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2025 DIGILAW 532 (TS)

Aijaz Sultana v. District Collector

2025-04-30

LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY

body2025
JUDGMENT: LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J. This Second Appeal is filed challenging the judgment and decree, dated 08.04.2024, passed by the II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, in A.S.No.330 of 2013, whereunder and whereby the judgment and decree, dated 03.06.2013, passed by the XI Additional Senior Civil Judge (F.T.C), City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in O.S.No.517 of 2005 was confirmed. 2. The appellant herein is plaintiff and respondents herein are defendants, before the trial Court. For convenience, hereinafter the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. 3. The brief facts of the case as narrated in the plaint are that plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No.517 of 2005, for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment in respect of H.No.8-2-602/34, measuring 647 square yards in Sy.No.129/65 (old) 242 (new) along with compound wall, situated at Road No.10, Zahara Nagar, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘schedule property’). It is averred that husband of plaintiff namely, late Mohd.Lateef-Ur-Rahaman purchased the schedule property under registered sale deed document No.942/1979 dated 25.05.1979 from one M.A.Waheed Qadri; that one Abdul Muneem Khan was the original pattedar of land measuring Ac.9-00 acres, out which Ac.2-10 gts was sold to to Mohini Bai and the remaining land was sold to various individuals; that title of Abdul Muneem Khan was well established with the link documents as well as kasra pahani and original registered release deed registered as 2979/65 dated 17.12.1965; that the Government issued a letter vide Dis No.F4/4246/98, dated 02.09.1998 addressed to the vendor’s vendor of the plaintiff stating that schedule property along with other property is identified in T.S.No.2/part, Block No.’M’, Ward No.11 of Shaikpet Village, correlating Sy.No.129/65 is a patta land and despite the same, defendants are disturbing the physical possession of the plaintiff by one pretext or other; that plaintiff submitted an application to the Government, especially, to the Survey and Settlement Department to conduct survey for demarcation of the schedule property and despite payment of requisite amount there was no response from the government officials. Hence, plaintiff filed the suit for perpetual injunction. 4. Hence, plaintiff filed the suit for perpetual injunction. 4. Defendant No.2 filed written statement denying the allegation made in the plaint and the same was adopted by the defendant No.1; it is averred that the schedule property is Government land situated in T.S.No.3, Block-M, Ward No.11 admeasuring to an extent of 667 Sq.yards, situated at Road No.10, Banjara Hills, backside of Our Palace Hotel duly fenced and in possession of the Government, which forms part of the Sy.No.403 of Shaikpet Village and Mandal, Hyderabad and that on 27.03.2005 Abdul Mannan along with unsocial elements removed fencing and tried to make construction of compound wall; that when the Mandal Revenue Inspector of Shaikpet Mandal along with demolition squad, tried to stop the construction, the said Abdul Mannan, threatened the Mandal Revenue Inspector with dire consequences and abused in filthy language; that the defendant No.2, sought police protection from Assistant Commissioner of Police vide Lr.No.D/2076/2002, dated 28.03.2005 and as a result of the request, the said illegal activities were prevented; that plaintiff is trying to mislead the Court by mentioning that the land in T.S.No.2/Part, Block-M, Ward No.11 of the Shaikpet Village, correlating Sy.No.129/65 is a patta land, however, documents filed by the plaintiff does not pertain to the schedule property and are fabricated and created and that the plaintiff relied upon the alleged certified copy dated 22.05.1979, however, the said document does not reveal the title of the vendor and there is no mention of survey number of the said property and further plaintiff failed to submit the original sale deed; that the sale deed dated 30.03.1966 executed by Abdul Munim Kham and Mohini Bai, being relied upon by the plaintiff is fabricated and created and the original is not been filed before the Court and also the plan of the last page of the sale deed creates doubt about the genuineness of the sale deed; that plaintiff cannot claim ownership over the schedule property and the documents filed by the plaintiff does not prove any title over the schedule property and therefore, same cannot be considered. It is finally averred that the schedule property is classified as government land and therefore, suit is liable to the dismissed. 5. It is finally averred that the schedule property is classified as government land and therefore, suit is liable to the dismissed. 5. On the basis of the above pleadings of both the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues for trial:- “(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief of perpetual injunction as prayed for? (2) Whether the suit is bad for want of notice under section 80 CPC? (3) Whether the suit is under valued and court fee paid is sufficient? (4) To what relief?” 6. During the course of the trial, plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and Exs.A1 to A13 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DW.1 was examined and Ex.B1 to Ex.B6 were marked. 7. After full-fledged trial and upon considering the oral and documentary evidence and the contentions of both the parties, the trial Court dismissed the suit, vide judgment and decree dated 03.06.2013. 8. The trial Court categorically observed as hereunder:- “27. I have bestowed my thoughtful consideration and anxious moments considering the rival submissions and I am of the considered view that the main crux of the problem being whether the suit schedule property is existing in Sy.No.242 (New) or part of Sy.No.3, Block-M, Ward No.11, correlated to Sy.No.403 of Shaikpet Village, further more the plaintiff has also stated that he has moved the survey and settlement people for demarcating the suit schedule property to know as to whether the suit schedule property was falls in Sy.No. 129/65 (242) or in Sy.No.403 for which he ought to have moved the court for demarcation of the suit schedule property for its actual localization. In case the suit property falls in Sy.No.129/65 (242) the plaintiff will succee and in the absence of taking such recourse for actual localization of the suit land as such it can be safely be held that the plaintiff has not discharged the burden of proving actual location of the suit land, more so when defendants particularly contended that the suit schedule property within the abuttals falls in the government land. 28. Further as per the documentary evidence filed by the defendant No.2 on verification of the land on ground the suit schedule property pertains and falls in revenue survey No.403 which is government land as notified by the government. 28. Further as per the documentary evidence filed by the defendant No.2 on verification of the land on ground the suit schedule property pertains and falls in revenue survey No.403 which is government land as notified by the government. Further nothing prevented the plaintiff from moving the court by a suitable application for localisation and demarcation of the suit schedule property to know as to whether it falls in government land or otherwise. Thus in view of the non taking of the steps for localization of the land any amount of arithmetical and mathematical calculation of Sy.No.129/85 as per the version of the plaintiff will not be of any use.” 9. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 03.06.2013, defendants preferred A.S.No.330 of 2013, and the first Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, re-appreciated the entire evidence and material available on record and dismissed the Appeal, vide its judgment dated 08.04.2024, confirming the judgment of the trial Court. 11. The first Appellate Court in its judgment observed as hereunder:- “36. … it is luminous that the plaintiff who has approached the trial Court seeking the relief of perpetual injunction, and when her title is seriously disputed by the defendants, the plaintiff is obliged to atleast prima facie demonstrate before this Court that she has got lawful and legal title to the suit schedule property. Further, it is also laid down in the said decision that when the title of the plaintiff is denied by the defendants, and when the plaintiff is claiming possession over the suit schedule property on the basis of title, the burden is also on the plaintiff to establish her lawful possession over the suit schedule property. 37. … the plaintiff has not filed the original sale deed of her husband and not taken any legally permissible steps to get an advocate commissioner appointed for localizing the suit schedule property as held by the trial Court in Para No.27 of the impugned judgment in support of her claim that the suit schedule property is not falling in Sy.No.403. … the plaintiff has not filed the original sale deed of her husband and not taken any legally permissible steps to get an advocate commissioner appointed for localizing the suit schedule property as held by the trial Court in Para No.27 of the impugned judgment in support of her claim that the suit schedule property is not falling in Sy.No.403. The plaintiff has also failed to place any authenticated link documents, muchless the registered link documents of the vendor of her husband pertaining to Exhibit A1 to show that his vendor has obtained the said land in his name by way of legal alienation and by a registered document from his vendor, who was having legal and lawful right over the said property and that the suit schedule property actually falls in Sy.No.129/65 (old) and 242 (new), but not in Sy.No.403. However, as discussed above, the documents filed by the plaintiff are falling short of proving her case to the satisfaction of this Court in the absence of any acceptable proof of valid flow of time from the vendor's vendor of her husband who obtained Ex.A1 in his favour and Ex.A13 cannot be said to be a legal and valid document conveying the property covered therein in favour of M.A. Waheed Qadri, who is the so-called vendor of the husband of the plaintiff in Ex.A1. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to dispel the cloud surrounding her title with acceptable material on record.” 11.1. The first Appellate Court further observed as hereunder:- “39. …on a careful consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record adduced by PW1 and DW1, if the documents filed under Exhibits B1 to B6 are juxtaposed with Exhibits A1, A11, A12 and A13, this Court is of the view that Exhibits B1 and B2 have to be given primacy as the plaintiff failed to establish the proper and valid flow of legal title in favour of her husband nor she has established that the suit schedule property is in Sy.Nos.129/65 (old) and 242 (new), but not falling in Sy.No.403 of Shaikpet Village, which is stated to be a Government land. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptable material placed on record by the plaintiff showing her lawful legal possession over the suit schedule property and also her incidental legal title as Exs.A6 to A10 filed by her are subsequent to the filing of the suit, in view of the fierce resistance by the defendants therein to the title claimed by the plaintiff and in view of the cloud surrounding over her title, she ought to have filed a suit for declaration to declare her title in respect of the suit schedule property and in this background of factual matrix, she cannot maintain the suit for perpetual injunction on the basis of Exhibit A1 in the absence of any acceptable proof that the suit schedule property is in Sy.No.129/65 (old) and 242 (new) but not in Survey No.403. Hence, the aforesaid referred judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anathula Sudhakar's case clearly applies to the factual matrix of this case.” 12. Heard Sri A. Manoj Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and learned Government Pleader for Arbitration, for the respondents. Perused the entire material available on record. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the trial Court as well as first appellate Court by misreading the oral and documentary evidence placed on record by the plaintiff, has come to an erroneous conclusion and thus dismissed the suit. Learned counsel further contended that both the Courts failed to appreciate the admission made by DW.1 in the cross examination and ought to have allowed the suit for perpetual injunction. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that both the Courts have given much credit and importance to the Ex.B1 and Ex.B2, which are nothing but self-surveyed reports and thus came to an erroneous conclusion. He further contended that the First Appellate Court ought to have allowed the application in I.A.No.2381 of 2018 in O.S.No.330 of 2013, filed by the plaintiff for localization of schedule property, which would have thrown light on location of the schedule property and thus, prayed to allow the second appeal. 14. A perusal of record would disclose that the trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court concurrently held that plaintiff approached the Court seeking perpetual injunction, therefore, burden lies on the plaintiff to prove his possession over the schedule property, which the plaintiff failed to prove. 14. A perusal of record would disclose that the trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court concurrently held that plaintiff approached the Court seeking perpetual injunction, therefore, burden lies on the plaintiff to prove his possession over the schedule property, which the plaintiff failed to prove. The First appellant Court, however observed that when there is serious dispute with regard to the title of plaintiff over the schedule property, plaintiff ought to have filed the suit for declaration of the title instead of perpetual injunction, as per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anathula Sudhahar Vs. P.Buchi Reddy , [ AIR 2008 SC 2033 ] . Both the Courts categorically held that on one hand, plaintiff failed to place on record convincing/admissible evidence in proof of his title and possession over the schedule property and on the other hand, material placed on record by the defendants is in fact convincing and trustworthy. Therefore, the trial Court as well as first appellate Court rightly dismissed the suit. 15. In considered view of this Court, the learned counsel for appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law to be decided by this Court in this Second Appeal. In fact, all the grounds raised in this appeal are factual in nature and do not qualify as the substantial questions of law in terms of Section 100 C.P.C. 16. It is well settled principle by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court that in the Second Appeal filed under Section 100 C.P.C., this Court cannot interfere with the findings on facts arrived at by the first Appellate Court, which are based on proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record. 17. Further, in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki , [(2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 546] , the Apex Court held that the High Court sitting in Second Appeal cannot examine the evidence once again as a third trial Court and the power under Section 100 C.P.C. is very limited and it can be exercised only where a substantial question of law is raised and falls for consideration. 18. 18. Having considered the entire material available on record and the findings recorded by the first Appellate Court, this Court finds no ground or reason warranting interference with the said findings, under Section 100 C.P.C. Moreover, the grounds raised by the appellant are factual in nature and no question of law, much less a substantial question of law arises, for consideration in this Second Appeal. 19. Hence, the Second Appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.