A. Abhishek Reddy, J. – As the issue involved in the present writ petitions are one and the same, all the cases are disposed of by a common judgment. 2. For the purpose of convenience, the facts in the CWJC No. 848 of 2024 are reiterated. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 4. The writ petition No. 848 of 2024 has been filed for the following relief(s): – “a. For issuance of an appropriate Writ/ Writs, direction/directions in the nature of Certiorarified Mandamus calling upon the Respondents to produce the entire records pertaining to the quantification done for levying interest and damages under Section 14B and 7Q of the Employees Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and upon being satisfied be pleased to set aside the demand raised for failure to pay the contributions for the period 01/09/2019 to 31/03/2021 within the stipulated time vide letter No.- BR/RO/MUZ/ENF/14B/BRMUZ1993823000/ORDER/ 1201 and letter No.- BR/RO/MUZ/ENF/70/BRMUZ1993823000/ ORDER/1201 dated 21.11.2022 respectively issued under the Signature of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II, Employees Provident Fund Organization, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, Regional Office, Surya Complex, Lakshmi Chawk, Muzaffarpur to the tune of Rs 42,53,984 as against damages and Rs. 23,49,970 towards interest under aforementioned provisions respectively, on the ground of violation of Principles of Natural Justice and further that the decision of the State Government to cover Home guards under the provisions of the EPF with effect from Sept. 2019 came in February 2020 and official outbreak of Covid-19 from the month of March 2020 resulting in prolonged lockdown having delayed the process of opening the Universal Account Number(UAN) of each Home guards for paying the Contributions and as also the Administrative Workforce in all the connected establishments were reduced to half strength during the intervening period and its surge, would borne out from office Memorandum of EPFO as contained in letter dated 15.05.2020. b. For issuance of appropriate direction upon the respondents concerned to fix the liability upon erring officials for violating the directives issued by the Employees Provident Fund Organization, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, Head office, Bhavishyanidhi Bhawan, 14, Bikkaji Cama Place, New Delhi vide letter No.-C-I/Misc./2020-21/Vol.I./ c. For further setting aside the order issued vide Letter No.-876 dated 25.10.2023 under Section 8F of the Employees Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 whereby the total quantified amount as against damages and interest calculated under 14B & 7Q of the Employees Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, out of which, part amount as been recovered including putting the bank account on hold and remitted to the organization from the respective Bank account of the establishment and in consequence thereto, be further pleased to direct refund of the same and remove the hold besides restraining the respondent EPFO from recovering the quantified amount from the respective Bank of the establishment during pendency of the case, so that, future contributions could be deposited without further delay salary be paid. d. For any other relief/reliefs for which the Hon'ble court may grant in the interest of the justice that may be deemed appropriate and necessary in this case including restraining the respondents from taking final decision in the matter during the pendency of the instant writ application.” 5. The present writ petition has been filed by the Office Of The District Commandant, Bihar Home Guards against the order of the respondent organization passed under Section 7Q and 14B of the Employees Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (EPF & MP Act, 1952). 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that pursuant to the policy decision taken by the State Government to include the home guard under the EPF Scheme, the State of Bihar has issued necessary orders in the Month of February, 2020. The decision to include the home guards under the EPF scheme was with effect from September, 2019. Learned counsel has stated that due to the Covid-19 Pandemic situation, which started from the month of March 2020 and the restrictions imposed throughout the country, the authorities were not in a position to take necessary steps for processing the applications of the employees and pay the contribution. Learned counsel has stated that due to the Covid-19 Pandemic situation, which started from the month of March 2020 and the restrictions imposed throughout the country, the authorities were not in a position to take necessary steps for processing the applications of the employees and pay the contribution. That there was a delay in processing the Universal Account Number (UAN) of the employees as the physical movement was restricted and further, the working strength of the staff was at 50%. Learned counsel has stated that subsequently after the details of the home guards were gathered, the necessary accounts of individual home guards were opened and the amounts deposited into the EPF. It is stated by the counsel that the petitioner is a government unit and not a business entity where commercial interests are involved, therefore, the imposition of interest on the delayed payments and damages is bad in law. Further, it is stated that there is no mens rea attributable to the petitioner as the delay was on account of the Covid-19 Pandmic situation and beyond the control of the petitioner. However, the authorities have passed the order under Section 7Q and 14B without taking into account the peculiar facts of the case and the letter dated 15.05.2020 issued by the head office of the Provident Fund. Learned counsel has stated that the authorities have levied interest and also damages for no fault of the petitioner. That the petitioner cannot be blamed for the delay in proceeding the application due to the Covid-19 Pandemic situation prevailing in the country. Further, it is stated by the learned counsel that no interest or damages can be calculated for the period of September, 2019 till February, 2020 and also for the period from March 2020 till the end of the Covid-19 Pandemic situation as the petitioner was not in a position to generate the UAN of each individual home guard. The counsel has stated that the orders to include the home guards under EPF Scheme came only in the Month of February, 2020 with effect from September, 2019 and immediately thereafter, the Covid-19 Pandemic situation had arisen. Learned counsel has stated that the head office of the EPFO duly taking into account the Covid-19 pandemic situation had issued necessary instructions dated 15.05.2020. Learned counsel has stated that the head office of the EPFO duly taking into account the Covid-19 pandemic situation had issued necessary instructions dated 15.05.2020. However, the same was not taken into consideration while calculating the interest or the damages, learned counsel has therefore, prayed this Hon’ble Court to allow the present writ petition by setting aside the impugned order dated 21.11.2022. Learned counsel has relied on the following judgments in support of his case. i. In the case of Kranit Associates Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and Ors. reported in 2010 (95) AIC 139 . ii. In the case of Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, EPFO and Anr. vs. Management of RSL Textiles India Private Limited through its Director reported in (2017) 3 SCC 110 . iii. In the case of Mcleod Russel India Limited vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Jalpaiguri and Ors. reported in (2014) 15 SCC 263 . 7. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-EPFO has vehemently opposed the very maintainability of the present writ petition and stated that the provisions of the EPFO are beneficial in nature. That the impugned order is passed duly taking into account the provisions of Section 7Q and 14B of the Act. That insofar as the provisions of Section 7Q are concerned, the authorities does not have any option while calculating the interest for the delayed payment, that the provisions of the 7Q are mandatory in nature. Irrespective of the fact whether there were any laches on part of the petitioner or not, the authorities are bound to invoke the provisions of Section 7Q and impose the interest on the delayed payment. That the order passed by the authority is in consonance with the provisions of the Act and does not suffer from any illegality, perversity which warrants any interference by this Court. Further, learned counsel has stated that the petitioner having collected/ deducted the amounts from the home guards/employees is bound to deposit the same before the authorities within the time. However, in this case the same was not done. Further, learned counsel has stated that the letter dated 15.05.2020 issued by one of the officers of the respondent- Organization cannot override the provisions of the Act and, therefore, prayed this Hon’ble Court to dismiss the present writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondent-EPFO has relied on the following judgments. However, in this case the same was not done. Further, learned counsel has stated that the letter dated 15.05.2020 issued by one of the officers of the respondent- Organization cannot override the provisions of the Act and, therefore, prayed this Hon’ble Court to dismiss the present writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondent-EPFO has relied on the following judgments. i. In the case of Organo Chemical Industries vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1979 AIR SC 1803. ii. In the case of Horticulture Experiment Station vs. RPFC reported in (2022) 4 SCC 516 . 8. In order to appreciate and resolve the issue involved in the batch of writ petitions, it is necessary to extract the relevant provisions of the EPF & MP Act, 1952 more particularly Section 2E, 7A, 7Q, 14B which reads as under; “Section 2E “employer” means – (i) in relation to an establishment which is a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory, including the agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier and, where a person has been named as a manager of the factory under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), the person so named; and (ii) in relation to any other establishment, the person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment, and where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director or managing agent, such manager, managing director or managing agent; 7A. Determination of moneys due from employers. Determination of moneys due from employers. – (1) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner, any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, or any Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may, by order, – (a) in a case where a dispute arises regarding the applicability of this Act to an establishment, decide such dispute; and (b) determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act, the Scheme or the Pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be, and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary; (2) The officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall, for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely: – (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; and any such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). (3) No order shall be made under subsection (1), unless 5 the employer concerned is given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case. (3A) Where the employer, employee or any other person required to attend the inquiry under sub-section (1) fails to attend such inquiry without assigning any valid reason or fails to produce any document or to file any report or return when called upon to do so, the officer conducting the inquiry may decide the applicability of the Act or determine the amount due from any employer, as the case may be, on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and other documents available on record. (4) Where an order under sub-section (1) is passed against an employer ex parte, he may, within three months from the date of communication of such order, apply to the officer for setting aside such order and if he satisfies the officer that the show cause notice was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the inquiry was held, the officer shall make an order setting aside his earlier order and shall appoint a date for proceeding with the inquiry: Provided that no such order shall be set aside merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of the show cause notice if the officer is satisfied that the employer had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear before the officer. Explanation. – Where an appeal has been preferred under this Act against an order passed ex parte and such appeal has been disposed of otherwise than on the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this sub-section for setting aside the ex parte order. (5) No order passed under this section shall be set aside on any application under sub-section (4) unless notice thereof has been served on the opposite party. 7Q. Interest payable by the employer. – The employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent. per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under this Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment: Provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank. 14B. Power to recover damages. 14B. Power to recover damages. – Where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the Fund, the Pension Fund or the Insurance Fund or in the transfer of accumulations required to be transferred by him under sub-section (2) of Section 15 or sub-section (5) of Section 17 or in the payment of any charges payable under any other provision of this Act or of any Scheme or Insurance Scheme or under any of the conditions specified under Section 17, the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, in this behalf may recover from the employer by way of penalty such damages, not exceedingthe amount of arrears, as may be specified in the Scheme: Provided that before levying and recovering such damages, the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard: Provided further that the Central Board may reduce or waive the damages levied under this section in relation to an establishment which is a sick industrial company and in respect of which a scheme for rehabilitation has been sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction established under Section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985,subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified in the Scheme. 9. A perusal of the above provision makes it abundantly clear that insofar as levy of interest under Section 7Q is concerned, the authority does not have any discretion, as the provisions are mandatory in nature. Once it is found that the organization is covered under the provisions of the Act, the organization is bound to deposit the provident contribution every month within the stipulated period. If there is any delay in depositing the said contribution the provisions of Section 7Q will automatically come into effect and the organization is bound to pay the interest for the delayed payment. In view of the same, the order passed under Section 7Q of the EPF Act dated 21.11.2022 is in consonance with the provisions of the Act and this Court is not inclined to interfere with the said order and the same is confirmed. The writ petition insofar as it relates to challenging the order passed under Section 7Q is dismissed. 10. The writ petition insofar as it relates to challenging the order passed under Section 7Q is dismissed. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arcot Textiles Mills Limited vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Others reported in (2013) 16 SCC 1 has held as under; “27. Presently we shall address to the nature of the lis that can arise under this provision. There cannot be any dispute that the Act in question is a beneficial social legislation to ensure health and other benefits of the employees and the employer under the Act is under statutory obligation to make the deposit that is due from him. In the event of default committed by the employer Section 14-B steps in and calls upon the employer to pay the damages. (See Regl. Provident Fund Commr. vs. S.D. College) Section 7-Q which provides for interest for belated payment is basically a compensation for payment of interest to the affected employees. This provision has been made to secure just and humane conditions of work as has been opined in Regl. Provident Fund Commr. vs. Hooghly Mills Co. Ltd. 16 The language employed in Section 7-Q provides for levy of interest on delayed payment and the rates have been stipulated.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Horticulture Experiment Station vs. RPFC reported in (2022) 4 SCC 516 has held as under; “8. The learned counsel for the appellant(s) submits that the justification tendered by the appellant(s) for which the contribution of EPF could not have been deposited has not been looked into by the authority and the element of mens rea or actus reus is one of the essential elements which has not been taken note of by the authority while imposing damages under Section 14-B of the 1952 Act. In support of his submissions, the counsel for the appellant(s) has placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in ESI Corpn. vs. HMT Ltd. [ESI Corpn. vs. HMT Ltd., (2008) 3 SCC 35 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 558], McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. vs. Regl. Provident Fund Commr. [McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. vs. Regl. Provident Fund Commr., (2014) 15 SCC 263 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 593] and Provident Fund Commr. vs. RSL Textiles (India) (P) Ltd. [Provident Fund Commr. vs. RSL Textiles (India) (P) Ltd., (2017) 3 SCC 110 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 543] 9. Provident Fund Commr. [McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. vs. Regl. Provident Fund Commr., (2014) 15 SCC 263 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 593] and Provident Fund Commr. vs. RSL Textiles (India) (P) Ltd. [Provident Fund Commr. vs. RSL Textiles (India) (P) Ltd., (2017) 3 SCC 110 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 543] 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent(s) in support of submissions, submitted that mens rea is not an essential element for imposing penalty for breach of civil obligations or liabilities and mere contravention of the provisions of the Act or default in making compliance of the mandate of law as regards the civil liabilities are concerned, mens rea or actus reus is not the requirement of law to be considered, while imposing damages like, in the instant case, under Section 14-B of the 1952 Act. In support of submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a two-Judge Bench judgment in SEBI vs. Shriram Mutual Fund [SEBI vs. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361 ] which has been relied upon by a three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Union of India vs. Dharamendra Textile Processors [Union of India vs. Dharamendra Textile Processors, (2008) 13 SCC 369 ] . 10. The question that emerges for our consideration in the instant appeals is that what will be the effect and implementation of Section 14-B of the 1952 Act and as to whether the breach of civil obligations or liabilities committed by the employer is a sine qua non for imposition of penalty/damages or the element of mens rea or actus reus is one of the essential elements has a role to play and the authority is under an obligation to examine the justification, if any, being tendered while passing the order imposing damages under the provisions of the 1952 Act. 11. 11. Undisputedly, the establishment of the appellant(s) was covered under the provisions of the 1952 Act, but still failed to comply with the same and for such noncompliance of the mandate of the 1952 Act, initially the proceedings were initiated under Section 7-A and after adjudication was made in reference to contribution of the EPF which the appellant was under an obligation to pay and for the contravention of the provisions of the 1952 Act, the appellant(s) indeed committed a breach of civil obligations/liabilities and after compliance of the procedure prescribed under the 1952 Act and for the delayed payment of EPF contribution for the period January 1975 to October 1988, after affording due opportunity of hearing as contemplated, order was passed by the competent authority directing the appellant(s) to pay damages as assessed in accordance with Section 14-B of the 1952 Act. 12. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Shriram Mutual Fund case [SEBI vs. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361 ], while examining the scope and ambit of Section 15-D of the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 regarding imposition of penalty for certain defaults in case of mutual funds, examined the question as to whether mens rea is an essential element for imposing penalty for breach of civil obligations and taking note of the binding precedent of this Court held that mens rea is not an essential element for imposing penalty for breach of civil obligations or liabilities 13. Relevant paras 33 and 35 of the judgment are reproduced as under : (Shriram Mutual Fund case [SEBI vs. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361 ], SCC pp. 372-76) “33. This Court in a catena of decisions has held that mens rea is not an essential element for imposing penalty for breach of civil obligations: (a) Director of Enforcement vs. M.C.T.M. Corpn. (P) Ltd. [Director of Enforcement vs. M.C.T.M. Corpn. (P) Ltd., (1996) 2 SCC 471 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 344] : (SCC pp. 478 & 480-81, paras 8 & 12-13) ‘8. (P) Ltd. [Director of Enforcement vs. M.C.T.M. Corpn. (P) Ltd., (1996) 2 SCC 471 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 344] : (SCC pp. 478 & 480-81, paras 8 & 12-13) ‘8. It is thus the breach of a “civil obligation” which attracts “penalty” under Section 23(1)(a) of the FERA, 1947 and a finding that the delinquent has contravened the provisions of Section 10 of the FERA, 1947 that would immediately attract the levy of “penalty” under Section 23, irrespective of the fact whether the contravention was made by the defaulter with any “guilty intention” or not. Therefore, unlike in a criminal case, where it is essential for the “prosecution” to establish that the “accused” had the necessary guilty intention or in other words the requisite “mens rea” to commit the alleged offence with which he is charged before recording his conviction, the obligation on the part of the Directorate of Enforcement, in cases of contravention of the provisions of Section 10 of the FERA, would be discharged where it is shown that the “blameworthy conduct” of the delinquent had been established by wilful contravention by him of the provisions of Section 10 of the FERA, 1947. It is the delinquency of the defaulter itself which establishes his “blameworthy” conduct, attracting the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) of the FERA, 1947 without any further proof of the existence of “mens rea”. Even after an adjudication by the authorities and levy of penalty under Section 23(1)(a) of the FERA, 1947, the defaulter can still be tried and punished for the commission of an offence under the penal law, … *** 12. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 85, at p. 580, para 1023, it is stated thus: “A penalty imposed for a tax delinquency is a civil obligation, remedial and coercive in its nature, and is far different from the penalty for a crime or a fine or forfeiture provided as punishment for the violation of criminal or penal laws.” 13. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view and in our opinion, what applies to “tax delinquency” equally holds good for the “blameworthy” conduct for contravention of the provisions of the FERA, 1947. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view and in our opinion, what applies to “tax delinquency” equally holds good for the “blameworthy” conduct for contravention of the provisions of the FERA, 1947. We, therefore, hold that mens rea (as is understood in criminal law) is not an essential ingredient for holding a delinquent liable to pay penalty under Section 23(1)(a) of the FERA, 1947 for contravention of the provisions of Section 10 of the FERA, 1947 and that penalty is attracted under Section 23(1)(a) as soon as contravention of the statutory obligation contemplated by Section 10(1)(a) is established. The High Court apparently fell in error in treating the “blameworthy conduct” under the Act as equivalent to the commission of a “criminal offence”, overlooking the position that the “blameworthy conduct” in the adjudicatory proceedings is established by proof only of the breach of a civil obligation under the Act, for which the defaulter is obliged to make amends by payment of the penalty imposed under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act irrespective of the fact whether he committed the breach with or without any guilty intention.’ (b) J.K. Industries Ltd. vs. Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers [J.K. Industries Ltd. vs. Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1] : (SCC p. 692, para 42) ‘42. The offences under the Act are not a part of general penal law but arise from the breach of a duty provided in a special beneficial social defence legislation, which creates absolute or strict liability without proof of any mens rea. The offences are strict statutory offences for which establishment of mens rea is not an essential ingredient. The omission or commission of the statutory breach is itself the offence. Similar type of offences based on the principle of strict liability, which means liability without fault or mens rea, exist in many statutes relating to economic crimes as well as in laws concerning the industry, food adulteration, prevention of pollution, etc. in India and abroad. “Absolute offences” are not criminal offences in any real sense but acts which are prohibited in the interest of welfare of the public and the prohibition is backed by sanction of penalty.’ (c) STO vs. Ajit Mills Ltd. [STO vs. Ajit Mills Ltd., (1977) 4 SCC 98 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 536] : (SCC p. 110, para 19) ‘19. “Absolute offences” are not criminal offences in any real sense but acts which are prohibited in the interest of welfare of the public and the prohibition is backed by sanction of penalty.’ (c) STO vs. Ajit Mills Ltd. [STO vs. Ajit Mills Ltd., (1977) 4 SCC 98 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 536] : (SCC p. 110, para 19) ‘19. … Even here we may reject the notion that a penalty or a punishment cannot be cast in the form of an absolute or no-fault liability but must be preceded by mens rea. The classical view that “no mens rea, no crime” has long ago been eroded and several laws in India and abroad, especially regarding economic crimes and departmental penalties, have created severe punishments even where the offences have been defined to exclude mens rea. Therefore, the contention that Section 37(1) fastens a heavy liability regardless of fault has no force in depriving the forfeiture of the character of penalty.’ (d) Gujarat Travancore Agency vs. CIT [Gujarat Travancore Agency v CIT, (1989) 3 SCC 52 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 509 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 389] : (SCC p. 55, para 4) ‘4. … It is sufficient for us to refer to Section 271(1)(a), which provides that a penalty may be imposed if the Income Tax Officer is satisfied that any person has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the return of total income, and to Section 276-C which provides that if a person wilfully fails to furnish in due time the return of income required under Section 139(1), he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine. It is clear that in the former case what is intended is a civil obligation while in the latter what is imposed is a criminal sentence. There can be no dispute that having regard to the provisions of Section 276-C, which speaks of wilful failure on the part of the defaulter and taking into consideration the nature of the penalty, which is punitive, no sentence can be imposed under that provision unless the element of mens rea is established. In most cases of criminal liability, the intention of the legislature is that the penalty should serve as a deterrent. In most cases of criminal liability, the intention of the legislature is that the penalty should serve as a deterrent. The creation of an offence by statute proceeds on the assumption that society suffers injury by the act or omission of the defaulter and that a deterrent must be imposed to discourage the repetition of the offence. In the case of a proceeding under Section 271(1)(a), however, it seems that the intention of the legislature is to emphasise the fact of loss of revenue and to provide a remedy for such loss, although no doubt an element of coercion is present in the penalty. In this connection the terms in which the penalty falls to be measured is significant. Unless there is something in the language of the statute indicating the need to establish the element of mens rea it is generally sufficient to prove that a default in complying with the statute has occurred. In our opinion, there is nothing in Section 271(1)(a) which requires that mens rea must be proved before penalty can be levied under that provision.’ (e) Swedish Match AB vs. SEBI [Swedish Match AB vs. SEBI, (2004) 11 SCC 641 ] : (SCC p. 671, para 113) ‘113. … The provisions of Section 15-H of the Act mandate that a penalty of Rupees twenty-five crores may be imposed. The Board does not have any discretion in the matter and, thus, the adjudication proceeding is a mere formality. Imposition of penalty upon the appellant would, thus, be a forgone conclusion. Only in the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants, existence of mens rea on the part of the appellants will come up for consideration.’ (f) SEBI vs. Cabot International Capital Corpn. [SEBI vs. Cabot International Capital Corpn., 2004 SCC OnLine Bom 180 : (2005) 123 Comp Cas 841] : (SCC OnLine Bom paras 38, 43 & 45) ‘38. Thus, the following extracted principles are summarised: (A) Mens rea is an essential or sine qua non for criminal offence. (B) A straitjacket formula of mens rea cannot be blindly followed in each and every case. The scheme of a particular statute may be diluted in a given case. Thus, the following extracted principles are summarised: (A) Mens rea is an essential or sine qua non for criminal offence. (B) A straitjacket formula of mens rea cannot be blindly followed in each and every case. The scheme of a particular statute may be diluted in a given case. (C) If, from the scheme, object and words used in the statute, it appears that the proceedings for imposition of the penalty are adjudicatory in nature, in contradistinction to criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, the determination is of the breach of the civil obligation by the offender. The word “penalty” by itself will not be determinative to conclude the nature of proceedings being criminal or quasi-criminal. The relevant considerations being the nature of the functions being discharged by the authority and the determination of the liability of the contravener and the delinquency. (D) Mens rea is not essential element for imposing penalty for breach of civil obligations or liabilities. (E) There can be two distinct liabilities, civil and criminal, under the same Act. *** 43. The SEBI Act and the Regulations, are intended to regulate the securities market and the related aspects, the imposition of penalty, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be tested on the ground of “no mens rea, no penalty”. For breaches of provisions of the SEBI Act and Regulations, according to us, which are civil in nature, mens rea is not essential. On particular facts and circumstances of the case, proper exercise of judicial discretion is a must, but not on foundation that mens rea is essential to impose penalty in each and every breach of provisions of the SEBI Act. *** 45. However, we are not in agreement with the appellate authority in respect of the reasoning given in regard to the necessity of mens rea being essential for imposing the penalty. According to us, mens rea is not essential for imposing civil penalties under the SEBI Act and Regulations.’ *** 35. In our considered opinion, penalty is attracted as soon as the contravention of the statutory obligation as contemplated by the Act and the Regulations is established and hence the intention of the parties committing such violation becomes wholly irrelevant. According to us, mens rea is not essential for imposing civil penalties under the SEBI Act and Regulations.’ *** 35. In our considered opinion, penalty is attracted as soon as the contravention of the statutory obligation as contemplated by the Act and the Regulations is established and hence the intention of the parties committing such violation becomes wholly irrelevant. A breach of civil obligation which attracts penalty in the nature of fine under the provisions of the Act and the Regulations would immediately attract the levy of penalty irrespective of the fact whether contravention must be made by the defaulter with guilty intention or not. We also further held that unless the language of the statute indicates the need to establish the presence of mens rea, it is wholly unnecessary to ascertain whether such a violation was intentional or not. On a careful perusal of Section 15- D(b) and Section 15-E of the Act, there is nothing which requires that mens rea must be proved before penalty can be imposed under these provisions. Hence once the contravention is established then the penalty is to follow.” 14. The three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India vs. Dharamendra Textile Processors [Union of India vs. Dharamendra Textile Processors, (2008) 13 SCC 369 ] while examining the scope and ambit of Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 held that as far as the penalty inflicted under the provisions is a civil liability is concerned, mens rea or actus reus is not an essential element for imposing civil penalties and overruled the two-Judge Bench judgment in Dilip N. Shroff vs. CIT [Dilip N. Shroff vs. CIT, (2007) 6 SCC 329 ] and approved the view expressed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Shriram Mutual Fund case [SEBI vs. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361 ] and held in paras 18 and 20 as under : (Dharamendra Textile Processors case [Union of India vs. Dharamendra Textile Processors, (2008) 13 SCC 369 ], SCC p. 394) “18. The Explanations appended to Section 271(1) (c) of the IT Act entirely indicates the element of strict liability on the assessee for concealment or for giving inaccurate particulars while filing return. The judgment in Dilip N. Shroff case [Dilip N. Shroff vs. CIT, (2007) 6 SCC 329 ] has not considered the effect and relevance of Section 276-C of the IT Act. The judgment in Dilip N. Shroff case [Dilip N. Shroff vs. CIT, (2007) 6 SCC 329 ] has not considered the effect and relevance of Section 276-C of the IT Act. Object behind enactment of Section 271(1)(c) read with Explanations indicate that the said section has been enacted to provide for a remedy for loss of revenue. The penalty under that provision is a civil liability. Wilful concealment is not an essential ingredient for attracting civil liability as is the case in the matter of prosecution under Section 276-C of the IT Act. *** 20. Above being the position, the plea that Rules 96-ZQ and 96-ZO have a concept of discretion inbuilt cannot be sustained. Dilip N. Shroff case [Dilip N. Shroff vs. CIT, (2007) 6 SCC 329 ] was not correctly decided but SEBI case [SEBI vs. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361 ] has analysed the legal position in the correct perspectives. The reference is answered. The matter shall now be placed before the Division Bench to deal with the matter in the light of what has been stated above, only so far as the cases where challenge to vires of Rule 967-Q(5) are concerned. In all other cases the orders of the High Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, are quashed and the matter remitted to it for disposal in the light of present judgments. Appeals except Civil Appeals Nos. 3397 & 3398-99 of 2003, 4096 of 2004, 3388 & 5277 of 2006, 4316, 4317, 675 and 1420 of 2007 and appeal relating to SLP (C) No. 21751 of 2007 are allowed and the excepted appeals shall now be placed before the Division Bench for disposal.” 15. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject, it is well-settled that mens rea or actus reus is not an essential element for imposing penalty or damages for breach of civil obligations and liabilities.” 16. The judgment on which the learned counsel for the appellant(s) has placed reliance i.e. ESI Corpn. [ESI Corpn. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject, it is well-settled that mens rea or actus reus is not an essential element for imposing penalty or damages for breach of civil obligations and liabilities.” 16. The judgment on which the learned counsel for the appellant(s) has placed reliance i.e. ESI Corpn. [ESI Corpn. vs. HMT Ltd., (2008) 3 SCC 35 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 558], the Division Bench in ignorance of the settled judicial binding precedent of which a detailed reference has been made, while examining the scope and ambit of Section 85-B of the Employees State Insurance Corporation Act, 1948 which is in pari materia with Section 14-B of the 1952 Act placing reliance on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Dilip N. Shroff [Dilip N. Shroff vs. CIT, (2007) 6 SCC 329 ] held that for the breach of civil obligations/liabilities, existence of mens rea or actus reus to be a necessary ingredient for levy of damages and/or the quantum thereof. 19. Taking note of the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Union of India vs. Dharamendra Textile Processors [Union of India vs. Dharamendra Textile Processors, (2008) 13 SCC 369 ] , which is indeed binding on us, we are of the considered view that any default or delay in the payment of EPF contribution by the employer under the Act is a sine qua non for imposition of levy of damages under Section 14-B of the 1952 Act and mens rea or actus reus is not an essential element for imposing penalty/damages for breach of civil obligations/liabilities. 12. Though the counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of in the cases of Kranit Associates Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and Ors. reported in 2010 (95) AIC 139 , in the case of Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, EPFO and Anr. vs. Management of RSL Textiles India Private Limited through its Director reported in (2017) 3 SCC 110 and in the case of Mcleod Russel India Limited vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Jalpaiguri and Ors. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and Ors. reported in 2010 (95) AIC 139 , in the case of Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, EPFO and Anr. vs. Management of RSL Textiles India Private Limited through its Director reported in (2017) 3 SCC 110 and in the case of Mcleod Russel India Limited vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Jalpaiguri and Ors. reported in (2014) 15 SCC 263 ., it is to be noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Horticulture case (cited supra) has dealt with the judgments relied by the petitioner and held that mens rea is not a creteria to be taken into consideration while calculating the damages. However, it is pertinent to note that Central Provident Commissioner vide letter dated 15.05.2020 duly taking into consideration the Covid-19 Pandemic situation has directed all the commissioners to take into effect the Covid-19 Pandemic situation and pass necessary orders under Section 14B. The contents of the letter are extracted herein below; 13. Having regard to the same, the impugned order dated 21.11.2022 under Section 14B is set aside, the matter is remanded back to authority concerned for passing orders afresh duly taking into account the above mentioned letter and pass a reasoned order. It is needless to mention that before passing any orders, the petitioner shall be given an opportunity of hearing. The entire exercise shall be completed as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Any order passed shall be communicated to the petitioners. 14. The dates of impugned order in all the batch cases/ CWJC Nos. are quoted herein below with their respective CWJC Nos; and they are also accordingly set aside. CWJC No. Letter Dated CWJC-1557/2024 23.06.2022 CWJC-957/2024 01.12.2022 CWJC-1209/2024 05.01.2023 CWJC-962/2024 21.10.2022 CWJC-1518/2024 22.12.2022 CWJC-1178/2024 18.05.2022 CWJC-19289/2024 01.11.2023 CWJC-19377/2024 03.06.2024 CWJC-19265/2024 01.11.2023 CWJC-13180/2024 15.12.2023 CWJC-9881/2024 29.06.2022 CWJC-8986/2024 14.01.2022 CWJC-8999/2024 10.04.2023 CWJC-7847/2024 15.12.2023 CWJC-8338/2024 15.12.2023 CWJC-7892/2024 03.06.2024 CWJC-7866/2024 01.01.2024/20.02.2024 CWJC-8614/2024 28.11.2023/01.01.2024 CWJC-7800/2024 17.05.2024 CWJC-7894/2024 18.06.2024 CWJC-6894/2024 27.06.2024 CWJC-7235/2024 21.10.2021 CWJC-6499/2024 27.06.2024 CWJC-6486/2024 13.12.2023 CWJC-5837/2024 07.05.2024/04.06.2024 CWJC-5286/2024 18.04.2024 CWJC-5964/2024 29.08.2024 CWJC-6061/2024 29.07.2023/19.08.2023 CWJC-3414/2024 21.07.2023 CWJC-2807/2024 04.01.2023 CWJC-3460/2024 29.04.2022 CWJC-2523/2024 26.09.2023 CWJC-2563/2024 24.05.2023 CWJC-2933/2024 05.04.2023/01.05.2023 CWJC-1880/2024 19.10.2022 CWJC-1763/2024 19.10.2022 CWJC-1482/2024 29.06.2022 CWJC-1070/2024 07.08.2024 CWJC-1524/2024 23.07.2024 CWJC-1106/2024 18.09.2023 CWJC-1536/2024 18.07.2023 15. As it is stated that the authorities in some cases have already recovered the amount of damages levied by the respondents, the authorities are directed to either refund the amount to the petitioners herein or in case they take a decision to retain the said amounts. The authorities are directed to pay interest till the passing of the fresh orders as directed by this Court. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be calculated from the date of receipt of this order till the date of passing of the order by the EPFO. The amounts retained along with the accrued interest shall be adjusted depending on the final orders likely to be passed by the said authority within the time frame fixed by this Court under Section 14B. 16. The writ petitions are accordingly, partly allowed to the extent indicated.