case. In the case of BuddhiNathChaudhary v. Abahi Kumar, (2001) 3 SCC 328 , it was held as under :- 6. The selected candidates, who have been appointed, are now in employment as Motor Vehicle Inspectors for over a decade. Now that they have worked in such posts for a long time, necessarily they would have acquired the requisite experience. Lack of experience, if any, at the time of recruitment is made good now. Therefore, the new exercise ordered by the High Court will only lead to anomalous results. Since we are disposing of these matters on equitable consideration, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that their cases for appointment should also be considered. It is not clear whether there is any vacancy for the post of Motor Vehicle Inspectors. If that is so, unless any one or more of the selected candidates are displaced, the cases of the contesting respondents cannot be considered. We think that such adjustment is not feasible for practical reasons. We have extended equitable considerations to such selected candidates who have worked in the post for a long period, but the contesting respondents do not come in that class. The effect of our conclusion is that appointments made long back pursuant to a selection need not be disturbed. Such a view can be derived from several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Ram Sarup v. State of Haryana [ (1979) 1 SCC 168 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 35] ; District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [ (1990) 3 SCC 655 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 520 : (1990) 14 ATC 766] and H.C. Puttaswamy v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore [1991 Supp (2) SCC 421 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 53 : (1992) 19 ATC 292] . Therefore, we must let the matters lie where they are. 17.
Therefore, we must let the matters lie where they are. 17. In view of the above the law is clear that if the authority has accepted some qualification or document as acceptable then after a long period which in the present case is 30 years, the authority cannot suddenly wake up and say that its predecessors wrongfully gave effect to a document which otherwise was not acceptable. Settled things cannot be allowed to be unsettled in this manner at drop of a hat. 18. Therefore, the charge sheet as to charge Nos.1 to 4 is quashed on the ground of delay as well as on the ground that no charges are made out because the qualifications and documents of the petitioner were accepted with open eyes by the Corporation and there was no fraud or suppression on the part of the petitioner. 19. So far as the charge No.5 is concerned, it is in respect of refusal to discharge duties by refusing to deal with U-PVC pipes, because it has been stated by the petitioner that he does not understand price variation clause perfectly. 20. So far as this charge is concerned, it is alleged to be violation of Clause 17, 19 and 20 of service Rules of the Corporation placed on record as Annexure P-11. As per Clause 17, an employee has to maintain proper conduct and serve the Corporation faithfully and to maintain secrecy. As per Clause 19, the employee has to maintain appropriate integrity and devotion to duty and serve the Corporation honestly and faithfully. As per Clause 20, an employee shall undertake to perform duties in such manner, capacity and place, as may be directed by the competent authority from time to time. 21. Therefore, charge No.5 can be said to be the charge alleging violation of Clause 20 of Service Rules. However, the exact note that was put up by the petitioner on strength of which it is said that the petitioner has committed misconduct was as under:- “I can’t understand price variation clause perfectly, as such it would be better to allot u.p.v.c. pipe and other similar pipes witch have price variation clause to some one else who can handle such item smoothly.” 22.
In the aforesaid note the petitioner has only intimated the authority that he is not comfortable with price variation clauses and it would be better to allot the work of U-PVC pipe and similar pipes, which have price variation clause to someone else. It is a case of the petitioner stating that he is not comfortable with doing some work and the work should be assigned to some other person, who is better qualified to do the work because he does not understand price variation clause perfectly. The aforesaid note put up to the management cannot be said to be refusal to work because in this case, the petitioner has not said that he is having rush of work or that he cannot perform the work or that he refused to perform the work without assigning any reason. It is the case where the petitioner at the outset, informed the employer that he is not having much skill to do the work with which he has been tasked and it should be given over to some other person who can handle such work in better and smooth manner. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be an misconduct and refusal of the petitioner to work. The refusal could have been inferred if the petitioner had simply kept the work unattended and sat over it. However, the petitioner at the outset had informed the Employer that he is not having much knowledge of the work assigned and that some part of it should be assigned to someone else. An employee pointing out to the employer his lack of skill to do a particular work cannot be said to be a misconduct by the employee unless it is alleged that he had requisite skill and despite that, there was refusal. However, the charge or the imputation of charge does not mention that despite having the requisite skills, the petitioner wrote to the management that he does not have skill to perform the work and therefore, it would amount to refusal to perform the work. It could have been a case of incompetence, but that is not an misconduct. 23. In view of the above, it is to be held that even charge No.5 does not disclose any misconduct so as to justify issuance of charge sheet thereupon. 24.
It could have been a case of incompetence, but that is not an misconduct. 23. In view of the above, it is to be held that even charge No.5 does not disclose any misconduct so as to justify issuance of charge sheet thereupon. 24. It is settled in law that the Courts in judicial review should not lightly interfere in the charge sheet. However, there is no bar to such interference if the charge sheet does not disclose any misconduct at all, which is the present case also. 25. Accordingly, the charge sheet so far as it relates to charge No.5 also stands quashed. In the result, the petitioner is allowed and the impugned charge sheet Annexure P-1 stands quashed in its totality.