JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for setting aside the summoning order dated 16.3.2024, passed in Private Complaint No. 2554 of 2023, pending before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) and for quashing the complaint. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). As per the complainant, the accused and her husband visited the office of the Panchayat eleven days after the death of the complainant’s father. They shouted in Panchayat “Humarey Liye ye budha 7 saal phele mar chuka tha, who gawar aur anpad tha, mere liye who zero the zero”. This hurt the sentiments of the complainant and lowered the image of his father. The accused also circulated SMS/Messages on Whatsapp stating that “Tu meri maa ko phone karke kya batana chahta hai unko sab pta hai ki teri okat kya hai.” “Pta hai meri maa or bhai ko chor hai, tu chori karke aaya hai fojj mein or ab ghar akar apne baap ko kha rha tha tu.”, “Army mei agar tu chori kar skate hai to ghar par chori karna tere liye koi difficult task nhi he.” “Chor hai tu chor. Ye Court mein prove karungi mei wait”. The accused called Malkiyat Singh and stated that the complainant was a ‘Bhagora’, and he was suspended from service. The complainant issued a notice through his counsel to the accused, asking her to tender an apology, but in vain. Hence, the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused. 3. Being aggrieved from the filing of the complaint, the accused has filed the present petition asserting that there was insufficient material for summoning the accused, and the summoning order shows non-application of mind. The complaint was filed by the complainant as a counterblast to the civil suit, and the application filed by the husband of the accused. The contents of the complaint, if taken at their face value, do not make out a prima facie case against the accused. The complaint was filed with mala fide motive. The complaint was filed by the complainant as a counterblast to the civil suit, and the application filed by the husband of the accused. The contents of the complaint, if taken at their face value, do not make out a prima facie case against the accused. The complaint was filed with mala fide motive. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed, the summoning order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside, and the complaint be quashed. 4. I have heard Mr. Digvijay Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. Mr Digvijay Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the contents of the complaint do not establish the commission of a cognisable offence. The allegations in the complaint show that defamatory words were used against the deceased, which is no offence. The husband of the accused has filed a civil suit and an application under Order 39 Rule 2A of CPC. The complainant filed the present complaint as a counterblast to the civil suit and the application. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the summoning order and the complaint be quashed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025, SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8 . Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceeding can be quashed.” 8. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v . ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v.Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 9. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. A heavy reliance was placed upon the photographs, plaint and the application stated to have been filed by the husband of the accused. Since they are not certified copies of the court record, it is not known whether they were really filed in any Court of law and whether any proceedings were conducted pursuant to them. In any case, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 11. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018 , that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.” 12. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP , and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 13. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” 14. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 15. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 15. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: “63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482 CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioner with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the material brought before the learned Trial Court. As already stated, the authenticity of the documents filed with the petition has not been established and it is impermissible to rely upon them to quash the complaint. 17. It was submitted that false averments were made in the complaint and the statements on oath. As already stated, the authenticity of the documents filed with the petition has not been established and it is impermissible to rely upon them to quash the complaint. 17. It was submitted that false averments were made in the complaint and the statements on oath. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 wherein it was held : - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court in a series of judgments has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) “6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) “6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 19. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884 . It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 , “If the use of power is of the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal case cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 21. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the criminal proceedings due to the enmity. Moreover, enmity is a double- edged weapon because it may furnish a motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of a crime. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the enmity between the parties. 22. It was submitted that the statement was made concerning the deceased and does not fall within the purview of Section 499 of IPC. This submission is not acceptable. Explanation-1 of Section 499 reads that it may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person and is intended to be hurtful to his family or relatives. Calling a person a rustic villager, illiterate, and a zero would be defamatory to him if alive and would hurt the sentiments of his relatives after his death. Saying that the complainant had deserted the Army is defamatory of him. Therefore, the allegations in the complaint prima facie constitute the commission of an offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC, and the complaint cannot be quashed on the ground that no offence is made out. 23. Hence, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 24. Saying that the complainant had deserted the Army is defamatory of him. Therefore, the allegations in the complaint prima facie constitute the commission of an offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC, and the complaint cannot be quashed on the ground that no offence is made out. 23. Hence, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 24. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.