Order : 1. Vide this common order, the aforesaid bunch is being disposed of together as both the facts and the issue involved therein is similar. 2. Illustratively, for the sake of brevity, facts are being taken from S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.13241/2021. Petitioner herein, inter-alia, seeks issuance of appropriate writ, order and/or direction commanding the respondents to consider his application for grant of compassionate appointment on the post of LDC owing to death of his father in harness. 3. Petitioner claim to be an adopted son of deceased Shri Madan Lal Prajapat, who served as a Class IV employee at Government Primary School in Sundervas, District Udaipur. Petitioner’s adoptive father passed away in 2016. He applied for compassionate appointment for the post of LDC in accordance with the Rajasthan Compassionate Appointment of Dependents of Deceased Government Servants Rules, 1996 ("Rules of 1996"). However, despite being fully qualified and eligible for appointment under the provisions of the Rules of 1996, petitioner’s application was rejected by respondent No. 3 vide an order dated 10.08.2021 on the ground that the adoption deed was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Hence this petition. 4. In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard the rival contentions and perused the case file. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies on various judgments, which are as below :- 1. Mohan Singh Bhati Vs. State of Rajasthan (SBCWP No.9943/2022), decided on 11.08.2023 ; 2. Ronak Joshi Vs. State of Rajasthan (SBCWP No.8556/2020), decided on 02.09.2022; 3. Jay Kumar vs. The Bihar State Electricity Board (Letter Patent Appeal No.866/2005 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.6844/2005), decided on 04.08.2015. 6. First and foremost, reference may be had to the pointed stand taken in the reply filed by the respondents. Relevant thereof is reproduced herein below:- “2. That the averments made in para no.2 of the writ petition are matter of record and same are not admitted. It is denied that petitioner is adopted son of Madan Lal Prajapat as there is no Adoption deed as per Section 10 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and in all the educational documents, the name of biological father has been mentioned, therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be adopted son of late Madan Lal Prajapat. 3. It is denied that petitioner is adopted son of Madan Lal Prajapat as there is no Adoption deed as per Section 10 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and in all the educational documents, the name of biological father has been mentioned, therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be adopted son of late Madan Lal Prajapat. 3. That the averments made in para no.3 of the writ petition are not admitted and same are denied. As stated above, there is no Adoption deed as per Section 10 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and in all the educational documents, the name of biological father has been mentioned, therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be adopted son of late Madan lal Prajapat and thus, he is not entitled for compassionate appointment under the Rules of 1996. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 8. That in reply to para no.8 of the writ petition, it is submitted that the petitioner does not fall within the definition of dependent as there is no adoption deed under Section 10 of the Act of 1956 showing that the petitioner is the adopted son of late employee, therefore, his application for compassionate appointment was not considered. As stated above, ‘Dependant’ means a spouse, son, unmarried or widowed daughter, adopted son/adopted unmarried daughter, legally adopted by the deceased Government servant during his/her life time and who were wholly dependent on the deceased Government servant at the time of his/her death. Since the petitioner is not legally adopted son of deceased employee, he is not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground.” 7. Having gone through the judgments ibid, I am in agreement with the proposition of law laid down therein, however, since the disputed facts are involved in the present petitions, which cannot be resolved through extra ordinary writ jurisdiction and evidence is required to be adduced by the respective parties, I find no grounds to interfere. 8. Reference may, in this regard, be had to a judgment titled Narendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12002/2023 , decided on 02.05.2024 , which too, coincidentally was rendered by me. Relevant thereof is extracted hereinbelow:- “6. I have seen the judgment rendered in Mohan Singh Bhati (ibid). 8. Reference may, in this regard, be had to a judgment titled Narendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12002/2023 , decided on 02.05.2024 , which too, coincidentally was rendered by me. Relevant thereof is extracted hereinbelow:- “6. I have seen the judgment rendered in Mohan Singh Bhati (ibid). I am of the view that it is per incurium in view of the clear provision explained by the Division Bench of this Court at Jaipur Bench in the case of Kumari Vinita Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors. , decided on 15.01.2014 read with the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Atluri Brahmanandam (D) Thr. LRs Vs. Anne Sai Bapuji [ AIR 2011 SC 545 ]. In any case, the Division Bench view taken in Kumari Vinita Sharma judgment has to take precedence over that of the Single Bench judgment in Mohan Singh Bhati 7. In the case of Kumari Vinita Sharma (ibid), it was held as under:- "11. LRs Vs. Anne Sai Bapuji [ AIR 2011 SC 545 ]. In any case, the Division Bench view taken in Kumari Vinita Sharma judgment has to take precedence over that of the Single Bench judgment in Mohan Singh Bhati 7. In the case of Kumari Vinita Sharma (ibid), it was held as under:- "11. In the instant case, apart from the adoption deed, which the petitioner claimed to have been registered (much before the death of the Government employee) the petitioner, in succession got all the retiral dues of late Government employee and there was no other person dependent upon the deceased employee except the petitioner, in view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court one cannot claim compassionate appointment in due course of time or after the crisis is over, in the instant case as well, when the petitioner additionally got all retiral dues of the late Government employee, in succession and no other family member was dependent upon the deceased employee, at least, she cannot be said to be under financial crunch or distress even at the relevant point of time when she approached to the Tribunal for seeking compassionate appointment and apart from it, the petitioner for the first time approached by filing of original application in the later part of 2004 after two years of the death of the deceased employee which took place in February, 2002, and in our considered view as well, when the compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and sufficient means were available with the petitioner being an adopted daughter of the deceased-employee, as alleged and as regards Sec. 16 of the Act, 1956 has not been looked into by the Tribunal, suffice it to say that Sec.10 (4) of the Act, 1956 ordinarily debars an incumbent to take in adoption a child who have crossed the age of 15 years and indisputably, the petitioner was 25 years of age and from the material which has come on record even before this Court regarding the customs and usage prevalent in the society/community of the petitioner, we too are not satisfied and merely because it was a registered adoption deed, no presumption could be drawn that may be helpful for the petitioner to seek compassionate appointment." In the case of Atluri Brahmanandam (D) Thr. LRs (ibid), Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- "12. LRs (ibid), Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- "12. We are concerned for the purpose of this case with clause (iv) of Section 10 which provides that a person to be adopted should not have completed the age of 15 years. But there is also an exception provided therein to the aforesaid required qualification which provides that if there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties permitting persons who have completed the age of 15 years being taken in adoption, such a person could also be validly adopted. On the other hand, the effect and the implication of Section 16 of the Act is that if there is any document purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving as well the person taking the child in adoption is registered under any law for the time being in force and if it is produced in any Court, the Court would presume that the adoption has been made in compliance of the provisions of the Act unless and until it is disproved. 13. There is no denial of the fact in the present case that the respondent was more than 15 years of age at the time of his adoption. But the respondent has relied upon the exception provided in section 10 (iv) and has proved by leading cogent and reliable evidence like Ex. A-8 that there is a custom in the “Kamma” community of Andhra Pradesh for adoption of a boy even above the age of 15 years. Therefore, the aforesaid exception which is engrafted in the same part of the provision of Section 10 of the Act was satisfied. Since the aforesaid custom and aforesaid adoption was also recorded in a registered deed of adoption, the Court has to presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act, since the respondent has utterly failed to challenge the said evidence and also to disprove the aforesaid adoption." 8. The aforesaid two judgments were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge while deciding the case of Mohan Singh Bhati (ibid). The aforesaid two judgments were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge while deciding the case of Mohan Singh Bhati (ibid). The said Single Bench judgment in Mohan Singh Bhati, therefore, cannot be applied to the facts of the present case where the conceded position is that at the time of adoption, petitioner was of 18 years, which is in direct conflict with the statutory requirement provided in Section 10(4) of the Act of 1956. For ready reference, Section 10(iv) is reproduced hereunder:- " 10. Persons who may be adopted.— No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely: — (i) xxx xxx; (ii) xxx xxx; (iii) xxx xxx; (iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption." 9. The aforesaid Section has to be read homogeneously with Section 16. No doubt, under Section 16, presumption has been envisaged in favour of the biological parents but the said presumption has to be in compliance with the requirement of Section 10(iv) ibid. 10. In the present case, it is borne out from the certificate of the petitioner (Annex.1) that he was aged 18 years at the time of his adoption on 13.12.2013. It is not even the case of the petitioner that there is certain special custom, which permits adoption of a child regardless of his age so s to seek applicability of Atluri Brahmanandam (D) Thr. LRs judgment, ibid. 11. In view thereof, there is no ground to interfere. 12. Dismissed accordingly.” 9. Trite it may sound that the benevolence policy of the State is intended to provide immediate succor to the family of the sole earning member who dies in harness, so that the family can be saved from starvation, sheer penury and the unforeseen financial calamity with which it is visited. 10. Furthermore, it is evident that the petitioners have failed to establish the validity of their respective adoptions under Section 10 of the Act of 1956. Consequently, they do not qualify as a ‘dependent’ under the Rules of 1996 and are not entitled to compassionate appointment. 11. That apart, source of compassionate appointment cannot be treated as a reservation. 10. Furthermore, it is evident that the petitioners have failed to establish the validity of their respective adoptions under Section 10 of the Act of 1956. Consequently, they do not qualify as a ‘dependent’ under the Rules of 1996 and are not entitled to compassionate appointment. 11. That apart, source of compassionate appointment cannot be treated as a reservation. It is not an alternative route for appointment by way of backdoor entry at the cost of a competent candidate being denied the job in question. 12. Being so, the petitions are accordingly dismissed with liberty to seek remedy to establish the adoption in accordance with law, including filing of the civil suit, if so advised. 13. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.