JUDGMENT: 1. This second appeal under section 100 of CPC is filed by the appellant impugning the judgment dated 24.09.2003 in A.S.No.165 of 1997 on the file of learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Ongole. 2. A vacant site in an extent of 2030 square yards in Markapur Town of Prakasam District has been in dispute among the parties. OS.No.21 of 1989 is a suit for partition of the above-referred property. After due trial, learned Subordinate Judge, Markapur by a judgement dated 04.08.1997 dismissed the suit. Aggrieved plaintiff preferred A.S.No.165 of 1997. After due hearing, the learned III Additional District Judge (Fast Court), Ongole by a judgement dated 24.09.2003 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgement of the trial court and directed division of properties and passed a preliminary decree for partition. A further direction was given for moving appropriate proceedings for final decree and ascertainment of mesne profits. Aggrieved D15 in the suit preferred the present S.A.No.1025 of 2003 praying to set aside the judgement of the first appellate court and restore the judgement passed by the trial court. 3. Parties on both sides are Muslims and are governed by Sunni Hanafi Law for Mohammedans. 4. Sri Venkateswara Rao Gudapati, learned counsel for appellant advanced elaborate arguments and filed written arguments. On behalf of respondents, Sri S.Sree Rama Chandra Murthy, the learned counsel for respondents advanced elaborate arguments and filed written arguments. 5. Sri Esamiah married Smt. Daulatunnisa Begum and thereafter, also married Sarambi. The latter mentioned wife Smt.Sarambi was originally a Hindu woman by name Soda Guramma and on marrying Sri Esamiah she took the name Sarambi. During the wed lock of Sri Esamiah and his first wife/ Smt. Daulatunnisa Begum, they were blessed with five sons and two daughters. For Esamiah and his second wife, there were no children. Sri Esamiah died intestate in the year 1955. His first wife/ Smt. Daulatunnisa Begum died in the year 1983. The second wife/ Smt. Sarambi died sometime thereafter. One of the sons of late Esamiah is the plaintiff and his name is Shaik Mohammad Hussain. D11 to D13 are younger sons of late Esamiah. One of the sons of late Esamiah was Sri Hussain Meiah and he died earlier to the institution of the suit and his legal representatives are D1 to D10. The two daughters of Late Esamiah were D14 and D15. D11 to D13 are younger sons of late Esamiah. One of the sons of late Esamiah was Sri Hussain Meiah and he died earlier to the institution of the suit and his legal representatives are D1 to D10. The two daughters of Late Esamiah were D14 and D15. By the time, O.S.No.21 of 1989 was filed by Shaik Mohammad Hussain, his father, mother and stepmother were no more. 6. The essence of the dispute has been whether the plaint schedule property is the property of late Esamiah or it is the property of his second wife Smt. Sarambi. The case set out in the plaint was that the eastern part of plaint schedule property has been the ancestral property of late Esamiah whereas the western part of the plaint schedule property was acquired by him. This acquisition was pleaded to be out of an assignment granted by the Government. During trial, an additional contention was raised that Sri Esamiah purchased that portion of site from the Government. It was that plaint schedule which the plaintiff prayed for division and according to the plaintiff it must be divided into 192 parts from out of which, plaintiff was entitled for 30 parts, whereas the other parts are to be allotted to the defendants who are the other shares. D1 to D14 sailed with the plaintiff through their pleadings as well as evidence. D15/ Shaik Mahaboob Bi alias Bibijan wife of S.A.Subhan contested the suit. She pleaded that plaint schedule property was purchased by Smt. Sarambi who is the second wife of late Esamiah. She asserted that Sarambi purchased this from Sri Papaiah about 60 years earlier to the institution of the suit. That Smt. Sarambi while holding the title and possession over these properties leased out the properties to various tenants and thereafter, during the year 1979, late Sarambi gifted eastern half of the suit property under registered gift deeds as per Ex.B19 and B20 in favour of her stepsons/ D11 to D13. It is further pleaded by D15 in her written statement that she looked after Sarambi and therefore, under Ex.B18 registered gift deed dated 18.10.1985, the western portion of the suit schedule property was gifted by Sarambi to her. She denied the case set out in the plaint. It is further pleaded by D15 in her written statement that she looked after Sarambi and therefore, under Ex.B18 registered gift deed dated 18.10.1985, the western portion of the suit schedule property was gifted by Sarambi to her. She denied the case set out in the plaint. It is required to be noticed here itself that D11 to D13 denied to have received any gift from Smt.Sarambi and stated that all that was only a ploy and the property shall be partitioned in accordance with the Mohammad in law and as prayed in the plaint. 7. Learned trial court settled the following issues and additional issues for trial. Issues: - 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of suit properties as claimed ? 2. Whether late Sarambi executed gift deeds dated 18.10.1985 in favour of Defendant Nos.11, 12, 13 and 15 are correct? and if so, what are the effect of the same? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 4. Whether the Court fee paid is sufficient and correct 5. To what relief? Additional issue framed on 13.03.1996:- 1. Whether the alleged sale deed dated 31.7.1940 by the Government in favour of Plaintiff's father is true, Valid, and binding ? 8. The evidence of PWs.1 to 6 and DW.1 and 2 and Exs.A1 to A17 and Exs.B1 to B27 and Exs.X1 and X2 were placed for consideration before the trial court. 9. After analysis of evidence, the learned trial court stated that the evidence on record did not prove that the plaint schedule property was owned by late Esamiah and it stated that late Sarambi executed gifted deeds as pleaded in written statement of D15. It further stated that Esamiah died way back in the year 1955 whereas the suit for partition was not filed soon thereafter. In the light of the gift deeds executed by late Sarambi especially Ex.B18 in favour of D15, the mere suit for partition, without further prayer for declaration for annulment of gift deeds could not be maintained. Thus, in that view of the matter, in the opinion of the trial court, the suit was barred by limitation. While addressing the issue with reference to court fee, it stated that the court fee paid in terms of section 34(2) Andhra Pradesh Court Fee and Suits Valuation Act was not correct. Thus, in that view of the matter, in the opinion of the trial court, the suit was barred by limitation. While addressing the issue with reference to court fee, it stated that the court fee paid in terms of section 34(2) Andhra Pradesh Court Fee and Suits Valuation Act was not correct. It did not say what could have been the correct court fee and under which provision such court fee was expected to be paid. Eventually, it dismissed the suit. 10. Before the first appellate court, all those contentions that were raised before the trial court were once again reagitated. 11. Learned First appellate court settled the following points for its determination. 1. Whether Esamia is the original owner of suit property? 2. Whether Guramma purchased the property from Papaiah? If not, whether she had acquired the property in any other mode? 3. Whether Guramma was in possession and enjoyment of the property for over a statutory period, to acquire title by adverse possession? If so, whether the suit is not within time? 4. Whether the suit schedule property is available for partition between plaintiffs and defendants? If so, to how many shares? 12. After considering the very same evidence, learned first appellate court stated that by virtue of Ex.X1 and the evidence of PW3, who was an officer of Markapur municipality had stated that the plaint schedule property consists of ancestral property in one part and property obtained by late Esamiah by way of alienation from the Government in the other part. Thus, it disapproved the findings of the trial court and positively held that the property belonged to late Esamiah and therefore was available for division. It then assessed the evidence and stated that there was no evidence to prove that late Sarambi purchased the property from Sri Papaiah. Consequently, it recorded that property did not belong to Sarambi and therefore other documents such as gifts stated to have been executed by Sarambi could not prevent the plaintiff’s claim for partition. It accordingly decreed the suit for partition. 13. D15 presented this second appeal. Paragraph No.2 of the memorandum of grounds of appeal states that the following substantial questions of law are involved in this second appeal. For convenience, they are reproduced here. 1. Whether the appellate court is correct in reversing the findings of the trial court contrary to the evidence on the record. 13. D15 presented this second appeal. Paragraph No.2 of the memorandum of grounds of appeal states that the following substantial questions of law are involved in this second appeal. For convenience, they are reproduced here. 1. Whether the appellate court is correct in reversing the findings of the trial court contrary to the evidence on the record. The Judgement is perverse and contrary to the evidence on record which is liable to be set aside. 2. Whether the appellate court is correct in going beyond the pleadings and contrary to the orders passed by the Hon'ble High court in C.R.P.No. 2919 of 1998 dated 18-01-1997. 3. Whether all the appellants are entitled to transpose themselves as the appellants without the leave of the court as contemplated under order 1 rule 10 of C.P.C. and without paying the court fee as contemplated under section 34 (2) of the A.P.C.F. Act whether the appeal is maintainable? 4. Whether the appellate court is entitled to go beyond the evidence on record and give finding on the presumption of Section 90 of the Evidence Act ? 5. Whether the appellate court has framed the proper points for determining the appeal contrary to provisions of the order 41 rule 31 of C.P.C. ? 6. Whether the appellate court is correct in giving the finding of title and possession without the same is being established by the Plaintiff and contrary to his own evidence? 7. Whether the appellate court can rely the Ex. A1 when the same has not been proved by the plaintiff contrary to the evidence Act? 8. Whether the appellate is correct in holding the boundaries as per the amendment petition filed in I.A. No. 2370 / 1997 in A.S.No. 165/1997 when the same petition is dismissed 9. Whether the appellate court is correct in holding the family settlement is correct which is unknown to the Muslim law? 14. Initially, a learned judge of this court admitted this second appeal on 08.10.2003. After receiving notices, the respondents in this appeal made their appearance. Whether the appellate court is correct in holding the family settlement is correct which is unknown to the Muslim law? 14. Initially, a learned judge of this court admitted this second appeal on 08.10.2003. After receiving notices, the respondents in this appeal made their appearance. Apart from arguments on merits, learned counsel for respondents argued that none of the grounds mentioned in the memorandum of grounds of appeal have given rise to any substantial question of law, and that in the event that the contentions raised do not give rise to any substantial question of law the appeal deserves dismissal and cited Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Chandrabhan Vs Saraswati, [2022 (6) ALD 204 (SC)] and Kirpa Ram vs Surendra Deo Gour, [2021 (2) ALD 90 (SC)] 15 One prime submission raised by the learned Counsel for appellant/D15 is that the evidence on record led by plaintiff did not establish that the plaint schedule property belonged to late Esamiah and while determining that said contentious issue, according to the learned counsel, the boundaries of the property are to be considered. Thus, the crux of the issue, according to the learned Counsel lies in determining correct boundaries of the property. 16. From the record, one would see that Exs.A1 and X1 are the two documents based on which the claim of ownership of late Esamiah was asserted by those who prayed for partition. Ex.A1 - assignment deed, refers the name of Esamiah as owner. However, his father’s name do not find a mention there. However, one thing is clear that Ex.A1 makes a reference to the boundaries of the property wherein stated that on Eastern side, there has been in existence a house belonging to Esamiah. Before the trial court, it was admitted by both sides that late Esamiah was a public servant. Based on such finding, the contention raised on behalf of D15/ appellant is that a Government servant was not entitled for an assignment and therefore under Ex.A1 Esamiah could not have got the property. Be it noted, the assignment pertain to the year 1940. Validity or invalidity of the assignment was not settled as an issue before both the courts below. Government was not a party and government servants deposed in proof of title of Esamiah. Be it noted, the assignment pertain to the year 1940. Validity or invalidity of the assignment was not settled as an issue before both the courts below. Government was not a party and government servants deposed in proof of title of Esamiah. Therefore, validity or invalidity of assignment has no bearing to decide the essence of the dispute raised in the suit. 17. Before the trial court, the genuineness of Ex.A1 was questioned. To meet that contention, plaintiff got summoned officers of municipality who testified as PW.3 and who produced original registers from the office as per Ex.X1. It could not be disputed as one would gather from the judgements of both the courts below, and even from the appendix of evidence found with the judgement of the trial court where Ex.X1 contained a copy of Ex.A1 Patta also. It was not only evidence of PW.3 but also two other witnesses who went on to say about the Government alienating the property to Esamiah. 18. Another contention was raised on behalf of appellant/ D15 before the courts below was that the individual mentioned as Esamiah in Ex.A1 and Ex.X1 are different from Sri Esamiah who is father of D15 and the plaintiff. It was argued before the courts below that in Markapur there could have been many number of Esamiahs. If there were so many Esamiahs in Markapoor, nothing prevented anyone from examining one such Esamiah. Such effort was not there on part of D15. The identity of Esamiah was recorded by the learned first appellate court stating that in Ex.X1, he had noticed the name of Esamiah’s second wife Guramma alias Sarambi. Such mention was made in the records to the effect that even earlier to the petition for Patta, Esamiah and his wife Sarambi encroached the government land as it was adjoining the house of Esamiah. The categorical observation of the learned first appellate court is that there could have been no other Esamiah with his wife’s name Guramma alias Sarambi. From the record, one could not demonstrate anything contrary to it so as to say that there was perversity in appreciation of evidence on part of the learned first appellate court in this regard. 19. The case set out by the contesting D15 who is appellant herein has been that Smt.Sarambi originally purchased plaint schedule property from Sri Papaiah. From the record, one could not demonstrate anything contrary to it so as to say that there was perversity in appreciation of evidence on part of the learned first appellate court in this regard. 19. The case set out by the contesting D15 who is appellant herein has been that Smt.Sarambi originally purchased plaint schedule property from Sri Papaiah. The consistent finding of both the courts below is that the said purchase having not been disclosed by any document could not be accepted. 20. Any claim of D15 is only through late Smt.Sarambi. Earlier to the suit from out of which present second appeal has arisen there was O.S.No.60 of 1967 on the file of learned District Munsif, Markapur. That was a suit for partition of properties of Esamiah. That suit was filed by Sri Shaik Hussain Meiah who was the eldest son of late Esamiah. By the time, O.S.No.60 of 1967 was filed, late Esamiah’s first wife/ Smt. Daulatunnisa Begum was alive. She was a party to that suit. In that suit for partition, the present appellant/ D15 was shown as D7. 21. In O.S.No.60 of 1967 plaint - A schedule, plaint - B Schedule and plaint - C schedule were shown. Plaint - C schedule therein is the very property that is the subject matter of the present second appeal. What was mentioned in OS.No.60 of 1967 by the plaintiff therein was that though they have shown plaint - C schedule, the same could not be partitioned at that time since Esamiah’s second wife Smt.Guramma Alias Sarambi holds a life estate over it and that part of the property could be prayed for partition only after her death and not during her life time. Smt. Daulatunnisa Begum / first wife of Esamiah filed her written statement admitting the same. Her written statement was adopted by rest of the defendants which include the D7 therein/ Smt.Shaik Mohaboob Bi alias Bibi Jan who is the present appellant before this court. Thus, this appellant by her pleadings in the earlier suit admitted that Smt.Sarambi was only a life estate holder and not an absolute owner of the property. Her earlier statement estops her from saying otherwise. It is for her to explain her earlier stand so as to allow her to wriggle out of her earlier admission. Thus, this appellant by her pleadings in the earlier suit admitted that Smt.Sarambi was only a life estate holder and not an absolute owner of the property. Her earlier statement estops her from saying otherwise. It is for her to explain her earlier stand so as to allow her to wriggle out of her earlier admission. Nothing is shown to this court as to how she could be stated to have overcome that. 22. Referring to these aspects, the learned trial court stated that since Sarambi was not a party to O.S.No.60 of 1967, what was pleaded by parties therein do not bind her and further the said suit for partition was disposed on a settlement among parties. While it is true that Sarambi was not a party to that suit, the fact remains that the present appellant being a defendant therein in OS.No.60 of 1967 was bound by her own statements. She was entitled to explain but such explanation was neither recorded by the trial court nor one could see it from the material on record. Learned first appellate court rightly found the error of the trial court and rectified it. The huge effort of appellant/D15 in demonstrating long standing possession of this property by Smt.Sarambi does not make any difference since to the knowledge of the parties to the current litigation, the possession of Sarambi was only as a life estate holder. The argument of the learned counsel for appellant is that there was nothing in Mohammad in law to say that there was a family settlement out of which Sarambi was continuing to hold possession and there is error in the findings of the appellate court. There is no merit in this contention. In the first place, the learned first appellate court did not say that there was a family settlement. It only mentioned that one version of explaining possession was out of an alleged family settlement. Be it noted, there is no family settlement as a document on record. Therefore, reference to family settlement was not a reference to any legal principle but was only a matter of arrangement made among family members. When it comes to the manner and method in which a property could be enjoyed, the law never prohibited family members from making their own arrangements in their usual way of living. Therefore, reference to family settlement was not a reference to any legal principle but was only a matter of arrangement made among family members. When it comes to the manner and method in which a property could be enjoyed, the law never prohibited family members from making their own arrangements in their usual way of living. Such normal arrangements available in any family including family of Muslims does not by itself alter the legal character of the property. 23. The property in dispute has been there for decades. It is not unnatural that there would be change in the boundaries when it comes to the description of the boundaries. The voluminous evidence on record does not chronologically depict how and when any change took place. The extents mentioned are not shown out of any actual measurements being taken on the ground at any point of time. Therefore, the first appellate court, at that length of time had to grapple with such situation and it had to appreciate the evidence in a pragmatic way. A reading of the first appellate court’s judgment makes it crystal clear that the learned Judge was very much alive to the realities in life and has meticulously referred to the extent of site as mentioned in the plaint and as available in Ex.A1 and as available in Ex.X1 and referred to the boundaries which at any rate remain static on North and West. It was in such circumstances, the learned first appellate court recoded its clear observation that the property mentioned in the plaint schedule is the property that is seen in Ex.X1 and Ex.A1. 24. The law has been that the trial court and first appellate court are the courts of facts and on determination of facts those courts would apply the law relevant to the facts. Seeking a redressal before a further forum beyond the first appellate court always require, as per law, a substantial question of law. A substantial question on fact is different from substantial question of law, Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs Savitribai Sopan Gujar (1999) 3 SCC 722 . The purported substantial questions of law raised in the memorandum of grounds of appeal do not really give rise to any substantial question of law. They are only questions of fact. A substantial question on fact is different from substantial question of law, Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs Savitribai Sopan Gujar (1999) 3 SCC 722 . The purported substantial questions of law raised in the memorandum of grounds of appeal do not really give rise to any substantial question of law. They are only questions of fact. Unless the findings of the first appellate court are perverse law confers no jurisdiction on this court to say anything further on facts. In the opinion of this court there is no perversity in the judgment of the first appellate court with reference to its appreciation of evidence and reaching out to the conclusions it has recorded. 25. The pleadings of parties placed before the trial court culminated into issues and guided by the issues evidence was led by both parties. It is that that fell for consideration before the trial court as well as first appellate court. Learned first appellate court having considered all that recorded its clear findings that it was the property of late Esamiah and possession of such property by his own wife is possession for everyone. Therefore, the criticism raised by the appellant in the present appeal that the first appellate court did not frame appropriate points for consideration or it reached to conclusions not supported by evidence are without any merit and at any rate those contentions have not emerged as substantial questions of law in the given facts and circumstances. There is no merit in this appeal. 26. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. Consequently, the judgment dated 24.09.2003 in A.S.No.165 of 1997 on the file of learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Ongole is confirmed. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, pending, if any, shall stand closed.