JUDGMENT : Yarenjungla Longkumer, J. Heard Mr. K. Laldinliana, learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Vanlalhriatpuii, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Samuel Lalremruata, learned counsel for respondent No. 2. 1 . The present appeal has been filed by the United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Aizawl Branch, Aizawl under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle, Act 1988, praying for setting aside the Impugned Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2023 passed by the learned member MACT, Aizawl in MACT Case No. 24/2021. 2. The facts of the case leading to the present appeal is that the claimant/respondent No. 1 filed a petition under Section 166 of the MV Act, 1988, claiming compensation for the damage of his vehicle B/R MZ-01-J 8843 (Chevrolet Spark). The story of the claimant/respondent No. 1 was that, on 10.04.2021 at 1:00 P.M one vehicle Scorpio B/R MZ01/P-2457 owned by the respondent 2 Sh. Lalramchena which was driven by his driver Lalnunchhunga, was proceeding towards Aizawl, from Thenzawl when it collided with the claimant’s vehicle Chevrolet Spark B/R No.MZ01/ 8843 driven by driver Lalhmingduhawma. As a result, the vehicle of the claimant/respondent No.1 was badly damaged. That the vehicle which was involved in the accident, the Scorpio B/R No. MZ01/P-2457 was validly insured with the United Insurance Co. Ltd., Aizawl, Mizoram with policy No. 1305023120P10706743 with a validity from 30.09.2020 to midnight of 29.09.2021. The estimated bills for the repair of his accident vehicle was around Rs. 2,80,482/-(Rupees Two lakhs eight thousands four hundred and eighty two) as estimated by the work shop Highland Chevrolet. The claim petition was filed by the claimant/respondent No. 1, claiming Rs. 2,80,482/- for the damage caused to his vehicle because of the vehicular accident which occurred on 10.04.2021. The claim was contested by both the respondent No. 2/owner of the Scorpio vehicle and the present appellant/insurance by submitting their respective written statements. 3. The respondent No. 2/owner of Scorpio vehicle in his written statement stated that he is the owner of the Scorpio vehicle B/R MZ01/P-2457 which was driven by his driver Lalhmingduhawma and the collision of the vehicle took place at Chalkawn, Sailam, Mizoram, and he specifically stated that his driver was not at fault for the occurrence of the accident. 3. The respondent No. 2/owner of Scorpio vehicle in his written statement stated that he is the owner of the Scorpio vehicle B/R MZ01/P-2457 which was driven by his driver Lalhmingduhawma and the collision of the vehicle took place at Chalkawn, Sailam, Mizoram, and he specifically stated that his driver was not at fault for the occurrence of the accident. He further stated in his written statement that the bill annexed by the claimant in the claim petition is only an estimated amount and as such the claimant is not liable to receive the amount claimed by him. Moreover, since his vehicle was validly insured at the time of the collision, he is not liable to pay compensation to the claimant. 4. The appellant/insurance company in their written statement stated that the claim is bad because of non-joinder/mis-joinder of necessary parties and in that regard, it was submitted that the two vehicles Chevrolet Spark and Scorpio were involved in the accident and as such the owners, drivers and insurers of the two vehicles are necessary parties. It was also stated in the written statement that the claimant is not the owner of the Chevrolet Spark vehicle and it was also denied that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the Scorpio, it was denied that the claimant had incurred an expenditure of Rs. 2,80,482/- for repair of his vehicle. The Tribunal framed three issues : “i) Whether the claim application is maintainable in its present form and style? ii) Whether there was fault on the part of the driver owner of the accident vehicle? iii) Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation, and if so, who is liable to pay and to what extent?” 5. The claimant produced and examined three witnesses and the O.Ps produced and examined one witness. Thereafter, the learned Tribunal passed Impugned Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2023 by which the appellant/insurer company was directed to deposit Rs. 2,80,482/- along with interest @ 7% Per Annum from the date of filing i.e. 17.08.2021 for onward disbursement to the claimant. Being aggrieved by Impugned Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2023, the appellant/insurer company has filed the present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. 2,80,482/- along with interest @ 7% Per Annum from the date of filing i.e. 17.08.2021 for onward disbursement to the claimant. Being aggrieved by Impugned Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2023, the appellant/insurer company has filed the present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. K. Laldinliana, relying on the grounds taken in the Memorandum of Appeal has submitted that the claimant/respondent No. 1 is not the rightful owner of the Chevrolet Spark vehicle B/R No. MZ01/J-8843 and the claimant has not been able to establish his ownership before the learned tribunal. Learned counsel states that the Registration Certificate of the Chevrolet Spark was not enclosed in the claimant petition nor was it exhibited during the Trial. Before the Tribunal, the claimant/respondent No. 1 had produced a copy of the alleged sale deed executed between him and one Mr. R. Lalmuanpuii which is at Annexure-5 page-17 in the Trial Court records. According to the alleged sale deed the claimant/respondent No. 1 had bought the vehicle Chevrolet Spark from one R. Lalmuanpuii for an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/-. 7. According to the learned counsel for the appellant there is no proof that the so called R. Lalmuanpuii was the rightful owner of the Chevrolet Spark vehicle. The alleged sale deed is not registered in accordance with law and there is no witness to the sale deed. Apart from the sale deed no other evidence was adduced by the claimant/respondent No. 1 before the learned Tribunal and in fact, the claimant also deposed in his cross- examination that he is not the registered owner of the Chevrolet Spark vehicle. The claim petition ought to have been dismissed on this count alone. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the police report at page-21 Annexure-9 in the Trial Court records and also the Motor Vehicles inspection report at page-18 Annexure-6 of the LCR. While referring to the police report the learned counsel states that in the said Report it is stated that M.V.I. requisition for mechanical inspection of the said vehicle has been sent to DTO, Aizawl and the report is enclosed. The M.V.I. report is dated 09.07.2021 for the alleged accident which occurred on 10.04.2021. The Motor Vehicles Inspector report at Annexure-6 in the LCR is dated 09.07.2021 which means that the inspection was done only after all the repairs had been completed in respect of the Chevrolet Spark vehicle. The M.V.I. report is dated 09.07.2021 for the alleged accident which occurred on 10.04.2021. The Motor Vehicles Inspector report at Annexure-6 in the LCR is dated 09.07.2021 which means that the inspection was done only after all the repairs had been completed in respect of the Chevrolet Spark vehicle. And learned counsel has therefore, stated that the said M.V.I. report which is after a lapse of 90(ninety) days from the date of the accident; being issued only after the repairs were all completed cannot be relied upon. Moreover, the police report dated 16.07.2021 also cannot be relied upon to decide the case, because the officer-in-charge of Sialsuk Police Station who had issued the police report appeared as a witness before the learned Tribunal and when he was cross examined, he stated that he was not present when the accident happened. Even in his report he has stated that the report is based on a spot enquiry which revealed that the cause of accident was due to rash and negligent driving on the part of Scorpio B/R No. MZ-01P-2457, whose driver drove the vehicle on the wrong side and was over speeding. The O.C. has mentioned about the spot enquiry in his police report but, in his deposition he categorically stated that he was not present when the accident happened. Accordingly, learned counsel for the appellant submits that another ground why the said report cannot be relied upon is that the enquiry officer was not examined and the enquiry report was not produced before the learned Tribunal. Moreover, no independent witnesses were examined and there was not FIR and no regular case registered against the driver of the Scorpio vehicle. 9. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the claim petition was filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. And therefore, the claimant has to prove negligence of the driver by adducing evidence and without proving the same the claimant cannot succeed in his claim. To support this contention, the learned counsel has relied on the cases of; 1) (2002) 1 GauLR 99: R.K. MADHURYYAJIT AND ANOTHER VS TAKHELLAMBAN ABUNG SINGH AND ANOTHER. 2) ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS MEENA VARIYAL AND ORS., (2007) 5 SCC 428 and 3) MAC App./3/2022 Smt. Parmawii and others VERSUS Sh. C. Lalthangmuana and Anr. Chanmari, Lawngtlai passed by a coordinate bench of this Court. 10. 2) ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED VS MEENA VARIYAL AND ORS., (2007) 5 SCC 428 and 3) MAC App./3/2022 Smt. Parmawii and others VERSUS Sh. C. Lalthangmuana and Anr. Chanmari, Lawngtlai passed by a coordinate bench of this Court. 10. Relying on the above cited cases the learned counsel for the appellant has stated that the claimant/respondent No. 1 could not prove by adducing reliable evidence that any damage was caused due to rash or negligent driving on the part of the driver of the vehicle Scorpio. 11. Another contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that there is non-joinder of necessary party as the drivers of the two vehicles the Chevrolet Spark and the Scorpio were not impleaded as party in the claim petition. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the standard of proof in a Motor Vehicle claim case may be of preponderance of probabilities but, insofar as the negligence of the driver is concerned in this case the same cannot be said to be established even by adopting a liberal view. The fact remains that whenever an accident happens and a claim petition is filed the party concerned has the liberty to avail for a claim under Section 163A or 166 of the Motor Vehicle, Act, 1988. The claimant/respondent No. 1 chose to prefer a claim under Section 166 of the MV Act and therefore, the burden of proof is on him to show that there was negligence on the part of the driver of offending vehicle in driving the vehicle concerned. In the present case, the claimant/respondent No. 1 has not been able to show by cogent and reliable evidence that there had been negligence on the part of the offending vehicle through the driver or the owner. 13. Learned counsel, Ms. Vanlalhriatpuii appearing for the claimant/respondent No. 1 has opposed the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant. Learned counsel submits that the respondent No. 1 is the rightful owner of the vehicle Chevrolet Spark B/R MZ-01-J 8843, and that the sale deed at Annexure-5 page, 17 of the LCR is a valid and effective sale deed between the claimant/respondent No. 1 and R. Lalmuanpuii. She submits that the transfer of ownership had already taken place, but the name of the owner had not been changed in the records, during the time of the accident. She submits that the transfer of ownership had already taken place, but the name of the owner had not been changed in the records, during the time of the accident. In this regard learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/claimant has relied on the case of; CIVIL APPEAL NO 1427 OF 2018 NAVEEN KUMAR VERSUS VIJAY KUMAR AND ORS. Wherein, at paragraph-6 the Hon’ble Supreme Court had stated that the ‘owner’ definition in the MV Act is:- “2(30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.” 14. And relying on the above definition the counsel for the respondent No. 1 states that a failure to intimate the transfer will only result in a fine under Section-50(3) of the MV Act, but it will not invalidate the transfer of the vehicle. There can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car, and therefore, the owner within the meaning of Section- 2(30) of the MV Act is liable to compensate. Learned counsel has also relied on the case of; [2024] 4 S.C.R. 394: Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another. Wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had stated that mere failure to get registered the name of the new owner of an already registered vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would stand in validated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also stated that vehicles being goods their sale would be covered by the provision of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and the same would make it clear that conveyance of ownership of the vehicle would stand concluded upon execution of the document of sale/transfer and registration of the new owner by the authorities concerned would be a post sale event. Relying on the above Judgment the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, therefore, states that there is no doubt that the claimant/respondent No. 1 is the real owner of the Chevrolet Spark vehicle which was damaged in the accident on 10.04.2021. 15. Relying on the above Judgment the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, therefore, states that there is no doubt that the claimant/respondent No. 1 is the real owner of the Chevrolet Spark vehicle which was damaged in the accident on 10.04.2021. 15. Learned counsel further, submits that the negligence of the driver of the Scorpio vehicle has been proved by the deposition of the officer-in- charge of Sialsuk Police Station, S.I Ramfangzauva. The O.C. in his evidence deposed that on 10.04.2021 at 1:00 pm the accident between the Chevrolet Spark and the Scorpio vehicle happened at Chalkhan Kawn, Sailam. He exhibited the police report dated 16.07.2001 prepared by him as the Officer-in-Charge of Sialsuk Police Station, and exhibited his signature thereon. The deposition of the O.C. of Sialsuk Police Station has proved the authenticity of the accident and has also proved the negligence on the part of the driver of the Scorpio vehicle. Regarding the expenses incurred by the claimant/respondent No. 1 in repairing the vehicle, the same has been proved by the owner of the workshop one Mr. George S. Thoite. He is the manager of the Highland Chevrolet workshop and he has deposed that one damaged Chevrolet Spark B/R No. MZ-01-J 8843 was repaired in his workshop and that the claimant/respondent No. 1 had come to his workshop and he had paid the total bills. In his cross-examination, he deposed that the total estimated bill amounting to Rs. 2,80,482/- was paid by the claimant C. Lalsangzuala which was received by him after the repairs of the vehicle was done. Learned counsel for the claimant also submits that the driver is not a necessary party and that the offending vehicle was the Scorpio B/R MZ01/P-2457 and therefore, only the registration certificate of the Scorpio vehicle was exhibited before the learned Tribunal. However, since the Chevrolet Spark vehicle was not the offending vehicle, the registration certificate for the same was not produced. Learned counsel therefore, submits that the Insurance Company is liable and prays that the present appeal may be dismissed. 16. Learned counsel, Mr. Samual Lalremruata appearing for the respondent No. 2 submitted that lodging of FIR is not mandatory in the case of an accident claim. Learned counsel therefore, submits that the Insurance Company is liable and prays that the present appeal may be dismissed. 16. Learned counsel, Mr. Samual Lalremruata appearing for the respondent No. 2 submitted that lodging of FIR is not mandatory in the case of an accident claim. He has also stated that the negligence on the part of the driver, of the Scorpio has been proved by the evidence of the officer-in-charge of Sialsuk Police Station and the same has been proved by the police report which was exhibited as Exhibit C-10 before the Tribunal. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 also states that the workshop bills were exhibited before the learned Tribunal without any dispute or objections and they were duly proved by the owner of the workshop, Mr. George S. Thoite. The ground of non-joinder taken by the appellant cannot be raised at this appellant stage and the claim petition can proceed without the driver being impleaded. 18. Learned counsel submits that the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, is a Welfare Legislation and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in a claim application. Learned counsel further, states that there is deemed ownership as per Section-157 of the MV, Act and therefore, the claimant /respondent No. 1 is the rightful owner of the Chevrolet Spark vehicle. Learned counsel submitted that there is no error or legality in the Impugned Judgment and Order of the learned Tribunal dated 19.10.2023 and prays that the said Judgment Order may not be interfered with. 19. This Court has considered the submissions of the learned counsels and perused the LCR as well as the judgments relied upon by the parties. As far as the ownership is concerned, this Court is bound by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Karikho Kri (supra). The Supreme Court stated that vehicles, like other goods, are covered under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which means ownership is transferred once the sale or gift agreement is executed. Registration in the buyer's name is a subsequent administrative requirement, but not a legal necessity for the sale to be valid. The Apex Court also observed that the failure to update the registration does not invalidate the sale or gift of a vehicle, thus alleviating concerns regarding ownership disputes post-transaction. Registration in the buyer's name is a subsequent administrative requirement, but not a legal necessity for the sale to be valid. The Apex Court also observed that the failure to update the registration does not invalidate the sale or gift of a vehicle, thus alleviating concerns regarding ownership disputes post-transaction. In the present case it is an admitted fact that the updating of registration was not done in the records, however it is the finding of this court that the sale deed and the transfer of ownership proves that the claimant/R 1 was the owner of the Chevrolet Spark B/R No.MZ01/ 8843. 20. It is an admitted fact that the claim made by the claimant/R1 was filed under Section 166 of the MV Act. It is also settled law that a claim under Section 166 of the MV Act is a claim for compensation on fault basis and burden on the claimant is to establish that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver while driving the offending vehicle concerned. In the present case the sole and only evidence regarding the accident and the alleged negligence is the police report dated 16.07.2021 which was exhibited as Exhibit C-10 before the Tribunal and the deposition of the Officer –in Charge of Sialsuk Police Station who scripted the said Report. This Court has carefully perused the said Police Report/Exhibit C-10 dated 16.07.2021. The relevant portion states: “……spot enquiry revealed that the cause of accident is due to rash and negligence driving on the part of Scorpio No.MZ01/P-2457 driver Lalnunchhunga (20) s/o Lalsianga (L) of Lawngtlai P/A Ramhlunvengthar, Aizawl who drove the vehicle in a wrong side position and over speeding. This has reference to Sialsuk PS GDE No.150 @ 2:30 PM dated 10.04.2021” 21 . The officer-in-charge of Sialsuk Police Station is the person who authored this Report dated 16.07.2021, more than 90 days after the alleged accident and by a person who was not there at the time of the accident. He was examined by the claimant as CW No.3. The officer-in-charge of Sialsuk Police Station is the person who authored this Report dated 16.07.2021, more than 90 days after the alleged accident and by a person who was not there at the time of the accident. He was examined by the claimant as CW No.3. In his cross-examination he deposed that, “I was not present when the accident was happened at the spot….” He also deposed that, “at the request of the parties, no further investigation was continued since both the parties had made an agreement between them and no criminal case as per the provision of Indian Penal Code and MV Act 1988 was registered against the driver of Scorpio MZ01/P- 2457”. …….”it is a fact that requisition for Mechanical Inspection for the vehicle MZ01/ 8843 and MZ01-P-2457 was sent to the DTO Aizawl after a lapse of about 89 days.” The evidence shows that the CW-3/O.C is not the enquiry officer as he was not at the spot when the accident happened and there is also nothing in his evidence to suggest that he went to the spot for the enquiry. His Report dated 16.07.2021 appears to be based on an enquiry/investigation report made by another person. However, the investigation officer was never examined and the enquiry/investigation report was also not produced before the Tribunal. Not a single eye witness was also examined. In the case of Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd Vrs Meena Variyal & others (supra) , the Hon’ble apex court stated: “27. …………………..therefore, the victim of an accident or his dependants have an option either to proceed under section 166 of the Act or under section 163-A of the Act. Once they approach the Tribunal under section 166 of the Act, they have necessarily to take upon themselves the burden of establishing the negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle concerned. But if they proceed under Section 163-A of the Act, the compensation will be awarded in terms of the Schedule without calling upon the victim or his dependents to establish any negligence or default on the part of the owner of the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle.” 22. In the case of Smti Parmawii & others (supra) , a similar view was taken by a coordinate bench of this Court by stating that: “16…… .. In the case of Smti Parmawii & others (supra) , a similar view was taken by a coordinate bench of this Court by stating that: “16…… .. however, when a claim is made under Section 166 of the MV Act, party concerned has to show that there was negligence on the part of the offending vehicle in driving the vehicle concerned. In the process of establishing such negligence, the strict proof as may be required in a criminal case will not be required but nevertheless, the party has to show by cogent and reliable evidence that there has been negligence on the part of the offending vehicle through the driver or the owner.” 23. Additionally, the owner of the Scorpio MZ01/P-2457 appearing as O.P 1 before the Tribunal in his written statement stated that his driver did not have any fault in the occurrence of the accident. In his examination-in-chief also he stated that his driver does not have any fault on the occurrence of the accident. On being cross-examined he deposed that, “it is a fact that no criminal case as per the provisions of IPC and MV Act was registered against my driver Lalnunchhunga…..it is a fact that my driver does not have any fault on the occurrence of the accident…..in my opinion if my driver Lalnunchhunga was at fault, the OC Sialsuk P.S may file a case against him.” 24. On the ground taken by appellant of non-joinder of driver as party in the claim before the Tribunal the Hon’ble apex court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd Vrs Meena Variyal & others (supra) , stated at para 10 that: “………when a car belonging to an owner is insured with the insurance company and it is being driven by a driver employed by the insured, when it meets with an accident, the primary liability under law for payment of compensation is that of the driver. Once the driver is liable, the owner of the vehicle becomes vicariously liable for payment of compensation. It is this vicarious liability of the owner that is indemnified by the Insurance company. Once the driver is liable, the owner of the vehicle becomes vicariously liable for payment of compensation. It is this vicarious liability of the owner that is indemnified by the Insurance company. A third party for whose benefit the insurance is taken, is therefore entitled to show, when he moves under Section 166 of the Motor vehicles Act, that the driver was negligent in driving the vehicle resulting in the accident; that the owner was vicariously liable and that the Insurance company was bound to indemnify the owner and consequently satisfy the award made. Therefore, under general principles, one would expect the driver to be impleaded before an adjudication is claimed under Section 166 of the Act as to whether a claimant before the Tribunal is entitled to compensation for an accident that has occurred due to alleged negligence of the driver. Why should not a Tribunal insist on the driver of the vehicle being impleaded when a claim is being filed?”. Similarly in Mst Hafija Begum Vrs The National Insurance Co.Ltd, 2022 (3) GLR 150 a coordinate bench of this Court held that, “18…..though it is not necessary to decide the claim under motor vehicle act that the driver should be prosecuted yet charge-sheet against him serves a purpose to make extra prima-facie case of involvement of driver and to corroborate the mode and manner of the accident….” 25 . In the present case the Claimant Witness 3/O.C Ramfangzuava in his cross-examination deposed that, “at the request of the parties no further investigation was continued since both the parties had made an agreement between them and no criminal case as per the provision of Indian Penal Code and MV Act 1988 was registered against the driver of Scorpio MZ-01-P- 2457.” But this evidence was rebutted by the owner of the Scorpio MZ01/P- 245/R2 by deposing in his cross-examination that, “we do not have any agreement between me and the owner of MZ01/ 8843 and no document is executed”. FIR may not be mandatory in an accident claim case as long as factum of accident and negligence is proved. However, registration of a case would have helped to corroborate any evidence available to prove negligence of the driver. 26. The claim in the present case is admittedly one made under Section 166 of the MV Act. FIR may not be mandatory in an accident claim case as long as factum of accident and negligence is proved. However, registration of a case would have helped to corroborate any evidence available to prove negligence of the driver. 26. The claim in the present case is admittedly one made under Section 166 of the MV Act. The driver of the alleged offending vehicle has not been impleaded as a party in the claim petition. More pertinently the claimant/R1 on the basis of the records and the evidence adduced before the Tribunal has not been able to establish or discharge the burden required under Section 166 of the MV Act. It is therefore held that the claimant/R1 has not been able to prove the negligence of the driver or the owner of the Scorpio MZ01/P-2457 even on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Consequently, the question of indemnifying the repair bills does not arise. 27. The Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and award dated 19.10.2023 passed by the learned member MACT, Aizawl in MACT Case No. 24/2021 is quashed and set aside. 28. Statutory deposit if any is released to the appellant. No orders as to costs. 29 . Registry shall send back the trial court records.