Order : 1. By way of filing this instant Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No. 89-2/2018, registered at the office of the Zonal Forest Officer, Asind, District Bhilwara, for the offences under Sections 9 and 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, along with all further proceedings arising therefrom. 2. The facts of the case, as emerging from the record, are that on 21.04.2018, one Jamunadas Vaishnav, resident of Bharlia, Tehsil Hurda, District Bhilwara, was attacked by a wild panther in Village Sabdada, Tehsil Asind, District Bhilwara, while he was out for morning ablutions. Upon hearing his cries, the villagers gathered, and the panther took refuge in a nearby ruin. Despite instructions from the officials of the Forest and Police Departments to maintain distance, certain individuals assaulted the panther with sticks, causing injuries. The injured panther was subsequently captured by the forest staff and provided primary treatment before being transported to Nahargarh Biological Park, Jaipur, under the directions of higher authorities. A video of the incident was circulated on social media and published in newspapers, leading to the registration of FIR No. 89/02 dated 22.04.2018 at Forest Guard Post, Asind, under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. Pursuant thereto, six accused persons were arrested on 27.04.2018 and produced before the learned Magistrate, who remanded them to judicial custody. Thereafter, the accused moved S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail No. 4385/2018 before this Court, which granted them bail on 07.05.2018. Subsequently, the accused filed S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 2100/2018 before this Court, challenging the FIR and seeking a stay on further proceedings, whereupon this Court directed a halt on further action. The matter remains pending before this Court, and the proceedings in Case No. 89-02/2018 before the learned MJM, Asind, shall abide by the outcome of the present petition. 3. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. 4. Upon a careful perusal of the facts and legal provisions governing the present case, this Court deems it appropriate to examine the statutory framework under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. 5. Section 9 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, states- ”Prohibition of hunting.-No person shall hunt any wild animal specified in Schedules I, II, III and IV except as provided under section 11 and section 12.” 6. 5. Section 9 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, states- ”Prohibition of hunting.-No person shall hunt any wild animal specified in Schedules I, II, III and IV except as provided under section 11 and section 12.” 6. Section 51 prescribes penalties for contraventions of the Act, stipulating imprisonment which may extend to three years, or a fine which may extend to twenty-five thousand rupees, or both. 7. Section 2(16) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, defines “hunting” as including— (a) killing or poisoning of any wild animal or captive animal and every attempt to do so; (b) capturing, coursing, snaring, trapping, driving, or baiting any wild or captive animal and every attempt to do so; (c) injuring, destroying, or taking any part of the body of such an animal or, in the case of wild birds or reptiles, damaging the eggs of such birds or reptiles, or disturbing the eggs or nests of such birds or reptiles. 8. In the present case, the alleged act does not fall strictly within the ambit of "hunting" as defined under the Act, as there is no evidence to suggest a deliberate intent to hunt, capture, or kill the wild animal. For an act to qualify as "hunting," there must be clear preparation, intent, and an effort to trace and kill the animal. In the present case, the wild panther had entered a human settlement, creating a state of fear among the villagers. The actions of the accused were aimed at ensuring their safety and curbing any potential assault by the animal, rather than an act of hunting per se. The process of driving away a wild animal to prevent harm to human life does not amount to hunting within the meaning of Section 2(16) of the Act. 9. Furthermore, Section 11(2) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, states: (2) The killing or wounding in good faith of any wild animal in defence of oneself or of any other person shall not be an offence: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall exonerate any person who, when such defence becomes necessary, was committing any act in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder. (3) Any wild animal killed or wounded in defence of any person shall be Government property. 10. (3) Any wild animal killed or wounded in defence of any person shall be Government property. 10. From the above statutory provision, it is evident that the FIR against the petitioner lacks merit, as the act was carried out in self-defence and with a bonafide intention to protect human lives. The accused individuals were not engaged in any unlawful activity prior to the incident, nor was there any deliberate effort to harm the panther beyond what was necessary for protection. The circumstances clearly indicate that the panther had posed an imminent threat to the safety of the villagers, necessitating immediate action to prevent injury or loss of life. As such, the accused persons are fully protected under Section 11(2) of the Act, and their actions do not constitute an offence. 11. This Court is also mindful of the principle that, in determining whether the accused acted in self-defence when causing injury to a wild animal, the nature and ferocity of the animal must be considered. A panther, like a tiger, falls under the category of ferae naturae—a wild and inherently dangerous species—unlike mansuatae naturae, such as domesticated animals like dogs or horses, which may display aggression only in specific cases. When faced with an imminent attack by a ferae naturae, an individual cannot be expected to assess the situation with meticulous precision. In such circumstances, the inference that the act was done in defence of human life is more readily drawn, as opposed to cases involving less dangerous or harmless wildlife, such as birds. Given the facts of the present case, where the panther had already attacked an individual and posed a continuing threat to the villagers, the accused's actions fall squarely within the scope of self-defence as envisaged under Section 11(2) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. 12. The distinction between "hunting" and "self-defence" is frequently a pivotal consideration in cases under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The essential sine qua non for invoking Section 9 of the Act is the existence of an unequivocal intent to hunt. The facts and circumstances of the present case clearly establish that the panther intruded into the village, and the petitioner did not proactively venture to the location in pursuit of the wild animal with an intent to hunt. The essential sine qua non for invoking Section 9 of the Act is the existence of an unequivocal intent to hunt. The facts and circumstances of the present case clearly establish that the panther intruded into the village, and the petitioner did not proactively venture to the location in pursuit of the wild animal with an intent to hunt. The sequence of events unmistakably suggests that the presence of the panther in a human settlement created an atmosphere of fear and distress among the villagers. A wild panther’s unexpected intrusion into a populated area naturally triggers widespread alarm and panic. Some individuals, upon hearing the commotion, instinctively rushed outside—some out of fear, others out of curiosity, and many in an effort to safeguard their lives and property. The resultant human reaction, whether prompted by a defensive instinct, a sense of urgency, or mere curiosity, cannot be construed as an act of "hunting" within the meaning of the Act. The conduct of the villagers, driven by an immediate and overwhelming apprehension of danger rather than any premeditated intention to capture or kill the animal, does not fall within the ambit of the prohibited activities under Section 9. Hence, equating such instinctive and defensive reactions with the offence of hunting would be legally untenable. 13. The Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, is the primary penal law of India and contains general exceptions that apply universally, including in cases where special statutes are silent on particular aspects. These exceptions are of broad application and provide legal immunity in specific situations. In the present case, Section 81 of the IPC is directly applicable. Section 81 states: "Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm.—Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property. Explanation.— It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm." 14. Explanation.— It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm." 14. The accused in the present case did not intend to cause harm to the panther but acted in good faith to prevent imminent danger to human life. The situation demanded immediate action to protect a fellow villager from further attack. The villagers’ response, even if it resulted in injury to the animal, was neither premeditated nor driven by any unlawful motive but was solely to prevent a greater harm. The principle of necessity embodied in Section 81 IPC applies here, as the accused had to choose between the safety of human life and the potential harm to the animal. Given that the panther had already attacked a person and continued to pose a threat, the villagers’ actions were justified under this provision. 15. In the realm of criminal jurisprudence, the fundamental principles of actus reus (guilty act) and mens rea (guilty mind) play a pivotal role in determining the culpability of an accused person. A mere act, devoid of a criminal state of mind, does not automatically constitute an offence unless the requisite mens rea is established. In the present case, even if the allegations as set forth in the prosecution's case are taken at their highest, the actions of the accused do not, in any manner, reflect the presence of a guilty mind or criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction under the penal provisions invoked against them. The principle of mens rea is deeply embedded in criminal law, ensuring that liability is not imposed in the absence of a wrongful intent or deliberate culpable state of mind. The accused individuals, as per the facts emerging from the record, were responding to an imminent and life-threatening situation rather than engaging in a premeditated or unlawful act. Their conduct was dictated by necessity and self-preservation rather than any conscious desire to inflict harm upon the wild animal. Criminal liability cannot be fastened upon individuals merely because harm has occurred; rather, it must be ascertained whether the act was accompanied by an intention to commit an offence or a willful disregard for the law. Their conduct was dictated by necessity and self-preservation rather than any conscious desire to inflict harm upon the wild animal. Criminal liability cannot be fastened upon individuals merely because harm has occurred; rather, it must be ascertained whether the act was accompanied by an intention to commit an offence or a willful disregard for the law. In the instant matter, the essential ingredient of criminal intent is conspicuously absent, thereby negating the very foundation of the prosecution’s case. Hence, in the absence of mens rea, the invocation of penal provisions against the accused is legally unsustainable. 16. Consequently, this Court deems it just and proper to quash FIR No. 89-2/2018, registered at the office of the Zonal Forest Officer, Asind, District Bhilwara, and all further proceedings emanating therefrom. 17. Accordingly, the present petition allowed. 18. The stay petition is disposed of.