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2025 DIGILAW 54 (ALL)

Vishu v. State Of U. P. Though It Principal Secretary

2025-01-16

NALIN KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Nalin Kumar Srivastava,J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material available on record. 2. This criminal appeal under Section 14-A (2) of The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act hereinafter referred as the SC/ST Act has been preferred by the appellant- Vishu against the order dated 08.10.2024 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge/Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Muzaffarnagar whereby the application under Section 167 (2) (a) (i) Cr.P.C. moved by the accused/appellant was rejected. 3. The matter as brought before this Court, is that in a case under section 302 IPC which provides the punishment for imprisonment for life or death sentence alongwith fine, the first remand of the accused was granted on 22.05.2024 which was extended from time to time and non-submission of charge-sheet within a statutory period of 90 days resulted into accrual of right to statutory bail in favour of the accused/appellant. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the accused/appellant that the accused/appellant is detained in judicial custody in case crime no. 117 of 2024 under section 302 IPC and section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, Police Station Titavi, District Muzaffar Nagar. His first remand was granted by the court under section 167 Cr.P.C. on 22.05.2024 and since then he is detained in jail. The Investigating Officer of this case did not file charge-sheet even after the lapse of 90 days and by virtue of the provisions of section 167 (2) Cr.P.C. a right to default bail accrued in favour of the appellant. On this ground an application for statutory bail under section 167(2)(a)(i) Cr.P.C dated 08.10.2024 was moved before the court concerned but the same was rejected vide order dated 08.10.2024 and it was observed that since after submission of charge-sheet the court had passed an order for further investigation in the matter vide order dated 03.08.2024 and regular bail application of the accused/appellant was pending before the High Court, his application for default bail was liable to be rejected. Resting on the aforesaid facts it is vehemently submitted that the impugned order is illegal and not sustainable and it was passed in an arbitrary manner. The accused/appellant is entitled for default bail under the proviso to section 167(2) Cr.P.C. 5. Resting on the aforesaid facts it is vehemently submitted that the impugned order is illegal and not sustainable and it was passed in an arbitrary manner. The accused/appellant is entitled for default bail under the proviso to section 167(2) Cr.P.C. 5. Per contra, learned AGA has opposed the prayer for default/statutory bail and it has been contended that charge-sheet in this matter was submitted by the Investigating Officer on 03.08.2024 i.e. before the expiry of statutory period. The court concerned after perusing the entire case diary and applying its judicial mind, sent the matter for further investigation with certain directions and the further investigation is now completed. The first remand of the accused/appellant was granted on 22.05.2024 u/s. 302 IPC and section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act and since charge-sheet was submitted on 03.08.2024 well within the period prescribed for an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less then ten years as provided under section 167 (2) (a) (i) of Cr.P.C, the application for statutory bail was rightly rejected by the court. 6. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the State that since first remand of accused/appellant was granted on 22.05.2024 and the charge- sheet was submitted on 03.08.2024, no right for default bail accrued in favour of the accused/appellant in the light of the provisions of section 167(2) Cr.P.C. 7. 6. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the State that since first remand of accused/appellant was granted on 22.05.2024 and the charge- sheet was submitted on 03.08.2024, no right for default bail accrued in favour of the accused/appellant in the light of the provisions of section 167(2) Cr.P.C. 7. For the purpose of disposal of instant appeal a perusal of provisions envisaged under section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is required which reads as under:- " Section 167 (2)- The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that-- [(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding.- (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (i) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;] [(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage;] (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police."…………..." 8. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Ritu Chhabaria Vs. Union of India , Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 60 of 2023 decided on 26th April, 2023. 9. In Ritu Chhabaria (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court found an opportunity to deal with the issue which is under consideration in the instant matter. The Hon'ble Apex Court emphasized upon protection of civil liberty of individuals in the society at large and held that the relief of statutory bail under Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C. is a fundamental right directly flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was further observed that the grant of remand beyond the statutory period fixed under Section 167 can lead to serious abuse, as an arrested person can in this manner be kept in custody indefinitely while the investigation can go on in a leisurely manner. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that it is thus axiomatic that first investigation is to be completed and only then a chargesheet or a complaint can be filed within the stipulated period and failure to do so would trigger the statutory right of default bail under Section 167 (2) of Cr.PC. In the case of Union Of India vs Thamisharasi & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 190 , which was a case under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, on finding that the investigation was not complete and a chargesheet was not filed within the prescribed period, denial of default bail was held to be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and it was further held that even the twin limitations on grant of bail would not apply. 10. A perusal of aforesaid decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Ritu Chhabaria (Supra) reveals that the issue in that matter was quite different from the present case. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said writ reiterated the law over the subject that if the charge-sheet is filed within the stipulated period valuable right of statutory bail is extinguished. At the same time it was also noticed that the practice of filing preliminary reports has now taken the form of filing chargesheets without actually completing the investigation, only to scuttle the right of default bail and resultantly in effect negates the purpose of introducing provisions regarding default bail. At the same time it was also noticed that the practice of filing preliminary reports has now taken the form of filing chargesheets without actually completing the investigation, only to scuttle the right of default bail and resultantly in effect negates the purpose of introducing provisions regarding default bail. In the above mentioned matter before the Hon'ble Apex Court some supplementary chargesheets were filed without completing the investigation and in consequence thereof the remand of the accused was continued and he was not released on default bail. This fact was also taken cognizance of that investigation was still pending as mentioned in the supplementary chargesheet. It was in this backdrop of such events the writ petition was allowed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 11. But the position in the case in hand is different and the simple reason behind it is that admittedly charge-sheet in this matter was filed within statutory period and it was not a preliminary or supplementary charge-sheet. The charge-sheet dated 12.07.2024 was filed under section 306 IPC and section 3 (2) (v) of the SC/ST Act before the court on 03.08.2024 after concluding the investigation and no offence under section 302 IPC was found to be made out as mentioned in the charge-sheet itself. It reveals from the perusal of record that the trial court after examining the charge-sheet without taking cognizance over the same passed an order dated 03.08.2024 for further investigation in the matter after noticing some lacunas and omissions in the investigation and subsequently further investigation was culminated into charge-sheet. It is apparent from the perusal of record that although trial court found some slip and laxity on the part of the Investigating Officer and for that reason order for further investigation was passed but in the charge-sheet itself it was nowhere mentioned that it was a preliminary or supplementary charge-sheet and any investigation was still pending after submission of the charge-sheet. In view of that it was the final outcome of investigation which was now completed. 12. As noticed earlier the first remand of the accused under section 167 Cr.P.C. was granted by the court on 22.05.2024 and since then the accused had been detained in jail and the court used to grant further remand to the accused on the request of the Investigating Officer of the case. 12. As noticed earlier the first remand of the accused under section 167 Cr.P.C. was granted by the court on 22.05.2024 and since then the accused had been detained in jail and the court used to grant further remand to the accused on the request of the Investigating Officer of the case. Since the matter was pertaining to a case under section 302 IPC and section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act wherein sentence of life imprisonment/death sentence could be passed the charge-sheet ought to have been filed within 90 days from 22.05.2024. A perusal of the record explicitly reveals that charge-sheet was filed on 03.08.2024 under section 306 IPC which was punishable with imprisonment for a maximum period of ten years alongwith section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act which was punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine meaning thereby that it was submitted well before the stipulated period of 90 days. 13. From the submissions/contentions raised by the rival sides particularly in the given facts and circumstances of the instant matter, two legal issues emerge out to be examined by this Court firstly, as to whether the charge- sheet will be presumed as not to be submitted before the Court if cognizance over the same was not taken and secondly, what would be the effect of the order of the Court for further investigation into the matter after receiving the charge-sheet with reference to the instant matter. 14. The answer of the aforesaid questions is found in Dinesh Dalmia Vs. CBI (2007) 8 Supreme Court Cases 770 which reads as under: "39. The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in regard to an investigation leading to filing of final form under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 and further investigation contemplated under Sub-section (8) thereof. Whereas only when a charge sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, benefit of proviso appended to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to an offender. Once, however, a charge sheet is filed, the said right ceases. Such a right does not revive only because a further investigation remains pending within the meaning of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code." 15. Also, referring to an earlier judgment passed in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another (2013) 3 SCC 77 in Serious Fraud Investigation Office Vs. Such a right does not revive only because a further investigation remains pending within the meaning of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code." 15. Also, referring to an earlier judgment passed in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another (2013) 3 SCC 77 in Serious Fraud Investigation Office Vs. Rahul Modi & Others (2023) 15 SCC 311 , 2022 SCC Online SC 153 (Criminal Appeal Nos. 185-186 of 2022, decided on 7th February, 2022) it has been expressly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as extracted below- "9. The issue is squarely covered by a judgment of this Court in Bhikamchand Jain (supra), as contended by the Appellant. It is necessary to closely examine the judgment passed in Bhikamchand Jain (supra). The petitioner in the said case was arrested on 11.03.2012 on the allegation of misappropriation of amounts meant for development of slums in Jalgaon City. The petitioner therein was accused of committing offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 411, 406, 408, 465, 466, 468, 471, 177 and 109 read with Section 34, IPC and also under Sections 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The contention of the petitioner therein was that he could not have been remanded to custody in view of cognizance not being taken for want of sanction within the statutory period of 90 days. The scheme of the provisions relating to remand of an accused first during the stage of investigation and thereafter, after cognizance is taken, indicates that the legislature intended investigation of certain crimes to be completed within the period prescribed therein, according to this Court in Bhikamchand Jain (supra). This Court held that in the event of investigation not being completed by the investigating authorities within the prescribed period, the accused acquires an indefeasible right to be granted bail, if he offers to furnish bail. This Court was of the firm opinion that if on either the 61st day or the 91st day, an accused makes an application for being released on bail in default of charge-sheet having been filed, the court has no option but to release the accused on bail. However, once the charge- sheet was filed within the stipulated period, the right of the accused to statutory bail came to an end and the accused would be entitled to pray for regular bail on merits. However, once the charge- sheet was filed within the stipulated period, the right of the accused to statutory bail came to an end and the accused would be entitled to pray for regular bail on merits. It was held by this Court that the filing of charge-sheet is sufficient compliance with the provisions of proviso (a) to Section 167 (2), CrPC and that taking of cognizance is not material to Section 167 ." 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court further proceeded to hold that in respect of the issue of default bail under Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C there is no additional requirement of cognizance having to be taken within the period prescribed under Proviso (a) to Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C., failing which the accused would be entitled to default bail even after filing of the charge-sheet within the stipulated period. 17. The aforesaid discussion is connotative to the fact that once the charge- sheet is filed, the right to statutory bail under Proviso to Section 167 (a)(2) Cr.P.C. ceases and does not revive only because a further investigation order is pending or cognizance over the charge-sheet has not been taken by the court concerned. The decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in Dinesh Dalmia (Supra) and Serious Fraud Investigation Office (Supra) directly apply to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. Charge-sheet in this matter as a final outcome of investigation was submitted by the police within the stipulated period of 90 days for the purpose of the provisions of Proviso to Section 167 (2) (a) (I) Cr.P.C. If the court did not take cognizance over the same or the matter was ordered for further investigation it does not falsify the factum of submission of charge-sheet within stipulated time. It is avowed in the judicial dictums as narrated above that it is never necessary for a court to take cognizance of charge-sheet in any condition because it is not a statutory requirement under Section 167 Cr.P.C. and in fact the litmus test is only the filing of charge-sheet within stipulated time and nothing further. The questions formulated above are answered accordingly. 18. The questions formulated above are answered accordingly. 18. In the given facts and circumstances of this case and also relying upon the dictum of law promulgated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove, this Court is of considered view that the law submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant in Ritu Chhabaria (Supra) case does not offer any help to the appellant. The appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. Hence, the appeal is accordingly dismissed.