ORDER : P.G. AJITHKUMAR, J. The petitioner is the accused in C.C.No.159 of 2022 pending before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class-I, Thiruvananthapuram. On the basis of Annexure-IV complaint filed by the 1 st respondent, summons was issued to the petitioner to answer the offences punishable under Sections 182 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The petitioner seeks to quash Annexure IV complaint and all further proceedings in C.C.No.159 of 2022. 2. The petitioner produced Annexures I to V. The 1 st respondent filed a counter affidavit producing therewith Annexures R1(a) to R1(g). The 1 st respondent would contend that Annexure II complaint filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner of Police, Thiruvananthapuram contains defamatory statement and when such statements were made with the intention of lowering reputation of the 1 st respondent among his friends and well-wishers and with the oblique motive of implicating him in offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (PoCSO Act), her intention to make defamatory imputations is quite evident. The 1 st respondent would categorically contend that the petitioner is liable to be proceeded against based on Annexure IV complaint. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for the 1 st respondent and the learned Senior Public Prosecutor. 4. The offences alleged in Annexure IV complaint are punishable under Sections 182 and 500 of the IPC. Annexure V is a copy of the proceedings of the learned Magistrate in that complaint. Annexure R1(b) is a copy of the statement given by the 1 st respondent before the learned Magistrate under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Code) and Annexures R1(c) to R1(g) are copies of the sworn statements given by the five witnesses before the learned Magistrate under Section 202 of the Code. After considering the allegations in the complaint and statements of those witnesses, the learned Magistrate issued summons to the petitioner. The offences for which cognizance was taken and summons issued are under Sections 182 and 500 of the IPC. 5. Insofar as the offence under Section 182 of the IPC is concerned, it has been contended by the petitioner that its cognizance is bad in view of the bar created under Section 195 of the Code. The offences for which cognizance was taken and summons issued are under Sections 182 and 500 of the IPC. 5. Insofar as the offence under Section 182 of the IPC is concerned, it has been contended by the petitioner that its cognizance is bad in view of the bar created under Section 195 of the Code. Section 182 of the IPC makes an act of giving false information to a public servant, which he knows or believes to be false, intending to cause such public servant to take action, is made penal. Section 195(1) of the Code lays down the procedure for taking cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the IPC. It envisages that in order for taking cognizance of any of the said offences, a complaint in writing by the public servant to whom such false information was given or some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate is mandatory. Therefore, except upon a complaint to whom Annexure II complaint was given, or his administrative superior, the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence under Section 182 of the IPC. Since that procedure was not followed, the order of the learned Magistrate issuing summons to the petitioner to answer that offence is illegal. 6. Three instances of imputation are alleged in Annexure IV complaint that constitute the offence of defamation. The first allegation is that ". The second is that the petitioner abused and used slanderous words in a telephone conversation with the 1 st respondent. The said conversation extracted in paragraph No.6 of the complaint, if published, undoubtedly is defamatory. The third is that while the 1 st respondent along with his friends appeared in the Sreekaryam Police Station in pursuance of the direction for his appearance as part of enquiry on Annexure II complaint, the petitioner repeated the allegations against the 1 st respondent in front of his friends. 7. This Court in Malayalam Communications Ltd. v. K.C. Venugopal [2024 KHC 1545] reiterated the law laid down in Mammen Mathew v. M.N.Radhakrishnan and another [ 2007 (4) KHC 502 ] as to the ingredients of an offence of defamation. 7. This Court in Malayalam Communications Ltd. v. K.C. Venugopal [2024 KHC 1545] reiterated the law laid down in Mammen Mathew v. M.N.Radhakrishnan and another [ 2007 (4) KHC 502 ] as to the ingredients of an offence of defamation. The following are held to be the ingredients,- “(1) making or publishing an imputation concerning a person; (2) such imputation must have been made by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations; and (3) the said imputation must have been made with the intention of harming or with the knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerned.” 8. A publication of the imputation is a necessary ingredient. When the allegation in the complaint is that the slanderous imputations as narrated in paragraph No.6 of Annexure IV complaint were made only during a telephonic conversation with the 1 st respondent. Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner publicised such an imputation. An interpersonal conversation through phone, even if slanderous, would not amount to an offence of defamation for want of publication. So, the second instance of imputation cannot be a reason to prosecute the petitioner for the offence of defamation. 9. The allegation of the 1 st respondent is that the petitioner made an allegation that the 1 st respondent took their child, aged only 7 years, to various lodges and he would have subjected the child to mental and physical torture, and that was with a view to implicate the 1 st respondent in PoCSO offences. On the request in the complaint, medical examination of the child was conducted. The said statements in Annexure II are said to be defamatory. The petitioner is none other than the mother of the child. Following marital discord, the 1 st respondent took away the child along with him. The petitioner was not aware of the whereabouts of the 1 st respondent as well as the child. In that circumstance, Annexure II complaint was lodged by the petitioner alleging that the child would have been put to physical and mental torture by the 1 st respondent. That cannot be stretched to say that, by alleging so, the petitioner intended that the 1 st respondent committed some offence under the PoCSO Act. Such a meaning cannot be read into the so-called statement of libel contained in Annexure II. That cannot be stretched to say that, by alleging so, the petitioner intended that the 1 st respondent committed some offence under the PoCSO Act. Such a meaning cannot be read into the so-called statement of libel contained in Annexure II. 10. Pursuant to Annexure II, the 1 st respondent was summoned to the Sreekaryam Police Station. Annexure R1(a) would indicate that in the enquiry conducted by the Station House Officer, Sreekaryam Police Station, the allegations in Anenxure II complaint concerning mental and physical torture of the child were turned out to be baseless. Along with that, the 1 st respondent alleged in Annexure IV complaint that such false allegations were hurled by the petitioner at the Police Station in front of the 1 st respondent’s friends and that amounted to defamation. If the petitioner raised the allegations in front of his friends, that would amount to publication of the imputation. But when the 1 st respondent took along with him his friends voluntarily to the police station, he cannot have a complaint that the petitioner publicised the allegations with a malicious intention. 11. This Court in David John v. Jose Moothedan and others [ILR 2020 (2) Ker.338] held that filing of a complaint before a public authority with the intention of taking action would not amount to an offence of defamation. It was held: “6. xx xx When a citizen make a complaint to the authorities to cancel an arms license issued to a person for certain specific reasons, the same will not amounts to defamation as contained in Sec.499 IPC. Similarly, filing a complaint before the statutory authorities to cancel an arms license, will not come within the purview of “makes or publishes” mentioned in Section 499 IPC. There is no publication of the complaint, if a complaint is submitted by a citizen to the District Collector for taking appropriate action for cancelling an arms licence. In such situation, the licensee of the arms cannot file a complaint to prosecute a person for defamation. If he sustained any loss for not taking appropriate action by the authorities in view of the complaint, he may have civil remedies.” 12. Annexure II complaint was submitted by the petitioner before the Commissioner of Police. As forwarded it by the Commissioner of Police, an enquiry was conducted by the Station House Officer, Sreekaryam Police Station. If he sustained any loss for not taking appropriate action by the authorities in view of the complaint, he may have civil remedies.” 12. Annexure II complaint was submitted by the petitioner before the Commissioner of Police. As forwarded it by the Commissioner of Police, an enquiry was conducted by the Station House Officer, Sreekaryam Police Station. When the petitioner submitted Annexure II complaint in regard to taking away of her child by the 1 st respondent; of course, he is the father of the child, such a complaint was lodged. When the imputation in the complaint is that the child would have been subjected to physical and mental torture, even if the same was baseless, cannot be said to be a libel attracting offence under Section 499 of the IPC. In the circumstances, the learned Magistrate went wrong in taking cognizance and issuing summons to the petitioner for an offence punishable under Section 500 of the IPC. No such offence is constituted from the allegations in Annexure IV complaint and the materials gathered during inquiry concerning such allegations. Accordingly, I hold that Annexure IV complaint and the proceedings initiated thereon are liable to be quashed. The Crl.M.C. is therefore allowed. Annexure IV complaint and further proceedings in C.C.No.159 of 2022 pending before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class-I, Thiruvananthapuram are quashed.