JUDGMENT : G. S. AHLUWALIA, J. Heard on IA No. 1736 of 2025, which is an application for condonation of delay in filing this review petition. 2. Reply of this application has been filed by respondent. Preliminary Objection 3. However, it is submitted by Sri P.C. Chandil, counsel for the respondent, that before considering this application, his objection with regard to locus standi of applicant may also be considered. It is submitted that applicant, who is a practicing advocate, was not a party to the litigation at any stage. Therefore, he cannot be said to be an aggrieved person. 4. Per contra, it is submitted by applicant that since Government land worth Rs.500 crores is involved in the present case and, according to him, the judgment in question has been obtained by playing fraud and valuable forest land has been declared as private land, therefore, being a vigilant citizen of the country, he has right to file review petition. It is submitted that, the words “person aggrieved” in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, does not mean only party to proceeding, and would include any person who can show that he is directly or indirectly affected by judgment, or such person can demonstrate his legitimate interest, and that the judgment has resulted in miscarriage of justice. In support of his contentions, applicant has relied upon judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the following cases: (i) Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad reported in (2019) 18 SCC 586 wherein it has been held as under:- "18. Reverting to the question of whether the Union of India has locus to file the review petition, we must immediately advert to Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) which, inter alia, postulates that “any person considering himself aggrieved” would have locus to file a review petition. Order 47 CPC restates the position that any person considering himself aggrieved can file a review petition. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court exercises review jurisdiction by virtue of Article 137 of the Constitution which predicates that the Supreme Court shall have the power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it. Besides, the Supreme Court has framed Rules to govern review petitions. Notably, neither Order 47 CPC nor Order 47 of the Supreme Court Rules limits the remedy of review only to the parties to the judgment under review. Besides, the Supreme Court has framed Rules to govern review petitions. Notably, neither Order 47 CPC nor Order 47 of the Supreme Court Rules limits the remedy of review only to the parties to the judgment under review. Therefore, we have no hesitation in enunciating that even a third party to the proceedings, if he considers himself an aggrieved person, may take recourse to the remedy of review petition. The quintessence is that the person should be aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by this Court in some respect." (ii) Ram Prakash Agarwal v. Gopi Krishan reported in (2013) 11 SCC 296 wherein it is held as under:- 28. In view of the above, the legal issues involved herein, can be summarised as under: 28.1. An application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC cannot be filed by a person who was not initially a party to the proceedings; 28.2. Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC can be exercised by the Court to redress only such a grievance, for which no remedy is provided for under CPC; 28.3. In the event that an order has been obtained from the court by playing fraud upon it, it is always open to the court to recall the said order on the application of the person aggrieved, and such power can also be exercised by the appellate court; 28.4. Where the fraud has been committed upon a party, the court cannot investigate such a factual issue, and in such an eventuality, a party has the right to get the said judgment or order set aside, by filing an independent suit. 28.5. A person aggrieved may maintain an application before the Land Acquisition Collector for reference under Section 18 or 30 of the 1894 Act, but cannot make an application for impleadment or apportionment before the Reference Court. (iii) Munshi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, decided by Allahabad High Court on 23.02.2012, in Writ B No. 29571 of 2004 wherein it is held as under:- Point No. 2:- Though I have already held that the order passed by the learned Member of Board of Revenue is without jurisdiction but assuming for a moment that it was within his competence to maintain the revision and decide the same, even then learned Member has erred in cancelling the lease without assigning any reason. So far as the view taken by the learned Member of Board of Revenue that the respondent no. 6 is an aggrieved person is concerned, controversy in this regard is no more res integra as the Apex Court as well as this Court in a catena of decisions, while considering as to who could be said to be the "person aggrieved", held that although the meaning of expression "person aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the Statute and facts of the case nevertheless normally, a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance; a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongly deprived him of something or wrongfully refused something, or wrongfully affected his title to someone. In M.S. Jayaraj Vs. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 552 , the Supreme Court considered the matter at length and placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including the Chairman, Railway Board & Ors., Vs. Chandrima Das (Mrs.) & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 988 ; held that the Court must examine the issue of locus standi from all angles and the petitioner should be asked to disclose as what is the legal injury suffered by him. The term "person aggrieved" was also considered and defined in Re: Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458, wherein it has been observed as under :- "The words ''person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something." In K. Ramadas Shenoy Vs. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 2177 , the Supreme Court examined the case of a resident of a locality where a cinema hall was to be constructed contrary to the Building Town Planning Scheme. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 2177 , the Supreme Court examined the case of a resident of a locality where a cinema hall was to be constructed contrary to the Building Town Planning Scheme. The resident was held to be entitled to maintain writ on the ground that the residential area would stand spoiled by the construction in violation of the statutory provisions and the municipal authorities owed a public duty and an obligation under the Statute not to allow the construction of a cinema hall in a residential area. The Supreme Court observed as under:- "... The question whether an individual who is one of a class for whose benefit such an obligation is imposed can or cannot enforce performance by an action must depend on the purview of the legislature in the particular statute. Injury may be caused either by the fulfillment of the duty cast by statute or by failure to carry it out or by negligence in its performance. In order to succeed in an action for damages for breach of statutory duty the plaintiff must establish a breach of a statutory obligation which, on the proper construction of the statute was intended to be a ground of civil liability to a class of persons of whom he is one. He must establish an injury or damage of a kind against which the statute was designed to give protection." In The Nagar Rice and Flour Mills & Ors., Vs. N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros. & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 246 , the Supreme Court rejected the claim of an existing Mill owner that in case any other Mill is shifted to the locality wherein his Mill is situated, he would be adversely affected, therefore, has a locus standi to maintain the suit/writ. The Supreme Court held that the right to carry on business being fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, its exercise is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the law in the interest of general public under Article 19 (6) (i) of the Constitution. The "person aggrieved" means a person who is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. "Person aggrieved" means a person who is injured or he is adversely affected in a legal sense. The "person aggrieved" means a person who is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. "Person aggrieved" means a person who is injured or he is adversely affected in a legal sense. (Vide K.N. Lakshminarasimaiah Vs. Secretary, Mysore S.T.A.T., (1966) 2 Mys. L.J. 199). Whether a person is injured in strict legal sense, must be determined by the nature of the injury considering the facts and circumstances involving in each case. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance, as the law can appreciate and not a stat pro ratione valuntas reasons. In Messrs. Swami Motor Transport (Private) Ltd. Vs. Messrs. Raman & Raman (Private) Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1961 Mad. 180 , a Full Bench of Madras High Court, while considering the provisions of Madras Motor Vehicles Act, considered the issue and approved the law laid down in The King Vs. Richmond Confirming Authority, (1921) 1 KB 248; and The King Vs. Groom & Ors., 1901 (2) KB 157, and laid down the principle as under:- "The true principle is to determine whether the applicant has an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law being wrongly administered." This Court in the case of Kalka Prasad and others vs. Board of Revenue and others reported in 2008 (10) ADJ 409 has taken the view that the land which is not vacant cannot be subject matter of lease unless the unauthorised occupant is evicted and if lease has been granted the person occupying the land unauthorisedly cannot be thrown except in accordance with the procedure contained under Section 122-B of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act. Here, in this case the respondent no. 6 has come up with the case that on the land in dispute a number of trees are standing which have been planted by him, therefore, he has sufficient interest in the matter and will fall in the ambit of aggrieved person. Therefore, the District Magistrate as well as learned Commissioner while treating the respondent no. 6 has come up with the case that on the land in dispute a number of trees are standing which have been planted by him, therefore, he has sufficient interest in the matter and will fall in the ambit of aggrieved person. Therefore, the District Magistrate as well as learned Commissioner while treating the respondent no. 6 as not aggrieved person, has erred in law and view taken by the learned Member of Board of Revenue is justified to that extent." (iv) S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 149 wherein it has been held as under:- "23. We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the constitutional objectives. “Law”, as pointed out by Justice Krishna Iyer in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 568 : AIR 1981 SC 344 : (1981) 1 LLJ 193 ] “is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action only when someone with real public interest ignites the jurisdiction” (SCC p. 585). A fear is sometimes expressed that if we keep the door wide open for any member of the public to enter the portals of the court to enforce public duty or to vindicate public interest, the court will be flooded with litigation. But this fear is totally unfounded and the argument based upon it is answered completely by the Australian Law Reforms Commission in the following words : (SCC p. 587, para 43) “The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a specter which haunts the legal literature, not the courtroom. [Prof.K.E. Scott : Standing in the Supreme Court : A Functional Analysis (1973), p. 86] A major expressed reason for limiting standing rights is fear of a spate of actions brought by busybodies which will unduly extend the resources of the courts. No argument is easier put, none more difficult to rebut. [Prof.K.E. Scott : Standing in the Supreme Court : A Functional Analysis (1973), p. 86] A major expressed reason for limiting standing rights is fear of a spate of actions brought by busybodies which will unduly extend the resources of the courts. No argument is easier put, none more difficult to rebut. Even if the fear be justified it does not follow that present restrictions should remain. If proper claims exist it may be necessary to provide resources for their determination. However, the issue must be considered. … Over recent years successive decisions of the United States Supreme Court have liberalised standing so as to afford a hearing to any person with a real interest in the relevant controversy. Surveying the result in 1973 Professor Scott commented : (Op. cit, p. 673) When the floodgates of litigation are opened to some new class of controversy by a decision it is notable how rarely one can discern the flood that the dissenters feared. Professor Scott went on to point out that the liberalised standing rules had caused no significant increase in the number of actions brought, arguing that parties will not litigate at considerable personal cost unless they have a real interest in a matter.” We wholly endorse these remarks of the Australian Law Reforms Commission. We may add, with Justice Krishna Iyer (SCC p. 585):“In a society where freedoms suffer from atrophy and activism is essential for participative public justice, some risks have to be taken and more opportunities opened for the public-minded citizen to rely on the legal process and not be repelled from it by narrow pedantry now surrounding locus standi.” It is also interesting to note that in India, as in other Commonwealth countries, the strict rule of standing does not apply to a writ of quo warranto or a ratepayer's action against a municipality, but there is no evidence that this has let loose the floodgates of litigation in these areas. The time, money and other inconveniences involved in litigating a case act as sufficient deterrents for most of us to take recourse to legal action, vide article of Dr S.N. Jain on Standing and Public Interest Litigation. 24. The time, money and other inconveniences involved in litigating a case act as sufficient deterrents for most of us to take recourse to legal action, vide article of Dr S.N. Jain on Standing and Public Interest Litigation. 24. But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. Andre Rabie has warned that “political pressure groups who could not achieve their aims through the administrative process” and we might add, through the political process, “may try to use the courts to further their aims”. These are some of the dangers in public interest litigation which the court has to be careful to avoid. It is also necessary for the court to bear in mind that there is a vital distinction between locus standi and justiciability and it is not every default on the part of the State or a public authority that is justiciable. The court must take care to see that it does not overstep the limits of its judicial function and trespass into areas which are reserved to the Executive and the legislature by the Constitution. It is a fascinating exercise for the court to deal with public interest litigation because it is a new jurisprudence which the court is evolving, a jurisprudence which demands judicial statesmanship and high creative ability. The frontiers of public law are expanding far and wide and new concepts and doctrines which will change the complexion of the law and which were so far as embedded in the womb of the future, are beginning to be born." 5. Thus, it is submitted that a person who is not a party to proceeding can also challenge the order. However, the only requirement is that the third party must show that they are affected directly or indirectly and should not have any personal gain or private profit. It is further submitted that in the present case, the matter involves public land, forest land and similarly environmental concerns are involved, therefore this Court must liberally interpret the words "locus standi". However, the only requirement is that the third party must show that they are affected directly or indirectly and should not have any personal gain or private profit. It is further submitted that in the present case, the matter involves public land, forest land and similarly environmental concerns are involved, therefore this Court must liberally interpret the words "locus standi". It is submitted that the applicant is aggrieved by potential loss of state of land worth rupees 500 crores. The land in dispute is a forest land and applicant is raising public interest and environmental concerns, etc. Therefore, it is submitted that he has suffered a legal injury. 6. Considering the submissions made by counsel of the parties, coupled with the fact that it is the specific case of applicant that he has no personal interest in the matter, and he has filed this review petition to protect the interests of the State, as well as the fact that delay in filing the review petition by the State Government has already been condoned by a separate order passed by this court today in RP No.750/2025, this Court is of considered opinion that the applicant has locus standi to file this review petition. Accordingly, preliminary objection raised by counsel for respondent with regard to locus standi of applicant to file the review petition is hereby overruled. Condonation of delay 7. This court, by a separate order passed in RP No. 750/2025, has already condoned the delay in filing the review petition by the State Government. Therefore, this Court is of considered opinion that the delay in filing this review petition is also liable to be condoned. Accordingly, it is hereby condoned. 8. Issue notice of this review petition to the respondents. 9. Since respondent No.1 is being represented by his counsel Shri P.C. Chandil, Advocate, therefore, he accepts notice on behalf of respondent No. 1. 10. Applicant undertakes to serve respondent Nos. 2 and 3 by Hamdast notice. 11. Accordingly, on payment of process fee, within seven working days, Office is directed to hand over the Hamdast notice to applicant who shall serve the notice upon respondent Nos. 2 and 3 by Hamdast and shall file acknowledgement of service of notice as well as affidavit in support of service. 12. List this case on 10/09/2025 along with R.P.No.750/2025.