JUDGMENT : 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned senior advocate Mr.K.M.Patel with learned advocate Mr.Dilip Rana waives service of Rule on behalf of respondent No.2 and 3. 2. Present petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India thereby challenging the order passed by the learned Tribunal at Vadodara dated 15.09.2023 passed below Exh.33 in Reference (I.T.) No.42 of 2018 challenging the application filed for amendment of statement of claim. This petition was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 05.08.2024, however, while dismissing the petition, the observation was made that it is open for the petitioner to take all the contention before the learned Tribunal at the time of arguments and the learned Industrial Tribunal shall consider the same in accordance with law and the observation made by the learned Tribunal will not come in the way of petitioner at the time of arguments. Challenging the said order dated 24.09.2024, in intra court appeal filed by both the parties, this Court has remanded the matter back to this Court by allowing the appeal being Letters Patent Appeal No.1374 of 2024 and No.1340 of 2024 directing the learned Single Judge to decide the matter afresh and the petition is heard thereafter, by this Court at length. 3. Gist of the case is that the petitioner Union raised a demand claiming the strength of employees more than 100, alleging the violation of provision under Chapter V-B. The respondent No.3 has filed the written statement contending that the strength of workman which is alleged to have been 125 is not correct, out of the said 125 workmen, 34 employees are employees of the respondent No.2 Unit, which is separate and independent identity. During the course of adjudication of the reference, an application was preferred by the petitioner Union seeking production of the documents to establish the violation of provision under Chapter V-B. The said application was allowed by the learned Tribunal vide order dated 06.08.2019 and was subject matter of challenge before this Court in Special Civil Application No.22274 of 2019 which came to be allowed vide order dated 15.06.2022 setting aside the order dated 06.08.2019 passed by the learned Tribunal. The order passed in the Writ petition was further challenged in the intra court appeal by filing Letters Patent Appeal No.977 of 2022 wherein, consensus order was passed by this Court on 19.12.2022 recording the consent of the respondent No.3 to produce the statement showing the names, designation and salary of the employees named in Annexure-B of the written statement and last pay slip of 2007. 3.1. On being complied with the observations made in the intra court appeal, the list of the documents were produced below Exh.29 on 30.12.2022. The petitioner Union, on receiving the documents, more particularly the pay slip of 34 workman showing the place of work as Vejalpur at Maharashtra in July, 2017 which is before the date of closure i.e. 05.08.2017 has filed the application on 17.02.2023 seeking amendment in the statement of claim alleging the rationalization and retrenchment in violation of section 9(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). The said application came to be rejected by the learned Tribunal vide order dated 15.09.2023 below Exh.33 which is subject matter of challenge before this Court. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr.Ishan Joshi for the petitioner and learned senior advocate Mr.K.M.Patel with learned advocate Mr.Dilip Rana for respondent No.2 and though Notice is served no one has represented respondent No.1. 5. Learned advocate Mr.Joshi appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the documents which are produced pursuant to the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court suggests that pay slip of 34 workmen show their place of work as Vejalpur in the year 2017 which is before the notice of the closure dated 05.08.2017 confirming that either it was partial closure of the Company by the management or the management had changed the service condition of 89 workmen without following the due process of law provided under section 9(A) of the Act. It is contended by the learned advocate Mr.Joshi that the same fact would become instrumental in adjudicating the reference since same is incidental to the terms of reference, therefore, application filed on 17.02.2023 seeking amendment of the statement of claim. It is contended by the learned advocate Mr.Joshi that the same fact would become instrumental in adjudicating the reference since same is incidental to the terms of reference, therefore, application filed on 17.02.2023 seeking amendment of the statement of claim. It is submitted that the learned labour court committed an error in rejecting the said amendment application instead of considering section 10(4) of the Act as the amendment which was sought to be made by the petitioner Union was not only in confinement to the terms of reference, but was incidental thereto. It is further submitted by the learned advocate Mr.Joshi that learned court has erred in rejecting the application for amendment and while rejecting the said application, learned court has virtually decided the reference of the petitioner Union at the stage of amendment of claim. Learned court ought to have appreciated the fact that application to the statement of claim was made only after production of documents by management as directed by this Court and such a question being formulated would help to decide the terms of reference as directed by this Court. It is contended that the learned court ought to have considered the fact that amendment to the statement of claim would infact assist the learned reference court to decide the reference as per the terms of the reference, in as much as on one hand the management says that only 89 workmen were discharging their duties at relevant point of time whereas, in the documents produced before the respondent No.1, the pay slips disclose that 34 other workmen have been given their salaries prior to closure notice which shows their place of work as Vejalpur. It is submitted by the learned advocate Mr.Joshi that learned court has erred in rejecting the amendment application on the basis that the PF of 34 workmen were deducted in Maharasthra as what is to be seen is the last place of employment and not the deduction of PF which would help to determine the facts that whether or not, provisions as provided under Chapter V-B would be applicable to the respondent Management. It is further contended that the learned court has erred on rejecting the management application as the same was interim application for which the petitioner ought not to have been relegated to the appropriate Government by raising separate reference. It is further contended that the learned court has erred on rejecting the management application as the same was interim application for which the petitioner ought not to have been relegated to the appropriate Government by raising separate reference. It is further submitted by the learned advocate Mr.Joshi that the learned court has erred in coming to the conclusion that no material has been placed on record with respect to 34 workmen which is factually inconsistent with the record and therefore, same is required to be interfered with by granting the application filed below Exh.33. Learned advocate Mr.Joshi has relied on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of:- i. Goa MRF Employees Union Versus MRF Limited reported in (2014) 14 SCC 483 ; ii. Goa MRF Employees Union Versus MRF Limited reported in (2010) 15 SCC 432; iii. Regional Manager, SBI Versus Rakesh Kumar Tewari reported in (2006) 1 SCC 530 ; iv. Steel Authority of India Ltd. Versus Union Of India And Others reported in (2006) 12 SCC 233; v. M.Revanna Versus Anjanamma (Dead) By Legal Representatives And Others reported in (2019) 4 SCC 332; vi. Oshiar Prasad and Others Versus Employers In Relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal, Washery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, Jharkhand reported in (2015) 4 SCC 71; 6. Per contra, learned senior advocate Mr.Patel appearing with learned advocate Mr.Rana has submitted that the chartered of the demand was raised by the petitioner, containing three demands alleging illegal closure of the Vejalpur factory of the respondent Company in violation of section 25(O) of the ID Act. It is contended that the total number of workmen on the date of closure of the said Factory were more than 100 and the Vejalpur Factory and Dawalwadi Factory is constituted as one establishment and its combined strength of workmen should be considered for the purpose of applicability of Chapter V-B of the Act. It is contended that the total number of workmen on the date of closure of the said Factory were more than 100 and the Vejalpur Factory and Dawalwadi Factory is constituted as one establishment and its combined strength of workmen should be considered for the purpose of applicability of Chapter V-B of the Act. The case of the respondent Company before the Conciliation Officer as well as in the written statement is that 36 employees out of the list of 125 employees produced by the Union do not fall under the definition of the workmen as per section 2(s) of the Act and in any case they were not employed in Vejalpur establishment and therefore, they cannot be considered for the purpose of computation of strength of 100 workmen for invoking Chapter V-B and section 25(O) of the ID Act. It is submitted by the learned senior advocate Mr.Patel that the Vejalpur and Dawalwadi Factory are separate and independent establishment, therefore, its combined strength of workers cannot be considered for the applicability of Chapter V-B. It is submitted by the learned senior advocate Mr.Patel that at no stage, either in the chartered of demand or before the Conciliation Officer in the conciliation proceedings or before the Tribunal in the statement of claim, the Union had pleaded the case of illegal retrenchment for breach of section 9(A) of the Act. The Tribunal derives its jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim on the basis of terms of reference and it cannot travel beyond the terms of reference. The said terms of reference are derived or framed on the basis of the demand made by the Union of workmen and in absence of such demand of illegal retrenchment on account of breach of section 9(A) of the Act, no Industrial disputes can be said to have been arise of illegal retrenchment and indeed no such dispute arose, nor is referred to the tribunal for adjudication. By filing the application for amendment, the petitioner is trying to expand the scope of terms of reference and cover the industrial disputes which was neither raised, nor referred for adjudication. In that background, the learned court has rightly rejected the amendment application below Exh.33 as the Union is trying to change the nature of dispute. By filing the application for amendment, the petitioner is trying to expand the scope of terms of reference and cover the industrial disputes which was neither raised, nor referred for adjudication. In that background, the learned court has rightly rejected the amendment application below Exh.33 as the Union is trying to change the nature of dispute. It is further submitted by the learned senior advocate Mr.Patel that illegal retrenchment for breach of section 9(A) of the Act cannot be considered or said to be incidental issue to the dispute referred. It is independent, substantive and separate dispute and same cannot be raised as an incidental issue under section 10(4) of the ID Act. It is submitted by the learned senior advocate Mr.Patel that the claim of Union was with regard to the illegal closure of Vejalpur Factory and by way of amendment, petitioner is trying to amend the terms by proposing illegal retrenchment. The seed processing plant at Vejalpur Factory was closed with effect from 05.08.2017 and said closure was fully in accordance with the provisions of section 25(FFF) of ID Act read with Industrial Dispute (Gujarat) Rules, 1966 and the provision of Chapter V-B of the Act are not applicable. These facts, though stated before the learned tribunal in the written statement and though there is no subsequent development which can be basis for the petitioner to file amendment application and therefore, the learned tribunal is justifying in dismissing the amendment application which is filed after more than four years of filing of reference and at the stage of recording of evidence. Learned senior advocate Mr.Patel has relied on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of:- i. Airlines Hotel (Private) Ltd., Bombay Versus Workmen reported 1961 SCC OnLine SC 250; ii. Management of the D.C.M. Chemical Works Versus Their Workmen reported in SCR (1962) Supp. iii. Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat Versus Perfect Pottery Co.Ltd. And Another reported in (1979) 3 SCC 762. iv. LIC of India Versus Retired LIC Officers Assn. Reported in (2008) 3 SCC 321 . v. Firestone Tyre And Rubber Company of India (P0 Ltd. Versus Workmen Employed, Represented by Firestone Tyre Employees’ Union reported in (1981) 3 SCC 451 . vi. Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd. And Ors. Versus Labour Appellate Tribunal and Ors. In Civil Revn. Nos.636 and 1320 of 1956 (In the High Court of Calcutta). 7. v. Firestone Tyre And Rubber Company of India (P0 Ltd. Versus Workmen Employed, Represented by Firestone Tyre Employees’ Union reported in (1981) 3 SCC 451 . vi. Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd. And Ors. Versus Labour Appellate Tribunal and Ors. In Civil Revn. Nos.636 and 1320 of 1956 (In the High Court of Calcutta). 7. Having considered the arguments advanced by learned advocates for the respective parties, it emerges that the petitioner Union has raised a dispute by raising following demand:- “Schedule of Demands -A – Revised Demands Demand No. 1: - The workmen and employees, as per the list appended herewith as Annexure – B, are employed at Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Pvt. Ltd., situated at Vejalpur, Taluka Godhara, District Panchmahal. As total 125 workmen/ employees are employed in the production activity in the plant at Vejalpur, the provisions under Chapter-5B of the Industrial Dispute Act are applicable to the company. Despite that, the work of production, processing and packaging etc. have been illegally shut from 05/08/2017 without any permission from the appropriate government or following the procedure as provided under Section 25 (O) of the I.D. Act. Therefore, the act of laying off the workmen, as per Annexure – C appended herewith, on a reason of illegal closure is not only against the provisions of Section 25 (O) of the I.D. Act but also lacks application of mind. Therefore, whether all the workmen, as per Annexure-C appended herewith, should be reinstated on their original posts with back wages and all concomitant benefits or not? Demand No.2:- The action of transferring the plant machinery and other articles, installed at Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Pvt. Ltd., at Vejalpur, Taluka Godhara, District Panchmahat, to other locations in Gujarat and outside, is contrary to the provisions under Section 9 (a) of the I.D. Act. Moreover, the act of the company of assigning the operation of plant and machinery to a contractor and undertaking a contract system, though under supervision of 36 employees out of the 125 employees including drivers, technical production staff, office staff etc. working at the unit at Vejalpur, for operation of the plant and machinery transferred to other locations in the state of Gujarat, is illegal and unjust. working at the unit at Vejalpur, for operation of the plant and machinery transferred to other locations in the state of Gujarat, is illegal and unjust. Therefore, whether the plant and machinery transferred from Vejalpur to other location should be brought back to the original location and the employees included in the present demand should be employed for the work or not ? Demand No. 3:- The work of production, sales and distribution of Company No.1 Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Pvt. Ltd. at Jalna, Davalvadi (Maharashtra) and Company No.2 Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Pvt. Ltd. at Vejalpur, Taluka Godhara, District Panchmahal is done in the name of the Company No.1. Moreover, it is the Company No.1 who exercises all the management and financial control on the Company No.2. Semi-finished goods produced by the Company No.1 are being sent to the Company No.2 for processing. In this manner, on considering the Seniority List of the workmen of Company No.1 and Company No.2 a Common List, the number of workmen/employees employed in Company No.1 and 2 is more than 100. Thus, the action of shutting the plant situated at Vejalpur is contrary to the provisions under Section 2 5(O) of the I.D. Act. Therefore, whether all the workmen should be paid full pay, as provided under sub-section 6 of Section 2 5(O) of the I.D. Act, for the period till final disposal of the present dispute or not?” 8. Before the Conciliation Officer, the respondent appeared and contended that:- 8.1. Average number of workmen employed per working day in the preceding 12 months to the closure were less that 100 and were 89 in numbers and therefore, the provisions of Chapter V-B of the Act is not attracted in the case of the petitioner Union. It is contended that all the 89 workmen were duly paid the notice pay in lieu of notice and closure compensation as per section 25(FFF) read with section 25(F) of the Act, therefore, also proceedings initiated by the union is not maintainable. It is further contended that the 34 persons are not affected workman and therefore, they are required to be excluded from the computation of the strength of workmen, actual employer and work, in the closed factory from August 2016 to August 2017. It is further contended that the 34 persons are not affected workman and therefore, they are required to be excluded from the computation of the strength of workmen, actual employer and work, in the closed factory from August 2016 to August 2017. It is also contended before the Conciliation Officer that with regard to the demand No.2, once the Company has affected closure and the dues of the workmen are paid there is no question of keeping machineries in the said location to rust and become junk. Therefore, the said action of the Company cannot be said to be contravention of section 9(A) of the Act. With regard to the demand No.3, it is submitted that the company is registered under the Company’s Act and having its registered office at Mumbai. It has various establishments and each and every establishment is separate and distinct and all these establishments cannot be clubbed together. It is contended that the Union is trying to club the establishment at Jalna with establishment at Vejalpur, however, employees employed in both the establishments are separate and distinct and the terms and conditions of the service of the employees employed in these two establishments are separate as well as functional integrity between these two establishments are also distinct. Therefore, there is no question of any common seniority as there was never any transfer of the employees between these establishments. 9. Conciliation Officer has referred the dispute to the learned Tribunal for adjudication of the demands which are referred herein above. Thereafter, the application came to be filed under section 11 of the Act seeking production of certain documents to establish the violation of Chapter V-B which was ultimately ordered in favour of the petitioner in intra court appeal filed by the petitioner Union. On producing the said documents, more particularly the pay slips, another application came to be filed below Exh.33 for amendment of statement of claim claiming that there is illegal retrenchment as it has violated the provision of section 9(A)of the Act and therefore, the said issue is incidental to the demand of demand No.2. 9.1. On producing the said documents, more particularly the pay slips, another application came to be filed below Exh.33 for amendment of statement of claim claiming that there is illegal retrenchment as it has violated the provision of section 9(A)of the Act and therefore, the said issue is incidental to the demand of demand No.2. 9.1. If one would refer the demand No.2 which was raised by the petitioner Union alleging that action of the petitioner shifting the said plant is contrary to the provision of the section 9(A) of the Act and the action of the petitioner of operating the said plant and machinery through the contractor and of taking the work of production and processing of the company through the contract system under supervision, instructions, guidance of 36 employees comprising of the driver, technical production staff, office staff, from amongst total of 125 employees working at the said plant is illegal and unjust. As the demand No.2 is raised for violation of section 9(A)of the Act, shifting the machineries, the petitioner Union has raised the demand that the retrenchment or rationalization has adversely affected the workers therefore, it would be brought under item 11 in the fourth schedule. At this stage reference of section 9(A) of the Act is required to be made which is reproduced herein below:- 9A. Notice of change.- No employer, who proposes to effect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule, shall effect such change,- (a)without giving to the workmen likely to be affected by such change a notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected; or(b)within twenty-one days of giving such notice:” 10. The initial case of the petitioner was with regard to the illegal closure which is defined under section 2(ka)of the Act and the illegal retrenchment which is alleged in the amendment application is defined under section 2(oo)of the Act , both the sections are reproduced herein below:- “2. Definitions. (ka)[ "industrial establishment or undertaking" means an establishment or undertaking in which any industry is carried on: (oo)[ "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include -” 10.1. Definitions. (ka)[ "industrial establishment or undertaking" means an establishment or undertaking in which any industry is carried on: (oo)[ "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include -” 10.1. The effect of both the provisions and the procedure for adjudication is all together different. As to establish violation of section 2(oo), the relevant provision would be section 25(F). 25(FF), 25(FFF), however, to establish the violation of illegal closure, the relevant provision would be under Chapter V-B. In the opinion of this Court a dispute arises when the demand is made and not considered by the employer. When such dispute comes into existence appropriate Government may refer it for adjudication to labour court or Tribunal. It will give an award on the dispute so referred which is binding to the parties and learned court cannot go beyond the terms of reference. 11. At this stage, the decision relied by the learned advocates in the case of Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat Versus The Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. & Anr. reported in 1979 3 SCC 762 is required to be referred, wherein, the Apex Court has held as under:- “11. Having heard a closely thought out argument made by Mr. Gupta on behalf of the appellant, we are of the opinion that the High Court is right in its view on the first question. The very terms of the references show that the point of dispute between the parties was not the fact of the closure of its business by the respondent but the propriety and justification of the respondent's decision to close down the business. That is why the references were expressed to say whether the proposed closure of the business was proper and justified. In other words, by the references, the Tribunals were not called upon by the Government to adjudicate upon the question as to whether there was in fact a closure of business or whether under the pretence of closing the business the workers were locked out by the management. In other words, by the references, the Tribunals were not called upon by the Government to adjudicate upon the question as to whether there was in fact a closure of business or whether under the pretence of closing the business the workers were locked out by the management. The references being limited to the narrow question as to whether the closure was proper and justified, the Tribunals by the very terms of the references, had no jurisdiction to go behind the fact of closure and inquire into the question whether the business was in fact closed down by the management. 13. On June 28, 1967, the Managing Director of the respondent sent a reply to the Regional Labour Commissioner dealing with the contentions made by the Union in its letter of June 22,, 1967. The Managing Director contended that no industrial dispute existed or was apprehended and that the Conciliation officer had, therefore, no jurisdiction under the Act to hold any proceedings. In the order dated April 30, 1970, of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur, reference has been made to an affidavit which was filed on behalf of the workers for the purpose of securing an interim award. We have, looked at the affidavit for ourselves and are in agreement with the view expressed by the Tribunal that there is a clear and unequivocal admission on the part of the workers in that affidavit to the effect that the business was in fact closed by the respondent. The High Court has also referred to a statement dated June 16, 1967, in which it was stated on behalf of the workmen that since the establishment had already closed down, there was no necessity for making submissions on the point relating to the reduction in the number of employees and revision of the workload. 16. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the two Tribunals had no jurisdiction to go behind the references and inquire into the question whether the closure of business, which was in fact effected" was decided upon for reasons which were proper and justifiable. The propriety of or justification for the closure of a business, in fact and truly effected, cannot raise an industrial dispute as contemplated by the State and Central Acts. 17. The propriety of or justification for the closure of a business, in fact and truly effected, cannot raise an industrial dispute as contemplated by the State and Central Acts. 17. It is unnecessary to consider the second question as regards the payment of retrenchment compensation and we will, therefore, express no opinion as to whether the Tribunals had jurisdiction to go into that question. Happily, the parties have arrived at a settlement on that question under which, the respondent agrees to fix within a period of six months from today the retrenchment compensation payable to the retrenched workers in accordance with the provisions of section 25FFF of the Central Act, namely, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, without the aid of the proviso to that section. After the retrenchment compensation is so fixed, a copy of the decision fixing the compensation payable to each of the workers will be sent by the respondent to the appellant Union. The workers or their legal representatives, as the case may be, will then be entitled to receive the retrenchment compensation from the respondent, which agrees to pay the same to them. The respondent will be entitled to set off of the amounts of retrenchment compensation already paid to the workers against the amounts found due to them under this settlement. On receiving the retrenchment compensation the workers concerned shall withdraw the applications, if any, filed by them for relief in that behalf.” 11.1. This Court has also referred the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. Versus Union Of India And Others reported in (2006) 12 SCC 233 , wherein, the Apex Court has held as under:- “34. Recently this Court in Baldev Singh and Others etc. v. Manohar Singh & Another etc., held : "15 Let us now take up the last ground on which the application for amendment of the written statement was rejected by the High Court as well as the Trial Court. The rejection was made on the ground that inconsistent plea cannot be allowed to be taken. We are unable to appreciate the ground of rejection made by the High Court as well as the Trial Court. The rejection was made on the ground that inconsistent plea cannot be allowed to be taken. We are unable to appreciate the ground of rejection made by the High Court as well as the Trial Court. After going through the pleadings and also the statements made in the application for amendment of the written statement, we fail to understand how inconsistent plea could be said to have been taken by the appellants in their application for amendment of the written statement, excepting the plea taken by the appellants in the application for amendment of written statement regarding the joint ownership of the suit property. Accordingly, on facts, we are not satisfied that the application for amendment of the written statement could be rejected also on this ground. That apart, it is now well settled that an amendment of a plaint and amendment of a written statement are not necessarily governed by exactly the same principle. It is true that some general principles are certainly common to both, but the rules that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to amend his pleadings so as to alter materially or substitute his cause of action or the nature of his claim has necessarily no counterpart in the law relating to amendment of the written statement. Adding a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence does not raise the same problem as adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action. Accordingly, in the case of amendment of written statement, the courts are inclined to be more liberal in allowing amendment of the written statement than of plaint and question of prejudice is less likely to operate with same rigour in the former than in the latter case." While laying down the principle, this Court followed Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. (supra) and distinguished Hira Lal (supra). 35. It is, thus, evident that by taking recourse to an amendment made in the pleading, the party cannot be permitted to go beyond his admission. The principle would be applied in an industrial adjudication having regard to the nature of the reference made by the Appropriate Government as also in view of the fact that an industrial adjudicator derives his jurisdiction from the reference only.” 11.2. The principle would be applied in an industrial adjudication having regard to the nature of the reference made by the Appropriate Government as also in view of the fact that an industrial adjudicator derives his jurisdiction from the reference only.” 11.2. This Court has also referred the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Regional Manager, SBI Versus Rakesh Kumar Tewari reported in (2006) 1 SCC 530, wherein, the Apex Court has held as under:- “16. In the first appeal, the respondent had raised no allegation of violation of Section 25G in his statement of claim before the Industrial Tribunal. His only case was that Section 25H of the Act had been violated. Section 25H unlike Section 25G deals with a situation where the retrenchment is assumed to have been validly made. In the circumstances, if the employer wishes to re employ any employee, he must offer to employ retrenched workman first and give them preference over others. The two sections viz 25G and 25H therefore operate in different fields and deal with two contradictory fact situations. The Tribunal ignored the fact that there was no pleading by the respondent in support of an alleged violation of Section 25G. Indeed the order of reference by the Central Government did not also refer to Section 25G but only to Section 25H. In the circumstances it was not open to the Tribunal to "fly off at a tangent" and conclude that the termination of service of the respondent was invalid because of any violation of Section 25G by the appellant.” 11.3. If the above ratio would be applied in the present case, then it emerges that the demand of the petitioner Union before the Conciliation Officer was not with regard to the illegal retrenchment, however, it was with regard to the illegal closure and violation of section 9(A) of the Act, demand No.2 was with regard to the shifting of machineries without following the principle laid down in section 9(A) of the Act. 12. In the opinion of this Court, another dispute which arises during the pendency of the reference cannot be decided in absence of a valid reference in respect of fresh industrial dispute. If the dispute, not covered by the terms of reference is sought to be adjudicated, that would amount to expanding the scope of reference. 12. In the opinion of this Court, another dispute which arises during the pendency of the reference cannot be decided in absence of a valid reference in respect of fresh industrial dispute. If the dispute, not covered by the terms of reference is sought to be adjudicated, that would amount to expanding the scope of reference. The learned court cannot allow the parties to change the nature, complexion or the purport of the dispute. It is not open for the court to enlarge the ambit or alter the character of the dispute referred to it by amending the statement of claim. The scope of references cannot be extended either by the court or by the parties by bringing matters which are not subject matter of the reference and which are not incidental to the dispute which has been referred. 13. The argument of the petitioner is that the illegal retrenchment is an incidental question of demand No.2. To test the argument, moot question arise before this Court is that whether, while claiming illegal closure and applicability of the Chapter V-B, illegal retrenchment under section 9(A) of the Act can be said to be incidental? To adjudicate this question, this Court has referred the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India and others Versus Retired L.I.C. Officers Association and others reported in 2008 3 SCC 321 wherein, the Apex Court has held as under:- “20. Method of fixation, eligibility for the benefit of revision and the date from which the revisions shall apply are thus, the only areas within which the Chairman can exercise jurisdiction. The effect of revision of pay scales on other spheres and which are otherwise governed by another statute or other provisions of the said Regulations would not come within the purview thereof. 21. The terminology used "and other matters connected therewith or incidental thereto" must, therefore, be held to have a direct nexus with any one of the aforementioned three elements. The same has nothing to do with the construction of any other provision of the Regulations. The words "incidental to" cannot be interpreted too broadly. It cannot be read independently of the main provision. It cannot serve some other purpose which is not covered by Regulation 51 of the Regulations. The same has nothing to do with the construction of any other provision of the Regulations. The words "incidental to" cannot be interpreted too broadly. It cannot be read independently of the main provision. It cannot serve some other purpose which is not covered by Regulation 51 of the Regulations. It cannot be permitted to encroach upon an area which is not within the jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Corporation. 22. It is one thing to say that the court while exercising its jurisdiction would be entitled to exercise such incidental power for determination of the principal issue but it is another thing to say that a statutory authority in such matters would be held to have such power which is beyond the scope and purport of the principal provisions. 23. The word "Incidental" has been defined in Advanced Law Lexicon 3rd (2005) Edition, Book 2 at 2275 to mean :- "According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, a thing is said to be incidental to another when it appertains to the principal thing. According to the ordinary Dictionary meaning, it signifies a subordinate action. Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd. vs. Labour Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1958 Cal. 68 , 70. (Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1917), S. 10(4)]. The word "incidental" does not imply any casual or fortuitous connection. In a legal sense as applied to powers, it means a power which is subsidiary to that which has been expressed, and of an instrumental nature in relation thereto, which is both necessary and proper for the carrying into execution of the main power which has been expressly conferred. (Dunichand and Co. vs. Narain Das and Co. (1947) 17 Comp. Cas. 195 (FB)." 13.1. This Court has also referred the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Airlines Hotel (Private) Ltd. Bombay Versus Workmen reported in AIR 1962 SC 676 wherein, the Apex Court has held as under:- “1. This appeal by special leave arises out of an industrial dispute between the appellant company, the Airlines Hotel Private Limited, Bombay, which runs hotel business in the city of Bombay and its workmen. The workmen had raised demands in regard to a number of matters including, wages, service charges and provident fund. This appeal by special leave arises out of an industrial dispute between the appellant company, the Airlines Hotel Private Limited, Bombay, which runs hotel business in the city of Bombay and its workmen. The workmen had raised demands in regard to a number of matters including, wages, service charges and provident fund. The demand in the matter of service charges was divided into five heads, one of which was inspection of the company's accounts books, bills and receipt books etc., "to ascertain the correct amount collected by the management and due to the workers." The Government made a reference for adjudication by an industrial tribunal under Section 10 of the Act as regards all the demands, excepting one, viz., the demand for inspection of accounts in connection with the amount of service charges. The Tribunal made as award in favour of the workers as regards the demand on the question of wages and the demand for provident fund. The demand as regards service charges was rejected except that the Tribunal directed all outstanding arrears in respect of what the company admitted to be payable to workers to be paid within one month and that a direction was given for giving access to the workers to the books of account for the purpose of ascertaining the amount collected. The special leave granted by this Court was limited to three points, viz., (1) the matter of inspection of accounts ; (2) the wages ; and (3) the provident fund. With the other portions of the award we are not concerned in this appeal. 2. The appellant's main contention on the first question is that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to give any direction to the appellant to give access to the workers to the account books in view of the fact that the Government had in terms refused to refer the dispute as regards the inspection of accounts. In our opinion, this contention should prevail. 3. On behalf of the workmen it was urged that the only result of the refusal of the Government to refer for adjudication the demand for inspection of accounts was that the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to deal with this matter directly ; but that would not stand in the way of giving such directions as the Tribunal might think necessary as ancillary to its award on any other point in dispute. It is urged that the Tribunal has given this direction not as a decision on a matter which was not referred to it but only as incidental to the dispute as regards service charges that was in fact referred. If the question of inspection of accounts had not at all been raised so that there was no question of refusal to refer the question, there might perhaps be some scope for an argument that the question might have been considered as involved in and incidental to the question of service charges that was referred. That however is not the position here. As has already been pointed out, the workmen had mentioned five different heads of the demand for service charges, one of the heads being for inspection of accounts, in these words: - "The management should place all the account books, bills and receipt books etc., from 1-1-57 onwards and relevant documents of the Airlines Hotel Private Ltd., before the representatives of Bombay Hotels Kamgar Union for inspection to ascertain the correct amount collected by the management and due to the workers." It was this demand which the government refused to refer because "the government was satisfied that there was no case for reference thereof to a tribunal for the reason that this demand was not reasonable." In these circumstances, there can be no justification for the view that what could not be done directly because of this refusal could be done indirectly on the plea that it was incidental. In our opinion, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to give the direction as regards inspection of accounts. That direction must accordingly be set aside. 9. While we think it undesirable to lay it down as an inviolable rule that if the dispute referred is on the question of wage scale ad hoc increases could never be given, there can be no doubt that ordinarily that should be so. On the facts of the present case there are no circumstances which would justify a departure from this ordinary rule. Demands which raised the dispute being for a wage scale and that being the dispute referred in terms the Tribunal could either grant the wage scale demanded in part or in whole or refuse the demand altogether. It was not justified in giving ad hoc increases in the manner as has been done here.” 13.2. Demands which raised the dispute being for a wage scale and that being the dispute referred in terms the Tribunal could either grant the wage scale demanded in part or in whole or refuse the demand altogether. It was not justified in giving ad hoc increases in the manner as has been done here.” 13.2. This Court has referred the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Oshiar Prasad and Others Versus Employers In Relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal, Washery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, Jharkhand reported in (2015) 4 SCC 71 wherein, the Apex Court has held as under:- 17. Before we examine the factual matrix of the case in hand, we consider it apposite to take note of law laid down by this Court regarding the powers of the appropriate Government in making reference under Section 10 of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal while answering the reference. Indeed it is well settled and remains no more res integra. 18. One of the questions which fell for consideration by this Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen and Others ( AIR 1967 SC 469 ) was that what are the powers of the appropriate Government while making a reference and the scope and jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. 19. Justice Mitter, speaking for the Bench, held as under: "(8) ......Under S. 10(1)(d) of the Act, it is open to the appropriate Government when it is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists to make an order in writing referring "the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to the dispute,.....to a Tribunal for adjudication" under s. 10(4) "where in an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto." (9) From the above it therefore appears that while it is open to the appropriate Government to refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected therewith for adjudication, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication to the points of dispute referred and matters incidental thereto. In other words, the Tribunal is not free to enlarge the scope of the dispute referred to it but must confine its attention to the points specifically mentioned and anything which is incidental thereto. The word 'incidental' means according to Webster's New World Dictionary : "happening or likely to happen as a result of or in connection with something more important; being an incident; casual; hence, secondary or minor, but usually associated :" "Something incidental to a dispute" must therefore mean something happening as a result of or in connection with the dispute or associated with the dispute. The dispute is the fundamental thing while something incidental thereto is an adjunct to it. Something incidental, therefore, cannot cut at the root of the main thing to which it is an adjunct to it....."” 13.3. This Court has also referred the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Firestone Tyre And Rubber Company of India (P0 Ltd. Versus Workmen Employed, Represented by Firestone Tyre Employees’ Union reported in (1981) 3 SCC 451 , wherein, the Apex Court has held as under:- “9. In this case the points of dispute were specified in the schedule to the order of reference, and the Tribunal was therefore required to confine its adjudication to those points and matters that were incidental to them. From a reading of demands 1(A) and 1(B) as a whole it is clear that the demand for reinstatement in respect of both groups of workmen as made arises on the alleged invalidity of the action taken by the management in dismissing these workmen. The issue of unfair labour practice or discrimination by reason of subsequent reinstatement on a permanent basis of some and not all the 25 workmen was not a matter referred to the Tribunal for adjudication, nor it can be said to be in any way connected with or incidental to the right of reinstatement claimed by the 101 workmen from the date of their dismissal. The fairness of subsequent absorption of some workmen is a matter quite irrelevant for judging the validity of the earlier dismissal of these workmen along with others; it is an entirely separate and independent question. The Tribunal also did not frame an issue on the alleged discrimination. That being so, we think the Tribunal travelled outside its jurisdiction in recording a finding of unfair labour practice and discrimination.” 13.4. The Tribunal also did not frame an issue on the alleged discrimination. That being so, we think the Tribunal travelled outside its jurisdiction in recording a finding of unfair labour practice and discrimination.” 13.4. On referring the above decision, this Court is of the view that the learned Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain a claim in respect of the demand raised under section 10(4) of the Act that confines to those points of disputes which have been specified in order of reference by the appropriate Government. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate only on the points of dispute as specified and incidental matters, it has no other jurisdiction, the matter which requires independent consideration or treatment and have there own importance cannot be considered “Incidental”. Referring the dictionary, meaning of the word incidental means, “something happening has resulted, of or in connection with the dispute or associated with the dispute”. The dispute is the fundamental thing which something incidental thereto is an adjunct. Something incidental, therefore, cannot cut at the root of the main thing to which it is adjunct. Whether a matter is incidental or not would depend on how and under what circumstances the question arises in the context of the dispute referred for adjudication. The matter which is independent in one context may become subsidiary in another matter in a different context. A different result would follow in the instant case where the point in the order of reference is in respect of the person who were retrenched a short time before closure. The question before the learned tribunal for adjudicating was whether the provision of Chapter V-B was followed before closing the Unit and whether section 9(A) of the Act was complied with before shifting the machinery. The illegal retrenchment is independent question and same is not incidental to the main question which was raised for illegal closure. 13.5. If one would refer the pleading and the prayer made in the statement of claim, then it emerges that it was never the case of the petitioner for illegal retrenchment neither section 9(A) of the Act was referred in context of illegal retrenchment. Pleadings by the employee limits the issue which is to be determined by the learned tribunal. Though labour courts, are not courts in the strict sense of the terms, they have to discharge quasi judicial functions. Pleadings by the employee limits the issue which is to be determined by the learned tribunal. Though labour courts, are not courts in the strict sense of the terms, they have to discharge quasi judicial functions. Once a reference is made by the Government, the Tribunal has to take pleadings of the parties in writing and to draw issues, to ascertain the real dispute between the parties, narrow area of conflict and to see where the two sides differ. It is not open to the Tribunal to fly off at a tangent and disregard the pleadings, to reach to any conclusion that they think are just and proper ignoring the real questions that arise for decision and the issues that arise out of pleadings of parties. In the opinion of this Court, petitioner Union, by filing the amendment application below Exh.33 is trying to change the nature of dispute and is seeking to achieve something indirectly which is not permissible directly by expanding the scope of reference. The contention of learned advocate of the petitioner that when this Court has permitted to produce certain documents, the amendment is necessary to determine the real dispute, is not correct as the amendment was permitted by this Court in the opinion of this Court is only to ascertain the applicability of Chapter V-B wherein, the strength of the workmen is required more than 100. 14. In that background also, in considered opinion of this Court no error has been committed by the learned Tribunal in rejecting the application for amendment filed below Exh.33, hence this petition being devoid of any merits is required to be dismissed. 15. Resultatnly this petition is dismissed. 16. Rule is discharged.