1. Heard Shri Manish Goyal alongwith Shri Rakesh Ranjan Agrawal, both learned Senior Advocates, assisted by Shri Suyash Agarwal and Shri Nitin Kumar Kesarwani for the applicant in review and Shri Ashish Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondent-Income Tax Department. 2 . The instant application under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short ‘the Code’) on behalf of assessee seeks review of the final judgement and order dated 16.05.2014 whereby this Court had Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Kanpur vs. Shri Umang Agarwal, Allahabad] setting aside the order dated 26.05.2006 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad in ITR No.464/ALLd./05 for the block period w.e.f. 01.04.1996 to 04.09.2002 and remanded the matter to the Tribunal with certain observations. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT-ASSESSEE 3. Shri Manish Goyal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant/assessee submits that there is an error apparent on the face of the record, inasmuch as, this Court has neither answered the substantial question of law, on which, the appeal had been admitted on 15.05.2012 nor has it dealt with significant factual aspects of the matter. Submission is that the assessee had paid advance tax of Rs.5,71,000/- on 14.03.2002, a search operation was conducted by the Department on 04.09.2002 wherein account books and other documents of the applicant were seized. According to him, 31.10.2002 was the due date for filing return for the Financial Year 2001-2002, (Assessment Year 2002-2003), however, since the account books were seized by the Department prior to the said due date and the seized materials and books were received from the Department on 05.07.2004, the applicant filed return under Section 143 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short ‘the Act’) on 01.09.2004 after obtaining audit report, whereafter block assessment order was passed on 30.09.2004; regular assessment order was passed on 29.03.2006 which was assailed before the CIT (Central) Kanpur on 16.08.2005 by way of appeal. The appeal was allowed in favour of the applicant/assessee on 26.06.2006 holding that provisions of Section 158 -BB(1)(ca) would apply in favour of the assessee. The appeal was allowed in favour of the applicant/assessee on 26.06.2006 holding that provisions of Section 158 -BB(1)(ca) would apply in favour of the assessee. Shri Goyal further submits that this Court, while passing the order under review, has grossly erred in ignoring the vital aspect of the matter that the inability on the part of the assessee to file return before the due date was seizure of the books of accounts and other materials prior to the arriving of the said date and the documents having been released on 05.07.2004, this Court wrongly held the ITR filed on 01.09.2004 as non-est. Submission is that had this Court taken into consideration the aforesaid aspect, as emphatically pressed through written arguments submitted after the judgement was reserved in the appeal, the order would have been in favour of the assessee and not against him. In support of submission that this Court is competent to correct errors to prevent miscarriage of justice and should not hesitate in reviewing its own order when the interest of justice so demands in appropriate cases, reliance has been placed on the following authorities:- (i). Rajendra Singh vs. Lt. Governor, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and others, (2005) 13 SCC 289 ; (ii). Board of Control for Cricket in India and another vs. Netaji Cricket Club and others, (2005) 4 SCC 741 . SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF I.T. DEPARTMENT 4. Per contra, Shri Ashish Agrawal, learned counsel for the Department submits that the instant review application is not maintainable inasmuch as, this Court passed a well-reasoned order and under the garb of review, the applicant is expecting this Court to sit in appeal over its own decision. On merits of the contention advanced as regards applicability of one or the other provision or other factual aspects, learned counsel submits that the Assessing Officer had made assessment for block period w.e.f. 01.04.1996 to 04.09.2002 by his order dated 30.09.2004, categorically recording that seized materials were handed over by Investigating Wing, Allahabad and on 09.09.2003, whereafter, by an order dated 05.12.2003, assessee was called upon to inspect the seized material and obtain photocopy thereof. The assessment order further records that inspection and photocopying work was carried out w.e.f. 31.12.2003 to 28.05.2004, print outs of CPUs and floppies seized were carried out in the presence of the assessee’s authorized representative and two witnesses, a notice under Section 158-BC was issued to the assessee on 08.06.2004 requiring him to prepare a true and correct return of his total income in the prescribed form and to deliver the same in the Department’s Office within twenty days; such notice was served upon assessee on 09.06.2004; the assessee requested for extension of time for filing return, which extension was granted to him upto 45 th day i.e. 24.07.2004, however, no return was filed by that date. Shri Agrawal further submits that the assessee was not co-operative in the proceedings and had taken much time in inspection and photocopying work, which continued for about five months. By referring to the computations made by the Assessing officer in his order dated 30.09.2004, it is urged that in the Assessment Year 2002-2003, total income of the assessee was shown as Rs.1,08,03,703/-, his disclosed income being Rs.53,27,810/- and undisclosed income Rs. 54,75,893/- and, accordingly, the block assessment was done in accordance with law. Referring to the order dated 16.08.2005 passed under Section 263 of the Act, it is urged that CIT (Central) Kanpur found the return under Section 139 as non-est and the assessment order dated 30.09.2004 was set aside on a limited issue of redetermination of the undisclosed income for the Assessment Year 2002-2003. Submission is that the said order was set aside by this Court after considering the entire facts of the case and, since, this Court had remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal, review of the order is not a remedy and, in case, the assessee was aggrieved by the order sought to be reviewed, he should have filed an appeal. On the scope of review, learned counsel for the Department has placed reliance on the following authorities:- (i) S. Murali Sundaram vs. Jothibai Kannan and others, (2023) 13 SCC 515 ; (ii). Pancham Lal Pandey vs. Neeraj Kumar Mishra and others, AIR 2023 (SC) 948 ; (iii). M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. vs. Commissioner Trade Tax, Lucknow, 2024 (6) ADJ 248 ; (iv). M/s. M.M.I. Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. And another vs. Iftikhar Alam, 2024 (5) ADJ 708 . SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT-ASSESSEE IN REJOINDER 5. Pancham Lal Pandey vs. Neeraj Kumar Mishra and others, AIR 2023 (SC) 948 ; (iii). M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. vs. Commissioner Trade Tax, Lucknow, 2024 (6) ADJ 248 ; (iv). M/s. M.M.I. Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. And another vs. Iftikhar Alam, 2024 (5) ADJ 708 . SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT-ASSESSEE IN REJOINDER 5. As far as remedy of appeal is concerned, Shri Goyal submits that as per Section 114 and Order XVLII Rule 1 of the Code, review lies when an appeal lies but has not been preferred or when no appeal lies. Submission is that since, against final order of this Court in appeal, no appeal is provided under the Act before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it is only by way of grant of special leave to file appeal that an appeal can be entertained by the Supreme Court, it is a case where no statutory appeal lies and, hence, the review of the order was rightly sought. He, otherwise, submits that the applicant has been taxed twice in the matter, i.e. he has been made liable to pay tax in regular assessment proceedings as well as for block assessment and since this Court, in the order sought to be reviewed, had held the ITR filed under Section 139 of the IT Act as “non-est”, when the order of remand passed by this Court was given effect to, the Appellate Tribunal has, by order dated 25.08.2014, dismissed the appeal by observing that since the High Court has already held the ITR as non-est, it would be treated as non-est. Submission is that challenging the subsequent order dated 25.08.2014, the applicant-assessee has filed Income Tax Appeal No.86 of 2015 (connected with this review application) and, therefore, not only the order dated 16.05.2014 is required to be reviewed and set aside but also the consequential order dated 25.08.2014 passed by the Appellate Tribunal and the connected appeal be also allowed. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 6. First of all, we would like to narrate the scope of review application as per Order XVLII Rule 1 of the Code. The said provision finds place in procedural part of the Code and as far as substantive part thereof is concerned, Section 114 is the relevant provision. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 6. First of all, we would like to narrate the scope of review application as per Order XVLII Rule 1 of the Code. The said provision finds place in procedural part of the Code and as far as substantive part thereof is concerned, Section 114 is the relevant provision. Even if we accept the submission of Shri Goyal that appeal against order of the Appellate Court is entertained by Hon’ble Supreme Court only after special leave is granted by the Apex Court and, hence, as a matter of course, no statutory appeal is provided under the Act before the Supreme Court, irrespective of maintainability of review application for any reason whatsoever, including non- availability of remedy of statutory appeal, such application has to be considered as per the contours of Rule 1 of Order XVLII of the Code. The said Rule clearly provides that review can be sought on discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was passed or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. 7. The Supreme Court, in S. Murali Sundaram (supra), after placing reliance on Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra (2019) 20 SCC 753 , observed that while exercising the review jurisdiction in an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC , the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its own order; a rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law; review is not appeal in disguise; power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view; such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power; it is wholly unjustified and exhibits a tendency to rewrite a judgment by which the controversy has been finally decided. It was summed up as under: “(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC . (ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. It was summed up as under: “(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC . (ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions. (iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. (iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. (v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit.” 8. In Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. vs. Assam SEB (2020) 2 SCC 677 , it was held that scope of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC read with Section 114 CPC is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-agitate and reargue questions which have already been addressed and decided; that an error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC . 9. In Pancham Lal Pandey (supra), the Supreme Court observed that the provision of review is not to scrutinize the correctness of the decision rendered rather to correct the error, if any, which is visible on the face of the order / record without going into as to whether there is a possibility of another opinion different from the one expressed. In M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. (supra) , reliance was placed by this Court on Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Pishak Sharma reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court propounded that review power and appellate power are inherently distinct. While the appellate power enables the courts to rectify all manners of errors in the judgment or order under challenge, review power does not. While the appellate power enables the courts to rectify all manners of errors in the judgment or order under challenge, review power does not. In Parsion Devi v Sumitri Devi reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Hon’ble Supreme Court espoused that the power under Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC , 1908 does not allow for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.” In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372 : (1964) 5 SCR 174 ] (SCR at p. 186), the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined that there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Similar view was taken in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [ (1995) 1 SCC 170 ] 10. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India , (2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056 , it is observed and held that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. It is further observed in the said decision that the words “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule” as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki , 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11 : (1921-22) 49 IA 144 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius , AIR 1954 SC 526 ] 11. In M/s. M.M.I. Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. (supra), one of us (Kshitij Shailendra, J.), gainfully referred to the abovenoted authorities on the subject and observed that since Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being the substantive provision for review, clearly uses the words “the Court may make such order thereon”, power to allow or reject a review application depends on discretion of the Court in given facts and circumstances of a particular case and the Court is not bound to allow the application in every case and situation. 12 . 12 . One of us (Shekhar B. Saraf, J.), after placing reliance upon various decisions of the Supreme Court, pronounced a judgment for the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal vs. Confederation of State Government Employees , (2019) 3 Cal LJ 351 and culled out the principles emerging for reviewing the judgement/order holding that power of review is quite limited and would be governed by the principles under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC . It was further held that the third condition “for any other sufficient reason” has to be read within the four corners of the first two conditions and an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by the process of reasoning is not an error apparent on the face of the record. It was further held that a review petition cannot be allowed to be an “appeal in disguise”. 13. As far as judgments cited on behalf of the applicant i.e. Rajender Singh (supra) and Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra) are concerned, though it is true that the Courts should not hesitate to review their own order when interest of justice so demands in appropriate cases, the Supreme Court has clearly observed that this can be done only when there exists an error on the face of record and the words “sufficient reason” used in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include misconception of fact or law of a Court. We have to consider the ratio laid down in the authorities cited at the Bar in the given facts of the present case and we find that this Court, while deciding the Income Tax Appeal No.422 of 2006 by order dated 16.05.2014, though quoted a substantial question of law framed on 15.05.2012, but refrained to answer the same for the reason that, after setting aside the order under challenge before it, had remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal. ITR U/S 139, WHETHER NON-EST 14. Insofar as the observation of this court that ITR filed under Section 139 of the Act had become ‘non-est’, after carefully going into the complete order dated 16.05.2014 in its spirit, we find that the observation of ‘non-est’ was not the ratio or the conclusion drawn by this Court, otherwise there was no necessity to remand the matter to the Appellate Tribunal. The said observation appearing at ‘internal page No.5’ of the order can either be treated as an argument advanced on behalf of the Department or, if not, it can be treated as an ‘obiter.’ It was infact a passing remark made by the Court during the course of deciding the appeal and, therefore, when the matter was remanded to the Appellate Tribunal, it cannot be said that this Court had expressed any final opinion regarding ITR under Section 139 as “non-est”. 15. In the facts of the case, it has to be seen as to when the due date for filing return i.e. 31.10.2002 had lapsed but, prior thereto, account books and other material of the assessee were seized on 01.09.2002 and when the block assessment was being done, whether it was at all necessary for the assessee to file a belated return after the seized material was released in favour of the assessee or if at all it was filed, whether such filing could be fatal to his case or whether the assessee was precluded from filing return though inspection was facilitated to him. The inter- se connection between regular proceedings vis-a-vis block assessment proceedings in the peculiar facts of the case, is a question that has relevance so as to adjudge the issue of double jeopardy allegedly faced by the assessee, as argued on his behalf. NON-ANSWERING THE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION WHETHER A GROUND FOR REVIEW 16. We are of the view that if the substantial question of law framed as regards applicability of correct clause/sub-clause of any Section/sub-Section of Section 158-BB of the IT Act was not answered by this Court while deciding the appeal, the same, in itself, cannot be a ground to review the order, inasmuch as, the point was left open by the Court to be decided in appeal after remand, i.e. to say that the ingredients of the substantial question of law were to be re-determined by the Appellate Tribunal pursuant to the order of remand. Therefore, when Shri Goyal submits that the Appellate Tribunal, after remand, has accepted the finding of this Court as regards the ITR under Section 139 being “non-est” and, therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal be also set aside on this ground alone, we are of the view that the present review application and the connected appeal are to be decided in the light of scope of two different and independent proceedings, i.e. one being an application for review and the other being a statutory appeal and, hence, we would do accordingly. CONCLUSION 17. While applying the ratio laid down in the aforementioned authorities on the scope of review, we find that not only the block assessment order dated 30.09.2004 but also the assessment order 29.03.2006 and orders passed subsequently i.e. on 16.08.2005 and 26.06.2006 contained discussion of material that was available before the Authorities/Tribunal. Merely because this Court interpreted the record of proceedings in one way or the other, we do not find that there is any error apparent on the face of the record so as to justify exercise of our review jurisdiction. At the same time, the effect of order dated 16.05.2014 on the proceedings culminating into passing of the subsequent order dated 25.08.2014 after remand, has to be seen while deciding the connected Income Tax Appeal No.86 of 2015 (Umang Agarwal vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle, Allahabad) but, in any case, we are of the considered view that the order dated 16.05.2014 does not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record so as to persuade this Court to review the order and take another view of the matter different from the one taken by this Court in its order dated 16.05.2014. 18. With the above observations, the application for review stands rejected. 19. Shekhar B. Saraf,J. : I agree.