ORDER : AMIT SETH, J. The instant writ petition takes exception to the resolution dated 14.04.2023 (Annexure-P/11) passed by the Gram Panchayat Mohanpura, Janpad Panchayat Seondha, District Datia (M.P.). The petition also challenges the order dated 10.04.2023 (Annexure-P/15) passed by the respondent No.3, whereby, on the representation/resolution of the Gram Panchayat, the earlier order dated 16.02.2023 passed by respondent No.3, appointing the petitioner as Pujari of the temple Shri Bhagwan Shankar Va Vankhandeshwar Ji, Gram Mohanpura and Teda Mandir, Tehsil Seondha, has been recalled and cancelled. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that pursuant to the application (Annexure-P/1) dated 17.04.2023 submitted by the petitioner, and on receiving the report from the Patwari (Annexure-P/2), and on being satisfied that the petitioner was eligible to be appointed as Pujari of the temple in question, the respondent No.3 passed an order dated 16.02.2023, whereby the petitioner was appointed as a Pujari of the temple in question. Counsel for the petitioner submits that though the Gram Panchayat has absolutely no authority to make any recommendation in respect of the appointment of a Pujari, yet the impugned resolution dated 14.04.2023 was passed, wherein it was resolved that the petitioner had succeeded in getting himself appointed as a Pujari of the temple in question by misrepresenting facts and by incorrectly claiming to be a resident of village, whereas he is actually a resident of Alampur, District Bhind. It is on this recommendation/resolution, without following the principles of natural justice and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, respondent No.3 has passed the order dated 10.04.2023, thereby cancelling/recalling the appointment order of the petitioner dated 16.02.2023. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 10.04.2023 passed by respondent No.3 is patently without jurisdiction, inasmuch as he has no authority to act upon the resolution of the Gram Panchayat, which, according to the petitioner, is itself without any authority. That apart, learned counsel further submits that the procedure as contemplated under the circular dated 04.02.2019 has not been followed prior to passing of the impugned order. Accordingly, learned counsel prays for quashment of the orders impugned along with other reliefs as stated in paragraph 7 of the petition. 4. That apart, learned counsel further submits that the procedure as contemplated under the circular dated 04.02.2019 has not been followed prior to passing of the impugned order. Accordingly, learned counsel prays for quashment of the orders impugned along with other reliefs as stated in paragraph 7 of the petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the State as well as other respondents oppose the reliefs claimed by the petitioner and submit that the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition without availing the alternative remedy of appeal as provided under the circular itself. Furthermore, it is contended that the temple in question is not managed by the State Government but is managed by the funds collected by the villagers of the Gram Panchayat. Therefore, in the first instance, the appointment of the petitioner under the circular (Annexure-R/2) was itself not proper, as the said circular is applicable only to such temples which are managed by the State. It is further submitted that the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), while passing the impugned order dated 10.04.2023, recorded a specific reason/finding that the petitioner had not only misrepresented facts, but the temple in question is not managed by the State Government, which is one of the basic reason for passing of the order impugned. However, nothing has been filed/pleaded by the petitioner to controvert the said finding. Once the authority records a reason that the temple is not managed by the State Government, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to challenge the said reasoning, which he has not done and therefore, he is not entitled for any relief. 5. No other point has been pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7 . The submission made on behalf of counsel appearing for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 10.04.2023 passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer, Seondha, cancelling the earlier order dated 16.02.2023, whereby the petitioner was appointed as Pujari of the temple being without jurisdiction deserves to be stated to be rejected, as it is the settled proposition of law that power to grant includes power to recall/cancel. Admittedly, the order dated 16.02.2023 was passed by the respondent No.3; therefore, he is fully competent to pass an order cancelling the same. 8 . Admittedly, the order dated 16.02.2023 was passed by the respondent No.3; therefore, he is fully competent to pass an order cancelling the same. 8 . The crucial issue arising for consideration in the present writ petition is as to whether, the circular dated 04.02.2019 (Annexure-R/2) issued by the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Adhyatma Vibhaag, could have been invoked to grant appointment to the petitioner as the Pujari of the temple in question or not. The bare perusal of the circular dated 04.02.2019 itself reveals that the same deals with the procedure of appointment, duties, rights and termination of the Pujari in respect of such temples which are managed by the State Government. In the instant case, the report of the Patwari (Annexure-P/15) specifically states that the temple in question though situated on govt. land but is not a maafi temple and its management is not vested with the Collector. 9 . Memo dated 05.02.2019 placed on record by the official respondents along with the reply contains the "Shaskiya Devisthan Prabandh Samiti Niyam 2019" and the same defines the " Temple Religious Sansthan" to be such sansthan temple, math etc. which are in direct control of the State or which receive honorarium or grant from State. In the instant case, there is absolutely no material on record to show that except for the temple being situated on govt. land, it is in direct control of State or is in receipt of any grant or honorarium from the State. 10. In view whereof, the application filed by the petitioner before the respondent No.3 seeking his appointment as a Pujari of the temple in question was itself misconceived. Further, the perusal of the proceedings drawn by the respondent No.3 dated 06.02.2023 (Annexure-P/5) specifically reveals that respondent No.3 proceeded to pass the order of appointment of petitioner as Pujari of the temple in question on the strength of the circular dated 04.02.2019, which itself is not applicable on the temple in question. Thus, the appointment of the petitioner as Pujari by the respondent No.3 for the temple in question was itself void ab initio. 11. It is a settled proposition of law that no order adversely affecting the civil rights of a person cannot be passed by an authority without affording an opportunity of hearing. Thus, the appointment of the petitioner as Pujari by the respondent No.3 for the temple in question was itself void ab initio. 11. It is a settled proposition of law that no order adversely affecting the civil rights of a person cannot be passed by an authority without affording an opportunity of hearing. However, it is equally well settled that the compliances of principles of natural justice cannot be invoked as an empty formality. Unless and until, it is established that any prejudice has been caused to the person concerned by not affording an opportunity of hearing. 12. In the instant case, the report of Patwari (Annexure-P/15) so also the impugned order dated 10.04.2023 categorically states that the temple in question is not a maafi temple but a temple maintained by the villagers being a collective private temple. However, there is absolutely no pleading in the instant writ petition that the aforesaid reason/finding of the authorities is factually incorrect and the temple in question is in fact being managed by the State. No document whatsoever to rebut the said finding/reason has been placed on record by the petitioner. 13. The petitioner is required to point out the prejudice caused to him by non-affording of opportunity of hearing as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Nirma Industries Limited and another Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India reported in (2013) 8 SCC 20 has held as under: “30. In B. Karunakar, having defined the meaning of “civil consequences”, this Court reiterated the principle that the Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished to the employee. It is only if the Court or Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. In other words, the Court reiterated that the person challenging the order on the basis that it is causing civil consequences would have to prove the prejudice that has been caused by the non-grant of opportunity of hearing. In the present case, we must hasten to add that, in the letter dated 4-5-2006, the appellants have not made a request for being granted an opportunity of personal hearing. In the present case, we must hasten to add that, in the letter dated 4-5-2006, the appellants have not made a request for being granted an opportunity of personal hearing. Therefore, the ground with regard to the breach of rules of natural justice clearly seems to be an afterthought." 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, State Bank of India and another Vs. M.J.James reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301 has held as under :- “31. In State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh referring to the aforesaid cases and several other decisions of this Court, the law was crystallised as under : (SCC para 42) “42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals: 42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused. 42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest. 42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice. 42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person. 42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person. 42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.” 15. The Supreme Court in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and others reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 has held as under:- “20. Natural justice is an expression of English Common Law. Natural justice is not a single theory—it is a family of views. In one sense administering justice itself is treated as natural virtue and, therefore, a part of natural justice. It is also called “naturalist” approach to the phrase “natural justice” and is related to “moral naturalism”. Moral naturalism captures the essence of commonsense morality—that good and evil, right and wrong, are the real features of the natural world that human reason can comprehend. In this sense, it may comprehend virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence in relation to justice as all these are attributes of natural justice. We are not addressing ourselves with this connotation of natural justice here. 21. In Common Law, the concept and doctrine of natural justice, particularly which is made applicable in the decision-making by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, has assumed a different connotation. It is developed with this fundamental in mind that those whose duty is to decide, must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred both without bias and they must give (sic an opportunity) to each of the parties to adequately present the case made. It is perceived that the practice of aforesaid attributes in mind only would lead to doing justice. Since these attributes are treated as natural or fundamental, it is known as “natural justice”. The principles of natural justice developed over a period of time and which is still in vogue and valid even today are : (i) rule against bias i.e. nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa; and (ii) opportunity of being heard to the party concerned i.e. audi alteram partem. These are known as principles of natural justice. The principles of natural justice developed over a period of time and which is still in vogue and valid even today are : (i) rule against bias i.e. nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa; and (ii) opportunity of being heard to the party concerned i.e. audi alteram partem. These are known as principles of natural justice. To these principles a third principle is added, which is of recent origin. It is the duty to give reasons in support of decision, namely, passing of a “reasoned order”. * * 38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as a necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post- decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on. * * 40. In this behalf, we need to notice one other exception which has been carved out to the aforesaid principle by the courts. Further, the courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on. * * 40. In this behalf, we need to notice one other exception which has been carved out to the aforesaid principle by the courts. Even if it is found by the court that there is a violation of principles of natural justice, the courts have held that it may not be necessary to strike down the action and refer the matter back to the authorities to take fresh decision after complying with the procedural requirement in those cases where non-grant of hearing has not caused any prejudice to the person against whom the action is taken. Therefore, every violation of a facet of natural justice may not lead to the conclusion that the order passed is always null and void. The validity of the order has to be decided on the touchstone of “prejudice”. The ultimate test is always the same viz. the test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing. 41. In ECIL, the majority opinion, penned down by Sawant, J., while summing up the discussion and answering the various questions posed, had to say as under qua the prejudice principle : (SCC pp. 756-58, para 30). “30. Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows: * (v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an ‘unnatural expansion of natural justice’ which in itself is antithetical to justice.” * * * * 44. At the same time, it cannot be denied that as far as courts are concerned, they are empowered to consider as to whether any purpose would be served in remanding the case keeping in mind whether any prejudice is caused to the person against whom the action is taken. This was so clarified in ECIL itself in the following words : (SCC p. 758, para 31) “31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer’s report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the court/tribunal and given the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment.” 16. The Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank and others v. Debasis Das and others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557 has held as under:- “22. What is known as “useless formality theory” has received consideration of this Court in M.C.Mehta v. Union of India. It was observed as under : (SCC pp. 245-47, paras 22-23) “22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of ‘real substance’ or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed see Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University, Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates’ Court, ex p Fannaran (Admn LR at p. 358) [see de Smith, Suppl. p. 89 (1998)] where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be ‘demonstrable beyond doubt’ that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. p. 89 (1998)] where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be ‘demonstrable beyond doubt’ that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is ‘real likelihood — not certainty — of prejudice’. On the other hand, Garner’s Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp. 271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin, Megarry, J. in John v. Rees stating that there are always ‘open and shut cases’ and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not consider. Ackner, J. has said that the ‘useless formality theory’ is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that ‘convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms’. More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the ‘useless formality theory’ in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton by giving six reasons. (See also his article ‘Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?’ 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the ‘useless formality theory’ has been made much earlier in ‘Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow’ by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch and Glynn were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a ‘real likelihood’ of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their ‘discretion’, refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived. 23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the ‘useless formality’ theory and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as in the case before us, ‘admitted and indisputable’ facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, J.” 17. 23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the ‘useless formality’ theory and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as in the case before us, ‘admitted and indisputable’ facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, J.” 17. Thus, even if the impugned order dated 10.04.2023 has been passed by the respondent No.3 without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, however, in the absence of any prejudice being caused to the petitioner by non-affording an opportunity of hearing in the wake of admitted fact that the temple in question is not managed by the State Government but being a private temple of the villagers, no useful purpose would be served by remanding the matter to respondent No.3 for reconsideration and the same would be nothing but empty formality. 18. The petitioner has failed to establish the fact that the temple in question is managed by the State Government or is in receipt of any honorarium or grant from the State government in term of circular dated 05.02.2019 so as to enable him to seek appointment by SDO under the policy (Annexure-R/2). Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that no right accrued in favour of the petitioner by passing of the order dated 16.02.2023 by the respondent No.3, as in the first instance, the petitioner could not have been appointed by the respondent No.3, and therefore, if such an order is cancelled, no illegality could be found in the same. 19. Taking overall view in the matter, this Court does not deem it appropriate to cause any further interference in the matter. The petition, being bereft of merits, is hereby dismissed.