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2025 DIGILAW 535 (TS)

S. Sathish Rao v. SRSA Infrastructure Private Limited

2025-04-30

P.SREE SUDHA, T.VINOD KUMAR

body2025
JUDGMENT : T.Vinod Kumar, J. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed against the order dated 02.01.2023 passed in I.A.No.816 of 2021 in O.S.No.58 of 2020 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge, at Sanga Reddy. 2. The Appellant herein is the plaintiff in the above suit filed for Specific Performance of Agreement of Sale dated 29.07.2019 under Order VII Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code (for short ‘CPC’), and respondent No.1 in the underlying Interlocutory Application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC. 3. It is the case of the appellant that, he had entered into an agreement of sale on 29.07.2019 with respondent No.1 in respect of sale of ten flatsin Sri Ayyappa Sai Ram Residency-4, situated at Kistareddypet village, Ameenpur Mandal at Sanagreddy District for total sale consideration of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores only); and that, the respondent No.1 received an amount of Rs 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) by way of Cheque dated 29.07.2019 and Cash of Rs.45,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Five Lakhs Only) as part advance sale consideration. 4. Appellant contends that, he approached the respondent No.1 on 10.01.2020 and demanded to produce all the documents and approvals for verification in order to get registration of subject property; and that the respondent No.1 had assured and promised to handover all the relevant documents and also agreed to register the subject property infavour of the appellant within one month. On the respondent No.1 delaying the execution of sale deed and due to lockdown, subsequently the appellant could not approach the respondent No.1 and after relaxation of the lockdown, on approaching the respondent No.1, it had denied to execute the registered sale deed. 5. Appellant further contends that, on enquiry he had learnt that, respondent No.1 intentionally avoided to execute the registered sale deed and by suppressing the existing agreement with him, had alienated part of the subject property to third parties, depriving the appellant of his right under agreement of sale. 6. 5. Appellant further contends that, on enquiry he had learnt that, respondent No.1 intentionally avoided to execute the registered sale deed and by suppressing the existing agreement with him, had alienated part of the subject property to third parties, depriving the appellant of his right under agreement of sale. 6. It is contended by the appellant that, on the respondent No.1 denying to execute sale deed in his favour, he had obtained the Encumbrance Certificate on 04.08.2020 and shocked to notice that Flat No. 201 was sold infavour of respondentNos.4 and 5 vide registered Sale deed dated 20.03.2020 and Flat No. 205 was sold infavour of respondent Nos.2 and 3 vide Registered Sale deed dated 26.02.2020, even though the said flats were part of the Agreement of sale entered into with the appellant. Thus, the respondent No.1 deliberately breached the conditions of agreement of sale which it was bound to comply by receiving the balance sale consideration. 7. Since, the respondent No.1 did not abide by the terms of agreement of sale, the appellant has filed the subject suit for Specific Performance of Agreement of Sale dated 29.07.2019 vide O.S. No. 58 of 2020 and along with the suit the appellant also filed application vide I.A. No. 365 of 2020 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC seeking grant of ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents from alienating the subject property in favour of third parties. The trial Court after hearing both the parties and by considering the documents on record, has allowed the I.A. No. 365 of 2020 vide order dated 10.03.2021. 8. Aggrieved by the trial Court’s order in I.A. No. 365 of 2020, the respondent No.1 filed C.M.A. No.250 of 2021 before this Court praying to suspend the interim order dated 10.03.202.This Court by considering the submissions made vide order dated 13.06.2021 had dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent No.1 herein. 9. Appellant further contends that, the trial Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court had elaborately dealt with the contentions of the respondent No.1 while considering I.A. No. 365 of 2020 and CMA No. 250 of 2021. 9. Appellant further contends that, the trial Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court had elaborately dealt with the contentions of the respondent No.1 while considering I.A. No. 365 of 2020 and CMA No. 250 of 2021. Appellant contends that the respondent No.1 thereafter filed the underlying interlocutory application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC vide I.A No.816 of 2021, seeking to set aside the order dated 10.03.2021 passed in I.A No. 365 of 2020 in the aforesaid suit, claiming that there is change in circumstances as it had obtained the expert opinion from Forensic Science Laboratories (for short ‘FSL’) vide report/opinion dated 27.09.2021 inCr.No.297 of 2020 of Ameenpur P.S. vide letter dated 16.08.2021by comparing the signature on the bank cheque issued and signatures of the respondent No.1 contained on the specimen sheet of the bank. 10. Further, the appellant contends that, the respondent No.1 has already got the expert’s opinion through a private agency i.e. Truth Laboratories, at the time of hearing of I.A. No. 356 of 2020 and the said expert report dated 21.10.2020 was also marked as Ex.R-3 in the said I.A. It is contended that the trial Court by considering the above document and after hearing both the parties had allowed the said application in favour of the appellant herein and the said order was also confirmed by this Court in the appeal. 11. It is contended by the appellant, since, the respondent No.1 had already availed its right of appeal by challenging the order and decree passed in I.A. No.365 of 2020 before the Division Bench of this Court, the order passed by the trial Court in underlying interlocutory application vide I.A. No. 816 of 2022 dated 02.01.2023 is unsustainable. 12. Per Contra, the respondent No.1 contends that, it approached the appellant for taking hand loan of an amount of Rs, 2,00,00,000/- for its business purpose, and the appellant for extending loan demanded for providing collateral security and advised to execute agreement of sale of flats in the apartment being constructed by him and due to acquaintance it had with the appellant, it had executed the agreement of sale, where under the appellant promised to pay Rs.5,00,000/-by way of cheque and Rs. 45,00,000/-by way of cash and remaining amount of Rs.1,50,00,000/- to be paid within three months. 13. 45,00,000/-by way of cash and remaining amount of Rs.1,50,00,000/- to be paid within three months. 13. Respondent No.1 contends that, on approaching the appellant demanding to hand over the cheque amount which is to be paid, the appellant failed to pay and postponed the matter on one other pretext and all of a sudden, the respondent No.1 received summons from the trial Court in O.S. No. 58 of 2020 in a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale filed by the appellant and on due verification of the agreement, it was discovered that two papers i.e. page Nos. 4& 5 in the agreement by putting forged signatures which does not belong to the respondent No.1. 14. Accordingly, the respondent No.1 in order to confirm that the last two pages of the agreement of sale i.e. Page No. 4 and 5 are containing his forged signatures or not, sent the agreement of sale and the receipt containing the questioned signatures to Telangana State FSL at Red Hills for comparison through the Principal Junior Civil Judge-Cum-Judicial First Class Magistrate at Sangareddy in Cr.No.297 of 2020 of Ameenpur P.S. vide letter dated 16.08.2021, who had furnished its report/opinion dated 27.09.2021 as follows: "The person who wrote the red enclosed signatures marked S1 to S7 did not write the red enclosed signatures marked Q1 and Q2." 15. The respondent No.1 contends that the above FSL report being subsequent event, it had filed the underlying interlocutory application vide I.A. No. 816 of 2021 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC seeking to set aside the order dated 10.03.2021 passed in favour of the appellant herein in I.A No. 365 of 2020. 16. Respondent No.1 contends that the trial Court considering the opinion of FSL, which is a subsequent event, has passed an order dated 02.01.2023 in I.A. No. 816 of 2021 in favour of the respondent No.1 herein by allowing the petition and setting aside the order passed in I.A. No. 365 of 2020 and as such the said order does not suffer from any error. 17. Heard, learned Counsel for the appellant and learned Counsel for respondents. 18. We have taken note of respective contentions urged and perused the record. 19. 17. Heard, learned Counsel for the appellant and learned Counsel for respondents. 18. We have taken note of respective contentions urged and perused the record. 19. The case of the appellant herein is that, as already the trial Court under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC had passed ad- interim injunction order dated 10.03.2021 in I.A. No.365 of 2020, which order has been affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 30.06.2021 in CMA No. 250 of 2021, the respondent No.1 cannot file the underlying interlocutory application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC. The respondent No.1 on the other hand contended that the FSL report being a subsequent event, it is entitled to maintain the underlying application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of CPC. 20. It is pertinent to note that, the respondent No.1 contended that it approached the appellant to lend a sum of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- for development of his business and as a collateral security executed agreement of sale. The respondent No.1 however did not produce any documents to prove the same. Further, the documents marked by the appellant before the trial Court as Ex. P-1 i.e. Agreement of Sale dated 29.07.2019 and Ex.P-2 i.e. Receipt dated 29.07.2019 clearly demonstrates that respondent No.1 received Rs.5,00,000/- through cheque and as well as Rs. 45,00,000/-by way of cash in respect of agreement of sale Ex.P-1. 21. Further, it is to be noted that, the trial Court in I.A. No.365 of 2020 as well as the Division Bench of this Court in appeal observed that, the respondent No.1 failed to produce its copy of the Agreement of Sale i.e. Ex.P-I which the respondent No.1in normal circumstances would have retained. 22. It is also pertinent to note that, the trial Court in I.A. No.365 of 2020 as well as this Court while upholding the order of the trial Court in CMA No.250 of 2021, by detailed analysis observed as under: Para 48- The contention of appellant that it only intended to create a security for a loan and Ex.P.1 is executed only for the said purpose. cannot be accepted prima facie, because the appellant is a Real Estate businessman and clearly understands the difference between an 'Agreement to Sell' immovable property and a 'Mortgage Deed'. cannot be accepted prima facie, because the appellant is a Real Estate businessman and clearly understands the difference between an 'Agreement to Sell' immovable property and a 'Mortgage Deed'. Such worldly-wise person cannot be allowed to take the plea that he did not know the difference between a mortgage deed and an agreement to sell. By observing as above, this Court in CMA t sustained he order of the trial Court was by dismissing the appeal filed by the respondent No.1 herein. 23. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 herein had filed the underlying application vide I.A. No. 816 of 2022 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC before the trial Court for setting aside the order in I.A. No. 365 of 2020 in O.S. No. 58 of 2020. 24. In order to consider as to whether the respondent No.1 could have maintained the underlying application, it is appropriate to refer to Rule 4 of Order XXXIX CPC which reads as under: 4. Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside. Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order: Provided that if in an application for temporary injunction or in any affidavit support such application a part has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular and the injunction was granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction unless, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that it is not necessary so to do in the interests of justice: Provided further that where an order for injunction has been passed after giving to a party an opportunity of being heard, the order shall not be discharged, varied or set aside on the application of that party except where such discharge, variation or setting aside has been necessitated by a change in the circumstances, or unless the Court is satisfied that the order has caused under hardship to that party. 25. A reading of the above Rule would show that any order of injunction may be discharged or varied or set aside by the Court, which had initially granted it on an application made thereto by any party which is dissatisfied with the said order. 26. 25. A reading of the above Rule would show that any order of injunction may be discharged or varied or set aside by the Court, which had initially granted it on an application made thereto by any party which is dissatisfied with the said order. 26. The first proviso to the aforesaid Rule would further indicate that the Court in order to vary, discharge or set aside the injunction order granted earlier, can vacate the said injunction by recording reasons, if the said order has been obtained by making a false or misleading statement in relation to the material particulars, without giving notice to the opposite party. 27. The mention of words ‘without giving notice to the opposite party’ in the aforesaid proviso implies that such an injunction having been passed ex parte in terms of Order XXXIX Rule 3 C.P.C. 28. The above said position would clear from the second proviso to Rule 4 C.P.C. wherein it is stated that if an injunction order has been passed after giving to a party an opportunity of being heard, the said order shall not be discharged, varied or set aside on the application except on the ground of change in the circumstances or the Court is satisfied that the order has caused undue hardship to that party. 29. In the facts of the present case, the impugned order passed by the trial Court in the underlying Interlocutory Application does not record any reasons as to the hardship to the party i.e. respondent No.1 herein or the change in the circumstance which was not available when I.A. No. 365 of 2020 was considered for it to discharge the order passed in I.A.No.365 of 2020 in O.S.No.58 of 2020. Though the respondent No.1 claimed FSL report is a subsequent circumstances, since it had already pleaded the said fact on the basis of report obtained from a private lab, mere getting another report reinforcing the said claim cannot be considered as ‘change in circumstances for the Court below to vary or discharge the order passed earlier. 30. Though the respondent No.1 claimed FSL report is a subsequent circumstances, since it had already pleaded the said fact on the basis of report obtained from a private lab, mere getting another report reinforcing the said claim cannot be considered as ‘change in circumstances for the Court below to vary or discharge the order passed earlier. 30. Further, it is also to be noted that since, the order in I.A.No.365 of 2020 having been passed after granting of opportunity of being heard to the respondent No.1 herein, the trial Court could not have dealt with the underlying Interlocutory Application as filed against an exparte ad interim injunction, more so, when respondent No.1 having assailed the said order in I.A.No.365 of 2020 by filing a CMA before the Hon’ble High Court and the said order having been confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in C.M.A.No.250 of 2021. 31. The reasons assigned by the trial Court for accepting the claim of respondent No.1 herein in the underlying Interlocutory Application that the signature on the cheque being stated to have been issued by the 1 st respondent varying with the specimen signature available with the Bank, cannot be considered as change in the circumstances for the trial Court to discharge the said order, more particularly, taking note of the fact that the Division Bench of this Court in C.M.A.No.250 of 2021 having prima facie observed that the respondent No.1 is a real estate businessman and clearly understands the difference between ‘agreement to sell’ immovable property and a ‘Mortgage deed’ and that respondent No.1 was not gullible enough to sign the document bona fidely believing the assurance of the appellant herein and also without taking the admitted signatures of the appellant for the purpose of comparison. 32. Since, the said findings recorded by this Court in C.M.A.No.250 of 2021 are in relation to the proceeding at an Interlocutory Application stage, the respondent No.1 merely by relying on the FSL report given in another proceeding in connection with Cr.No.297 of 2020 by claiming change in circumstance, cannot maintain the underlying Interlocutory Application before the trial Court to reopen and rehear the matter on same material ( See: Sitaram Madan Vs. Rajkunwarbai , 1959 MPLJ 532 ). 33. Rajkunwarbai , 1959 MPLJ 532 ). 33. It is also to be noted that, the respondent No.1 who had admittedly received the said money of Rs.45 lakhs in cash, cannot rely on R.B.I. guidelines to wriggle out of its obligation under Ex.P-1, claiming that as per R.B.I. Rules it is not permissible to pay large sums of money in cash. If there is any such infringement of the Rules it is for the said authority to take appropriate action and respondent No.1 cannot seek to take advantage of the same. (See:Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar and Anr , [2025 SCC OnLine SC 793] 34. In the light of the above, this Court is of the view that the trial Court had erred in exercising its power under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC in considering the underlying Interlocutory Application and setting aside the order dated 10.03.2021 in I.A. No. 365 of 2020 in O.S. No. 58 of 2020 as confirmed by this 1959 MPLJ 532 Court in C.M.A.No.250 of 2021 dated 30.06.02021, for it to be sustained. 35. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed and the order of the trial Court dated 02-01-2023 passed in I.A. No. 816 of 2021 in O.S. No.58 of 2020 is hereby set aside. No costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any shall stand closed.