JUDGMENT : G. S. AHLUWALIA, J. Heard on I.A. No. 3243/2025, an application for condonation of delay. 2. This review petition has been filed with a delay of 128 days. 3. Paragraphs 2 to 6 of I.A. No. 3243/2025 read as under:- "(2) That, the order was passed on 18.11.2024 thereafter the authority approaches in the office of Additional Advocate General Gwalior for its legal opinion, which was given on 05.12.2024 dispatched on 06.12.2024. It is not out of place to mention here that as per legal opinion, the Department was required to take permission from the Law Department or from the Advocate General for filing the review petition. The permission from the Forest Department was given to file review on 16.01.2025, but because the permission from the Law Department has not been given, therefore, again request has been made to prepare the review. So in pursuance to the letter, again the legal opinion was given on 28.01.2025 and informed to the Forest Department to take permission either from the Advocate General or from the Law Department. Accordingly, the Advocate General has given the permission on 12.03.2025, which has been received subsequently on 13.03.2025. After receipt of permission from the Advocate General, the matter has been placed before the office of Additional Advocate General Gwalior for preparing the review, but on account of non-availability of certain documents as well as original record, it could not be immediately prepared, however it has been prepared after receipt of certain copies of original record. So the delay in filing the review petition is not deliberate and intentional and thus it deserves to be condoned. (3) That, there is certain delay in filing the application as well as review petition is 128 days, which is based on bona-fide hence same deserves to be condoned. Thus the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held in the case of Executive Engineer Antiyur Town Vs. G. Arumgun (D) by LRs reported in 2015 (3) SCC 569 and delay may kindly be condoned in the interest of justice if that delay is procedural on as under:- “4. As held by this Court in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and Others, the court must always take a justice-oriented approach while considering an application for condonation of delay. As held by this Court in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and Others, the court must always take a justice-oriented approach while considering an application for condonation of delay. If the court is convinced that there had been an attempt on the part of the government officials or public servants to defeat justice by causing delay, the court, in view of the larger public interest, should take a lenient view in such situations, condone the delay, howsoever huge may be the delay, and have the matter decided on merits.” (4) That, in the case of Government of NCT of Delhi Vs. Sushil Kumar Gupta & Ors reported in 2023 (5) SCC 650 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that:- “2. It is true that there is a huge delay in preferring the appeal which is vehemently opposed by Shri Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting respondent(s)- original writ petitioner, however, taking into consideration the other similar orders passed by different benches in condoning such delay in preferring the appeal challenging the order(s) passed by the very High Court declaring that the acquisition is lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 and taking into consideration the fact that while passing the impugned judgment and order the High Court has relied upon and/or followed the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors., reported in (2014) 3 SCC 183 which has been overruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 and the observations made in paragraph 365 which is reproduced hereinbelow, in which it is observed that all the decisions in which the decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) have been relied upon stand overruled, we condone the delay and consider the appeal on merits.” (5) That, while deciding the application for condonation of delay, the facts and grounds raised in the memo of review petition may kindly be considered. (6) That, the instant application for condonation of delay is being filed bonafide intentions and thus deserves to be allowed in the interest of justice." 4. From the plain reading of the aforesaid pleadings, it is clear that petitioners have given the details of steps taken by them along with the dates. (6) That, the instant application for condonation of delay is being filed bonafide intentions and thus deserves to be allowed in the interest of justice." 4. From the plain reading of the aforesaid pleadings, it is clear that petitioners have given the details of steps taken by them along with the dates. 5. A reply to this application has been filed, mentioning therein that petitioners have not shown sufficient cause, and they have not explained the delay. It is further stated that the reasons assigned in the application are vague, general, and evasive. Mere assertions, without supporting material or documentary evidence, do not constitute sufficient cause. 6. Heard learned counsel for parties on the question of condonation of delay. 7. Respondent has relied upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala , reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556 to submit that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour and courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Respondent has also relied upon judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 to submit that delay should not be condoned mechanically because law of limitation binds everybody equally including government, and defence by government of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology cannot be accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. Counsel for Respondent has also relied upon judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ram Kumar Chaudhary, decided on 29-11-2024 in SLP (C) Diary No. 48636/2024 and submitted that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligent, inaction, or lack of bona fides is attributed to the parties. It is further submitted that by the same judgment, Supreme Court had also directed the State Government to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility of the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the government. 8. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Collector (LA) v. Katiji, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 , has held as under:- "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ”merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 9. The Supreme Court in the case of University of Delhi v. Union of India, reported in (2020) 13 SCC 745 , has held as under:- "23. The Supreme Court in the case of University of Delhi v. Union of India, reported in (2020) 13 SCC 745 , has held as under:- "23. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party, namely, the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even- handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the courts based on the fact situation. In Katiji [LAO v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 ] the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight of is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800%." 10. The Supreme Court in the case of Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, decided on 21-3-2025 in SLP (Civil) No. 6145/2024, has held as under:- "8. With regard to the Impugned Order referring to the judgment in Sheo Raj Singh v Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531 , where it has been observed that Courts must take a liberal approach regarding delays in appeals filed by the State, the learned counsel for the appellant drew the Court’s attention to Paragraphs no.17 and 22 of State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish Chand Shivhare And Brothers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151, wherein it was held: ‘17. The explanation as given in the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay filed by the Petitioners in the High Court does not make out sufficient cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of 337 days in filing the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The law of limitation binds everybody including the Government. The usual explanation of red tapism, pushing of files and the rigmarole of procedures cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. The Government Departments are under an obligation to exercise due diligence to ensure that their right to initiate legal proceedings is not extinguished by operation of the law of limitation. A different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down because the government is involved. xxx 22. When consideration of an appeal on merits is pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim on the technical ground of the bar of limitation, the Courts lean towards consideration on merits by adopting a liberal approach towards ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay. The Court considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act may also look into the prima facie merits of an appeal. However, in this case, the Petitioners failed to make out a strong prima facie case for appeal. Furthermore, a liberal approach, may adopted when some plausible cause for delay is shown. Liberal approach does not mean that an appeal should be allowed even if the cause for delay shown is glimsy. The Court should not waive limitation for all practical purposes by condoning inordinate delay caused by a tardy lackadaisical negligent manner of functioning.’ 9. Learned counsel for the appellant further relied on the judgment in Pathapati Subba Reddy v Special Deputy Collector, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513, wherein Paragraph no.26(v) states: ‘Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence.’ Hence, it was contended that this Court should not waive limitation, for all practical purposes, by condoning delay caused by the lackadaisical negligent manner of functioning of the respondent. It was urged that the appeal ought to be allowed and the Impugned Order be set aside. x x x 11. It was urged that the appeal ought to be allowed and the Impugned Order be set aside. x x x 11. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the interpretation of the words ‘sufficient cause’ should be such that it is construed liberally. By referring to the decision in State of West Bengal v Administrator, Howrah Municipality, (1972) 1 SCC 366 , the respondent contended that a liberal interpretation should specially be taken in the present case as the State has not been negligent in pursuing the remedies available to it under law. Moreoever, the submission was that COVID-19 not being an extraneous circumstance, the State should not be punished for the delay in filing the Second Appeal. x x x 16. The Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 held: ‘10. …There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [ (1969) 1 SCC 110 , 116 : (1969) 2 SCR 824 ] “is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose”.’ (emphasis supplied) 17. No doubt, Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar (supra) relates to a writ petition, but the statement of law laid down is clear. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose”.’ (emphasis supplied) 17. No doubt, Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar (supra) relates to a writ petition, but the statement of law laid down is clear. Sheo Raj Singh (supra) has also considered the impersonal nature of the functioning of the State, taking note of what was observed in State of Manipur v Kotin Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 . In A B Govardhan v P Ragothaman, (2024) 10 SCC 613 , the Court considered as under: ‘37. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 ], the Court noted that it had been adopting a justifiably liberal approach in condoning delay and that “justice on merits” is to be preferred as against what “scuttles a decision on merits”. Albeit, while reversing an order of the High Court therein condoning delay, principles to guide the consideration of an application for condonation of delay were culled out in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450: (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 595]. One of the factors taken note of therein was that substantial justice is paramount [Para 21.3 of Esha Bhattacharjee [Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450: (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 595]]. 38. In N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503], a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur considered, though in the context of delay vis-à-vis Article 226 of the Constitution, the decision in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598 ] , and held that: (N.L. Abhyankar case [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503], SCC OnLine Bom para 22) “22. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598 ] , and held that: (N.L. Abhyankar case [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503], SCC OnLine Bom para 22) “22. … The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such, but the test is whether by reason of delay there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner, so as to infer that he has given up his claim or whether before the petitioner has moved the writ court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” (emphasis supplied) 39. The Bombay High Court's eloquent statement of the correct position in law in N.L. Abhyankar case [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] found approval in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig [Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 ] and Mool Chandra v. Union of India [Mool Chandra v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 625 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878]. 40. In the wake of the authorities abovementioned, taking a liberal approach subserving the cause of justice, we condone the delay and allow IA No. 16203 of 2019, subject to payment of costs of Rs 20,000 (Rupees twenty thousand) by the appellant to the respondent.’ (emphasis supplied) 18. Considering the above pronouncements and on an overall circumspection, we are of the opinion that the Second Appeal deserves to be heard, contested and decided on merits. However, a note of caution is sounded to the respondent to exhibit promptitude in like matters henceforth and in futuro, failing which the Court may not be as liberal." 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through legal representatives and others vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 , has held as under:- "17. The Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through legal representatives and others vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 , has held as under:- "17. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji, the relevant High Court did not condone the delay of 4 (four) days in presentation of an appeal by the Collector in a land acquisition matter for which the order rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was carried in appeal. This Court opined that legislature had conferred power under Section 5 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. It was further held that the expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. Despite the liberal approach being adopted in such matters, which was termed justifiable, this Court lamented that the message had not percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy and, accordingly, emphasis was laid on the courts adopting a liberal and justice-oriented approach. The following passage from the decision is reflective of this Court's realisation that : (Katiji case, SCC p. 108, para 3) “3. … And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: * 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. * 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.’ ” (emphasis supplied) 18.State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao arose out of an appeal where this Court condoned the State's delay of 57 days in applying for grant of leave to appeal before the High Court against acquittal of certain accused persons. This Court observed that in cases where substantial justice and a technical approach were pitted against each other, a pragmatic approach should be taken with the former being preferred. This Court observed that in cases where substantial justice and a technical approach were pitted against each other, a pragmatic approach should be taken with the former being preferred. Further, this Court noted that what counted was indeed the sufficiency of the cause of delay, and not the length, where the shortness of delay would be considered when using extraordinary discretion to condone the same. This Court also went on to record that courts should attempt to decide a case on its merits, unless the same is hopelessly without merit. It was also observed therein that it would be improper to put the State on the same footing as an individual since it was an impersonal machinery operating through its officers. 19. In Balwant Singh, this Court refused to condone the delay of 778 days in bringing on record the legal heirs of the petitioner therein through an application filed under Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It was observed that though sufficient cause should be construed in a liberal manner, the same could not be equated with doing injustice to the other party. For sufficient cause to receive liberal treatment, the same must fall within reasonable time and through proper conduct of the party concerned. The Court emphasised that for such an application for condonation to be seen in a positive light, the same should be bona fide, based on true and plausible explanations, and should reflect the normal conduct of a common prudent person. Further, the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay to warrant a condonation. 20.Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. happened to be a case where this Court set aside the impugned judgment condoning both a delay of 883 days in filing the petition to set aside the dismissal order by the relevant High Court, along with a delay of 3703 days caused by the respondents in bringing on record the legal representative of the appellant. This Court observed that whilst the High Court admonished the Government Pleaders concerned for their negligence in prosecuting the appeal before it and not providing a sufficient cause for delay, it nonetheless proceeded to condone the delay despite holding the same to be unjustifiable. 21. This Court observed that whilst the High Court admonished the Government Pleaders concerned for their negligence in prosecuting the appeal before it and not providing a sufficient cause for delay, it nonetheless proceeded to condone the delay despite holding the same to be unjustifiable. 21. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., this Court noted that in cases when there was no gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession ought to be adopted to render substantial justice but on the facts before the Court, the appellant could not take advantage of the earlier decisions of this Court. Further, merely because the State was involved, no different metric for condonation of delay could be applied to it. Importantly, it noted that the appellant department had offered no proper and cogent explanation before this Court for condonation of a huge delay of 427 days apart from simply mentioning various dates. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making file notes, it was held, not acceptable in view of the modern technologies being used and available. Also, holding that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government, this Court went on to reject the prayer for condonation. 22. This Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, whilst referring to various precedents rejected the pleas of lack of knowledge and miscarriage of justice raised by the respondent/managing committee in challenging an interim order of a Single Judge of the High Court. It then proceeded to set aside the impugned judgment condoning a delay of 2449 days in challenging the said interim order based on lack of bona fides. Para 21 of the decision contains the principles culled out by this Court from the several precedents that it had considered in the process. 23. A Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of this Court in State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang was faced with a delay of 312 days by the State in preferring its first appeal before the High Court. This Court, on grounds of public interest, the impersonal nature of governments, and the ramifications of individual errors on State interest, condoned the delay in filing the first appeal on payment of costs of Rs 50,000. 24. This Court, on grounds of public interest, the impersonal nature of governments, and the ramifications of individual errors on State interest, condoned the delay in filing the first appeal on payment of costs of Rs 50,000. 24. In University of Delhi, another Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of this Court declined to condone the delay of 916 days by the appellant in challenging an order of a Single Judge of the High Court. This Court, whilst distinguishing Katiji on facts, observed that the consideration to condone could only be made on presentation of a reasonable explanation, and the same could not be done simply because the appellant therein was a public body. It then went on to note the conduct of the appellant in demonstrating delay and laches not only in filing the appeal, but also the original writ petition before the High Court at the first instance. While refusing to condone the appellant's delay, it was specifically noted that condonation of delay at that stage would be prejudicial to public interest as one of the respondents therein (Delhi Metro Rail Corporation) had received large amounts of money years ago to carry out development on the subject land in question. 25. We may profitably refer hereunder to some other decisions of this Court for the purpose of the present adjudication. 26. G. Ramegowda v. LAO, while summarising the position of law on “sufficient cause”, had the occasion to observe that the contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals have been set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. It was observed to be true that there is no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its the counsel. Noting that there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal if there was negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its the counsel, it was further observed that each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. Noting that there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal if there was negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its the counsel, it was further observed that each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, this Court reiterated that the expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. This was followed by these words : (SCC p. 148, paras 15 & 17) “15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. * 17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process.” 27. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process.” 27. Katiji was also noticed by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of this Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani where we find the following discussion : (Chandra Mani case, SCC p. 138, para 11) “11. … When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process.” 28. This Court in Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, had the occasion to observe that it would not be necessary for the State to provide a day-to- day explanation of delay while seeking condonation of the same. The relevant observations therein read as follows : (SCC p. 635, para 2) “2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day-to-day delay. The transaction of the business of the Government was being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. The transaction of the business of the Government was being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court should be pragmatic but not pedantic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge has rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every day's delay in filing the review application in the light of the law laid down by this Court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned.” Analysis 29. We have heard Mr Sharma and Mr Sen, appearing on behalf of the appellants and the respondents, respectively, and perused the order under challenge. 30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. 31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An “excuse” is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication. 33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question. Law is fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below”. If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha where it has been held that: “an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong”. If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha where it has been held that: “an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong”. (emphasis in original) 34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21-12-2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Katiji, Ramegowda, Chandra Mani [State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 ] , K.V. Ayisumma and Lipok AO were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal is one such decision apart from University of Delhi] which have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above. 35. We find that the High Court in the present case assigned the following reasons in support of its order: 35.1. The law of limitation was founded on public policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient to deny condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of justice. 35.2. The expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against one another, the former would prevail. 35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered when deciding such applications for condonation of delay. 35.4. 35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered when deciding such applications for condonation of delay. 35.4. Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present case, the first respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on account of negligence on part of the government functionaries and the government counsel on record before the Reference Court. 35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence would be liable to suffer and not public interest through the State. The High Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not border on callousness. 36. Given these reasons, we do not consider discretion to have been exercised by the High Court in an arbitrary manner. The order under challenge had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for interference, which it is not. 37. It is now time to distinguish the two decisions on which Mr Sharma heavily relied on. 38. Balwant Singh arose out of a landlord-tenant dispute. Our thought process need not be guided by the law laid down on what would constitute “sufficient cause” in a dispute between private parties to a case where the Central Government is a party. 39. According to Mr Sharma, University of Delhi is a decision by a larger Bench and, therefore, binding on us. This Court, while deciding University of Delhi, was seized of a situation where even if the delay were to be condoned, it would cause grave prejudice to the respondent Delhi Metro Rail Corporation at the instance of the casual approach of the appellant University. This Court, on the argument of non-availability of the Vice Chancellor for granting approval to file the appeal, and other reasons put forth in the matter, could not conclude that there was fulfilment of sufficient cause for condonation of delay; hence, the refusal to condone the delay. The decision really turns on the facts before this Court because of the prejudice factor involved. 40. The decision really turns on the facts before this Court because of the prejudice factor involved. 40. We can also profitably refer to Koting Lamkang [State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 163] , cited by Mr Sen, where the same Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of this Court which decided University of Delhi [University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 ] was of the view that the impersonal nature of the State's functioning should be given due regard, while ensuring that individual defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of collective interest. The relevant paragraphs read as follows : (Koting Lamkang case, SCC p. 410, paras 7-8) “7. But while concluding as above, it was necessary for the Court to also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in reaching a government decision and the routine way of deciding whether the State should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse to it. Even while observing that the law of limitation would harshly affect the party, the Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the State, should not be condoned. 8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the impersonal nature of the Government's functioning where individual officers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would result in injustice to the institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost for individual default, those who are at fault, will not usually be individually affected.” (emphasis supplied) 41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court's decision to condone the delay on account of the first respondent's inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests." 12. Thus, it is clear that the expression "day-to-day explanation" should not be given a pedantic approach, and the said doctrine has to be applied in a rational, common sense, and in pragmatic manner. 13. Although it is true that the merits of the case may not be very relevant to decide the question of limitation, but in the present case, the delay is only of 128 days. The controversy, which is involved in the present case, is that whether a valuable land has been rightly declared as private land or it should have been declared as a government land. 14. So far as the judgment relied upon by counsel for respondent are concerned, in those cases, the delay was exorbitant, i.e., 465 days, 427 days, 5 years and 10 months respectively. 15. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that petitioner/State has made out sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 128 days. 16. Accordingly, I.A. No. 3243/2025 is hereby allowed, and delay in filing this review petition is hereby condoned. 17. Also heard on merits. 18. Issue notice to the respondent. 19. Since respondent is being represented by his counsel, therefore, Shri Chandil accepts notice on behalf of respondent and prays for two weeks’ time to file reply on merits. 20. Time granted. 21. List this case on 10-9-2025.