JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. This order of mine shall dispose of all the above-titled petitions, which have been filed, under Section 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’) by petitioner-Ravinder Kumar. 2. The present petitions have been filed, seeking cancellation of bail, granted to respondent No.2-Mangla Devi in CrMP(M) No.2217 of 2024, respondent No.2- Kanchana Devi in CrMP(M) No.2218 of 2024 and respondent No.2-Bimla Devi in CrMP(M) No.2219 of 2024, by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’), vide order dated 22.07.2024, in case FIR No.40 of 2024 dated 24.05.2024 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIR in issue’), under Sections 302, 325, 323, 504, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’), with Police Station Sujanpur, District Hamirpur, H.P. 3. As per the applicant, after registration of the FIR in issue, respondent No.2, in all the three cases, had filed the anticipatory bails, before the learned trial Court. However, the same were dismissed vide order dated 12.06.2023. Thereafter, respondent No.2, in all the three cases, were arrested. Subsequently, they had filed regular bail applications, under Section 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CrPC’), which were allowed by the learned trial Court, vide order dated 22.07.2024. 4. According to the applicant, the learned trial Court has committed serious illegality, while granting the bail, by disassociating respondent No.2 from the other co- accused, on the basis of the information, given in the FIR. As per the applicant, the learned trial Court has ignored the legal implication of Section 34 of the IPC, as, FIR in issue has been registered, under Sections 302, 323, 325, 504, 506, 34 of IPC and as such, the Court cannot segregate the role of respondent No.2 with the other co-accused. 5. In this regard, the applicant has also highlighted the fact that the videography of the incident was on record, to contend that the learned trial Court has wrongly held in all the three cases that there was no allegation against respondent No.2, in all the three cases. Highlighting the provisions of Section 34 of IPC, it has been pleaded that the main offence is attributed to all the accused. 6. On the basis of above facts, Mr. Highlighting the provisions of Section 34 of IPC, it has been pleaded that the main offence is attributed to all the accused. 6. On the basis of above facts, Mr. Aman Parth Sharma, Advocate, appearing for the applicant, has prayed that the present petitions may be allowed, by cancelling the bail, in all the three cases, granted to respondent No.2, vide orders dated 22.07.2024. 7. Along with the petition, copy of FIR, copy of bail application and copy of orders, impugned herein, have been annexed. 8. When, put to notice, police has filed the status report, disclosing therein, that on 23.05.2024, one Yuvraj, S/o Rania Ram, informed the police that his father has been beaten by Ranjeet Singh and his family members, due to which, his father has been taken to Hospital at Hamirpur, for treatment. As such, he has requested that action be taken against the said persons. 9. Subsequently, on the information of Yuvraj, the police reached at Medical College and Hospital, Hamirpur, where, Rania Ram, Ravinder Kumar, Soma Devi and Neelma Devi were found to be admitted for treatment. Thereafter, the request was made to doctor regarding conducting the MLCs of the aforesaid persons/injured. At the spot, Ravinder Kumar, S/o Sikh Ram, has made a statement, under Section 154 of CrPC, disclosing therein that on 23.05.2024, in the evening, he, along with his sister-in-law Soma Devi, brother Rania Ram, Yuvraj S/o Rania Ram, his wife Neelma Devi and his sister-in-law Reena Kumari, had gone to their field to throw cow dung. 10. Thereafter, at about 06:30 pm, when, they were throwing the cow dung in the field, then, both sons of Ranjeet Singh, namely Manoj Kumar and Rakesh Kumar, their wives and mother Bimla Devi, came there and started abusing them, upon which, complainant party requested them not to abuse. Then, they started throwing the wooden sticks in their field, which, the complainant party had removed and due to this, Rakesh Kumar and Manoj Kumar started beating them with the same wooden sticks. Manoj Kumar inflicted the injury with the wooden sticks on the head of sister-in-law of the complainant, upon which, she sustained injuries. Rakesh Kumar slapped the wife of the complainant thrice. Rakesh Kumar had also beaten Yuvraj, who had tried to save them. 11. Manoj Kumar inflicted the injury with the wooden sticks on the head of sister-in-law of the complainant, upon which, she sustained injuries. Rakesh Kumar slapped the wife of the complainant thrice. Rakesh Kumar had also beaten Yuvraj, who had tried to save them. 11. Thereafter, Manoj Kumar came there, along with the wooden stick and inflicted the blow on the head of the complainant, which resulted into injury on his head. When, his brother Rania Ram came there to save them, then, Manoj Kumar and Rakesh Kumar also gave four blows on the person of his brother. Consequently, he became unconscious and blood started oozing out from his nose and mouth. The wives of Manoj Kumar and Rakesh Kumar were also associated in the said incident. 12. It is the case of the police that Rakesh Kumar and Manoj Kumar had also claimed that they will kill the complainant party. Both the brothers, according to the complainant, had inflicted four blows in order to kill his brother Rania Ram. 13. On the basis of above facts, police registered the case, under Sections 307, 323, 504, 506 and 34 of IPC. 14. It is the further case of the police that on 23.05.2024, the statements of Soma Devi and Neelma Devi, under Sections 161 of CrPC, were recorded. Subsequently, Manoj Kumar and Rakesh Kumar, both sons of Ranjeet Singh, were arrested on 24.05.2024. Both were medico legally examined. As per MLC, 12 injuries were found on the person of Manoj Kumar. However, injuries No.1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 were declared as simple, whereas, the opinion, regarding injuries No.3, 5 and 12, had been deferred till the receipt of the report of Radiologist, whereas, on the person of Rakesh Kumar, 9 injuries were stated to have been found, as per MLC. However, injuries No.2 to 8 were declared simple and blunt and opinion, regarding injuries No.1 and 9, had been deferred till the receipt of the report of Radiologist. 15. It is the further case of the police that there is a dispute with regard to the land, between the parties and on 23.05.2024, at about 06:30 pm, a quarrel had taken place, between the parties. The accused party had also lodged FIR No.39 of 2024 dated 23.05.2024, under Sections 341, 323, 504, 506 and 34 of IPC, with Police Station Sujanpur, against the complainant party. The accused party had also lodged FIR No.39 of 2024 dated 23.05.2024, under Sections 341, 323, 504, 506 and 34 of IPC, with Police Station Sujanpur, against the complainant party. During the scuffle, accused persons also sustained injuries. 16. It is the further case of the police that accused Manoj Kumar and Rakesh Kumar were produced, before the Court, from where, they were remanded to the judicial custody. On 25.05.2024, both accused persons had made the statement, under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. In pursuance of their statements, police had recovered the alleged weapon of offence i.e. wooden stick, which was taken into possession. 17. Thereafter, on 28.05.2024, during the treatment, Rania Ram had expired. The post-mortem of deceased Rania Ram was conducted and his dead body was handed over to his son Yuvraj. As such, Section 302 of IPC has been added and Section 307 of IPC was deleted, in this case. 18. It is the further case of the police that accused Bimla Devi, Kanchna Devi and Mangla Devi had filed the applications for bail, before the learned trial Court. However, their applications were rejected on 12.06.2024. Subsequently, they appeared before the police on the same day and they were associated in the investigation. Thereafter, they were arrested on 12.06.2024. 19. It is the further case of the police that as per the statements of witnesses, accused Rakesh Kumar, Manoj Kumar, Mangla Devi, Bimla Devi and Kanchna Devi, after hatching conspiracy, had started quarreling with the complainant party and in the said quarrel, Rania Ram had sustained fatal injuries, whereas, Ravinder Kumar, Soma Devi and Neelma Devi had also sustained injuries. 20. The investigation, as per the status report, is complete and case is now pending adjudication in the learned trial Court. 21. Mr. Aman Parth Sharma, Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, has highlighted the role, attributed to respondent No.2, in all the cases, in the alleged crime and stated that when, the provisions of Section 34 of IPC have been added in the FIR in issue, then, the learned trial Court has fallen into error by allowing the bail applications. 22. In order to buttress his contentions, he has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.1279 of 2021, titled as ‘Bhoopendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.’, decided on 29.10.2021 and in case ‘Gurcharan Singh and Others Vs. 22. In order to buttress his contentions, he has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.1279 of 2021, titled as ‘Bhoopendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.’, decided on 29.10.2021 and in case ‘Gurcharan Singh and Others Vs. State (Delhi Administration)’, reported in 1978 (1) SCC 118 . He has also relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in ‘Kalawati Devi Vs. State of U.P.’, Neutral Citation No.2014:AHC:42700. 23. Relying upon the above decisions, learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that the bail, granted to respondent No.2, in all the above-captioned cases, may be cancelled and accused persons may be remanded to the judicial custody. 24. Per contra, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No.2, in all the cases, has opposed the prayer by arguing that the present petitions are not maintainable and the jurisdiction, which has been exercised by the learned trial Court, in this case, by allowing the applications for bail, moved by respondent No.2, does not require any interference by this Court. 25. In order to buttress her contention, she has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.861/2025, titled as ‘Kailash Kumar Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr.’, decided on 20.02.2025. 26. The applicant is the complainant, who has put the criminal machinery into motion, by making the statement, under Section 161 of CrPC, upon which, the FIR in issue has been registered and police has conducted the investigation and thereafter, filed the charge-sheet against the accused persons, including respondent No.2 (in all the three cases). 27. The provisions of Section 483(3) of BNSS are pari materia of the provisions of Section 439(2) of the CrPC, which are reproduced, as under:- “483(3). A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.” 28. It is the fundamental principle of jurisprudence that accused is presumably considered as innocent, until his guilt is proved by the competent Court of law, after recording the evidence. As such, the accused is entitled for freedom and every right to look after his own case to establish his innocence. 29. Admittedly, a person, who is on bail, has a better chance to prepare and present his case, than a person, who is in custody. As such, the accused is entitled for freedom and every right to look after his own case to establish his innocence. 29. Admittedly, a person, who is on bail, has a better chance to prepare and present his case, than a person, who is in custody. Grant of bail is a rule and refusal is the exception. However, each criminal case is to be decided according to its peculiar facts and circumstances. 30. At the time of deciding the bail application, a detailed discussion about the evidence, so collected by the prosecution, should be avoided, as, the same would cause prejudice to the case of the prosecution, as well as, to the case of the accused. 31. Pre-trial punishment is prohibited, under the law, and jurisdiction to grant bail is required to be exercised on the basis of the settled principle of law, according to which, the gravity and severity of the offence, nature of accusation, punishment provided for the offence, position and status of the accused, vis-à-vis, the position and status of the victim, availability of the accused for trial, possibility of tampering with the evidence and possibility of repetition of the offence are to be considered. No straight jacket formula can be formulated to decide a particular bail in a particular manner. 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case ‘Dolat Ram and Others Vs. State of Haryana’, reported in (1995) 1 Supreme Court Cases 349, has held that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order, directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Relevant paragraph 4 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:- “4. Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of Justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. These principles, it appears, were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factors relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted.” 33. In another case titled as ‘Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) Vs. State of Gujarat’, reported in (2008) 5 Supreme Court Cases 66, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the bail can be cancelled, if material(s), on which, bail is granted is/are substantially irrelevant. Relevant Paragraphs 25 to 27 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “25. The perversity as highlighted in Puran's case (supra) can also flow from the fact that as noted above, irrelevant materials have been taken into consideration adding vulnerability to the order granting bail. The irrelevant materials should be of a substantial nature and not of a trivial nature. In the instant case, the trial Court seems to have been swayed by the fact that Sohrabuddin had shady reputation and criminal antecedents. That was not certainly a factor which was to be considered while granting bail. It was nature of the acts which ought to have been considered. By way of illustration, it can be said that the accused cannot take a plea while applying for bail that the person whom he killed was a hardened criminal. That certainly is not a factor which can be taken into account. 26. Another significant factor which was highlighted by the State before the High Court was that an FIR allegedly was filed to divert attention from the fake encounter. The same was not lodged by the Gujarat Police. The accused was the leader of the Rajasthan team and the other officials were Abdul Rehman, Himanshu Singh, Mohan Singh, Shyam Singh and Jai Singh. The first named Abdul Rehman had lodged the FIR. The same was not lodged by the Gujarat Police. The accused was the leader of the Rajasthan team and the other officials were Abdul Rehman, Himanshu Singh, Mohan Singh, Shyam Singh and Jai Singh. The first named Abdul Rehman had lodged the FIR. It is pointed out from the General Diary in respect of entry on 26.11.2005 that accused Dinesh was present. In FIR No.CR-I 5/2005 also the presence of Dinesh has been noted. The relevance of these factors does not appear to have been noticed by the High Court. In other words, relevant materials were kept out of consideration. Once it is concluded that bail was granted on untenable grounds, the plea of absence of supervening circumstances has no leg to stand. 27. We have only highlighted the above aspects to show that irrelevant materials have been taken into account and/or relevant materials have been kept out of consideration. That being so, the order of granting bail to the appellant was certainly vulnerable. The order of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed. However, it is made clear that whatever observations have been made are only to decide the question of grant of bail and shall not be treated to be expression of any opinion on merits. The case relating to acceptability or otherwise of the evidence is the subject matter for the trial Court.” 34. Being guided by the above decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, now, this Court would proceed to deal with the grounds, upon which, the cancellation has been sought. 35. So far as the arguments of learned counsel for the applicant that the FIR in issue has been registered under Sections 302, 325, 323, 504, 506 and 34 of IPC and as such, the learned trial Court cannot segregate the role, attributed to respondent No.2, in all the three cases, are concerned, at the time of deciding the bail application, detailed discussion about the merits of the case should be avoided. 36. Even otherwise, in this case, the learned trial Court has considered the contents of the FIR, according to which, Rakesh Kumar and Manoj Kumar had given the danda blow on the head of deceased Rania Ram. 37. No doubt, the FIR is not the encyclopedia of the events. 36. Even otherwise, in this case, the learned trial Court has considered the contents of the FIR, according to which, Rakesh Kumar and Manoj Kumar had given the danda blow on the head of deceased Rania Ram. 37. No doubt, the FIR is not the encyclopedia of the events. Even, in the status report, which has been filed, before this Court, no specific role has been attributed, except that the applicant (complainant party) and the accused party, had reached at the spot and thereafter, scuffle had taken place, in which, Rania Ram allegedly sustained fatal injuries. 38. The fact that the complainant party had also lodged FIR No.39 of 2024 dated 23.05.2024, under Sections 341, 323, 504, 506 and 34 of IPC, with PS Sujanpur, is sufficient to hold that the occurrence has not been disputed, as, accused Manoj Kumar and Rakesh Kumar had also sustained injuries, as referred to above and the fact as to who was the aggressor, will be proved during the trial. 39. So far as the case law, which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner i.e. Bhoopendra Singh’s case (supra), is concerned, with due respect to the law, laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the facts and circumstances of the said case are entirely different, as, in para No.12 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has noted down the specific role, attributed to the person, to whom, the bail was granted, whereas, in this case, no specific role has been attributed to respondent No.2 (in all the three cases). Moreover, the question of common intention is a question of fact, which would be proved during the trial. 40. So far as the other case law, which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner i.e. Gurcharan Singh’s case (supra), is concerned, with due respect to the law, laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no benefit could be derived by the applicant from the said judgment, as, no new fact has been found in the investigation, in this case, which warrants cancellation of bail. 41. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has added the proviso to Section 480(ii) of BNSS, according to which, the Court may release a person on bail, if such person is a child or is a woman or is sick or infirm. 42. 41. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has added the proviso to Section 480(ii) of BNSS, according to which, the Court may release a person on bail, if such person is a child or is a woman or is sick or infirm. 42. Even otherwise, the order, passed by the learned trial Court, granting bail to respondent No.2, in all the above-captioned petitions, from any stretch of imagination, cannot be said to be perverse order. 43. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition. Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition. Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re- appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 44. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:- “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala).” 45. Considering the above facts, this Court is of the view that the applicant could not satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court as to how the bail, which has been granted to respondent No.2 (in all the three cases), is liable to be interfered with. 46. In view of the discussions, made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that no ground is made out for cancelling the bail, already granted to respondent No.2- Mangla Devi in CrMP(M) No.2217 of 2024, respondent No.2-Kanchana Devi in CrMP(M) No.2218 of 2024 and respondent No.2-Bimla Devi in CrMP(M) No.2219 of 2024. 47. Consequently, all the above-titled applications are dismissed. 48. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as, these observations are confined only to the disposal of the present bail application. 49. Copy of this order be placed in the connected case files i.e. CrMPs(M) No.2218 and 2219 of 2024.