JUDGMENT : (M.G.S. KAMAL, J.) 1. This Regular Second Appeal is filed by the plaintiff, aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 7 th August 2015, passed in R.A. No.76/2013 by the Senior Civil Judge, Honavar (for short “the First Appellate Court”), by which the First Appellate Court while partly allowing the said appeal filed by the defendant No.5, set aside the judgment and decree dated 30 th September 2013, passed in O.S. No.109/2012 by the Principal Civil Judge, Bhatkal (for short “the trial Court”), in respect of suit “A” schedule property and held that the plaintiff is not entitled to a share in the schedule “A” property. It further held that the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 10 are entitled for 1/11 th share each in the suit “B” schedule property. 2. The above suit in O.S. No.109/2012 was filed by the plaintiff seeking partition and separate possession of two items of landed properties namely; (i) land in Sy.No.70A4 measuring 30 guntas (“A” Schedule property) and (ii) land in Sy.No.70A measuring 16 acres 13 guntas (“B” Schedule property) both situated at Hadin village, Bhatkal taluk, claiming 1/11 th share and to hold that the Will dated 13.10.2008, executed by his late father Nagappa Durgappa @ Durgayya Naik in favour of defendant No.5, is not binding on him. 3. The case of the plaintiff is that defendant No.1 is the mother of the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 to 10. The suit schedule properties were originally granted by the Government in favour of one Nagappa Durgappa @ Durgayya Naik, who was the father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 to 10. The schedule “A” property was granted subject to certain conditions, one of which was that the land shall not be alienated at any point of time by any mode and in any form and that after the death of the grantee it shall be devolved upon the legal heirs of the grantee. That though the schedule “B” property consisting of a residential house was granted in favour of late father of the plaintiff in terms of grant order dated 02.02.1981, the revenue records were not mutated in his name. 4. That the father of the plaintiff was addicted to bad voices and was not in sound mind of dispossession. That though the schedule “B” property consisting of a residential house was granted in favour of late father of the plaintiff in terms of grant order dated 02.02.1981, the revenue records were not mutated in his name. 4. That the father of the plaintiff was addicted to bad voices and was not in sound mind of dispossession. Defendant No.5 taking advantage of the same, had obtained a Will dated 30.10.2008 executed in his favour in respect of schedule “A” property in gross violation of the terms of the grant. The father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 to 10 was not having right to execute and bequeath the schedule “A” property. As such defendant No.5 cannot derive any right, title and interest over the same. However, in collusion with the village officers, defendant No.5 has obtained transfer of Khata in his name in respect of schedule “A” and “B” properties. Hence, the suit. 5. The written statement is filed by defendant No.5 denying the plaint averments and claimed that the house situated in the schedule “B” property was his absolute property. He contended that father had executed the Will out of his free Will in the presence of two witnesses before the Sub-Registrar and the same was valid and binding. Defendant No.5 is one of the legal heirs, as such the execution of Will in his favour conveying schedule ”A” property was not in violation of grant condition No.3. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit. 6. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the suit schedule properties are the joint family properties of the plaintiff and defendants? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the Willnama executed by the father of the plaintiff late Nagappa Durgappa @ Durgayya naik registered in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, HOnnavar in document No.56 of 2008-09, dated 13.10.2008 is not binding on him? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of partition and separate possession? If yes to what share the plaintiff is entitled? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought for? 5. What order or decree? 7. The plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and produced 8 documents, marked as Exs.P1 to P8. Defendant No.5 examined himself as DW1 and also examined two witnesses as DW2 and DW3 and produced 8 documents, marked as Exs.D1 to D8. 8. 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought for? 5. What order or decree? 7. The plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and produced 8 documents, marked as Exs.P1 to P8. Defendant No.5 examined himself as DW1 and also examined two witnesses as DW2 and DW3 and produced 8 documents, marked as Exs.D1 to D8. 8. The trial Court answered issue Nos.1 to 4 in the affirmative. Consequently, the trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated 30.09.2009, held that execution of Will was in violation of the terms of the grant and consequently granted 1/11 th share to all the parties in both schedule “A” and “B” properties. 9. Aggrieved by the above, defendant No.5 preferred an appeal in R.A. No.76/2013, contending that the trial Court had erred in holding that the Will executed by the deceased father of the parties bequeathing the schedule “A” property in favour of defendant No.5 was not binding. 10. The First Appellate Court framed the following points for its consideration. 1. Whether bequest by Will amounts to transfer during the life time of testator? 2. Whether grant condition No.3 in respect of “A” schedule property is bar for execution of the Will in respect of the said property by the grantee? 3. Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court is illegal, unjust and not sustainable? 4. Whether interference is required in the judgment and decree of the trial Court? 5. What order and decree? 11. On re-appreciation of the evidence and the position of law, the First Appellate Court answered point Nos.1 and 2 in the negative and point Nos.3 and 4 in the affirmative. The First Appellate Court by its judgment and decree, partly allowed the appeal setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court to the extent of the schedule “A” property and granting share only in the schedule “B” property. Being aggrieved, the present Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, taking this Court through Ex.P3, the grant order dated 07.09.1998 and specifically referring to condition No.3, vehemently submitted that the execution of the Will bequeathing the Will dated 13.10.2008 at Ex.D1 in favour of defendant No.5 was in violation of the terms of the grant. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, taking this Court through Ex.P3, the grant order dated 07.09.1998 and specifically referring to condition No.3, vehemently submitted that the execution of the Will bequeathing the Will dated 13.10.2008 at Ex.D1 in favour of defendant No.5 was in violation of the terms of the grant. It is contended that the trial Court had rightly appreciated this aspect of the matter and as such the First Appellate Court ought not to have reversed the same. He further submits that there is no prohibition under the law against the imposition of such a condition. With regard to the finding of the First Appellate Court that a Will does not amount to alienation, learned counsel for the appellant / plaintiff submits that the case of the appellant stands on a different footing. He contends that though a Will may not constitute alienation, as contemplated under law, and the latter part of the condition stating that the land granted shall devolve upon the natural heirs, implies that even disposition by way of Will is impermissible as the same override the specific condition. Hence he submits that a substantial question of law arises in the matter requiring consideration by this Court. 13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for defendant No.5 submitted that the condition imposed in Ex.P3 is contrary to the provisions of the Land Grant Rules, inasmuch as there is no provision under the said Rules providing for imposition of such a condition. Alternatively, he submits that, in any event, the execution of a Will does not amount to alienation of the property. Therefore, the First Appellate Court was justified in partly allowing the appeal and granting exclusive right over the schedule “A” property to defendant No.5. Accordingly, he prays for dismissal of the appeal. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents refers to Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 as well as Form 5(C) under Rule 28(1) of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 , to submit that these provisions do not authorise the imposition of a condition as the one found in Ex.P3. 15. In response, learned counsel for the appellant submits that Rule 9 was inserted by way of an amendment in the year 2005, whereas the grant in question was made in the year 1998. Therefore, the said condition is not applicable to the present case. 16. Heard. Perused the records. 15. In response, learned counsel for the appellant submits that Rule 9 was inserted by way of an amendment in the year 2005, whereas the grant in question was made in the year 1998. Therefore, the said condition is not applicable to the present case. 16. Heard. Perused the records. 17. The relationship between the parties and the properties originally belonging to Nagappa Durgappa Naik the father of plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 to 10 is not in dispute. Execution of the Will dated 13.10.2008 by said Nagappa Durgappa Naik in favour of defendant No.5 bequeathing schedule “A” property is also not in dispute. 18. Ex.P3 is the grant order dated 07.09.1998, by which schedule “A” property was granted in favour of the deceased Nagappa Durgappa @ Durgayya Naik, who was the father of the plaintiff and other defendants, and the husband of defendant No.1. 19. Condition No.3 which is the subject matter of dispute, reads as under: 20. The only issue raised pertains to the interpretation of the aforesaid condition No.3 imposed in Ex.P3. It is now well settled by the judgment of this Court and of the Apex Court that as bequest under a Will does not amount to transfer of property. It is also well settled bequest by way of Will in favour of family member is not prohibited under Section 61(1) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The First Appellate court in paragraph Nos.18 to 28 of its judgment has referred to these precedents. Thus, it is now clear that there is no dispute that the prohibition against alienation under the Land Grant Rules does not extend to the execution of a Will. In other words, bequeathing the granted property by way of a Will does not amount to a transfer as contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the execution of a Will cannot, under any circumstances, be construed as alienation in violation of the grant conditions. 21. Even the learned counsel for the appellant / plaintiff does not dispute the aforesaid proposition of law. However, his vehement submission is with regard to second part of the condition No.3 extracted hereinabove. 22. The second part of the condition, which is emphasised by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that the land shall devolve / inherited by the natural hairs of the grantee after his demise. However, his vehement submission is with regard to second part of the condition No.3 extracted hereinabove. 22. The second part of the condition, which is emphasised by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that the land shall devolve / inherited by the natural hairs of the grantee after his demise. There is no dispute that defendant No.5 is a natural hair being one amongst the ten children of the grantee. He is neither a stranger nor a third party. Merely because the grantee, through a Will, choose defendant No.5 to inherit the entire property to the exclusion of the other natural hairs, it cannot be said that the terms of the grant have been violated particularly when the execution of Will is admitted as well as proved. 23. Even assuming that the condition imposed requires to devolution of the property granted upon the natural heirs after the demise of the grantee, the same stands substantially complied with under the terms of the Will. 24. In view of the above, there is no substance in the contention and the grounds urged in this appeal. Both the trial Court and the First Appellate Court have held due execution of the Will in question. As such no substantial question of law arises for consideration. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 25. Pending applications, if any, do not survive for consideration and are accordingly disposed of.